

The Palestine Diary

Volume I
1914-1945

by

Robert John & Samuel Hadawi

THE PALESTINE DIARY

by

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With a Foreword by Arnold J. Toynbee

VOLUME ONE

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British Pledges of Arab Independence

Recognition of Zionism

The Balfour Declaration

The Palestine Mandate

Riots, Rebellion, Terrorism

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Foreword

BY ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

'DIARY' IS A MODEST TITLE for this massive work. It is a detailed narrative, covering the history of Palestine during the period running from the outbreak of the First World War to the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel and the outbreak of the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948. The narrative is supported by a very full documentation. As far as I know, so full an assemblage of pertinent documents is not to be found between the covers of any previous publication. The sub-titles are also apposite. The story is a tragedy, and the essence of this tragedy is that about 1,500,000 Palestinian Arabs have now become refugees as a result of the intervention of foreign powers in their country's affairs. The might of these foreign powers has been irresistible, and the evicted Palestinian Arabs have been forcibly deprived of their country, their homes, and their property without having been allowed to have a voice in the determination of their own destiny.

Though the facts are public, there is widespread ignorance of them in the Western World and, above all, in the United States, the Western country which has had, and is still having, the greatest say in deciding Palestine's fate. The United States has the greatest say, but the United Kingdom bears the heaviest load of responsibility. The Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917 was the winning card in a sordid contest between the two sets of belligerents in the First World War for winning the support of the Jews in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and—most important of all—in the United States.

In promising to give the Jews 'a national home' in Palestine, the British Government was, I believe, using deliberately ambiguous language. As a citizen of the United Kingdom, I declare this belief of mine with feelings of shame and contrition, but I do believe that this is the truth. Throughout the First World War and after it, the Government of the United Kingdom was playing a double game. Perhaps a lawyer might be able to plead plausibly that there was no inconsistency between the

respective pledges that Britain gave to the Arabs and to the Zionists, or between the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the text of the mandate taken by Britain for the administration of Palestine and the classification of this mandate in the 'A' class—a class in which the mandatory power was committed to giving the people of the mandated territory their independence at the earliest date at which they would be capable of standing on their own feet. Whatever the casuists might say, laymen—Arabs or Jews—would, I think, naturally infer, bona fide, from the British Government's various statements and acts that it had made two commitments that were incompatible with each other.

At the same time when the mandate was drafted, offered, and accepted, the Arab Palestinians amounted to more than 90 per cent of the population of the country. The mandate for Palestine was an 'A' mandate, and, as I interpret the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, Palestine had not been excepted by the British Government from the area in which they had pledged themselves to King Hussein to recognize and support Arab independence. The Palestinian Arabs could therefore reasonably assume that Britain was pledged to prepare Palestine for becoming an independent Arab state. On the other side, the Zionists naturally saw, in the British promise of 'a national home' in Palestine, the entering wedge for the insertion into Palestine of the Jewish state of Israel which was in fact inserted there in 1948.

To my mind, the most damaging point in the charge-sheet against my country is that Britain was in control of Palestine for thirty years—1918-1948—and that during those fateful three decades she never made up her mind, or at any rate never declared, what her policy about the future of Palestine was. All through those thirty years, Britain lived from hand to mouth, admitting into Palestine, year by year, a quota of Jewish immigrants that varied according to the strength of the respective pressures of the Arabs and Jews at the time. These immigrants could not have come in if they had not been shielded by a British *chevaux-de-frise*. If Palestine had remained under Ottoman Turkish rule, or if it had become an independent Arab state in 1918, Jewish immigrants would never have been admitted into Palestine in large enough numbers to enable them to overwhelm the Palestinian Arabs in this Arab people's own country. The reason why the state of Israel exists today and why today 1,500,000 Palestinian Arabs are refugees is that, for thirty years, Jewish immigration was imposed on the Palestinian Arabs by British military power until the immigrants were sufficiently numerous and sufficiently well-armed to be able to fend for themselves with tanks and planes of their own. The tragedy in Palestine is not just a local one; it is a tragedy for the World, because it is an injustice that is a

menace to the World's peace. Britain's guilt is not diminished by the humiliating fact that she is now impotent to redress the wrong that she has done.

As an Englishman I hate to have to indict my country, but I believe that Britain deserves to be indicted, and this is the only personal reparation that I can make. I hope this book will be read widely in the United States, and this by Jewish as well as by non-Jewish Americans. The United States Government's policy on the Palestinian question has been a reflexion of American public feeling and opinion. The opinion that has generated the feeling has been formed to a large extent in ignorance of the facts. If the American people are willing to open their minds to the truth about Palestine, this book will help them to learn it. If they do learn the truth, I hope this will lead them to change their minds, and if the American people do change their minds, I feel sure that their Government will change its policy to match. If the American Government were to be constrained by American public opinion to take a non-partisan line over Palestine, the situation in Palestine might quickly change for the better. Is this too much to hope for? We cannot tell, but at least it is certain that the present book will be enlightening for any reader whose mind is open to conviction.



1st June 1968

A.J. TOYNBEE

Introduction

THE ESTABLISHMENT in 1948 of a 'Jewish state' in Palestine was a phenomenal achievement. In fifty years from the Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, in 1897—attended by a small number of Jews who represented little more than themselves—the Zionist idea had captivated the vast majority of world Jewry, and had enlisted in particular Britain, America and the United Nations to intervene in Palestine in its support.

The Zionist efforts of those years run parallel with and are linked to the great historical drama of the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the ebullition of political nationalism, the end of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and German dynastic Empires, the eruption of communist dictatorship in Russia and its overflow across half of Europe, the rise and fall of Hitler and Mussolini, the American commitment to intervention abroad, the decline of Britain and France, the synthesizing of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization. To each of these and to many of the sub-plots of the age, the surge of Zionism has been more or less related.

Though 'Zion' referred to a geographical location, yet it functioned as a 'utopian conception in the myths of traditionalists, modernists and Zionists alike.' It was the reverse of everything rejected in the actual Jewish situation in the 'Dispersion' whether oppression or assimilation.¹ In Zionism, any one of the three nationalist aims; land, language and sovereignty could be made of primary value. Each was thought of as part of a logical means of helping to solve 'the Jewish problem' which 'lay at the roots of the Zionist myth and idea.'² The rising Zionist 'politicians' at the end of the 19th century, came to presuppose a right to colonize Palestine and to utilize its soil to the limits of its economic capacity.³

The miniature Jewish community in Palestine in the late 19th century, that had always been maintained there by a constant influx of pious Jews,⁴ was soon to be dominated by a force more powerful than their orthodoxy.

The propagation of Zionism was greatly assisted by the revolution in communications, particularly in rail and steamship travel and in the use

of the telegraph. The commentaries of the early Zionists are full of the use of these means to further their cause. Railway time-tables and sailing schedules not only meant that many more appointments could be kept with and between people living far apart, but the migration of large numbers of people was now possible with less risk than ever before.

Tourism had started to expand and its impact was already obvious in Palestine at the end of the 19th century. Christian pilgrimage and English missionary work also added to the annual influx of travellers to Palestine.* Thousands of Russian, Greek, Armenian, Coptic and Macedonian pilgrims visited the holy places between Christmas and Easter. The Imperial Russian Government subsidized the steamers that brought the pilgrims from Odessa on the Black Sea to Jaffa, and built hospices in many Palestinian towns and remote spots which marked holy sites.

In 1882 the Turkish Government began to repair the streets and improve the sewers of Jerusalem, and there was a burst of building activity,⁵ including the 'Grand New Hotel, with an arcade and shops below.'⁶ About 1890, a Greek engineer who planned the construction of the hard-top roads from Jerusalem to Jaffa, Hebron and Jericho, was employed by the Turkish Government to build a railroad between Jerusalem and the seaport of Jaffa. This was completed in 1892. Even in Jericho, a party of tourists from the United States in 1895 had a choice of hotels—the Jordan and the Bellevue.⁷

Also at the time a German colony was established near Haifa, and a group of Swedish farmers started farming in the Kedron Valley in 1896. Potatoes and eucalyptus trees were introduced by Mr. H.G. Spafford of the 'American Colony' of Jerusalem about 1883.

As is often the case with nationalist movements, Zionism found justification in a myth—that contemporary adherents of Judaism are descendants of the Hebrew tribes and the 'mixed multitudes' that followed Moses** on the exodus from Egypt and which conquered Canaan in Biblical times. Yet the UNESCO study *What is Race?*⁸ written mainly by Jewish anthropologists, recognized that there is no such thing as a Jewish race which can trace its ancestry back exclusively to Biblical Judea.

* In the 1870s, after a controversy between American and English missionary societies, it was agreed that Syria should be in the American sphere of activities and Palestine in the British; thus the American University was founded in Beirut.

** Moses had Midianite and Ethiopian wives. The anthropological diversity of the Biblical 'Jews' has been confirmed by Dr. Hillel Nathan of the Anatomy department of the Hebrew University Hadassah Medical School from a study of skeletal remains.⁹

Jews use three main groupings to classify their fellow religionists ethnically. The first type, the *Ashkenazim*, includes the Eastern Jews who comprise most of the Jewish population of central and eastern Europe, Russia, the United States, and the Palestine immigrants of the early decades of this century. Their native language is Yiddish, germanic in pattern using Hebrew characters. The second type, the *Sephardim* of Europe are largely descendants of those Jewish Moors who were expelled from Spain and Portugal at the end of the 15th century and settled mainly around the Mediterranean basin—in Italy, Greece, the Near East, North Africa, for example, and comprise a small minority of the Jews in England and America. The third type, the *Oriental Jews*, have lived for centuries in the Near East and Asia Minor.

Besides these main types there are smaller groups: the Yemenite Jews in southern Arabia, the Jews of Bokhara, the 'brown Jews' of Cochin on the Malabar coast of southern India, and the Falashas of Ethiopia. All these groups have been coloured racially by the inter-marriage of propagators of Judaism with their proselytes, and they with non-Jews around them, for though like the Biblical Israelites most of their religious teachers inveigh against such marriages, they have never been uncommon, as the union of Israelites with their neighbours in Palestine—the Hittites, Edomites, Kenites, Moabites, Ammonites, Philistines, as well as with the original Canaanites*—were not uncommon.

The Rise of Jewish Nationalism

The Eastern Jews have been the leading originators, advocates, champions of and fighters for Zionism. It was they who eventually ruled when the 'Jewish state' came into being. The first President and members of the Provisional Council came originally from Russia and to a lesser

* The Canaanite language, current for some two thousand years before the arrival of the Hebrew peoples (which includes Edomites, Kenites, Moabites and Ammonites), is now known as Hebrew because the collection of Scriptures written in it were preserved by the Hebrew peoples of Israel and Judah.¹⁰ The Hebrews were part of a wave of nomad or semi-nomad invaders which reached the coast of the 'Fertile Crescent' at about the turn of the second and last millenium B.C. The wave broke in an arc, with the Hebrews on the south-west wing, the Chaldaeans on the south-east wing, and the Aramaeans in the centre. The Aramaeans penetrated farthest, and would appear to have been the most numerous of the peoples.

Aramaic was probably the original language of the Hebrews,¹¹ and according to the Israelite tradition, the Hebrew Patriarchs were the kinfolk of the Aramaeans and married Aramaean wives; Jacob's ancestry is Aramaean in the commemorative formula in Deuteronomy xxvi:5.

extent Poland, Lithuania and Germany. The solidarity of the *Ashkenazim* was strong, increasing proportionately from central Europe eastwards. According to the Zionists, 'in the wars of the Gentiles, the ordinary Eastern European Jew was loyal to his sovereign out of customary obedience, not out of a real devotion,¹² a statement to be understood in the perspective of a thousand years during which the Jews had been hated and often feared by Russian Christian orthodoxy to whose power the majority remained subject. Yet each religion cherished messianic and apocalyptic expectations, each according to their separate beliefs.¹³

Even in 1096, when their cohesion in the areas they occupied north of the Black Sea had been threatened by the southward conquests and increasing control by the Russ under Vladimir III, there had been an unsuccessful messianic movement for an ingathering of Jews in Jerusalem.*

The disintegration of medieval Jewish life proceeded much more slowly than that of medieval Christianity, lasting for many communities in eastern and Russian Europe, well into the 19th century. In central and western Europe from the middle of the 17th century, 'new economic and spiritual forces began to modify Jewish life and to undermine its very foundations.' This engendered a messianic Palestine-looking movement initiated by Sabbatai Zvi in the second half of the 17th century and another by Jacob Frank in the 18th century.¹⁴ Frank's movement had, however, to contend in Poland and southern Russia with the introspective, fervent and quasi-mystic Hassidic movement whose success is attested to by its continuing existence.

Peasant liberation and constitutional reform were in the air of mid-19th century eastern Europe, and in 1861 serfdom was abolished in Russia. With the reforms, the last disabilities of the Jews, where these still existed, were generally relaxed. With emancipation came a tendency towards assimilation, and power which itself provoked a reaction called 'anti-semitism'.** With anti-semitism came a powerful argument for Jews to reject assimilation and draw together more closely for self-defence which in turn increased anti-semitic tendencies.

* 'In the mountains which are in the land of Khazaria there arose a Jew whose name was Solomon ben-Dugi. The name of his son was Menahem, and with them was Ephraim ben-Azarieh of Jerusalem, known as ben-Sahalon. They wrote letters to all the Jews, near and far, in all the lands round about them. . . They said that the time had come in which God would gather his people Israel from all lands to Jerusalem, the Holy City, and that Solomon ben-Dugi was Elijah and his son the Messiah.' Solomon ben-Dugi has been identified with David El-Roi, pseudo-Messiah and hero of one of Disraeli's novels.¹⁵

** The term 'semitic' was coined in 1781 by A.L. Schoezer to designate the Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic languages and the peoples who spoke them, based on the Biblical division of the post-diluvian world into groups descended from Noah's sons Shem, Ham and Japheth.

The spread of emancipation, including auto-emancipation, was from west to east across Europe. In the reverse direction came a slowly rising tide of Jewish migration. In 1750, there were only 8,000 Jews in England; by 1850 there were 35,000, though of the total number of Jews 72 per cent still inhabited eastern Europe (including Russia) and the Balkans, 14.5 per cent lived in central and western Europe, 1.5 per cent in America, and 12 per cent in the Near East and Africa.¹⁶ Thereafter, migration from eastern Europe grew to massive proportions.*

With the steam locomotive and the telegraph came newspapers and cheap publications for the masses of Europe. With the new means of communication came a new nationalism and internationalism. It extended from the Baltic to Egypt and beyond; and the Ashkenazic Jews were sensitive to its surge in Poland and Russia. In Germany, Moses Hess, a friend of Karl Marx and previously an anarchist and communist, wrote in 1862 in *Rome and Jerusalem* that 'the Jews are a nation, destined to be resurrected with all other civilized nations.' In Russia in 1872, Peretz Smolenskin published in his magazine *Ha-Shanar* an article *Am Olam* (Eternal People), attacking the assimilationist tendencies among European Jews and appealing for a rebirth of 'Hebraic nationalism'. This inspired an *Am Olam* society and the emigration of a few families to Palestine. Other branches of these families settled in America, 'and scores of their descendants are scattered throughout the United States.'**¹⁷

The call to separatism found expression in a new interest in the Hebrew language (which had had little use except as a religious-sacred language for well over 2,000 years, for even before the beginning of the Christian era, Greek, Latin and Aramaic were the living languages of the eastern Mediterranean, including Palestine), and in an effusion of writing in Yiddish, the eastern Jewish language. The 'Love of Hebrew' is said to have been the precursor of a 'Love-of-Zion' (*Chibath Zion*) movement,¹⁸ giving the eastern Jews a less tenuous identification with Biblical 'Israel' and hence with Palestine.

The 'Lovers-of-Zion' (*Chovevei Zion*) movement, founded in Odessa in 1881, spread rapidly through the Jewish communities of Pinsk, Warsaw, Vilna, Moscow, and small branches or counterparts sprang up in Germany, England and elsewhere. By the middle of the decade, the movement had eighty groups in fifty towns in Russia and had to its

* By 1938, 30 per cent of the Jews in the world were in the Americas,¹⁹ and in western Europe, with the exception of territory under the Third Reich, their numbers had increased many times.

** H.L. Sabsovitch, a student at Odessa University, went to the United States in 1888 and became supervisor of the communal Woodbine colony and head of the Woodbine Agricultural and Industrial School.

credit several colonies in Palestine. This loosely proto-Zionist organization held its first conference at Kattowitz in 1894, when resistance to Jewish assimilation into Russian cultural development was discussed and channelled into action through plans for supporting Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine, but without apparent political orientation.

The hope and striving for Jewish re-identification in a spiritual-national sense was intensified by anti-Jewish hostility in Russia which took the form of a pogrom in 1881, when a Jew was believed to have been the assassin of the benevolent and well-loved Czar Alexander II, whose death was followed by temporary legislation affecting the Jews, known as the *May Laws*, enacted the following year to regulate Jewish activities. In 1882, in Odessa, Dr. Leon Pinsker published a pamphlet, *Auto-Emancipation*, which advocated the re-establishment of a Hebrew state; and in that city also, Asher Zvi Ginzberg (born near Kiev 1856, alias Ahad Ha-am), who first sprang into prominence with an article 'Truth in Palestine', inspired and founded the 'Sons of Moses' (*Bnei Moshe*), a highly selective secret order of disciplined Jews, whose members founded the settlement of Rehovot in Palestine.

It was in Pinsk, a city of 30,000 inhabitants of whom the great majority were Jews, known among the eastern Jews as 'a city and mother in Israel', that Chaim Weizmann, perhaps the most successful personal diplomatist of the first half of the 20th century, and the future President of the Zionist state, went to school. And in the ferment which Weizmann called a 'folk awakening' of the Jewish and Russian masses, the Jewish nationalist dream competed with the Jewish internationalist idea. One led to 'Zionism', a term coined by Dr. Nathan Birnbaum about 1893, the other to the formation of the pre-communist socialist 'The Jewish Revolutionary Labour Organization' (*Der Algemeyner Idisher Arbeter Bund*) in 1897*. Both movements had in common an idea of 'the dignity of manual labour', perhaps inspired in part by the teachings of Leo Tolstoy, or William Morris in England, for all the emphasis on migration to Palestine was on agricultural settlement. The first, founded in 1860, was soon followed by others.

Of these, the philanthropists Baron Edmond de Rothschild supported settlement in Palestine, while Baron de Hirsch sponsored settlement mainly

* The dichotomy was resolved by Herzl as follows: "Nothing prevents us from being and remaining the exponents of a united humanity, when we have a country of our own. To fulfill this mission we do not have to remain literally planted among the nations who hate and despise us. If, in our present circumstances, we wanted to bring about the unity of mankind independent of national boundaries, we would have to combat the ideals of patriotism. The latter, however, will prove stronger than we for innumerable years to come."⁸⁰

in agricultural colonies in Argentina. Attempts to establish Jewish farm colonies in North America collapsed in the 1880s, but were saved in Palestine by Rothschild aid.* The feeling grew that more organization of colonization was required so that the need for emergency outlay of capital would not recur.²¹

For the proponents of Palestine Jewish settlement, there was a need for organization to combat a new impediment: for the first time in history as a result of Jewish colonization Jews were subjected to an Ottoman ordinance** that they might visit the country on pilgrimage, but were prohibited from acquiring the ownership of land or taking up permanent residence. For a short time it seemed possible that the Russian Government might insist on the extension of the right of all Russian subjects to acquire land in Palestine—a right guaranteed by treaty—to include Jewish immigration, but nothing was accomplished, 'and settlers now had to acquire land by a number of more or less inconvenient subterfuges.'[†] The local population was sometimes hostile, and the small settlements were occasionally attacked. Even after Rothschild intervened, some settlers left Palestine disillusioned, for the propagandist of *Chovevei-Zion* (Lovers-of-Zion) had painted rosy pictures of easy wealth and prosperity which did not exist and could not be realized.

In the settlements to which Edmond de Rothschild gave his assistance, vast sums were disbursed through his agents some of whom were

* When a deputation of Russian Zionists, with Max Nordau, an atheist, co-opted as their spokesman, called on Baron Edmond de Rothschild to discuss with him 'reform in the administration of his colonies' in Palestine, his reply was short: "These are my colonies and I shall do what I like with them!" Though shocked, the Zionists did not reply as they would have liked, for 'after all, he was buying land in Palestine and settling Jews on it', and he was rich. There was the hope that in time he would change from his policy of 'infiltration' to support for political action, and, like the majority of Jews, he was eventually won over.²²

** In 1885, Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of Turkey, who mounted the throne in 1876 and was deposed in 1909, 'issued an edict against aliens holding or acquiring real estate in Palestine, and against the creation there of any further Jewish colonies. . . .'²³

† Weizmann wrote in this connection: "We knew that the doors of Palestine were closed to us. We knew that every Jew who entered Palestine was given 'the red ticket', which he had to produce on demand, and by virtue of which he could be expelled at once by the Turkish authorities. We knew that the Turkish law forbade the acquisition of land by Jews. Perhaps if we had considered the matter too closely, or tried to be too systematic, we would have been frightened off. We merely went ahead in a small, blind, persistent way. Jews settled in Palestine, and they were not expelled. They bought land, sometimes through straw men, sometimes by bribes, for Turkish officialdom was even more corrupt than the Russian. Houses were built in evasion of the law. Between *baksheesh* and an infinite variety of subterfuges, the first little colonies were created. Things got done, somehow; not big things, but enough to whet the appetite and keep us going."²⁴

agricultural experts. Arabs were the cheapest source of labour, so many settlements became the homes of a Jewish 'planter class', protected by payments to the most powerful local sheikh, working under the direction of French or other experts. Grapes were a main crop, and the Baron sometimes bought the whole vintage himself when no direct market could be found.²⁵

In 1892 the British-Jewish banker, Sir Samuel Montagu (later Lord Swaythling), developed a detailed programme for settling Jews on a 250,000 acre tract in Transjordan. He proposed to petition the Sultan for a free grant of the area in return for credits 'which would be as profitable to the finances of the Turkish Empire... as they will be advantageous to the Jews.' By 1896 he thought that the Sultan might sell Palestine for two million pounds.²⁶ In this era too, there were a number of Christian 'messianic' groups who looked for a Jewish 'return'. One of these was the Rev. W.H. Hechler, Protestant chaplain at the British Embassy in Vienna, who published a book in 1882: *The Restoration of the Jews to Palestine according to the Prophets*.

It was in this atmosphere that Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), born with a Hungarian Sephardic strain on his father's side, published *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish state) in Vienna in 1896. Anti-Jewish discrimination had a minor role in its inspiration, although used by Herzl as an argument in favour of his idea; the dominant mood was positive, idealistic or utopian. It outlined the factors which he believed had created a universal Jewish problem, and offered a programme to regulate it through the establishment of the Jews as an independent nation on its own soil, but without the emigration of all Jews. It would have remained one more Zionist tract, if he had not pursued its object with avidity, persistence and craft. "I conduct the affairs of the Jews without their mandate," he wrote in his diary, "but I become responsible to them for what I do."²⁷

Through the Rev. Hechler, Herzl obtained an audience of the Grand Duke of Baden through whom he hoped to be received by the German Kaiser. Through intermediaries, he endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the Sultan of Turkey by activities designed to reduce the agitation by emigré Armenian committees in London and Brussels for Turkish reforms and cessation of oppression,* and started a press campaign to calm public opinion in London on the Armenian question. But when offered money for Palestine, the Sultan replied that the people had won their Empire

* A letter entered in Herzl's diary on 15 May 1896 states that the head of the Armenian movement in London is Avetis Nazarbek, 'and he directs the paper *Huntchak* (The Bell). He will be spoken to.'

with blood, and owned it. 'The Jews may spare their millions. When my Empire is divided, perhaps they will get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse can be divided. I will never consent to vivisection.'²⁸

Herzl met the Papal Nuncio in Vienna and promised the exclusion of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth from the Jewish state. He started a Zionist newspaper—*Die Welt*, and was delighted to hear from the United States that a group of rabbis headed by Dr. Gustave Gottheil favoured a Zionist movement. All this, and more, in a few months.

It was Herzl who created the first Zionist Congress at Basle, Switzerland, 29-31 August 1897.* There were 197 'delegates'; some were orthodox, some nationalist, liberal, atheist, culturalist, anarchist, socialist and some capitalist.

"We want to lay the foundation stone of the house which is to shelter the Jewish nation," and "Zionism seeks to obtain for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured homeland in Palestine," declared Herzl. And his anti-assimilationist dictum that 'Zionism is a return to the Jewish fold even before it is a return to the Jewish land,' was an expression of his own experience which was extended into the official platform of Zionism as the aim of 'strengthening the Jewish national sentiment and national consciousness.'²⁹

Another leading figure who addressed the Congress was Max Nordau, a Hungarian Jewish physician and author, who delivered a polemic against assimilated Jews. "For the first time the Jewish problem was presented forcefully before a European forum," wrote Weizmann. But the Russian Jews thought Herzl was patronizing to them as Ashkenazim. They found his 'western dignity did not sit well with our Russian-Jewish realism; and without wanting to, we could not help irritating him.'³⁰

As a result of the Congress, the 'Basle Protocol', keystone of the world Zionist movement, was adopted as follows:

"Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

- "1. The promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
- "2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry

* On either side of the main doorway of the hall hung white banners with two blue stripes, and over the doorway was placed a six-pointed 'Shield of David'. It was the invention of David Wolffsohn, who employed the colours of the traditional Jewish prayer shawl. Fifty years later, the combined emblems became the flag of the Zionist state. The 'Shield of Davi d'is of Assyrian origin; previously a decorative motif or magical emblem. It appeared on the heraldic flag of the Jews in Prague in 1527.

by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

"3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

"4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent where necessary to the attainment of the aim of Zionism."³¹

The British *Chovevei-Zion* Association declined an invitation to be represented at the Congress, and the Executive Committee of the Association of Rabbis in Germany protested that:

"1. The efforts of so-called Zionists to found a Jewish national state in Palestine contradict the messianic promise of Judaism as contained in the Holy Writ and in later religious sources.

"2. Judaism obligates its adherents to serve with all devotion the Fatherland to which they belong, and to further its national interests with all their heart and with all their strength.

"3. However, those noble aims directed toward the colonization of Palestine by Jewish peasants and farmers are not in contradiction to these obligations, because they have no relation whatsoever to the founding of a national state."³²

The Zionist congresses continued annually and were largely meetings of interested non-representative individuals. Herzl was indefatigable. He offered the Sultan of Turkey help in re-organizing his financial affairs in return for assistance in Jewish settlement in Palestine;³³ to the Kaiser, who visited Palestine in 1888 and again in 1898,* he offered support for furthering German interests in the Near East; a similar offer was made to King Edward VII of England; and he personally promised the Pope to respect the holy places of Christendom in return for Vatican support.** But only from the Czar did he receive, through the Minister of the Interior, a pledge of 'moral and material assistance with respect to the measures taken by the movement which would lead to a diminution of the Jewish population in Russia.'³⁴

He reported his work to the Sixth Zionist Congress at Basle on 23 August 1903, but stated, "Zion is not and can never be. It is merely an expedient for colonization purposes, but, be it well understood, an expedient founded on a national and political basis."³⁵

When pressed for Jewish colonization in Palestine, the Turkish Sublime Porte offered a charter for any other Turkish territory (with acceptance

* On the latter trip he was accompanied by his Empress. Their yacht, the *Hohenzollern*, put in at Haifa, and they were escorted to Jerusalem by 2,000 Turkish soldiers.

** Pope Pius X told him that the Church could not support the return of 'infidel Jews' to the Holy Land.³⁶

by the settlers of Ottoman citizenship) which Herzl refused.³⁷ The British Establishment, aware of Herzl's activities through his appearance before the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration,* and powerful press organs such as the *Daily Chronicle* and *Pall Mall Gazette* which were demanding a conference of the Powers to consider the Zionist programme,³⁸ somewhat characteristically, had shown a willingness to negotiate about a Jewish colony in the Egyptian territory of El-'Arish on the Turco-Egyptian frontier in the Sinai Peninsula. But the Egyptian Government objected to making Nile water available for irrigation; the Turkish Government, through its Commissioner in Cairo, objected; and the British Agent in Cairo, Lord Cromer, finally advised the scheme's rejection.³⁹

Meanwhile, returning from a visit to British East Africa in the Spring of 1903, Prime Minister Joseph Chamberlain put to Herzl the idea of a Jewish settlement in what was soon to become the Colony of Kenya, but through a misunderstanding Herzl believed that Uganda was intended, and it was referred to as the 'Uganda scheme'. Of the part of the conversation on the El-'Arish proposal, Herzl wrote in his diary that he had told Chamberlain that eventually "we shall get (Palestine) not from the goodwill but from the jealousy of the Powers."⁴⁰ With the failure of the El-'Arish proposal, Herzl authorized the preparation of a draft scheme for settlement in East Africa. This was prepared by the legal firm of Lloyd George, Roberts and Company, on the instructions of Herzl's go-between with the British Government, Leopold Greenberg.⁴¹

Herzl urged acceptance of the 'Uganda scheme', favouring it as a temporary refuge, but he was opposed from all sides, and died suddenly of heart failure on 3 July 1904. Herzl's death rid the Zionists of an 'alien', and he was replaced by David Wolffsohn (the Litvak**).⁴²

The 'Uganda proposal' split the Zionist movement. Some who favoured it formed the Jewish Territorial Organization, under the leadership of Israel Zangwill (1864-1926). For these territorialists, the renunciation of 'Zion' was not generally felt as an ideological sacrifice; instead they contended that not mystical claims to 'historic attachment' but present conditions should determine the location of a Jewish national homeland.⁴³

* In 1880, there were about 60,000 Jews in England. Between 1881 and 1905, there was an immigration of some 100,000 Eastern Jews. Though cut by the Aliens Bill of the Balfour Government, which became law in the summer of 1905, immigration continued so that by 1914 there was a Jewish population in England of some 300,000. A leader of the fight against the Aliens Bill and against tightening up naturalization regulations in 1903-1904 was Winston S. Churchill.⁴⁴

** The Eastern Jews referred to each other as 'Litvaks' (Lithuania), 'Galizianers' (Galicia), 'Pelaks', 'Hungarians', and geographical regions of their ancestral origin, e.g., 'Pinskners'; never by the term *Jew*.

The 'Young Turk' (Committee of Union and Progress) revolution of 1908 ended the tyranny of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and after a reactionary movement in 1909 he was forced to abdicate. With the triumph of the C.U.P., ostensibly a popular movement opposed to foreign influence, the Turks could no longer be approached in the manner of Herzl (and later, Weizmann). Though Jews and crypto-Jews known as *Dunmeh* had played a leading part in the Revolution,⁴⁵ the status the Zionists wanted had to be obtained, if at all, with the consent of a government responsible to the public.

A Zionist office had been established in Jaffa shortly before the 1908 revolution. Now a branch of the Anglo-Palestine Bank was opened in the Turkish capital, and the Bank became the headquarters of their work in the Ottoman Empire. Victor Jacobson* was brought from Beirut, 'ostensibly to represent the Anglo-Palestine Company, but really to make Zionist propaganda among the Turkish Jews.'⁴⁶ Halpern describes the new channels used by the Zionist diplomacy as characteristic. These included contacts with both political parties, discussions with Arab members of Parliament from Syria and Palestine, and a general approach to young Ottoman intellectuals through a newspaper issued by the Zionist office.⁴⁷ In Turkey, as in Germany, 'Their own native Jews were resentful of the attempt to segregate them as Jews and were opposed to the intrusion of Jewish nationalism in their domestic affairs.' Though several periodicals in French 'were subvented' by the Zionist-front office under Dr. Victor Jacobson,⁴⁸ (the first Zionist who aspired to be not a Zionist leader but a 'career' diplomat,) and although he built up good political connections through social contacts, 'always avoiding the sharpness of a direct issue, and waiting in patient oriental fashion for the insidious seed of propaganda to fructify',⁴⁹ yet some of those engaged in the work, notably Vladimir (Zev) Jabotinsky (1880-1940), came to despair of success so long as the Ottoman Empire controlled Palestine. They thenceforth pinned their hopes on its collapse.⁵⁰

When David Wolffsohn at the 9th Zionist Congress in 1909 said that 'Zionism was compatible with loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, and gave assurances that Zionist objectives would be pursued in harmony

* (1869-1935). Born in the Crimea, and nurtured in the atmosphere of assimilation and revolutionary agitation in Russia, Jacobson had organized clubs and written about Zionism in Russian Jewish newspapers. After the First World War, the era of the direct and indirect bribe and the contact man gave way to one in which the interests of nationalities, represented by diplomat-attorneys, had to be met, wrote Lipsky: 'In this new world into which Jacobson was thrown, he laboured with the delicacy and concentration of an artist... working persistently and with vision to build up an interest in the cause. He had to win sympathy as well as conviction.'⁵¹

with Turkish law,' this was believed by Louis Lipsky, a leading Zionist theoretician, to be 'a fatal impairment' of their scheme for obtaining a charter for a special status for Jewish immigration into Palestine.⁵² At the 10th Congress in 1911, Wolffsohn said in his presidential address that what the Zionists wanted was not a Jewish state but a homeland,⁵³ while Max Nordau denounced the 'infamous traducers', who alleged that 'the Zionists...wanted to worm their way into Turkey in order to seize Palestine...It is our duty to convince (the Turks) that...they possess in the whole world no more generous and self-sacrificing friends than the Zionists.'⁵⁴

The mild sympathy which the Young Turks had shown for Zionism was replaced by suspicion as growing national unrest threatened the Ottoman realm, especially in the Balkans. Zionist policy then shifted to the Arabs, so that they might think of Zionism as a possible make-weight against the Turks. But Zionists soon observed that their reception by Arab leaders grew warmer as the Arabs were disappointed in their hopes of gaining concessions from the Turks, but cooled swiftly when these hopes revived. The more than 60 Arab parliamentary delegates in Constantinople and the newly active Arabic press kept up 'a drumfire of complaints' against Jewish immigration, land purchase and settlement in Palestine.⁵⁵

Self-government for the 'Fertile Crescent' would not do. The Zionists knew this from their meeting with Arab nationalists in Constantinople and elsewhere. "After many years of striving, the conviction was forced upon us that we stood before a black wall, which it was impossible for us to surmount by ordinary political means," said Weizmann of the last pre-war Zionist Congress. But the strength of the national bill forged for itself two main roads towards its goal—the gradual extension and strengthening of our *Yishuv* (Hebrew: literally, 'settlement', a collective name for the Jewish settlers) in Palestine and the spreading of the Zionist idea throughout the length and breadth of Jewry.⁵⁶

The Turks were doing all they could to keep Jews out of Palestine. But this barrier was covertly surmounted, partly due to the venality of Turkish officials,⁵⁷ (as delicately put in a Zionist report—"it was always

* 'In the Zionist Congress of 1911, (22 years before Hitler came to power, and three years before World War I), Nordau said, "How dare the smooth talkers, the clever official blabbers, open their mouths and boast of progress...Here they hold jubilant peace conferences in which they talk against war...But the same righteous governments, who are so nobly, industriously active to establish the eternal peace, are preparing, by their own confession, *complete annihilation for six million people*, and there is nobody, except the doomed themselves, to raise his voice in protest although this is a worse crime than any war..."⁵⁸

possible to get round the individual official with a little artifice');⁵⁹ and partly to the diligence of the Russian consuls in Palestine in protecting Russian Jews and saving them from expulsion.⁶⁰

But if Zionism were to outgrow its small beginning, Ottoman rule of Palestine must end. Arab independence could be prevented by the intervention of England and France, Germany or Russia. The Eastern Jews hated Czarist Russia. With the *entente cordiale* in existence, it was to be Germany or England, with the odds slightly in Britain's favour in potential support of the Zionist aim in Palestine, as well as in military power.* Writing to Victor Jacobson in 1911, David Wolffsohn said in a sentence what most Jews felt, that 'The Jews generally, and especially the Zionists, have more to thank England for than all the other Powers put together.'⁶¹ On the other hand, Zionism was attracting some German and Austrian Jews with important financial interests and had to take into account strong Jewish anti-Zionist opinion in England.

But before Zionism had finally reckoned it could gain no special consideration in Palestine from Turkey, the correspondent of *The Times* was able to report in a message published 14 April 1911, of the Zionist organ *Jeune Turc*'s** 'violent hostility to England' and 'its germanophile enthusiasm,' and to the propaganda carried on among Turkish Jews by 'German Zionist agents.' When the policy line altered, this impression in England had to be erased.⁶² The concern of the majority of rich English Jews was not allayed by articles in the *Jewish Chronicle*, edited by Leopold Greenberg, pointing out that in the Basle programme there was 'not a word of any autonomous Jewish State,'⁶³ and in *Die Welt*, the official organ of the Movement, the article by Nahum Sokolow, then the General Secretary of the Zionist Organization, in which he protested that there was no truth in the allegation that Zionism aimed at the establishment of an independent Jewish State.⁶⁴ Even at the 11th Congress in 1913, Otto Warburg, speaking as chairman of the Zionist Executive, gave assurances of loyalty to Turkey, adding that in colo-

* Approximate annual expenditure for military purposes by the European Powers in the first years of the century were:

| | |
|---------------|---|
| France | — £ 38,400,000 |
| Germany | — £ 38,000,000 |
| Italy | — £ 15,000,000 |
| Russia | — £ 43,000,000 |
| United States | — £ 38,300,000 |
| Great Britain | — £ 69,000,000 at pre-1914 values of sterling. |

** Its business manager was a German Jew, Sam Hochberg. Among invited contributors was the immensely wealthy Russian Jew Alexander Helphand who, as 'Parvus' was later to suggest to the German left-wing parties that Lenin and his associates be sent to Russia in 1917 to demoralize still further the beaten Russian armies.⁶⁵

nizing Palestine and developing its resources, Zionists would be making a valuable contribution to the progress of the Turkish Empire.⁶⁶

British anti-alien sentiment provoked by the influx of Eastern Jews was being aggravated by the Zionist societies they were setting up at certain English universities. Twenty-five signatories representing many wealthy Anglo-Jewish families issued this statement in 1909: "We regard it as dangerous that the rising generation of educated Jews should be encouraged in opinions which (a) must tend to alienate them from other Englishmen, (b) demolish the structure of the argument advanced, for example, by Lord Macaulay, on which the Act for the removal of Jewish disabilities was supported, and (c) are likely to arouse some suspicion in all classes of society, and particularly in the working classes, among whom Jewish immigrants have to make their way, as to the measure of patriotism among English Jews..."⁶⁷

'According to Turkish sources, the population of Palestine in 1914 was estimated to be 689,000. The Jewish population was estimated in that year to be 84,660, while the Christian population in the years before the First World War was estimated at about 70,000.'

'Reliable statistical data were collected' on the Jewish population 'during the second part of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. They show on the whole a steady tendency to increase which was interrupted only by the First World War in the course of which the number of Jews declined from 84,660 to 56,000 as a result of epidemics, emigration and deportations by the Turks. In 1922 the number of Jews had reached once again the figure of 1914.' The estimated Jewish population of Palestine between 1882 and 1922 was:

| | |
|-----------|----------------------|
| 1882 | 24,000 |
| 1895 | 47,000 |
| 1900 | 50,000 |
| 1910 | 81,000 |
| 1914 | 85,000 |
| 1916-1918 | 56,000 |
| 1922 | 83,794 ⁶⁸ |

In the United States, the poor and newly-arrived Jewish masses from Russia and eastern Europe were sympathetic to the movement which had germinated there. But their problems were too large and too close to permit them the luxury of much Zionist activity. When the Federation of American Zionists met in Rochester, New York, in 1914, after almost a generation of labours, less than 15,000 American contributors were represented, and the annual budget for the entire American movement totalled a mere \$12,150. Yet, by the early 1940's, member-

ship in the American movement rose to almost 600,000 while the funds it raised for Palestine exceeded \$100,000,000 a year—by far surpassing the drives of such well-established national philanthropies as the American Red Cross and the American Cancer Society.⁶⁹ Behind the contributions was great wealth and many people in important positions. Zionism had become a power in the land.

The Rise of Arab Nationalism

The *Fertile Crescent**, of which Palestine is a part, had a history which had given its inhabitants a common political and cultural identity. Though divided administratively for centuries by the Ottoman Empire, in the nineteenth century more 'Arabs' began to be awakened by the desire to regain independence. This was partly due to dissatisfaction with Turkish rule and the failure of the Government to introduce certain reforms demanded by the Arabs. 'Under the impact of Western education, the infiltration of Western political ideas, the intercourse of commerce, the introduction of the material goods of life, as well as through travel abroad and personal contacts with the West, the inhabitants of the Near East were slowly waking up to a new world of progress and power which was taking shape in the West, in sharp contrast to the state of ignorance and weakness in which the Ottoman Empire was submerged.'⁷⁰

The idea of 'nationality' did not exist in the minds of the masses at that time, all their ties being religious and denominational. The idea of *Arabism* or '*Urubah*' may have had its origin in the Lebanon where a common cry was needed to rally the dissatisfied Moslem and Christian Arabs.⁷¹ Western education played an indirect part in the turning against Turkish rule. The two biggest educational institutions, the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University of Beirut) founded in 1866, and the Jesuit Université St. Joseph, were Christian schools with teaching devoid of political content.**

George Antonius, in *The Arab Awakening*, described the formation

* The territory bounded by the Mediterranean on the west, the Arabian Peninsula on the south, Iran on the east, and Turkey on the north. Internally, it was divided into two sectors. Its eastern sector is the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, historically known as Mesopotamia, now Iraq. The western sector is geographical Syria, which comprises the political entities which came to be known after World War I as the republics of Lebanon and Syria, Palestine and Transjordan.

** One exception was Elias Habbalin, who taught French at the Protestant College from 1871-1874, and often talked of getting rid of the Turks with all their injustices and corrupt government.⁷²

in Beirut in 1875, of 'a secret revolutionary society' [some of whose members had studied with Habbalin] as 'the first organized effort in the Arab national movement,'⁷³ but the society was predominantly Christian and it failed to secure any united action with the Beirut Moslems to emancipate Lebanon from the Turks. 'National unity was impossible under the circumstances...' ⁷⁴

On 31 August 1876, Abdul Hamid II was proclaimed Sultan, and for a short time acted as a constitutional monarch. The first Turkish Parliament met on 19 March 1877, but early the following year it was dissolved and the Constitution suspended. The more outspoken and critical deputies, among them a number of prominent Arabs, were ordered to leave Constantinople. Repression followed them home, and the reformers were either driven 'underground' or to Paris, London, Geneva and Cairo.

An Islamic revival subsequently preached by Jamal-ed-Din El-Afghani (from 1884 he began a publication in Paris) and his followers to resist the advance of European imperialism through Islamic unity, was partly exploited against 'Arabism' by Sultan Abdul Hamid to bolster unity of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁵ The infant Arab nationalist movement was for years reduced to impotence by the traditional Turkish combination of 'offers of office and other favours on the one hand, and terrorization on the other'.⁷⁶ But 'the idea of Arab unity was no less real in the nineteenth century awakening of the Arabs of the 'Fertile Crescent' because it was not conceptually formulated or explicitly articulated. Even the Egyptian movement of liberation and modernization of the nineteenth century did not lack elements which pointed beyond Egypt.'⁷⁷

About 1900, Abdul Rahman El-Kawakibi denied the Ottoman Sultan's claim to the caliphate and advocated recognition of an Arab caliph in Mecca. He demanded administrative autonomy for each nation within the Ottoman Empire, earning for himself, 'first the frowns of his chiefs' in the Ottoman public service, 'and later, a term in prison for his outspoken denunciation of tyranny.'⁷⁸

The 'Young Turk'* revolution in 1908, forced Abdul Hamid to restore the Constitution. There was great rejoicing and the Sultan's popularity rose as high as his peoples' hopes. A new Parliament met on 17 December 1908, with 119 Turkish and 72 Arab members. By religion, 214 were Moslems, 42 were Christians and 4 were Jews. A few months later Abdul Hamid was deposed.

* 'Hardly one among its true leaders has been a pure-blooded Turk. Enver is the son of a renegade Pole. Djavid belongs to the Jewish sect of Dunmehs. Carosso is a Sephardim Jew from Salonica. Talaat is an Islamised Bulgarian gypsy.'

'The real brains of the movement were Jewish...' and the main finance was Jewish.'⁷⁹

The revolution had promised justice to all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of religion or race. But to the dismay of the Arabs, the revolutionary leaders instituted a policy of Pan-Turanism, the unifying of all turkic peoples (and trying to turkify those who were not) on the same lines as Pan-Slavism sought to unify the Slavs. As a result of this programme, the Arab leaders' objective of gaining full national independence received a great stimulus which consolidated it.⁸⁰

An Arab nationalist movement in the form of secret societies emerged supported by many of the Moslem families, such as, the El-'Azm, El-'Asali and El-Jazayiri of Damascus, Hamadeh and Mahmasani of Beirut, Haidar of Baalbek, Arslan of the Lebanese Druze, El-Khalil of southern Lebanon, Husseini and Nashashibi of Jerusalem, and Abdul Hadi of Jenin. The most prominent of these societies was *El-Fatat*, founded in Paris in 1911 by seven young Moslem Arabs whose keenness and unanimity of views gave the society unity and vigour; and its development, which was cautious yet rapid, made it into the most effective of the Arab societies of the time, remarkable alike for its objects and methods as for the discipline of its members. The objects of the society were to work for independence of the Arab countries and their liberation from Turkish or any other alien domination, constituting a significant advance on those programmes which aimed at autonomy within the empire, and an unconscious return to the ideals of the Beirut secret society of 1875.⁸¹

The Christian Arabs had perhaps more reason for wishing to be rid of the Turks than the Moslem Arabs. The 'Terrible Turk' had been the bogey man of Europe's nurseries since the 15th century, and the massacres of Christians in Lebanon by the Turks in 1895 had aroused the sympathy of other Christians in many countries.

After a visit to Palestine in 1912, Asher Ginsburg writing as Ahad Ha-am, reported, "many natives of Palestine, whose national consciousness has begun to develop since the Turkish Revolution, look askance, quite naturally, at the selling of land to 'strangers' and do their best to put a stop to this evil."⁸² This warning was in keeping with views which he had expressed in an article in a Russian Hebrew periodical in 1819, on his return from his first visit to Palestine: "We are in the habit of thinking that all the Arabs are wild men of the desert and do not see or understand what goes on around them. But that is a great mistake. The Arabs, especially the town-dwellers, see and understand what we are doing and what we want in Palestine, but they do not react and pretend not to notice, because at present they do not see in what we are doing any threat to their own future... But if ever we develop in Palestine to such a degree as to encroach on the living space of the

native population to any appreciable extent, they will not easily give up their place."⁸³

But Ahad Ha-am's attempt to dispel the illusion that the Arabs could be relied upon to be apathetic and could safely be left out of the Zionist account, was in vain.⁸⁴

In 1912, the correspondent of *The Times* in Constantinople warned the British public against forfeiting the goodwill of the Arab world by indiscreet manifestations of sympathy with Zionism.⁸⁵

An Arab Congress, convened in Paris 18-24 June 1913, was attended by 24 delegates who were almost evenly divided between Moslem and Christian. With the exception of three from the United States and two from Mesopotamia, the delegates came from geographical Syria and Lebanon. The resolutions the Congress adopted called for guarantees of Arab political rights by effective participation in the central administration of the Ottoman Empire; decentralized regimes in each of the Syrian and other Arab *vilayets*; more recognition of power for the general council of the *vilayet* of Beirut; recognition of Arabic in the Ottoman Parliament and as an official language in Syria and other Arab countries.⁸⁶

On 18 August an imperial decree was issued, purporting to enact the provisions of the Paris agreement. The concessions had been scaled down considerably, and most of what was left was hedged with reservations and ambiguity. On the subject of language, the decree did rule that Arabic was henceforth to be the medium in primary and secondary schools; but it added that secondary schools in provincial capitals (and all secondary schools were in those capitals) would continue to teach Turkish. The concession with regard to military service was similarly qualified. No mention was made of the adoption of Arabic as the official language, or of its admission as one of the official languages, in the Arab provinces; or of offices in the cabinet and governorships being reserved to Arabs.

'The appearance of the imperial decree caused dismay which presently turned to despair. For it gradually dawned upon the watchful Arabs that it, too, was only a blind...Perfunctory instructions were sent to

* From 1900, the Egyptian Nationalist Party (*El-Hizb El-Watani*) led by a young Egyptian lawyer, Mustapha Kamil, declared for complete independence for Egypt and the Sudan. During the term of Lord Cromer's successor, Sir Eldon Gorst (1907-1911), various measures to give more administrative freedom to the Egyptians did not appease the public, and nationalism made more headway. In 1914, a conference of delegates representing the 2-3,000 Egyptian students in Europe and some from Egypt was organized and held at Geneva at the end of July. It was addressed by Mohammad Farid Bey and other Egyptian nationalist leaders and was intended to proclaim Egyptian independence, but the Great War had begun. Abdel Rahman 'Azzam, first Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, was one of the delegate students.⁸⁷

the *valis* (governors) in certain Arab provinces to "pave the way for the eventual enforcement of the august Imperial Decree;" and, meanwhile emissaries of the C.U.P. approached certain Arab personalities with offers of office, to buy their acquiescence.⁸⁸ So when Turkey entered the war a little over a year later on the side of the Central Powers, some Arabs already believed that their freedom and independence from Turkish domination would have to be won by force of arms.

The political acumen of Arab nationalist leaders in their assessment of Zionist aims was generally of a high order. Writing in the Cairo newspaper *El-Muqattam* on 14 April 1914, Rafik Bey Hakim gave as the reason why Arab public opinion had turned against Zionist Jews that they kept strictly apart from the Arabs and aimed at establishing a Jewish state.⁸⁹ Some nationalists were prepared to accept that Jewish immigration might be advantageous to Palestine, but 'what they were not prepared to admit was that there could be room in Palestine for both Arab nationalists and Zionist Jews. When the war came, British policy required that both Jews and Arabs should be encouraged in their respective national aspirations.'⁹⁰

Writing just after the outbreak of World War I, a British sympathizer with Zionism, R.W. Seton-Watson, drew attention to the growing force of Arab nationalism and warned against the ignoring of "the possible effect of such an Arab movement upon the state of Palestine and the future of healthy Jewish nationalism which is at length striking root in its original home."⁹¹

Meanwhile, in 1904, an agreement signed between Britain and France recognized British predominance in the Nile Valley. But this had increased French determination to improve on a claim of privileged status which had been built up in Syria, with responsibility as the leading Christian Power for the protection of Christian shrines and establishments. When France severed official relations with the Holy See in 1903, commercial interests came to the fore. On the eve of the Great War, plans were in hand for a great programme of public works to be carried out in Syria, which included Palestine,* by a French consortium which already had valuable options on railway and harbour concessions there.

Towards the end of 1912, however, the French opinion was disturbed by reports put out by 'a section of the press' that British agents in Syria were courting Arab nationalists and encouraging them to work for a

* 'In the south, the boundary between Egypt and Syria... follows an arbitrary line drawn from slightly west of Rafah on the Mediterranean to slightly east of Taba... on the Red Sea... In modern usage, the expression 'Palestine' has no precise meaning but is taken as being equivalent to 'Southern Syria'.⁹² Palestine is included in 'Southern Syria' as defined in the *Acts Séparé* annexed to the London Convention of 15 July 1840.⁹³

union of Syria with Egypt as part of a plan conceived by Lord Kitchener for bringing the entire Middle East under British control. This increased the French public's interest in Palestine, who thought of Palestine when they read of Syria.⁹⁴

On the other hand, there was good reason for British-German rivalry in the Near and Middle East. In 1900, the Sultan Abdul Hamid had initiated the construction of a far-reaching railway line to connect his Arabian provinces with Damascus. The work was to be carried out by German engineers whose Government looked forward to controlling indirectly the western shores of Arabia. It promised a means of exerting pressure on Britain's Suez and Red Sea artery. Another scheme was taking shape, for a Berlin-to-Baghdad railway link* which, by by-passing the Suez Canal more cheaply and quickly than sea passage except for the most bulky materials, might menace Britain's trade with the Far East and its strategic communications to India.

In 1913, the Deutsche Bank was competing with the Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Saxon (a subsidiary of Royal-Dutch Shell, controlled mainly by the Paris Rothschilds and Marcus Samuel, later Lord Bearsted) companies for oil concessions in Mesopotamia.⁹⁵ But the reorganization of the Turkish Petroleum Company was only one of many closely related problems in the Ottoman Empire that British and German diplomats were attempting to solve. Most issues centered on the Baghdad railroad project, and a year's intense bargaining between British and German businessmen produced a draft convention on the Baghdad railway on 15 June 1914.⁹⁶ World War I intervened before it could be ratified.**

* In 1888, a concession to build a railway in Anatolia to link Ankara with Constantinople had been granted to a group of German and British capitalists. The Germans subsequently bought out the British rights. In 1902, they were granted a further concession to extend the railway from Konia through the Taurus Mountains, across the Euphrates to Mosul, down the Tigris to Baghdad, and thence on to Basra, thus linking the Bosphorus and Berlin, with the Arabian Gulf. The scheme caused much apprehension in England.⁹⁷

** From 1912 to 1914, Great Britain, France and Germany had been moving towards inter-related agreements on their Levantine interests. Those initialled included:

The Anglo-Turkish Agreement, 29 July 1913;⁹⁸

The Franco-German Agreement, 15 February 1914;⁹⁹

The Anglo-French Agreement, 10 April 1914;¹⁰⁰

A German-Turkish Agreement was under negotiation in the summer of 1914.¹⁰¹

CHAPTER I

Prelude to Action

Until mid-1914, the surface of European diplomatic relations was placid, reflecting successfully negotiated settlements of colonial and other questions. But there were groups in every major European country which could see only in war the possible means to further their interests or to thwart the ambitions of their rivals. This is why the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, on 28 June in Sarajevo, soon set Europe crackling with fire, a fire which naturally spread through the lines of communications to colonial territories as far away as China.

The main line of communication to the East lay through the Suez Canal area under British-French control; but all too near, in the Arab territories of Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia, Turkish dominion was virtually absolute. Here the centuries of despotic rule had dried men's eyes with anger, and the smouldering spirits of those awakened to opportunity were ready to burn for freedom with the slightest spark. Among them was Hussein, head of the Hashemite dynasty who, after sixteen years of forced residence in Constantinople, had been allowed to assume his hereditary dignity as *Sherif of Mecca** and titular ruler of the Hejaz, a territory bordering the middle half of the Red Sea approach to Suez. The Hejaz railway, already completed to nearby Medina, now linked what had been a remote Arabian territory with the Mediterranean at Haifa. Except for an uncompleted stretch through the Taurus and Amarus mountains, the centres of the Arab world in the Near East were now linked with Turkey and Europe.

Improved communication allowed for greater control. In February 1914, the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress appointed Vahib Bey, whose anti-Arab sentiments were well-known, as Governor

* *Mecca* is known to Islam as the 'House of God', and is a place of pilgrimage, while *Medina* is the site of the tomb of the Prophet Mohammad. The custody of these Holy Cities was traditionally vested in a descendant of the Prophet, bearing the title of 'Sherif'.

of the Hejaz, and a measure of military conscription was proclaimed for Arabia and other Arab territories. The same month, Sherif Hussein sent his second son, Emir (Prince) Abdullah, foremost among the Arab deputies in the Ottoman Parliament,¹ to visit the Khedive of Egypt, and secretly, Lord Kitchener, who was then British Agent and Consul-General in name, but viceroy in fact.

To Abdullah's account of angry Arab discontent with Turkish rule, Kitchener, though non-committal, was discouraging: England's traditional policy was one of friendship with Turkey and it was unlikely that she would intervene in the event of Arab-Turkish conflict. After the interview, however, Kitchener told Ronald Storrs, Oriental Secretary at the British Agency, to return Abdullah's visit in two days. This time Abdullah, whose membership of secret Arab freedom societies had given him insight into the strength of Arab revolutionary feeling, spoke more freely of Arab revolt.²

In Turkey, at the head of the notorious Committee of Union and Progress, were Enver, Talaat, and Jemal, cabinet members under the new Grand Vizier, Mahmud Shevket Pasha, who had forced the resignation of his anglophile predecessor, Kamil Pasha. In 1908, these men had been the authors of a revolution claiming to work for the regeneration of the country, but in reality rendering its condition worse than before, since they were even more corrupt, more unscrupulous, and more brutal than their predecessors.³

Following a request on 22 May 1913 from the Grand Vizier to the German Kaiser, a German military mission under General Liman von Sanders initiated the reorganization of the army⁴ after its arrival in January 1914. The French General Baumann was entrusted with the reorganization of the Police, and the English Admiral Limpus with that of the Navy. On 22 July of the same year, the Ottoman Minister of War, Enver Pasha, proposed a secret Treaty of Alliance with Germany, to observe strict neutrality, unless Russia intervenes in the dispute which had arisen between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia as a result of the Archduke's assassination. In the event of Russian intervention, Germany and Turkey pledged to ally with Austria-Hungary, while the Turks agreed that the German military mission would be assured 'the actual exercise of the supreme command' of their army. The Treaty was signed on 2 August 1914.⁵

Serbia as a Slav state, appealed to Russia for support in refusing Austro-Hungarian demands, and on 24 July the Russian Council of Ministers agreed to authorize partial mobilization (in the districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan) and other measures suggested by

Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov. On 28 July, Austria declared war on Serbia. Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia threatening hostilities if orders for total mobilization of the Russian army and navy were not countermanded.

A telegram dated 29 July, 1915 from the Czar Nicolas to the Emperor Wilhelm, proposing that the Austro-Serbian dispute should be referred to the Hague Tribunal, remained unanswered. At the same time Germany sent a message to France asking if she would remain neutral; but France, which had absorbed issue after issue of Russian railroad bonds in addition to other problems, was unequivocal in supporting Russia. Amid mounting tension and frontier violations, Germany declared war on Russia and France. The French Chief-of-Staff, General Joseph Joffre, was prepared to march into Belgium if the Germans first violated its neutrality⁶ which had been guaranteed by Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia. German troops crossed the Belgian frontier (on 4 August at 8 a.m.) and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany.*

* The French Minister at Brussels, A.W. Klobukowski, telegraphed at 5.23 p.m. on 3 August that the Germans had not yet crossed the frontier: "It would be a good thing to let them take the initiative in the actual violation for which they are perhaps trying to make us responsible." At 6.56 p.m., he again telegraphed: "The impression deepens that the ultimatum of Germany... is a manoeuvre to induce us to be the first to intervene in Belgium..." It is a question, wrote Albertini, whether these anxious telegrams from Klobukowski were not the reason for the French Government's sending him 500,000 (gold) francs. At 12.35 p.m. on 4 August, he telegraphed to Paris. "I have just received from Lord Rothschild an order on the Banque Nationale for 500,000 francs on the Ministry of Finance's account. Kindly indicate use." A footnote in the DF runs: "These funds were probably to facilitate the departure of French people domiciled in Belgium." But Klobukowski 'seems to have received no reply.'

(Behind these events lay a great tangle of diplomatic activity. Apart from professional militarists, at least two figures may have helped to outweigh the elements which were for peace. One of these was Victor Naumann, an influential German publicist who was known to be in close touch with the German Foreign Secretary Jagow, and with Stumm, the Political Director at the Wilhelmstrasse. Naumann worked closely with Alexander Helphand, the great financial supporter of Zionism who had left Russia after the abortive revolt of 1905, and was now a socialist leader in Germany.⁸ After the Sarajevo tragedy, Naumann visited the Austrian Foreign Minister, a mission 'which he had certainly not undertaken on his own initiative,' and alleging that Germany was considering 'preventive war' against Russia, produced on Foreign Minister Hoyos the impression that Berlin was urging the monarchy to extreme measures. 'Austria-Hungary will be finished as a monarchy and as a great power if she does not take advantage of this moment,' he said.⁹ The other warmonger of any significance, was the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Stein, who on 5 July 1914 helped to put out a rumour that a Crown Council had just been held at Potsdam at which war had been decided upon. This legend, allegedly transmitted to U.S. ambassador Henry Morgenthau in Constantinople by the German Ambassador, Baron Wangenheim,¹⁰ may have inhibited peacemaking factors. It is a measure of Naumann's authority that on the afternoon of 4 August he was in Stumm's room at the Wilhel-

Lord Kitchener, who had left London at 11:30 on the morning of 3 August to return to Egypt after leave, was stopped at Dover and put in charge of the War Office.*¹¹ At the first meeting of the War Council he warned his colleagues of a long struggle which would be won not at sea but on land, for which Britain would have to raise an army of millions of men and maintain them in the field for several years.¹² When the defense of Egypt was discussed at the meeting, always a matter of concern to Kitchener, Winston Churchill suggested that the ideal method of defending Egypt was to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula which, if successful, would give Britain control of the Dardenelles. But this operation was very difficult, and required a large force. He preferred the alternative of a feint at Gallipoli, and a landing at Haifa or some other point on the Syrian coast. He recalled that in its pre-war studies the Committee of Imperial Defence had held that the proper *riposte* to an attack on Egypt was a landing on the coast of Palestine. Kitchener agreed that an attack on Turkish communications would probably be necessary, but held that the moment had not yet come. At this time Kitchener felt no anxiety about the security of Egypt.¹³

On 24 September 1914 (when Great Britain was at war with Germany but not yet with Turkey), the Foreign Office, at Lord Kitchener's request, telegraphed the instructions solicited, and Storrs' special messenger arrived in Mecca in the last week of September 1914 under conditions of the greatest secrecy.

Hussein had two possible courses of action: to stand by Turkey and hope to earn grateful recognition, or to seek freedom with the sword. Emir Feisal, Hussein's third son, favoured the first alternative. He was convinced that France had designs on Syria and England on the southern regions of Iraq. Kitchener's message contained no guarantees. Moreover, the Arabs were not prepared militarily and he feared a revolt might misfire. Emir Abdullah was confident that Damascus and Baghdad would readily respond to a call to revolt; he suggested negotiations with Kitchener for acceptable terms.

After much discussion, Sherif Hussein came to a compromise decision.

mastrasse discussing the situation when Jagow came in; 'his features showed, I will not say horror, but an expression of anguish which had awakened in him. When Herr von Stumm returned after a considerable time, he too was pale and said to me: "England has declared war on us".'¹⁴

* Writing of Lloyd George's change from support for negotiation to belligerence, Lord Morley, who opposed sending an expeditionary force abroad and had just resigned from the Cabinet, wrote: "My impression is that he must have begun the day with one of his customary morning talks with the splendid *condottiere* (Churchill) at the Admiralty, had revised his calculations . . . and found in the German ultimatum (to Belgium) a sufficiently plausible excuse."¹⁵

He composed a letter to Storrs for Abdullah to sign expressing his preference for Great Britain over Turkey: "So long as she protects the rights of our country and the rights of the person of His Highness our present Emir and Lord and the rights of his Emirate and its independence in all respects, without any exceptions or restrictions, and so long as it supports us against any foreign aggression and in particular against the Ottomans, especially if they wish to set up any one else as Emir with the intention of causing internal dissension—their principle of government—and provided that the Government of Great Britain would guarantee these fundamental principles clearly and in writing. This guarantee we expect to receive at the first opportunity"¹⁶

The letter reached Storrs just before the end of October and was telegraphed to Kitchener, reaching him at about the same time as a letter from his friend Sir John Maxwell, Commanding British Forces in Egypt, in which he wrote: "...I do not know what the policy of the Foreign Office is, but I think Arabs about Mecca and the Yemen ought to be approached and set against the Turks."¹⁷

In spite of the secret treaty with Germany of 3 August 1914, Turkey did not join the war on the side of the Central Powers until 3 November 1914, after the German Admiral Souchon, as a way of overcoming the Grand Vizier's last hesitations and creating a state of war, had on 29 October bombarded Odessa, Sebastopol and Novorossisk.¹⁸

Lord Kitchener, now Minister of War in London, had been receiving reports during October from the British Embassy in Constantinople of troop movements and the sending of arms and gold to equip and subsidize the bedouin tribes of southern Syria and Sinai for an attack on Egypt. Intelligence reported that 600 *Ulemas* (religious preachers) assembled in Aleppo were setting out for all parts of Syria and Egypt to unite Moslem feeling against Great Britain, and that batches of German officers headed by Colonel Kress von Kressenstein had arrived in Syria to take up appointments with the Turkish Fourth Army. Turkish emissaries were dispatched to the Senussi Chief, Sayyed Ahmad, on Egypt's western frontier, with injunctions from the Khalif to preach a *Jihad* (Moslem holy war) in the event of Turkey being involved in the European hostilities, for the Sultan of Turkey had taken the title of *Khalif-al-Islam*, or supreme religious leader of Moslems everywhere.¹⁹

Kitchener did not take these reports lightly. To Lloyd George he spoke of the possibility of hordes of Senussi horsemen sweeping into the Egyptian Delta.²⁰ Might not the call of *Jihad*, if supported throughout Islam unify the Arabs around the Turks and even lead to the mutiny of Moslem soldiers in the Allied Forces?²¹ To Abdullah he cabled on 31 October 1914: "Salaams...Germany has now bought the Turkish

Government with gold, notwithstanding that England, France and Russia guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire if Turkey remained neutral in the war. Against the will of the Sultan the Turkish Government has committed acts of aggression by invading the frontiers of Egypt with bands of Turkish soldiers. If the Arab Nation assists England in this war that has been forced upon us by Turkey, England will guarantee that no internal intervention takes place in Arabia and will give the Arabs every assistance against external aggression. It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina, and so good come by the help of God out of the evil that is now occurring.”²²

This statement was transmitted to Abdullah by letter from Cairo with the addition: “If the Emir of Mecca is willing to assist Great Britain in this conflict, Great Britain is willing, recognising and respecting the sacred and unique office of the Emir Hussein (titles), to guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sherifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans. Till now we have defended Islam in the person of the Turks; henceforward it shall be in that of the noble Arabs.”²³

At the same time, instructions were dispatched to the British Political Resident in the Arabian Gulf to issue a proclamation which began, “Do not allow foolish people to be led away by talk of *Jihad*...” and promised that there would be no interference with the Moslem holy places or the passage of pilgrims.²⁴

A summons to declare for *Jihad* reached Sherif Hussein from Turkey on 31 October, the day Kitchener sent his cable, and five days before Britain’s declaration of war on Turkey. The Turkish armies being fresh and well-supplied and the Allies relatively inactive against them, Abdullah sent back an enthusiastic reply to Constantinople ‘couched in nebulous prose of which he was a master.’ He explained to the Sultan that the British Navy controlled the Red Sea and could bombard his ill-protected coast, and he did not in fact join the *Jihad*.²⁵ A cautious reply came back to Cairo intimating that the Sherif’s position in Islam made it possible for him to break with Turkey immediately. The British experts of the Arab Bureau also sought to strengthen the position of Britain and its supporters in the Arab World by two official declarations.

The Government of India issued the following proclamation in November, 1914:

“In view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey, which to the regret of Great Britain has been brought about by the ill-advised, unprovoked, and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, His Excellency the Viceroy is authorised by His Majesty’s Government to make the following public announcement

in regard to the holy places of Arabia, including the holy shrines of Mesopotamia and the Port of Jedda, in order that there may be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's most loyal Moslem subjects as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this war, in which no question of a religious character is involved. These holy places and Jedda will be immune from attack or molestation by British naval and military forces, so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the holy places and shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given similar assurances."

A much looser pledge, extending to the whole of Arabia, was given in a Foreign Office telegram of 14 November, 1914, to the High Commissioner, Cairo:

"His Majesty's Government have no intention of undertaking any military or naval operations in Arabia or against its ports, unless such a course becomes necessary for the protection of Arabian interests against Turkish or other aggression, or in support of any attempt by the Arabs to free themselves from Turkish rule."²⁶

Meanwhile, Hussein secretly dispatched emissaries to the Idris, the Imam of Yemen, Ibn Saud, and Ibn Rashid, the other Arabian rulers, to sound them out on their attitude towards the Turks and explain why he was abstaining from the call to *Jihad*. "But in essentials," wrote British military commentator Liddell Hart, "the Sherif had already rendered Britain a service greater than any that could be expected in the material realm. For he had refused, much to the Turks' indignation, to proclaim the *Jihad* from the Holy Cities, and had thus largely drawn its sting,"²⁷ for if the Sherif of Mecca would not join it, why should any of the faithful?

From January to March 1915, Hussein received intimations of encouragement to resist Turkish demands from Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan,²⁸ which strengthened his confidence in Britain's sincere desire for an alliance. He was further encouraged by Ibn Saud's view that he should evade participation in the *Jihad* by pleading fear of British reprisals against the Hejaz ports.

While the Turks plotted the assassination of Sherif Hussein²⁹ and also retaliated by stopping pilgrims, and hence income, from going to Mecca, the British, who were elsewhere preventing the passage of food to the Central Powers, allowed food-ships from India into the Arabian port of Jedda. As an attack on the Suez Canal seemed imminent, the British proclaimed a protectorate over Egypt, and in January 1915,

Sir Henry McMahon was appointed British High Commissioner to Egypt, with instructions from the Foreign Office (and probably from Kitchener) to 'foster the Sherif's friendship.'³⁰

In February 1915, a Turkish army of 22,000 men advanced from Palestine across the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal. The Sultan hoped that his own title of *Khalif-al-Islam* might be sufficient to raise local 'fifth-column' support in Egypt, but this did not materialize. The Turks were repulsed on 3 February and retired into the Sinai Peninsula.

Hussein had not dismissed the possibility of rebellion against the Turks, but the 'when' and the 'wherefore', the terms on which he would support the Allies, had to be decided. He cabled to Constantinople for permission to send his son Emir Feisal to the Capital, ostensibly for discussions on outstanding differences, but in fact to give him the opportunity to pass through Damascus, the centre of the Arab nationalist freedom movements. The Turks readily agreed, still hoping for support for their idea of a Holy War.

On his outward journey, Feisal reached Damascus on 26 March and met enthusiastically with the leaders of the Arab nationalist societies *al-'Ahd* and *al-Fatat*. He told them of Kitchener's offer, the divergences between Abdullah and himself, and his father's policy of caution. Leaving the nationalist leaders to define their policy, Feisal went on to Constantinople, arriving on 23 April. He had conversations with the Grand Vizier, Talaat Bey (Minister of the Interior), Enver Pasha (Minister for War), and two audiences of the puppet Sultan. He was told that if the Sherif declared himself openly in favour of Holy War against the Allies, his grievances in the Hejaz would be fully met. Each gave him a letter for his father conveying this message. Enver's letter, dated 8 May, made much of the heavy losses which had been sustained by the Russians in eastern Galicia (after brilliant success by their armies in January) following strengthening of the Austrians by German divisions. It detailed also the failure of the British naval attack on the Dardanelles Narrows on 18 March, and the heavy losses sustained by a landing on Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April.³¹

Feisal then visited Jemal Pasha in Jerusalem, his headquarters for the unsuccessful operations against Egypt. As he made his way back to Damascus via Constantinople, there was more unfavourable news for the Turks from parts of their Arab empire to be weighed against the news from Europe; this time from southern Mesopotamia. There, a British reinforced brigade and the Sixth Indian Division from India had arrived on 23 October* and was now exploiting successes gained earlier in

* It started with the suggestion that a force should be sent 'to encourage the Arabs to rally

April. Turkish emissaries had been busy preaching the *Jihad* among the *Shi'a* tribes which gathered on the flanks of a Turkish force engaging British and Indian troops at Shuwaika on 12 April. The tribesmen played no part in the battle, and on the evening of its second day, before the Turks had given way, the tribes deserted them. Twenty-four hours later, the Turkish commander committed suicide and a general retreat of the Turkish forces began. The fleeing Turkish soldiers were butchered without mercy by Arab bands and only a small remnant reached their base at Nasiriya, about 100 miles north of Basra. 'Never again did the Turks invite the Arabs to cooperate in organized military operations.' Stories of Arab treachery resounded throughout the Ottoman Empire.³² Moreover, 1,000 to 1,500 Arabs were now fighting with detachments of the Dorsets and the 7th Rajputs in the area.³³

On 14 April, 1915, the Foreign Office (acting on the strength of a letter addressed by Seyyid Sir Ali Morghani, Grand Kadi of the Sudan, to Sir R. Wingate, then Sirdar, and forwarded by him) telegraphed to the High Commissioner, Cairo: "You should inform Sir R. Wingate that he is authorised by me to let it be known, should he think it desirable, that His Majesty's Government will make it an essential condition in the terms of peace that the Arabian Peninsula and its Mohammedan holy places should remain in the hands of an independent sovereign state."³⁴

This was communicated to Sir Ali Morghani, and by him, apparently, to Sherif Hussein. Later, towards the end of June, the substance of it was embodied in proclamations distributed in Egypt, the Sudan and Arabia.

Feisal was back in Damascus on 23 May and was able to discuss with the Arab leaders who had formed a Central Arab Nationalist Committee the drawing up of a protocol defining the conditions under which they would be prepared to cooperate with Great Britain against Turkey. This *Damascus Protocol* stated:

"The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying within the following frontiers:

North: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N. and thence along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn 'Umar)-Amadia to the Persian frontier;

East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;

South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be maintained);

West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

to us and confirm the local sheikhs of Mohammerah and Kuwait in their allegiance;' also, less vaguely, to protect the Anglo-Persian oil installation on Abadan Island.³⁵

"The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under the Capitulations.

"The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the future independent Arab state.

"The grant of economic preference to Great Britain."

An oath of allegiance by the six principal leaders pledged them to recognize the Sherif as spokesman for the Arab Nation. In the event of his securing an agreement with Britain on the basis of the *Damascus Protocol*, the Arab divisions in Syria would rise against the Turks. Feisal hurried home, a copy of the *Protocol* written in minute script sewn inside the lining of one of his retainer's boots. The party arrived in Mecca on 20 June 1915.³⁶

Secret negotiations and agreements were the order of the day. While Feisal was undertaking his mission, two secret agreements which included mention of Arab territory were made by the Allied Powers, the Constantinople Agreement (negotiated 4 March to 10 April 1915) and the London Agreement (26 April 1915). The former was a result of Russia's wish to define the position of Britain and France in the matter of Constantinople and the Straits. Should the incorporation of these areas into the Russian Empire be sympathetically considered by the two Allied Governments, "The said Allied Governments are assured similar understanding on the part of the Imperial Government for the realization of plans which they may frame with reference to other regions of the Ottoman Empire or elsewhere," wrote Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov to the British and French Ambassadors in Petrograd.³⁷

A British memorandum of 12 March to the Russian Government stated that, "As soon, however, as it becomes known that Russia is to have Constantinople at the conclusion of the war, Sir Edward Grey will wish to state that throughout the negotiations, His Majesty's Government have stipulated that the Mussulman holy places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion."³⁸ The French followed on 14 March with their conditions of the peace to be eventually imposed on Turkey; and the Russian Foreign Minister was informed that France 'would like to annex Syria together with the region of the Gulf of Alexandretta and Cilicia up to the Taurus (mountain) range,' and requested to be informed, 'without delay, of the Imperial Government's consent.'³⁹

The following day the Russian Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote a note to the Minister: "The French Ambassador has told me that it is his impression that Syria 'includes Palestine'. I deemed it useful to remind him that there is in Jerusalem an independent governor."⁴⁰

The French Ambassador also made a special journey to see the Czar who was at the Army General Headquarters, near Vilna. On 16 March 1915, Ambassador Paleologue 'described in detail the full programme of civilizing work France intends to undertake in Syria, Cilicia, and Palestine.' According to the Ambassador, the Czar made him point out on the map the regions which would thus come under French influence and declared: "I agree to all you ask."⁴¹

But Foreign Minister Sazonov then wrote to the Russian ambassador in Paris asking him to request elucidation from the French Government. 'This question appears important to us; for, if the Imperial Government should be prepared largely to satisfy France's desires concerning Syria and Cilicia proper, it is indispensable to study the question with closer attention, if the holy places are involved.'⁴² But France gave no details at the time.

On 18 March the British Government expressed in writing its accord with Russian claims to the Straits and Constantinople, and two days later the Russian Foreign Minister sent a message to their ambassador in London containing this paragraph: "The Imperial Government completely shares the view of the British Government on the maintenance of the Muslim holy places under an independent Muslim government. It is necessary to elucidate now whether they will remain under the suzerainty of Turkey, the Sultan retaining the title of *Caliph*, or it is envisaged to create new independent states, in order to permit the Imperial Government to formulate its views in full knowledge of the case. For its part the Imperial Government desires that the Caliphate should be separated from Turkey. In any case, the freedom of pilgrimage must be completely secured."⁴³

The Secret (London) Agreement brought Italy into the war on 23 May 1915. In return for this, Italian claims to parts of the Ottoman Empire were recognized. Article 12 stated: "Italy declares that she associates herself in the declaration made by France, Great Britain and Russia to the effect that Arabia and the Moslem holy places in Arabia shall be left under the authority of an independent Moslem Power."⁴⁴

Where appropriate, these negotiations on the British side were administratively the concern of a Committee on British Desiderata in Turkey under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice de Bunsen who had been ambassador in Vienna in 1914. Associated with the Committee of Imperial Defence, and particularly with further efforts to secure Arab support was a witty and talented politician and member of the Cabinet secretariat, Mark Sykes.⁴⁵ Coordinating the Foreign Office, Kitchener and Cabinet policies of cultivating the Arabs and encouraging revolt, (all the more desirable now that the Gallipoli campaign was proving so costly), Sykes now completed

negotiations for a policy statement by Sir Henry McMahon, the new High Commissioner in Egypt.

Consultations included talks with Syrian Arab nationalist leaders in Cairo and Khartoum and Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan, who was kept fully informed but had no part in this and subsequent negotiations and guarantees.⁴⁶

In a Foreign Office telegram of 14 April, 1915 (No.173), to the High Commissioner, Cairo, the British Government committed themselves to a public declaration that "they will make it an essential condition in the terms of peace that the Arabian Peninsula should remain in the hands of an independent sovereign state." They added, however, that "it is not possible to define at this stage exactly how much territory should be included in this state."

McMahon was then authorized to issue in June a public declaration pledging support for an independent Arabia and hinting that an Arab Caliphate would be welcome. Leaflets with this message were then distributed in large quantities throughout Egypt and the Sudan, and smuggled into Syria; copies were scattered from British airplanes over Wajh, Yanbo, Rabegh and Jedda.⁴⁷

This was the first public bid made by Britain for Arab support in the war.

CHAPTER II

Arab Bid for Independence

WITH SIR HENRY'S declaration and the '*Damascus Protocol*' before him, Sherif Hussein wrote on 14 July 1915 to Sir Henry McMahon embodying in his letter the terms of the Syrian Arab nationalists and prefacing them with emphasis on the desire of the Arab nation for freedom to administer their own affairs. So commenced the *Hussein-McMahon Correspondence*. (Document 1).

The initial (subsequently modified) conditions in the letter, under which Sherif Hussein said the Arabs would be prepared to assist 'England' in the war against Turkey, were as follows:

"England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to 37° of latitudes on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia Island, up to the borders of Persia; on the east, by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basrah; on the south, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west, by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina."

The correspondence between the Sherif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon lasted until 10 March 1916. All in all ten letters were exchanged of which eight related to Arab territorial questions.¹ During the exchange of these letters, the British, French and ANZAC forces landed at Salonika (19 August 1915) and made several costly but vain attempts to force the Dardanelles Straits and occupy Constantinople (now Istanbul), then the Turkish capital.

Sir Henry McMahon was no minor official of the British Government. As High Commissioner for Egypt, he was virtually its ruler at a time when the Suez Canal was clearing vast supplies and large numbers of troops for the Allies. He was a most trusted negotiator at the highest level, coming fresh from a diplomatic triumph settling the 'McMahon Line' dividing Indian and Tibetan territory* under the 1914

* From 1959 this 'line' became a cause of dispute between the 'Peoples Republic of China' and India.

Simla Convention between the Chinese and Tibetans.³ McMahon was disturbed by the vagueness of the terms on which he was instructed to negotiate an agreement, and he sent a warning to the Foreign Office in which he emphasized the importance of keeping faith with the Arab leaders as well as the dangers of under-rating the possible development of the Arab movement. Further, he urged the need for unity of control over all negotiations.²

Meanwhile the India Office in London, which was responsible for the part of Arabia bordering the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf, had sent a political officer, Captain Shakespear, as adviser to Ibn Saud of Riyadh and his Wahabi tribesmen in central Arabia. The Imam of Yemen, as well as a neighbouring prince, Ibn Rashid, had declared their loyalty to Turkey; and Ibn Saud, who turned to Kuwait for support, was persuaded, with some financial aid, to attack Ibn Rashid. The resulting battle was inconclusive but Shakespear was killed, and Ibn Saud played no further part in the war, but concluded a treaty with British India on 26 December 1915 which guaranteed his neutrality.³ A British Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill with the Idrisi Said of Sabya, geographically part of a larger territory north of Yemen called 'Asir,⁴ concluded by the British Political Resident in Aden on 30 April 1915, provided Idrisi with material support for action against the Turks.

Kitchener's policy of winning Arab friendship and support had now become the concern of those who had no comparable understanding of the area and its peoples. In London, he was in conflict with Winston Churchill about naval responsibility at Gallipoli; and in the middle of April had wanted to resign because of friction with Lloyd George over the Armaments Committee. He believed there was a cabal to get rid of him and Sir Edward Grey.⁵ But by a bitter twist of fate, on the very day that the Sherif's sons, Ali and Feisal, proclaimed independence from Turkish rule and the beginning of the great Arab rebellion, Kitchener was to die in the North Atlantic on his way to Russia.⁶

In the correspondence with McMahon, Hussein declared the aim of the Arabs as set out in the '*Damascus Protocol*' was to achieve independence and unity in all regions where the Arab people preponderated. In return for England's acknowledgement and support for such Arab independence, England was to have preference in 'all economic enterprises in the Arab countries', as well as a military pact of mutual assistance in the event of an attack by any foreign Power on either party.⁷

As the Allied forces had made little impression on the Turkish Empire at that time, McMahon regarded a discussion of such boundaries as 'premature'.⁸ But Hussein was very insistent. On 9 September 1915 he wrote:

"Your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coolness and hesitation which you have displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no use and is a loss of time, and that they are still in the hands of the government which is ruling them, etc., might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort.

"As the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over, but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this.

"Therefore, they have found it necessary first to discuss this point with the Power in whom they have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustrious British Empire."⁹

The substance of this letter was conveyed to the Foreign Office by Sir Henry McMahon on 18 October 1915;¹⁰ and in a private telegram of the same date to Sir Edward Grey, he reported the results of further conversations with Mohammed Farouki.* Farouki declared that Germany had promised the Arab party the fulfilment of all their demands, and that they were at the parting of the ways. He expressed the opinion that: "The occupation by France of the purely Arab districts of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus would be opposed by the Arabs with force of arms, but with this exception...they would accept some modification of the north-western boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."***¹¹

Sir Henry referred the matter to the British Government, which immediately got in touch with M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London.¹² With further instructions received from the British Foreign Office, on 24 October 1915, Sir Henry McMahon embodied the French decisions in a reply to the Sherif Hussein, as follows:

"The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

"With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

* A leader in one of the Arab nationalist organizations in the Ottoman army, who had passed over to the British lines at Gallipoli, and had recently been brought to Egypt.

** This latter suggestion by Farouki is important; for though it does not appear certain that it would have been agreed to by the rest of the Damascus party, and it has certainly never been agreed to by Sherif Hussein, it was taken by the British Government as the basis of their negotiations with France, and is the origin of the divisions made in the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

"As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

"(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca."¹³ (See map 1 on page 39).

In the Sherif Hussein's letter of 5 November 1915, he no longer insisted on 'the inclusion of the districts of Mersina and Adana' (now in Turkey) 'in the Arab Kingdom', but formally repeated his claim to the rest in entirety. 'But the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather.'

'We Moslems will follow the footsteps of the Commander of the Faithful, Omar ibn El-Khattab, and other Khalifs succeeding him, who ordained in the laws of the Moslem faith that Moslems should treat the Christians as they treat themselves. He, Omar, declared with reference to Christians: "They will have the same privileges and submit to the same duties as ourselves." The arrival of a clear and definite answer as soon as possible to the above proposals is expected.'¹⁴

The policy laid down with regard to the Christians was evidently inspired by the Damascus Committee, for Farouki, in his conversations in Cairo, stated their views on the point thus: "The basis of the new Arab Empire will be national, not religious. It will be an Arab, not a Moslem Empire. Christian Arabs, Druzes, and Nosairia will have the same rights as Moslems, but the Jews will be governed by a special law."¹⁵

McMahon's reply of 14 December 1915 noted Hussein's comment on the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, and stated, "but, as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course." The letter was delivered with 'a sum of twenty thousand pounds.'¹⁶

In his final letter of 1 January 1916, the Sherif said that he would not press an issue which might impair the alliance between Great Britain and France. 'Yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts. . . It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.'¹⁷

Map 1
THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD



Area of Arab independence as defined by Sherif Hussein in his letter dated 14 July 1915 to Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt.

////// Area excluded from Arab independence as defined by Sir Henry McMahon in his letter to Sherif Hussein No. 4 dated 24 October 1915 and further explained by letter No. 6 dated 14 December 1915.

Sir Henry McMahon answered this in his fourth letter of 25 January 1916, by taking note of the Sherif's 'desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance between Great Britain and France,' and assured him that the friendship between the two countries would endure after the war.¹⁸ The Sherif, on his part, never referred to the boundary question again during the negotiations, but the claims not accepted by the British Government were not withdrawn by him, and were the concern of his sons and the Arab nationalists.

For instance, a letter written to him by his son Emir Ali on 26 May 1916, on the eve of the revolt, and mostly occupied with military details, concluded: "Our Lord will not, we hope, forget Alexandretta, Beirut, and those regions."¹⁹

Again, Emir Abdullah remarked to Colonel Wilson at Jedda on 1 November 1916, *a propos* of his father's assumption of the title of 'King of the Arabs', that 'the boundaries of his kingdom were settled previous to the revolt'—an assumption that it was only the immediate military necessity which postponed a full and public declaration by Britain and the Arabs of Arab claims to the regions mentioned by Emir Ali.

The letters between the Sherif Hussein and McMahon reveal the Sherif as a man of determination, with great faith in his cause and people; that his bounding spirit soared high in hopes for the Arab peoples is shown by the views he expressed to T.E. Lawrence in July 1917 on the boundary question. 'The main points were that he had altogether refused to permit any French annexation of Beirut and the Lebanon. "They are Arab countries, but I will neither take them myself nor permit anyone else to take them. They have deserved independence and it is my duty to see they get it".'

'He said that he refused a detailed discussion of boundaries on the grounds that hostilities between Turkey and the Allies still continue and all decisions taken now would necessarily have to be modified in accordance with the actual results of military operations, for which he must have an absolutely free hand. "If advisable, we will pursue the Turks to Constantinople and Erzerum, so why talk about Beirut, Aleppo and Hail."'²⁰

In the absence of provision to the contrary, it was only logical for the Arabs to believe that the British declaration of acceptance of the Sherif's delimitation included Palestine within the area of Arab independence. According to McMahon's letters (No. 4 of 24 October as explained by No. 6 of 14 December 1915), the only territory excluded was the territory 'lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo' where it was said 'the interests of (Britain's) ally, France, were involved.' This region was understood to be the Lebanon where France

claimed for herself certain interests because of the large Christian community. Palestine, on the other hand, was predominantly Moslem and is located *south and south-west of the line delineated by McMahon*. The fact that Palestine after the Armistice had come under British control, and that Lebanon was placed under French control, lends greater force to the Arab argument that Palestine was indeed included in the British pledges of Arab independence.

In fact, the British Government recognized itself, with regard to Palestine, 'committed by Sir Henry McMahon's letter to the Sherif on 24 October 1915 to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence.'²¹

On 5 June 1916, Ali, the Sherif's eldest son, and Feisal, raised the crimson banner of revolt on the outskirts of Medina under their father's orders. They proclaimed the independence of the Arabs from Turkish rule in the name of the Sherif Hussein, Lord of Mecca.²²

Though Hussein was still working for uprisings to take place simultaneously in Syria while negotiating with McMahon on the supply of arms and ammunition, and pressing for a landing of British troops on the Syrian coast to interrupt Turkish communications, he was unaware that the Supreme Command in the Eastern theatre of war had decided on 28 December 1915 to adopt a passive role in outlying campaigns,²³ and that British forces in Mesopotamia had suffered a severe defeat with the fall of Kut* (29 April 1916), two new factors, one moral and one strategic, made him risk everything with a fine recklessness.

On 6 May, Feisal was staying with friends at a farmhouse five miles out of Damascus. A special messenger delivered the day's edition of the newspaper *al-Sharq*. On the front page were the names of 21 men who had been executed that morning for 'treasonable participation in activities of which the aims were to separate Syria, Palestine and Iraq from the Ottoman Sultanate and constitute them into an independent State.' After the names were read, there was silence broken only by murmured prayers for the repose of the souls of the dead. Then someone recited the opening verse of the Koran. Feisal leapt to his feet and shouted: "*Tab al-maut ya 'arab*" ('Death has become sweet, O Arabs').²⁴ Jemal, the Turkish Commander, was now ordering the execution of any Arab suspected of pro-French or pro-British sympathies.**

* T.E. Lawrence had been dispatched with Aubrey Herbert to negotiate an offer by the British Cabinet of LS.2 million to the Turks provided the Kut garrison of 13,000 officers and men were freed on parole. The offer, not published in the British press, was refused.²⁵

** Jemal Pasha held execution-parties, inviting his friends to be present at the hanging of those found guilty of desertion, of connivance with the Allies, and of other such acts. A number of the victims came from Palestine. Twelve young men were hanged together one day in Jerusalem, as were the Mufti of Gaza, Ahmad Aref el-Husseini, and his son.

The other factor influencing Hussein was the dispatch from Constantinople of a special Turkish force, including a German field mission under Major von Stotzingen, which would pass through the Hejaz on its way to Yemen. Stotzingen's orders were to set up a radio station on the coast in order to open up communications with German East Africa, where General Smuts was slowly wearing down the German General Lettow's sturdy opposition, as well as to keep Turkish General Headquarters better informed of the area. There were other purposes also, including the fomenting of anti-British propaganda in Dafur, the Sudan, Abyssinia and Somaliland.²⁶

The British Official History of the War states: "It is hard to over-estimate the importance of the Turco-German expedition, which might even have taken Aden by surprise. With these reinforcements, the Idrisi might have been crushed and the Imam left triumphant in the south. Of no less importance would have been its influence across the Red Sea, had Stotzingen established touch with German agents. It might have been able to give material assistance to the 'Mad' Mullah of Somaliland, who had designs upon Italian Eritrea, where the white garrison did not exceed two-thousand. All these plans and possibilities were brought to naught by the Arab Revolt."²⁷

The prematurity of the revolt meant that it opened under serious

A scion of the other great Arab family, the Nashashibi, also was hanged. So was Selim Ahmad Abdul Hadi, the uncle of 'Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, signatory of the Versailles Treaty and Secretary of King Feisal. Before Selim Abdul Hadi was arrested by the Turks, warning had reached him, but he refused to flee, saying: "If I go, they will take revenge on my uncle, Hafiz (Pasha), and I don't want him to be molested at his age. I shall stay here." He made a careful calculation of anything he owed, and signed a document for payments half an hour before he went to the scaffold, saying: "My hand does not tremble. Why should it? I die for my country."

Others condemned to death by the Turkish courts-martial at various periods were: Abdul Hamid Zahrani (who escaped); Shafiq Bey el Mouayyid (M. Bompard's visitor—condemned for his relations with the Allies); Shukri Bey el-Asali (for correspondence with M. Ottavi); Abdul Ghani el-Arisi; Seifuddin el-Habib (for having signed a secret proclamation of Arab independence); Mahmud el-Mahmasani; Saleh Bey Haidar; Rafiq Rizq Sollar; Abdul Wahid el-Inglisi ('the Englishman'—a Crusader's descendant); Enmu Hamid; Aref el-Shabab (for raising revolt amongst desert-tribes); Abdul Karim el-Habib; Sheikh Ahmad Tabarak; Ali el-Armanazi; Hafez Bey el-Said (of Jaffa); Said el-Karmi; Mahmud el-Adjem; Nayef Tello; Muhammad Muslim ben Abidin; Selim Bey Jazairi (of 'al-Fatat'); Amin Lutfi Bey (for endeavouring to promote rebellion amongst his fellow-officers); Abdul Qader el-Kharsa; Rushdi Shama'a; Muhammad el-Shamali; George Haddad (of the Christian Lebanon Society); Said 'Aqil; Petro Pauli. All these were executed, and other names could be added to the list.²⁸

Christians in Turkey were also suspected of Allied sympathies. On 24 April 1915, nearly one thousand Armenian intellectuals and leaders in Constantinople were seized and put to death.

material handicaps. In fulfilment of the agreement with Hussein, Wingate had begun to send rifles and ammunition, as well as money and food, across the Red Sea from the Sudan. But both McMahon and Wingate had been anxious for the Sherif to hold his hand until his forces had been better equipped. They were still urging delay when the news came that the uprising had taken place.²⁹

Within less than a week of the commencement of the revolt, the Turkish garrison at Mecca had surrendered. The Turks contributed to the Sherif's wider success by the folly of shelling the mosque that contained the *Ka'ba*, but the moves of Emir Ali to cut the railway 180 miles north of Medina and Emir Feisal's attempt to take Medina, were not so successful. Medina was now reinforced with the mobile column which included the German mission, and those of the Arabs who gained an entry were soon eliminated. Shelling by Turkish artillery was a nerve-shattering new experience. Feisal, who knew from Gallipoli the comparative innocuousness of such fire, tried, in vain, to calm his forces and press the attack.

Meanwhile, in ignorance of these dramatic events, Dr. Hogarth and other members of the Arab Bureau in Cairo who had come to a rendezvous near Jedda to discuss the revolt, were met on 6 June by the Sherif's youngest son, Zaid, instead of Abdullah, who told them the news. Hogarth carried back to Cairo the Sherif's urgent appeal for another 10,000 rifles at least, and above all for some mountain artillery. The news was telegraphed to London, where the War Committee quickly agreed that the 'new auxilliary must be supported. Instructions were sent to Egypt to deliver to the Sherif a battery of field guns complete and some machine-guns, and the War Committee concerted an active policy with a view to furthering the movement.' The main element in this policy was a decision to prepare to advance from the Suez Canal to El-Arish and Aqaba, to threaten Turkish communications and to reduce the danger to the Canal. At the same time the construction of a railway from Kantara on the Canal to El-Arish was to be begun. These decisions preceded by a fortnight another unsuccessful Turkish attack on the Canal.³⁰

On 27 June, three ships, manned by Egyptian troops, sailed from Port Sudan with rifles, artillery, and a large supply of food and ammunition and arrived next day at Jedda. It had been attacked by the Sheikh of the Harb tribe with 4,000 followers on the same day that Hussein struck at Mecca. As at Medina, shell and machine-gun fire had proved too much for the Arabs, but they cut the garrison's water supply, and after a bombardment by two cruisers and a bombing attack by aircraft from the seaplane carrier *Ben-my-Chree*, the garrison of 1,400 men surren-

dered to the Arabs on 16 June 1916.

Other successes followed. Rabegh, 100 miles north of Jedda, was lightly held and easily taken. On 27 July, Yenbo, 100 miles beyond Rabegh, also surrendered. Of the ports along the Hejaz coast, only Wajh in the extreme north remained in Turkish hands. Inland, Abdullah was besieging the hill-station of Taif with a force of some 5,000 tribesmen but was not so rash as to try an assault—the garrison of 3,000 Turks had 10 Krupp field guns—until an Egyptian battery of 4 guns and a howitzer captured from the Turks could be brought up on 16 July. The garrison of 2,000 men finally surrendered on 2 September, bringing the Sherif's bag of prisoners to over 5,000. Many of the Arab soldiers volunteered to enter his service, and later formed the nucleus of a regular force.

But there was no good news from Medina. The railway service from Damascus had been restored after momentary interruption. Command had been taken over by Fakhri Pasha, who had risen to notoriety as organizer of the Adana massacres in 1909. It did not take him long to live up to his reputation. He made a sudden sortie on 27 June, drove off Feisal and surrounded and assaulted the suburb that Feisal had occupied. The area was sacked and burned, the inhabitants massacred with few exceptions, the females, after rape, were thrown into the flames as a variant to death by mutilation.

'This experience of the Turkish mode of war made the more impression because of its breach of the Arab code of war, which rules on not only that women and children should be spared, but also material property, if it cannot be removed as loot.'

On 3 August the Turks took the offensive again from Medina, and drove the Arab forces 20 miles south of the city in a running fight. They did not exploit their success, the Turkish commander choosing to wait until fresh forces reached him at Medina, to permit him to undertake the complete subjugation of the Hejaz. Eight battalions were being sent, as well as a new Sherif who was to make a triumphal entry into Mecca.³¹

In October 1916, McMahon's Secretary for Oriental Affairs, Ronald Storrs, arrived for consultation with Emir Abdullah on the further prosecution of the war. His military attaché was T.E. Lawrence, whose name was to become familiar to the most isolated bedouin tribesman as a man to be trusted, and a man who understood the Arab peoples.

It was agreed that Lawrence investigate and advise on the military situation. He found the Arabs' weapons antiquated or unserviceable,

there was little ammunition, and Feisal* was entirely without money. Military aid was agreed upon on the usual western terms—the acceptance of advice and instruction from service officers of the supplying Power. But before it could arrive, the Turks struck out again from Medina towards the coast. Feisal's forces retreated toward the coast town of Yenbo. Here the guns of five British warships helped stop the Turkish advance. Now stores, equipment and some regular British army officers began to arrive; and in January 1917, a new plan of campaign was prepared. Abdullah's forces took over the siege of Medina, while Feisal's forces with a few British officers, including Lawrence, marched a hundred miles north to the port of Wajh. This was taken on 25 January with naval support. Raids were organized on the Hejaz railway carrying Turkish supplies, demolition advice being given by an officer of the Royal Engineers.

Meanwhile, Egypt-based British forces under the command of General Archibald Murray, which had until then been employed defensively before the Suez Canal, had advanced across and cleared the Sinai Peninsula. They reached Rafah on the southern borders of Palestine on 8 January 1917, while the Turks retired to a Gaza-Beersheba line. A further advance was not authorized until three months later, the last week in March, giving ample time for the reinforcement of the enemy and the fortification of positions to meet the offensive to come.³² That offensive, and another in April, were unsuccessful, British losses being estimated at nine to ten thousand men. The War Cabinet then decided to relieve Murray.

The choice of a successor led to an investigation of the whole future of this campaign. The Russians, who penetrated Turkish Armenia (Erzerum, 16 February; Trebizond, 17 April) and northern Persia (Iran) the year before, could no longer be counted on to contain many Turkish troops in the Caucasus. In Mesopotamia (Iraq), new forces under General Sir Stanley Maude had passed from success to success, and Baghdad had been occupied on 11 March—the one bright spot in the military situation. It was thought that the Turks had probably written off Mesopotamia and would therefore be able to concentrate on the Palestine front as large a force as communications allowed; and although there were Turks who favoured the retaking of Baghdad, a former capital of the Caliphs which was important to the Pan-Islamic part of the Young Turk Party, it was recognized that if Palestine fell to the British, Iraq

* At their first meeting Feisal politely enquired: "And do you like our place here in Wadi Safra?"

"Well; but it is far from Damascus," Lawrence replied.

'It was a thrust that drew blood and yet formed a binding tie.'

would too. So their Palestine front was reinforced.

Smuts was offered the Palestine command, but refused it because all the requirements for a great offensive campaign could not be spared him, owing to the Russian revolution. Eventually, on 28 June, when the future policy in this theatre had become merged into the question of the major strategy of the war which was being examined by a special committee of the Cabinet under the Prime Minister, General Sir Edmond Allenby took up the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.³³

In July the Committee of Prime Ministers refused to allow the transport of the 54th Division from Palestine to the Western Front,³⁴ and the importance of Palestine to the small group who were now running Britain can be judged by five letters written to the C.I.G.S. by Lloyd George in September, specifically asking for information on the Palestine campaign.³⁵

However, during the period from April until Allenby's autumn offensive in 1917, the main fighting in the area was done by the Arabs.

From Wajh, Feisal sent emissaries north in the direction of Jerusalem and eastwards into Arabia urging the tribes to join the revolt against the Turks. Lawrence followed in early May 1917, in company with Sheikh Audeh Abu Tayeh, a famous tribal chief, collecting the desert tribesmen. By agreement with Hussein, Feisal's army moved up to take Aqaba, keeping in close touch with General Allenby who was now in charge of the Syrian-Palestine campaign. Feisal's army attacked and destroyed a Turkish battalion moving to relieve the Aqaba garrison, and went on to take the town on 6 July 1917.

The importance of the capture of Aqaba was assessed by Captain Liddel Hart: "Strategically, the capture of Aqaba removed all danger of a Turkish raid through Sinai against the Suez Canal or the communications of the British army in Palestine...its capture ensured that the 'Arab ulcer' would continue to spread in the Turks' flank, draining their strength and playing on their nerves."³⁶

Desertions of Arabs conscripted into the Turkish forces were numerous. The German General Kress von Kressenstein, who had commanded the abortive attack on the Suez Canal and the subsequent retreat across the Sinai Peninsula as British forces advanced, had already suggested that Arab units be transferred to other fronts. A new commander, Marshal von Falkenhayn, who had routed the Rumanian-Russian forces in 1916, now insisted on positive measures to combat Anglo-Arab propaganda. With a liberal budget and a staff of German experts in Arab affairs, an Arab bureau was founded in Damascus, just as the British had formed one in Cairo. Severe penalties for retaining leaflets dropped by British

planes were combined with offers of free pardons by Jemal Pasha to all who had until then supported Hussein. Whether such a psychological approach could ever have had any chance of success is disputable. In any case, it was too late.

With the desert raiders, including a detachment of Indian troops and several British officers, operating far north and east to within a hundred miles of Haifa, the British army attacked the Turks on the Gaza-Beersheba line on 6 November 1917. The line was broken near Gaza; Jaffa was taken on 14 November; and on 9 December, Jerusalem surrendered.

The Mayor of Jerusalem, Hussein el-Husseini, in an improvised ceremony, was introduced to Major-General J.S.M. Shea by Mrs. Bertha Spafford Vester of the American Colony (a humanitarian organization) and presented to him a letter written by the Turkish commander a few hours before. The reason the Turkish army had retreated, the letter stated, was to save the holy places from destruction by British guns.

"Jerusalem was a new city," wrote Mrs. Vester. "Strangers greeted and congratulated one another. Faces we had not seen for months and years emerged from hiding... We thought then we were witnessing the triumph of the last crusade. A Christian nation had conquered Palestine! Everyone was happy at the ending of centuries of Turkish occupation, and good will was the expression of people of all religious and ethnic communities."³⁷

Two days later, accompanied by Col. T.E. Lawrence, Sir Mark Sykes, Secretary of the British War Cabinet, M. Georges Picot, French representative, and the Italian, French and American military attachés, General Allenby made a ceremonial entry into the Holy City on foot.

The Chief Rabbi stood beside the Grand Mufti as *Allenby's Proclamation* (Document 2) was read in English, French, Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, Russian and Italian, declaring the establishment of martial law and guaranteeing protection of religious rights and property. Throughout the ceremony, no Allied flag was flown.

The British capture of Jerusalem was a heavy blow to Turkey's prestige, more damaging because it followed the loss of Baghdad. For the Western Allies, it helped to soften the pain of a series of failures and disasters. The year had seen the collapse of Russia, the suppression of Rumania, the failure of the Franco-British offensive in the West, grave mutinies in the French army, the engulfing of the British in the mud of Passchendale, and the disastrous breakdown of the Italians at Caporetto. 'Then, as a timely Christmas present, came the redemption of the place to which the thoughts of Christendom turned at Christmastide.'³⁸

But the French and British, with increasing United States support, were as yet not interested in 'peace on earth'* unless it was on their own terms...And the United States, instead of using its great power for peace, had made peace more remote by President Wilson signing a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary on 7 December 1917.

At the beginning of the Arab rebellion, the Turkish garrisons in the Hejaz numbered about 15,000 men, and by the end of the year, a further 8,000 were³⁹ believed to have arrived. The Arabs are estimated to have had forces of about 16,000 tribesmen in that part of the campaign. The total strength of Turkish forces on the Gaza-Beersheba front were 50-60,000. General Allenby, and later General Sir John Bagot Glubb, Officer Commanding the Jordan Arab Legion from 1939 to 1956, estimated that Arab activity in the Hejaz diverted some 30,000 potential defenders from the front.³⁹

The British had taken prisoner 562 officers and 11,474 men in their operations in Palestine up to the taking of Jerusalem. But the German-supported Turkish forces were still effective, offering steady opposition to the advance of Allenby's forces north and east of Jerusalem. The Turks, with German assistance, unsuccessfully attempted to recapture Jerusalem on 27 December 1917 in an attack which lasted 26 hours.

General Allenby counter-attacked the Turkish right flank and made a general advance on 28 December. By the morning of the 29th, the British had reached the line Burqa-Ramallah-Wadi Qilt and inflicted heavy losses. They continued to advance north of Jerusalem, taking Bethel on the 29th, and Tafilah, south-east of the Dead Sea, was captured by Arab troops.

Small trained Arab forces were now built up from Arab prisoners-of-war, which included some officers, such as Nuri Es-Said, who were later to become internationally famous. Copies of a proclamation by King Hussein calling on Arab soldiers in the Turkish Army to 'come and join us who are labouring for the sake of religion and the freedom of the Arabs so that, if God wills, the Arab kingdom may again become what it was during the time of your fathers' (Document 3) had been dropped by planes in large quantities over the Turkish lines.

British aircraft were also active against Turkish troop concentrations and communications. The Hejaz railway was bombed on 15 January, probably contributing to the Arab capture of an important Turkish

* On 29 November 1917, a letter from Lord Landsdowne, who had resigned from the British Cabinet, was printed in the London *Daily Telegraph*, calling for a re-statement of Allied pre-requisites for peace. On 11 December, Mr. Arthur Balfour announced that German peace proposals had been received in September 1917.

convoy east of Medina. Strategic areas of Samaria were bombed on 18, 20 and 22 January, and troops in Nablus were bombed on the 25th. On 26 January, Turkish attacks near Tafleleh and Ma'an were repulsed by Hejaz troops. The British advance was slow and hard. At the end of January 1918, they were only 12 miles north of Jerusalem. Jericho was taken on 21 February, after attacks along a 15-mile front, and the Turks retreated eastward beyond the Jordan River.

After small advances in the earlier part of the month, on 24 March 1918 Allenby moved forces from Jericho east, crossed the River Jordan, took the town of Es-Salt,* and tried to link up with Feisal's desert forces in the vicinity of Amman. When the British forces reached the outskirts of that area, the Turks had already withdrawn from the town, leaving some ninety men to man the artillery on the surrounding hills to cover the retreat of the Turkish and German armies. The British were unable to advance, and after a three day siege of the town, withdrew to their original positions west of the River Jordan to avoid encirclement by Turkish forces which struck east from Nablus under the command of Mustapha Kemal (later the Turkish President Kemal Ataturk). This hasty retreat left many British dead on the battlefield and considerable supplies on the mountains overlooking the town.** Many Arab children tasted Australian jam and 'bully' beef for the first time after that day!

* The inhabitants of Es-Salt—half Moslem and half Christian—although they answered the Sherif's call of revolt against the Turks, were unable to take an effective part in the fighting itself because their town was located some ten miles from the front and served as a military base.

When the Turkish and German armies retreated towards Amman before the advancing British, the inhabitants of Es-Salt attacked the retreating armies causing havoc and losses in their ranks. When the British retreated ten days later, the inhabitants of Es-Salt were evacuated to Jerusalem for fear of Turkish reprisals. There they lived as refugees; the able-bodied men joining the Arab fighting forces and contributing their share towards the eventual defeat of the Turkish forces.

** Amman, now the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was no more than a small village during World War I. The population was mainly Circassian—descendants of Moslem mountain tribes who emigrated from the Caucasus after the Russian conquest of that region in 1877-78 because they were unwilling to live under Christian rule. In return for their loyalty, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid allowed them to settle in certain Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire as a counter-irritant to the restive Arab populations.

Unlike the Arabs, the Circassians threw in their lot with the Turks during World War I. This resulted in increased hostility between the two. But when the Turkish armies were driven out of the Arab World, friendly relations soon developed, and today the two communities in Jordan, as well as those in Syria, form one community and Nation. The Circassians, though largely arabized, have retained certain distinct characteristics and customs.

On 10 April, Turko-German troops attacked British positions in the coastal sector of Palestine; and on the 11th, the Turks attacked near Ghoraniya (east Jordan). Both attacks were driven off. Turkish resistance continued strong (they were having successes in Armenia, capturing Kars, Ardahan and Bayazid by 23 April), and in spite of a 53-mile sector of the Hejaz railway now being occupied by Arab troops, there was heavy fighting on all fronts on 2 May, with Turkish troops crossing the River Jordan at Jisr Damiya. The British retreated west of the River.

An attempt by some 4,000 'regulars' under Nuri Es-Said to take Ma'an was also unsuccessful, nor could the forces of Feisal and Lawrence claim more than local successes in destroying long sectors of the railway, thereby temporarily cutting off supplies to Medina.

But the attacks on communications were beginning to weaken the Turks; and on 28 June, they lost Qal'at el-Ahmar (200 miles north of Medina) to the Arabs. On 13 July, the Turks attacked British positions in the Jordan Valley, but were defeated by next day at the passages of the Jordan and on Abu Tellul ridge. During August, British and Arab attacks on communications continued.

Allenby now planned for his major blow to be launched on the town of Der'a (some 60 miles south of Damascus and about half-way to Amman) by Arab regulars, bedouin tribesmen on horseback and camels, two British armoured cars and a small French artillery unit. Within a few hours, the railway linking Damascus with Amman and Palestine was theirs.

Allenby had insisted to the British War Cabinet that he be generously supplied for his Palestine-Syrian campaign, and with their special interest at this time in Palestine, he had no difficulties of that nature. His forces now amounted to eight infantry and four cavalry divisions, including a French brigade of mainly Armenian volunteers and a small Italian contingent. They were supported by a strong fleet of French and British ships which opened a heavy bombardment of the Turkish Eighth Army positions near Tulkarm at 3 a.m. on 19 September 1918. Immediately after, Allenby launched his most violent attack on the coastal plain north of Jaffa. The battle for Samaria had commenced.

The German command was surprised. They had been diverted by the Arab attacks along their left flank from Jericho to Amman and Der'a, so that Allenby was using thirty-five thousand infantry on the vital coastal front of fifteen miles against only eight thousand Turks; the bulk of their forces being kept in the east by the enemy commander, General von Sanders.

British infantry soon broke through the Turkish front on the coast,

while other units breached the centre of the Seventh-Eighth Army front. By 7.30 a.m., the cavalry were through, riding up the coast and inland for Nazareth, Affula and Beisan in Palestine, all but capturing Sanders and his staff, but heading off the retreat of the major part of the Seventh and Eighth Armies. The Turkish Fourth Army, east of the Jordan, was forced to retreat partly on Der'a and some units towards Damascus, all the time being subjected to bitter Arab attacks and even bombing by British aircraft. Emir Feisal and his army took Der'a and started for Damascus, never letting up on their pursuit of the Fourth Army. Every day the forces of the sheikhs in the vanguard grew larger as the local tribesmen rose to add their blows against the retreating Turk; their piercing war-cry a weird falsetto over the thunder of swift-ridden horses. By the morning of 30 September 1918, the desert horsemen were seven miles from Damascus, cutting off the retreat of the remainder of the Fourth Army fleeing from the Feisal army, while the British under Allenby were making forced marches and closing in on the western flank. The Turkish survivors were only too glad to surrender and fairly rushed into the British lines. Before sunset Feisal's Damascus committee, which for months had prepared to take over the city when the Turks were beaten, hoisted the Arab Hejaz flag on the Town Hall. Through the night the retreating Germans and Turks fired the dumps and ammunition stores, shocking the sky with white flame.⁴⁰

On the morning of 1 October 1918, the combined Arab and British forces marched into Damascus and took possession of the city. Emir Feisal and General Allenby did not enter until a few days later. After 400 years of foreign rule this ancient Arab capital was free: Feisal rode to the square where Jamal Pasha had hanged Arab nationalist leaders two years before; there was wild cheering, music, excitement. Feisal gravely raised his hands in thanks to Allah and expressed gratitude for his welcome.

Emir Feisal as commander of the Arab forces had received a telegram from the Foreign Office, transmitted to him by Allenby, recognizing the Arabs as a belligerent Power. Feisal, as a subordinate commander under Allenby, was authorized to set up a government in Damascus. "I gave the Emir Feisal", said Allenby, "an official assurance that whatever measures might be taken during the period of military administration they were purely provisional and could not be allowed to prejudice the final settlement by the Peace Conference, at which no doubt the Arabs would have a representative. I added that the instructions to the military governors would preclude their mixing in political affairs, and that I should remove them if I found any of them contravening these orders. I reminded Emir Feisal that the Allies were in honour bound to endea-

vour to reach a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned and urged him to place his trust whole-heartedly in their good faith."⁴¹

To complete the conquest of Syria, British forces moved up the coast to Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli, where the Arab Hejaz flag already flew over every town. A British division and an Arab force moved toward Aleppo. The Arabs entered Homs and Hama without opposition, but at Aleppo, Mustapha Kemal was in command of a corps of two divisions. A joint attack by British cavalry and Arab regulars was planned, but on 25 October 1918 Arab tribal forces penetrated the city which was taken next day.

The Ottomans capitulated to the Allied Powers nearly a fortnight before the German surrender. The armistice terms were drawn up by the United Kingdom and signed on board H.M.S. *Agamemnon*, in the harbour at Murdos on the Island of Lemnos. The only article (16) relating to Palestine prescribed: "Surrender of all garrisons in Hejaz, Asir (coastal area of southern Arabia), Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander; and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order."⁴²

This indicates inclusion of Palestine as a part of Syria. The war in the Near and Middle East was over. The struggle for peace was soon to begin.

Arab contribution to the Allied victory was summed up by Liddell Hart in the following words:

"In the crucial weeks while Allenby's stroke was being prepared and during its delivery, nearly half of the Turkish forces south of Damascus were distracted by the Arab forces...

"What the absence of these forces meant to the success of Allenby's stroke, it is easy to see. Nor did the Arab operation end when it had opened the way. For in the issue it was the Arabs, almost entirely, who wiped out the Fourth Army, the still intact force that might have barred the way to final victory...

"The wear and tear, the bodily and mental strain that exhausted the Turkish troops and brought them to breaking point was applied by the Arabs, elusive and ubiquitous, to a greater extent than by the British forces, both before and during the final phase."⁴³

CHAPTER III

The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)

WHILE THE British Government through its official representative in Cairo was negotiating on the possibility of an agreement with the Arabs by promising them independence in a region to include Palestine, other representatives were negotiating secretly with France and Russia for dividing control of the asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire after victory.

In November 1915, Lord Kitchener had come out to the Levant to survey the situation in Gallipoli and the strategy of the surrounding theatre of war. In planning the evacuation of Gallipoli, a proposal for landing 100,000 men at Alexandretta was considered, but rejected by the British General Staff and Admiralty mainly on strategic grounds. However, the chance that it might be adopted led the French military attaché in London to present, on behalf of his Government, a note to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff containing these paragraphs:

"Should the British Government be considering a disembarkation of troops in the gulf of Alexandretta in order to cut the railway to Palestine, they will have to take into consideration not only the economic interests but also the moral and political interests of France in these countries.

"French public opinion could not be indifferent to any operation attempted in a country which it considers as destined to form part of the future Syrian state; and it would require of the French Government not only that no military operations be undertaken in this particular country without previous agreement between the Allies, but also that, should such action be taken, the greater part of the task should be entrusted to French troops and to the French generals commanding them."¹

In fact the French had no troops available for such an operation. The note was a veto upon action in an area which the French regarded as their peculiar preserve. It is true that French connections with Syria* were stronger

* 'Syria' in Ottoman Empire days was recognized to include Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan.

than those of the British. French missionaries and schools were very active and France had traditionally acted as a nominal protector of the Lebanese Christians from Turkish persecution. In 1816 French troops had been sent there after a massacre of Christians, but had returned almost immediately as a settlement had been negotiated by Lord Dufferin before they arrived. In 1913, Syrian Arab leaders had held conversations with the French Consul-General in the same exploratory manner that Abdullah had approached Lord Kitchener, and had received a similar reply. However, when the war started, there was constant French suspicion that British agents were trying to undermine French influence in the area.

When Turkey joined the war, the French Consul-General in Beirut (Mr. Georges Picot) had to leave, and the consulate was sealed and placed under the care of the United States. Jemal Pasha, the Commander of the Turkish forces in Syria charged with taking the Suez Canal, bided his time; and with the end of the Gallipoli menace, a strong attack on Syrian nationalists became possible. The seals of the French consulate were broken and papers with details of Syrian contacts with French officials disclosed. An era of terror against the population followed. Those whose names were found in the seized documents were publicly hanged, youths were conscripted into the army, and hundreds of leading Syrian, including Palestinian, citizens transported into mountainous districts of Anatolia where many died from starvation and other causes. The United States protested against the deportations, and three U.S. warships were dispatched to Jaffa and other Syrian ports to distribute relief supplies.

As the major ally, France's claim to preference in parts of Syria could not be ignored. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, told the French Ambassador in London, Mr. Paul Cambon, on 21 October 1915, of the exchanges of correspondence with Sherif Hussein, and suggested that the two governments arrive at an understanding with their Russian ally on their future interests in the Ottoman Empire.

M. Picot was appointed French representative with Sir Mark Sykes, now Secretary of the British War Cabinet, to define the interests of their countries and to go to Russia to include that country's views in their agreement. The negotiations for this *Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement for the partition of the Ottoman Empire* (Document 4) started as soon as general agreement had been reached with Hussein, but neither Sir Henry McMahon nor the Sherif Hussein were told of them.

In the secret discussions with Foreign Secretary Sazonov, Russia was accorded the occupation of Constantinople, both shores of the Bosphorus and some parts of Turkish Armenia.* France claimed Lebanon and Syria

* This new offer to Russia of a direct outlet into the Mediterranean is a measure of the great importance attached by Britain and France to continued and wholehearted Russian

eastwards to Mosul. Palestine did in fact have inhabitants and shrines of the Greek and Russian Orthodox and Armenian churches, and Russia at first claimed a right to the area as their protector. This was countered by Sykes-Picot and the claim was withdrawn to the extent that Russia, in consultation with the other Allies, would only participate in deciding a form of international administration for Palestine.

Roughly, in the Arab areas, the Sykes-Picot Agreement provided for:

(a) an independent Arab state or a federation of Arab states in a part of what is now geographically known as Saudi Arabia and Yemen;

(b) France in Lebanon and Syria, and Britain in Iraq and Trans-Jordan: 'to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they may desire or as they may deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.'

(c) Parts of Palestine to be placed under 'an international administration of which the form will be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and after subsequent agreement with the other Allies and the representatives of the Sherif of Mecca.' (See map 2 on page 56).

The record of the secret negotiations of European states as they affected the Palestine story cannot be complete without a mention of Italy's interest in the area, though it was small in comparison with those of Britain and France.

When the Sykes-Picot Agreement became known in Rome, the Italian Government asked for clarification of its interests in view of previous commitments in the Secret (London) Agreement of 1915. This was given in the Tripartite (Saint-Jean de Maurienne) Agreement of 18 August 1915.²


Because of this Agreement, the assent of the Italian Government was required to any projected change in the status of an area from Gaza in the south, eastward to include Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho to the northern tip of the Dead Sea, thence northwards along the River Jordan, the Sea of Galilee and turning westward to the south of Tyre (In other words, the terri-

participation in the war. British policy from the end of the Napoleonic wars had been directed against Russia's efforts to extend its conquests to the Golden Horn and the Mediterranean (threatening Egypt and the way to India). For this reason, Britain and France had formed an alliance and fought the Crimean War (1854-56), which ended in the Black Sea being declared neutral; no warships could enter it nor could arsenals be built on its shores.

But Russian concern for the capture of Constantinople was more than economic and strategic. It was not unusual for priests to declare that the Russian people had a sacred duty to drive out the 'infidel' Turk and raise the orthodox cross on the dome of Santa Sophia.

In 1877, the Russian armies again moved towards Constantinople with the excuse of avenging cruelties practised on Christians. Again England frustrated these designs and the aggression ended with the Congress of Berlin, and British occupation of Cyprus.

Map 2
PARTITION OF SYRIA AND IRAQ
under the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)



A and B - Areas in which France and Britain are prepared to recognize an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States.

In Zone A, France } To have priority and special privileges of administration
In Zone B, Britain } and Control

In Zone C, France } To have direct and indirect control.
In Zone D, Britain }

In Zone E, An international administration.

tory of the future mandate of Palestine excluding the southern Negeb area).

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was incompatible with the pledges made to the Arabs. When the Turks gave Hussein details of the Agreement, he confined his action to a formal repudiation,³ and went on fighting. His faith in British promises remained unshaken.

Lord Curzon,* a pre-eminent British statesman at the time of World War I, said of it: "When the Sykes-Picot Agreement was drawn up it was, no doubt, intended by its authors . . . as a sort of fancy sketch to suit a situation that had not then arisen, and which it was thought extremely unlikely would ever arise; that, I suppose, must be the principal explanation of the gross ignorance with which the boundary lines in that agreement were drawn."⁴

Lloyd George described it as 'a foolish document', and thought it 'inexplicable that a man of Sir Mark Sykes' fine intelligence should ever have appended his signature to such an arrangement.'⁵ Apparently Sykes was always ashamed of it and resented his name being associated with a pact of which he disapproved, but which he negotiated on instructions from the Foreign Office.⁶

T.E. Lawrence had a different view of the Agreement when he wrote in 1929, "The Sykes-Picot treaty was the Arabs' sheet anchor. The French saw that and worked frantically for the alternative of the mandate . . . By the mandate swindle England and France got the lot. The Sykes-Picot treaty was absurd in its boundaries, but it did recognize the claims of the Syrians to self-government and was ten thousand times better than the eventual settlement."⁷

Like the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the Tripartite Agreement made no mention of concessions to Zionism in the future disposition of Palestine. However it is now known that before the departure of Sykes for Petrograd on 27 February 1916 for discussions with Sazonov, he was approached with a plan by Herbert Samuel, who had a seat in the Cabinet as President of the Local Government Board and was strongly sympathetic to Herzl's Zionism.⁸

The plan put forward by Samuel was in the form of a memorandum which Sykes thought prudent to commit to memory and destroy. Commenting on it, Sykes wrote to Samuel suggesting that if Belgium should assume the administration of Palestine it might be more acceptable to France as an alternative to the international administration which she wanted and the Zionists did not.⁹ Of boundaries marked on a map attached to the memorandum he wrote, "By excluding Hebron and the East of the Jordan there is less to

* Curzon had been Viceroy of India in 1898 at the age of 39. In 1916 he was Lord President and leader of the House of Lords.

discuss with the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes the only matter of vital importance to discuss with them and further does away with any contact with the bedouins, who never cross the river except on business. I imagine that the principal object of Zionism is the realization of the ideal of an existing centre of nationality rather than boundaries or extent of territory. The moment I return I will let you know how things stand at Pd."¹⁰

However, in conversations both with Sykes and the French ambassador, Sazonov was careful not to commit himself as to the extent of the Russian interest in Palestine, but made it clear that Russia would have to insist that not only the holy places, but all towns and localities in which there were religious establishments belonging to the Orthodox Church, should be placed under international administration, with a guarantee for free access to the Mediterranean.¹¹

Czarist Russia would not agree to a Zionist formula for Palestine; but its days were numbered.

CHAPTER IV

The Recognition of Zionism (1914-1917)

IN 1914, THE CENTRAL office of the Zionist Organization and the seat of its directorate, the Zionist Executive, were in Berlin. It already had adherents in most Eastern Jewish communities, including all the countries at war, though its main strength was in Russia and Austria-Hungary.¹ Some important institutions, namely, the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Anglo-Palestine Company and the Jewish National Fund, were incorporated in England. Of the Executive, two members (Otto Warburg and Arthur Hantke) were German citizens, three (Yechiel Tschlenow, Nahum Sokolow and Victor Jacobson) were Russians and one (Shmarya Levin) had recently exchanged his Russian for Austro-Hungarian nationality. The 25 members of the General Council included 12 from Germany and Austria-Hungary, 7 from Russia, 2 (Chaim Weizmann and Leopold Kessler) from England, and one each from Belgium, France, Holland and Rumania.²

Some prominent German Zionists associated themselves with a newly founded organization known as the *Komitee für den Osten*, whose aims were: 'To place at the disposal of the German Government the special knowledge of the founders and their relations with the Jews in Eastern Europe and in America, so as to contribute to the overthrow of Czarist Russia and to secure the national autonomy of the Jews.'³

Influential Zionists outside the Central Powers were disturbed by the activities of the K.f.d.O. and anxious for the Zionist movement not to be compromised. Weizmann's advice was that the central office be moved from Berlin and that the conduct of Zionist affairs during the war should be entrusted to a provisional executive committee for general Zionist affairs in the United States.

At a conference in New York on 30 August 1914, this committee was set up under the chairmanship of Louis D. Brandeis, with the British-born Dr. Richard Gottheil and Jacob de Haas, Rabbi Stephen Wise and Felix Frankfurter, among his principal lieutenants. For Shmarya Levin, the representative of the Zionist Executive in the United States, and Dr. Judah

Magnes, to whom the alliance of England and France with Russia seemed 'unholy', Russian czarism was the enemy against which their force should be pitted.⁴ But on 1 October 1914 Gottheil, first President of the Zionist Organization of America, wrote from the Department of Semitic Languages, Columbia University, to Brandeis in Boston enclosing a memorandum on what the organization planned to seek from the belligerents, with respect to the Russian Jews. "We have got to be prepared to work under the Government of any one of the Powers...", he wrote. "I shall be glad to have any suggestion from you in regard to this memorandum, and shall be glad to know if it meets with your approval. I recognize that I ought not to have put it out without first consulting you; but the exigencies of the situation demanded immediate action. We ought to be fully prepared to take advantage of any occasion that offers itself."⁵

Weizmann's proposal to transfer the central office to the United States was rejected. Early in December 1914 the situation was reviewed by the General Council at a meeting in Copenhagen. It was decided to leave the central office in Berlin in charge of Warburg and Hantke; Jacobson, who had been temporarily in Berlin, returned to his post as Director of the Zionist Agency in Constantinople; a Zionist bureau was to be opened in Copenhagen under the direction of a Russian member of the Council (Leo Motzkin) to work in conjunction with the Berlin executive; Tschlenow and Sokolow should visit London en route for New York. This American mission was abandoned. After arriving in England on 31 December 1914 and staying a few months, Dr. Tschlenow returned to Russia and threw himself into the Zionist struggle.* Sokolow remained in England and, working closely with Weizmann, played an active part in the preliminaries to the Balfour Declaration.⁶

In a speech on 9 November, four days after Britain's declaration of war on Turkey, Prime Minister Asquith said that the traditional eastern policy had been abandoned and the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire had become a war aim. "It is the Ottoman Government," he declared, "and not we who have rung the death-knell of Ottoman dominion not only in Europe but in Asia."⁷ The statement followed a discussion of the subject at a Cabinet meeting earlier that day, at which we know, from Herbert Samuel's memoirs, that Lloyd George, who had been retained as legal counsel by the Zionists some years before,⁸ 'referred to the ultimate destiny of Palestine.' In a talk with Samuel after the meeting, Lloyd George assured him that 'he was very keen to see a Jewish state established in Palestine.'

On the same day, Samuel developed the Zionist position more fully

* 'His hour came in 1917, when as a result of the March revolution, the Russian Jews were relieved of their disabilities, and Zionism, in common with other Jewish movements, could come freely into the open.'⁹

in a conversation with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. He spoke of Zionist aspirations for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state, and of the importance of its geographical position to the British Empire. Such a state, he said, "could not be large enough to defend itself," and it would therefore be essential that it should be, by constitution, neutral. Grey asked whether Syria as a whole must necessarily go with Palestine, and Samuel replied that this was not only unnecessary but inadvisable, since it would bring in a large and unassimilable Arab population. "It would," he said, "be a great advantage if the remainder of Syria were annexed by France, as it would be far better for the state to have a European Power as a neighbour than the Turk."¹⁰

Grey, however, considered these visions of Palestine's future largely from the point of view of creating a Jewish cultural centre, 'a nidus', as he called it, rather than a political state, and this was reported by Weizmann to the Zionist International.¹¹

In January 1915 Samuel produced a Zionist memorandum on Palestine after discussions with Weizmann and Lloyd George. It contained arguments in favour of combining British annexation of Palestine with British support for Zionist aspirations, and ended with objections to any other solution.¹² Samuel circulated it to his colleagues in the Cabinet. Lloyd George was already a Zionist 'partisan'; Lord Haldane, to whom Weizmann had had access, wrote expressing a friendly interest;¹³ though privately expressing Zionist sympathies, the Marquess of Crewe presumably did not express any views in the Cabinet on the memorandum;¹⁴ Zionism had a strong sentimental attraction for Grey;¹⁵ but his other colleagues, including his cousin Edwin Montagu, did not give him much encouragement. Prime Minister Asquith wrote: "I confess that I am not attracted by the proposed addition to our responsibilities, but it is a curious illustration of Dissy's favourite maxim that 'race is everything' to find this almost lyrical outburst proceeding from the well-ordered and methodical brain of H.S."¹⁶

After further conversations with Lloyd George and Grey,¹⁷ Samuel circulated a revised text to the Cabinet in the middle of March 1915. This began by asking what should be British policy on the future of Palestine, and supplying rhetorical answers. Annexation by France 'would be a continual and a formidable menace' to the Suez Canal. Leaving Palestine under Turkish rule was unthinkable. Internationalization was unworkable and might lead to a German protectorate. An autonomous Jewish state had been suggested but 'it is certain that the time is not ripe for it.' So the memorandum offered the conclusion that the only satisfactory arrangement would be a British protectorate (the word 'annexation' was dropped).

The memorandum went on to express the hope that 'under British rule facilities would be given to Jewish organizations to purchase land, to found

colonies, to establish educational and religious institutions, and to co-operate in the economic development of the country, and that Jewish immigration, carefully regulated, would be given preference, so that in course of time the Jewish inhabitants, grown into a majority and settled on the land, may be conceded such degree of self-government as the conditions of that day might justify.' It ended with an elaboration of the case for British sponsorship of Zionism, but omitted the 'somewhat rhetorical peroration' of its predecessor.¹⁸

It is not known if the memorandum was formally considered by the Cabinet, but Asquith wrote in his diary on 13 March 1915 of Samuel's 'dithyrambic memorandum' of which Lloyd George was 'the only other partisan.'¹⁹ Certainly, at this time, Zionist claims and aspirations were secondary to British policy towards Russia and the Arabs.

The Anglo-French naval attack on the Dardanelles forts had opened on 19 February 1915, and in the interval between February and the landing of troops on Gallipoli on 25 April the Russians managed to extort from Britain and France recognition of a claim for the incorporation in the Russian Empire of the Straits, Constantinople and parts of Armenia in Turkey. But in regard to other dispositions of the Turkish Empire, Grey stipulated that 'the Mussulman holy places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion.'²⁰

The reason for this reservation is brought out in a memorandum of 20 March 1915 in which Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov was informed that Britain attached great importance to the creation of an independent Moslem state as the political centre of Islam. Author Leonard Stein notes that it indicates that Grey contemplated 'as at least a possibility the inclusion of Palestine in the Moslem Arab State, though only a few weeks earlier he had told Herbert Samuel that he was still anxious to promote a settlement of the Palestine question in a manner more favourable to Zionist ideas' as he understood them.²¹ There is reason to believe that it was in part the great authority of Lord Kitchener favouring Arab independence in Palestine, which he had earlier surveyed as an officer in the Royal Engineers Corps attached to the Palestine Exploration Fund Expedition, which guided British policy away from Zionist aims.*

However, Britain, France and Germany attached considerable importance to the attitudes of Jewry towards them because money and credit were needed for the war. The international banking houses of Lazard Freres, Eugene

* In a letter to *The Times* on 12 July 1922, Sir Vivian Gabriel wrote: "In 1915, when Lord Kitchener laid the proposition (concerning negotiations with the Sherif of Mecca) before the Cabinet, of which he was a member, I was acting as his personal assistant in regard to Arab matters, and know that his scheme, on which the letter to the Sherif was based, would certainly not have admitted the exclusion of Palestine."

Mayer, J. & W. Seligman, Speyer Brothers and M. M. Warburg, were all conducting major operations in the United States, as were the Rothschilds through the New York banking house of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.* Apart from their goodwill, the votes of America's Jewish community of 3,000,000 were important to the issue of that country's intervention or non-intervention in the war. The great majority represented the one-third of the Jews of Eastern Europe, including Russia, who had left their homelands and come to America between 1880 and 1914. Many, because of firsthand experience, detested Czarist Russia and wished to see it destroyed. Of these Jews, not more than 12,000 were enrolled members of the Zionist Organization,²² so that Zionist objectives in Palestine were not considered in the exchanges leading to the Sykes-Picot Agreement signed in January and ratified in May 1916.

The goodwill of Jewry, and especially America's Jews, was assessed by both sides in the war as being very important. The once-poor Eastern European Jews had achieved a dominant position in New York's garment industry, and had become a significant political force. In 1914 they sent a Russian-born socialist to the Congress of the United States. They produced dozens of Yiddish periodicals; they patronized numerous Yiddish theatres and music halls; their sons and daughters were filling the metropolitan colleges and universities.²³

From the beginning of the war, the German Ambassador in Washington, Count Bernstorff, was provided, by the *Komitee für den Osten*, with an adviser on Jewish Affairs (Isaac Straus); and when the head of the Zionist Agency in Constantinople appealed, in the winter of 1914, to the German Embassy to do what it could to relieve the pressure on the Jews in Palestine, it was reinforced by a similar appeal to Berlin from Bernstorff.²⁴ In November 1914, therefore, the German Embassy in Constantinople received instructions to recommend that the 'Turks sanction the re-opening of the Anglo-Palestine Company's Bank—a key Zionist institution. In December the Embassy made representations which prevented a projected mass deportation of Jews of Russian nationality.²⁵ In February 1915 German influence helped to save a number of Jews in Palestine from imprisonment or expulsion, and 'a dozen or twenty times' the Germans intervened with the Turks at the request of the

* Jacob Schiff, German-born senior partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and 'the most influential figure of his day in American Jewish life,' wrote in *The Menorah Journal* of April 1915: "It is well known that I am a German sympathizer. . . England has been contaminated by her alliance with Russia. . . I am quite convinced that in Germany anti-semitism is a thing of the past."²⁶ The Jewish Encyclopedia for 1906 states that 'Schiff's firm subscribed for and floated the large Japanese war loan in 1904-05' (for the Russo-Japanese war), 'in recognition of which the Mikado conferred on Schiff the second order of the Sacred Treasure of Japan.'

Partners with Schiff were Felix M. Warburg and his brother Paul who had come to New York in 1902 from Hamburg, and organized the Federal Reserve System of banking.

Zionist office in Turkey, 'thus saving and protecting the Yishuv.'²⁷ The German representations reinforced those of the American Ambassador in Turkey (Henry Morgenthau).^{*28} Moreover, both the German consulates in Palestine and the head of the German military mission there, frequently exerted their influence on behalf of the Jews.²⁹

German respect for Jewish goodwill enabled the Constantinople Zionist Agency from December 1914 to use the German diplomatic courier service and telegraphic code for communicating with Berlin and Palestine.³⁰ On 5 June 1915 Victor Jacobson was received at the German Foreign Office by the Under-Secretary of State (von Zimmerman) and regular contact commenced between the Berlin Zionist Executive (Warburg, Hantke and Jacobson) and the German Foreign Office.³¹

Zionist propagandists in Germany elaborated and publicized the idea that Turkey could become a German satellite and its Empire in Asia made wide open to German enterprise; support for 'a revival of Jewish life in Palestine' would form a bastion of German influence in that part of the world.³² This was followed by solicitation of the German Foreign Office to notify the German consuls in Palestine of the German Government's friendly interest in Zionism. Such a course was favoured by von Neurath** when asked by Berlin for his views in October, and in November of 1915, the text for such a document was agreed upon and circulated after the approval of the German Chancellor (Bethmann-Holwegg). It was cautiously and vaguely worded so as not to upset Turkish susceptibilities, stating to the Palestine consuls that the German Government looked favourably on 'Jewish activities designed to promote the economic and cultural progress of the Jews in Turkey, and also on the immigration and settlement of Jews from other countries.'³³

The Zionists felt that an important advance toward a firm German commitment to their aims had been made, but when the Berlin Zionist Executive pressed for a public assurance of sympathy and support, the Government told them to wait until the end of the war, when a victorious Germany would demonstrate its goodwill.³⁴ On 29 December 1915, however, Warburg and Jacobson called upon von Zimmermann and asked leave to bring the German Government's friendly gesture to the notice of leading Zionists throughout the world. Warburg explained that he was thinking particularly of the United States where the news would make a favourable impression, and would be timely in view of plans which were being made for the formation of an imposing organization, the American Congress. Von Zimmermann agreed in principle.³⁵

Through the international Zionist Organization, the German move

* An award for Morgenthau's heavy financial support for Wilson's presidential campaign.³⁶

** Later, Foreign Minister (1932-38) and Protector of Bohemia (1939-43).

was quickly known anyway, but there was no attendant publicity which could be used to extract better terms from the other side. However, when late in 1917 the British War Cabinet was being pressed by the Foreign Office for prompt approval of the Balfour Declaration, one of the main arguments for haste was that the Germans were courting the Zionists and might at any moment come out with a similar declaration.³⁷ This factor was reasserted by Lloyd George in defense of his policy after the war: 'The German General Staff in 1916 urged the Turks to concede the demands of the Zionists in respect of Palestine. Fortunately, the Turk was too stupid to understand or too sluggish to move.'³⁸

Though the German Government still maintained friendly relations with the Zionist leaders, the main motive for gratifying the Zionists had, in fact, evaporated with the American declaration of war. This attitude was promoted by the Information branch of the German Foreign Office, with which Otto Warburg was connected, but opposed by its Political branch on the grounds that Germany was in no position to invite a quarrel with the Turks.³⁹ Apart from Germany's military position, Jemal Pasha was in sharp disagreement with the German General Staff about the handling of the combined force assembled under von Falkenhayn for the recapture of Baghdad.⁴⁰ The Turks had been incensed by Morgenthau's Cincinnati speech in May 1916, when he had announced that arrangements could be made for the sale of Palestine by Turkey to the Jews after the war,⁴¹ and antagonized by press reports that this had been agreed to by Turkey under German pressure.⁴²

When Zionist leaders in Germany met Jemal Pasha, by arrangement with the Foreign Office, during his visit to Berlin in the summer of 1917, they were told that the existing Jewish population would be treated fairly but that no further Jewish immigrants would be allowed. Jews could settle anywhere else but not in Palestine. The Turkish Government, Jemal Pasha declared, wanted no new nationality problems, nor was it prepared to antagonize the Palestinian Arabs, 'who formed the majority of the population and were to a man opposed to Zionism.'⁴³

A few weeks after the interview, the Berlin Zionists' pressure was further weakened by the uncovering by Turkish Intelligence of a Zionist spy ring working for General Allenby's Intelligence section under an Aaron Aaronssohn. 'It is no wonder that the Germans, tempted as they may have been by its advantages, shrank from committing themselves to a pro-Zionist declaration.'⁴⁴

It was fortunate for Zionism that the American Jews as a whole showed no enthusiasm for the Allied cause, wrote Stein. 'If they had all along been reliable friends, there would have been no need to pay them any special attention.'⁴⁵

In 1914 the French Government had sponsored a visit to the United States by Professor Sylvain Levy and the Grand Rabbi of France with the object of influencing Jewish opinion in their favour, but without success. A year later, it tried to reply to disturbing reports from its embassy in Washington about the sympathies of American Jews⁴⁶ by sending a Jew of Hungarian origin (Professor Victor Basch) to the United States in November 1915.⁴⁷ Ostensibly he represented the Ministry of Public Instruction, but his real mission was to influence American Jews through contact with their leaders.⁴⁸ Though armed with a message to American Jewry from Prime Minister Briand, he encountered an insuperable obstacle—the Russian alliance. ‘For Russia there is universal hatred and distrust. . . We are reproached with one thing only, the persecution of the Russian Jews, which we tolerate—a toleration which makes us accomplices. . . It is certain that any measures in favour of Jewish emancipation would be equivalent to a great battle lost by Germany.’⁴⁹ Basch had to report to French President Poincaré the failure of his mission.⁵⁰

At the same time that Basch had been dispatched to the United States, the French Government approved the setting up of a ‘Comite de Propagande Français auprès des Juifs neutres,’ and Jacques Bigart, the Secretary of the Alliance Israélite, accepted a secretaryship of the Comité. Bigart suggested to Lucien Wolf, of the Jewish Conjoint Foreign Committee in London, that a similar committee be set up there. Wolf consulted the Foreign Office and was invited by Lord Robert Cecil to provide a full statement of his views.⁵¹

In December 1915 Wolf submitted a memorandum in which he analysed the characteristics of the Jewish population of the United States and reached the conclusion that ‘the situation, though unsatisfactory, is far from unpromising.’ Though disclaiming Zionism, he wrote that “In America, the Zionist organizations have lately captured Jewish opinion.” If a statement of sympathy with their aspirations were made, “I am confident they would sweep the whole of American Jewry into enthusiastic allegiance to their cause.”⁵²

Early in 1916 a further memorandum was submitted to the Foreign Office as a formal communication from the Conjoint Foreign Committee. This stated that ‘the London (Conjoint) and Paris Committees formed to influence Jewish opinion in neutral countries in a sense favourable to the Allies’ had agreed to make representations to their respective Governments. First, the Russian Government should be urged to ease the position of their Jews by immediate concessions for national-cultural autonomy; secondly, ‘in view of the great organized strength of the Zionists in the United States,’ (though out of the three million Jews in the U.S. less than 12,000 had enrolled as Zionists in 1913),⁵³ the Allied Powers should give assurances to the Jews of facilities in Palestine for immigration and colonization, liberal local self-government for Jewish colonists, the establishment of a Jewish university, and for the recognition of Hebrew as one of the vernaculars of the land—in

the event of their victory. These proposals were substantially the same as those made earlier by Wolf.⁵⁴

On 9 March 1916 Wolf was informed by the Foreign Office that 'your suggested formula is receiving (Sir Edward Grey's) careful and sympathetic attention, but it is necessary for H.M.G. to consult their Allies on the subject.'⁵⁵ A confidential memorandum was accordingly addressed to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Petrograd (Document 5), to ascertain his views, though its paternity, seeing that Asquith was still Prime Minister, 'remains to be discovered.'⁵⁶ No direct reply was received, but in a note addressed to the British and French ambassadors four days later, Sazonov obliquely assented, subject to guarantees for the Orthodox Church and its establishments, to raise no objection to the settlement of Jewish colonists in Palestine.⁵⁷

Nothing came of these proposals. On 4 July the Foreign Office informed the Conjoint Committee that an official announcement of support was inopportune.⁵⁸ They must be considered alongside the Sykes-Picot Agreement being negotiated at this time, and the virtual completion of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence by 10 March 1916, with the hope that an Arab revolt and other measures would bring victory near.

But 1916 was a disastrous year for the Allies. "In the story of the war" wrote Lloyd George, "the end of 1916 found the fortunes of the Allies at their lowest ebb. In the offensives on the western front we had lost three men for every two of the Germans we had put out of action. Over 300,000 British troops were being immobilized for lack of initiative or equipment or both by the Turks in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and for the same reason nearly 400,000 Allied soldiers were for all purposes interned in the malarial plains around Salonika."⁵⁹ The voluntary system of enlistment was abolished, and a mass conscript army of continental pattern was adopted, something which had never before occurred in British history.*⁶⁰ German submarine activity in the Atlantic was formidable; nearly 1½ million tons of merchant shipping had been sunk in 1916 alone. The resources of J.P. Morgan and Company, the Allies' financial and purchasing agents in the United States, though linked with N.M. Rothschild Company, were said to be nearly exhausted by increased Allied demands for American credit.⁶¹ There was rebellion in

* Russian nationals resident in the United Kingdom (nearly all of them Jews), not having become British subjects, some 25,000 of military age, still escaped military service.⁶² This prompted Jabotinsky and Weizmann to urge the formation of a special brigade for Russian Jews, but the idea was not favourably received by the Government, and the Zionists joined non-Zionists in an effort to persuade Russian Jews of military age to volunteer as individuals for service in the British army. The response was negligible, and in July 1917 the Military Service (Conventions with Allies) Act was given Royal assent. Men of military age were invited to serve in the British army or risk deportation to Russia. However, the Russian revolution prevented its unhindered application.⁶³

Ireland. Lord Robert Cecil stated to the British Cabinet: "France is within measurable distance of exhaustion. The political outlook of Italy is menacing. Her finance is tottering. In Russia, there is great discouragement. She has long been on the verge of revolution. Even her man-power seems coming near its limits."⁶⁴

In these circumstances, only one positive hope remained—that the United States should join the Allies.

The prospects were not good. Woodrow Wilson had fought and won his presidential re-election in 1916 on a pledge of continued neutrality in this foreign war. British,⁶⁵ French and German agents and representatives had been active in the United States on behalf of their causes since the beginning of the war without result. 'Throughout 1914 and 1915...the story of the relations between America and the belligerents is that of a country driven backwards and forwards between the two sides by an alternation of incidents any one of which might easily have tipped the scales of war, had it not been counterpoised by new troubles on the other side; and had it not been for the stubborn determination of President Wilson to keep his country out of the fight if he possibly could.'⁶⁶

Into this gloomy winter of 1916 walked a new figure. He was James Malcolm, an Oxford educated Armenian* who, at the beginning of 1916, with the sanction of the British and Russian Governments, had been appointed by the Armenian Patriarch a member of the Armenian National Delegation to take charge of Armenian interests during and after the war. In this official capacity, and as adviser to the British Government on Eastern affairs,⁶⁷ he had frequent contacts with the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, the War Office and the French and other Allied embassies in London, and made visits to Paris for consultations with his colleagues and leading French officials. He was passionately devoted to an Allied victory which he hoped would guarantee the national freedom of the Armenians then under Turkish and Russian rule.**

* Born in Persia, where his family had settled before Elizabethan days. He was sent to school in England in 1881, being placed in the care of a friend and agent of his family, Sir Albert (Abdullah) Sassoon. Early in 1915, he founded the Russia Society in London among the British public as a means of improving relations between the two countries. Unlike the Zionists, he had no animus towards Czarist Russia.⁶⁸

** There were many precedents for British concern with the welfare of Christian peoples under Ottoman rule. More recently, Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin had dealt with the right of protection of the Armenians from armed assaults by their non-Christian neighbours; in 1876 Britain had protested to the Turkish Sultan at the massacre of 20,000 Christians in Bulgaria; and a British circular of 12 January 1881 to the foreign ministries in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburg had drawn attention to Turkish persecution of the Armenians.

Following the 18 March 1915 failure of the British-French naval assault on Gallipoli,

Sir Mark Sykes, with whom he was on terms of family friendship, told him that the Cabinet was looking anxiously for United States intervention in the war on the side of the Allies, but when asked what progress was being made in that direction, Sykes shook his head glumly. "Precious little," he replied.

James Malcolm now suggested to Mark Sykes that the reason why previous overtures to American Jewry to support the Allies had received no attention was because the approach had been made to the wrong people. It was to the Zionist Jews that the British and French Governments should address their parleys.

"You are going the wrong way about it," said Mr. Malcolm. "You can win the sympathy of certain politically-minded Jews everywhere, and especially in the United States, in one way only, and that is, by offering to try and secure Palestine for them."⁶⁹

Zionism was not new to Sir Mark, but he had lost faith in its value as a means of getting America into the war,⁷⁰ and possibly because of the Prime Minister's disapproval.

But what really weighed most heavily now with Sykes were the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. He told Malcolm that to offer to secure Palestine for the Jews was impossible. 'Malcolm insisted that there was no other way and urged a Cabinet discussion. A day or two later, Sykes told him that the matter had been mentioned to Lord Milner' (an extreme imperialist and a very influential member of the War Cabinet who had authorized the South African Zionist Federation in 1902 to act, where Jews were concerned, as the channel for applications to enter or leave the Transvaal) 'who had asked for further information. Malcolm pointed out the influence of Judge Brandeis of the American Supreme Court, and his strong Zionists sympathies.'⁷¹

In the United States, the President's adviser, Louis D. Brandeis, an advocate of Zionism, had been inducted as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 5 June 1916. That Wilson was vulnerable was evident, in that as early as 1911, he had made known his profound interest in the Zionist idea and in Jewry.⁷² When Brandeis had been approved by the Senate, Wilson

there had been further massacres of more than 600,000 Armenians and some Greek Christians in Turkey out of a total of two million.

An aide-memoire presented to Lloyd George by M. Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference on 13 September 1919, represented British-French agreement on future responsibility: 'The French Government, having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate dispatch of French troops via Alexandretta for the purpose.'⁷³ When Turkish opposition was assessed to require substantial military intervention, the French abandoned Armenian protection.

wrote to Henry Morgenthau: "I never signed any commission with such satisfaction."⁷⁴

The fact that endorsement of Wilson's nominee by the Senate Judiciary Committee had only been made 'after hearings of unprecedented length,'⁷⁵ was not important. Brandeis had the President's ear; he was 'formally concerned with the Department of State.'⁷⁶ This was the significant development, said Malcolm, which compelled a new approach to the Zionists by offering them the key to Palestine.

The British Ambassador to the United States (Sir Cecil Spring-Rice) had written from Washington in January 1914 that "a deputation came down from New York and in two days 'fixed' the two Houses so that the President had to renounce the idea of making a new treaty with Russia."⁷⁷ In November 1914 he had written to the British Foreign Secretary of the German Jewish bankers who were extending credits to the German Government and 'were getting hold of the principal New York papers' thereby 'bringing them over as much as they dare to the German side' and 'toiling in a solid phalanx to compass our destruction.'⁷⁸

This anti-Russian sentiment was part of a deep concern for the well-being of Russian and Polish Jews. Brandeis wrote to his brother from Washington on 8 December 1914: "Am here on I.C.C. Oregon Minimum Wage and California eight-hour law cases. Expect to stay until the 18th and then return to Boston via N.Y.... You cannot possibly conceive the horrible sufferings of the Jews in Poland and adjacent countries. These changes of control from German to Russian and Polish anti-semitism are bringing miseries as great as the Jews ever suffered in all their exiles."⁷⁹

In a speech to the Russian Duma on 9 February (27 January Gregorian) 1915, Foreign Minister Sazonov denied the calumnious stories which, he said, were circulated by Germany, of accounts of alleged pogroms against the Jews and of wholesale murders of Jews by the Russian armies. 'If the Jewish population suffered in the war zone, that circumstance unfortunately was inevitably associated with war, and the same conditions applied in equal measure to all people living within the region of military activity.' He added to the rebuttal with accounts of hardship in areas of German military action in Poland, Belgium and Serbia.⁸⁰

* A reference to the 1914 invasion of Austria and East Prussia by the Russians with such vigour that many people believed that the 'Russian steamroller' would soon reach Berlin and end the war. Only the diversion of whole army divisions from the Western to the Eastern Front under the command of General von Hindenburg saved Berlin, and in turn saved Paris.

There was a direct effort by certain groups to support anti-Imperial activities in Russia from the United States,⁸¹ but Brandeis was apparently not implicated.

Brandeis first became interested in Zionism in 1910. He joined the Federation of American Zionists at the end of 1912, making his first appearance on a Zionist platform soon afterwards.⁸² He is said to have been influenced in favour of a British protectorate over Palestine by an article in the British socialist journal *New Statesman and Nation*, 21 November 1914.⁸³ He delivered a notable address in April 1915 to the Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis in New York. It was reprinted as *the Jewish Problem and How to Solve It*—which eventually sold 50,000 copies. The speech defined Jewishness as a matter of *blood* which, he said, both sides admitted: the non-Jews who persecute those of Jewish faith, and Jews themselves who take pride ‘when those of Jewish blood exhibit moral or intellectual superiority, genius, or special talent, even if they have abjured the faith like Spinoza, Marx, Disraeli, or Heine.’⁸⁴ The old-established Jews in the United States struggled with Brandeis and his supporters as he lobbied the Jewish community for united action to emphasize Zionist aims in Palestine to the Great Powers in any negotiations during or at the end of the war.⁸⁵ But a part of the masses, many of whom had not long come from Russia, were gradually won over to the Zionist idea so that they became a more and more important pressure group supporting Zionist plans for Palestine. Most of them worked in the garment industry for which Brandeis was an outstanding counsel.

Most important of all, there is ‘reason to believe that in 1916 Woodrow Wilson gave a prominent New York Zionist (Brandeis) an assurance of his benevolent interest in Zionism in return for a promise of support in the presidential campaign of that year.’⁸⁶ Commenting on discussions with Wilson in 1916, de Haas wrote: ‘The assurances, reduced to a six-line memorandum with the initials ‘W.W.’, were wholly satisfactory.’⁸⁷ De Haas’s daughter, Mrs. de Haas Dembitz, wrote to Stein (27 October 1954): ‘I presume you know that President Wilson, before he was elected, promised my father active support in return for my father’s support in getting him elected.’⁸⁸ Zionists accept that ‘President Wilson... was the first occupant of the White House to feel the full force of Zionist pressure. It may be assumed that domestic political repercussions were not ignored, either.’⁸⁹

Brandeis did have opposition from Jewish sources. The *Los Angeles Times*, 4 June 1915, commented: ‘Brandeis, the Boston butter-in, is a high-grade opportunist. He... suggests that ‘the immediate unsettlement and ultimate settlement which must come at the end of the European war gives us Zionists, and the Jews throughout the world, an opportunity which they have not had since the destruction of Jerusalem—to acquire Palestine real estate at bargain prices.’ It is to be hoped that Brandeis... will open real estate offices in Jerusalem and thrive there—and stay there, above all, stay there.’

A non-Zionist paper, *The American Israelite*, 1 July 1915, was quite as caustic: ‘No one will deny, and the Israelites least of all, that Mr. Brandeis

is entitled to his opinion that Zionism is the panacea for all Israel's ills. But when he says that all those who do not agree with him 'are against their own people', he is guilty of uttering that which is not true and of being grossly impertinent at the same time. Who is Mr. Brandeis to judge his brethren? How does he come by the right to say that a Jew, be he ever so faithful, is an enemy of his own people, if he does not believe as Mr. Brandeis does? It is very much to be feared that his success and the psalms of praise that the Jewish press have been singing before him, have turned Mr. Brandeis' head..."

And indeed the non-Zionist chairman of the American Jewish Committee responded to an appeal by the Brandeis group that all American Jews should organize to emphasize Zionist aims in Palestine before the Great Powers in any negotiations during or at the end of the war,⁹⁰ by dissociating his community from the suggestion that Jews of other nationalities were to be accorded special status. He said that "the very thought of the mass of the Jews of America having a voice in the matter of deciding the welfare of the Jews in the world made him shrink in horror."⁹¹

The new approach of the Zionist movement by Mark Sykes with James Malcolm as preliminary interlocutor took the form of a series of meetings at Chaim Weizmann's London house, with the knowledge and approval of the Secretary of the War Cabinet, Sir Maurice Hankey. The result has been described by Mr. Samuel Landman, a leader of the Zionist-Revisionists, and secretary of the World Zionist Organization from 1917 to 1922, in the review *World Jewry*: "After an understanding had been arrived at between Sir Mark Sykes and Weizmann and Sokolow, it was resolved to send a secret message to Justice Brandeis that the British Cabinet would help the Jews to gain Palestine in return for active Jewish sympathy and for support in the U.S.A. for the Allied cause, so as to bring about a radical pro-Ally tendency in the United States."⁹²

This was sent in cipher through the Foreign Office. One of the principal Under-Secretaries at the time was Sir Ronald Graham. He was in the confidence of Sir Mark Sykes and during the whole time he was at the Foreign Office he was of unfailing help to the Zionists. Secret messages were also sent to the Zionist leaders in Russia, to hearten them and to obtain their support for the Allied cause. Messages were also sent to Jewish leaders in neutral countries, and the result was to strengthen the pro-Ally sympathies of Jews everywhere.

* Stein calls 'an absurd myth' and Felix Frankfurter 'silly nonsense' the assertion that in the autumn of 1916 the British Government caused to be intimated to Brandeis that it would support Zionist aspirations in Palestine if he used his influence with the President to bring the United States into the war.⁹³

Mr. Landman continues in his 'Secret History of the Balfour Declaration': "Through General McDonogh, Director of Military Operations, who was won over by Fitzmaurice (formerly Dragoman of the British Embassy in Constantinople and a friend of James Malcolm), Dr. Weizmann was able, about this time, to secure from the Government the services of half a dozen younger Zionists for active work on behalf of Zionism. At the time, conscription was in force, and only those who were engaged on work of national importance could be released from active service at the Front. I remember Dr. Weizmann writing a letter to General McDonogh and invoking his assistance in obtaining the exemption from active service of Leon Simon, (who later rose to high rank in the Civil Service as Sir Leon Simon, C.B.), Harry Sacher, (on the editorial staff of the *Manchester Guardian*), Simon Mark,* Yamson Tolkowsky and myself. At Dr. Weizmann's request I was transferred from the War Office (M. I. 9), where I was then working, to the Ministry of Propaganda, which was under Lord Northcliffe, and later to the Zionist office, where I commenced work about December 1916. Simon Marks actually arrived at the Office in khaki, and immediately set about the task of organizing the office which, as will be easily understood, had to maintain constant communication with Zionists in most countries.

"From that time onwards for several years, Zionism was considered an ally of the British Government, and every help and assistance was forthcoming from each government department. Passport or travel difficulties did not exist when a man was recommended by our office. For instance, a certificate signed by me was accepted by the Home Office at that time as evidence that an Ottoman Jew was to be treated as a friendly alien and not as an enemy, which was the case with the Turkish subjects."⁹⁴

A Programme for a New Administration of Palestine in Accordance with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement was issued by the English Political Committee of the Zionist Organization in October 1916, and submitted to the British Foreign Office as a basis for discussion in order to give an official character to the informal house-talks. It included the following:

"(1) The Jewish Chartered Company is to have power to exercise the right of pre-emption over Crown and other lands and to acquire for its own use all or any concessions which may at any time be granted by the suzerian government or governments.

"(2) The present population, being too small, too poor and too little trained to make rapid progress, requires the introduction of a new and progres-

* Associated with Israel M. Sieff, another of Weizmann's inner circle, in the business which later became Marks & Spencer, Ltd... Sieff was appointed an economic consultant to the U.S. Administration (OPA) in March 1924. As subsequent supporters, with Lord Melchett, of 'Political and Economic Planning' (P.E.P.), they exercised considerable influence on British inter-war policy.

sive element in the population. (But the rights of minority nationalities were to be protected).''

Other points were, (3) recognition of a separate Jewish nationality in Palestine; (4) participation of the Palestine Jewish population in local self-government; (5) Jewish autonomy in purely Jewish affairs; (6) official recognition and legalization of existing Jewish institutions for colonization in Palestine.⁹⁵

This *Programme* does not appear to have reached Cabinet level at the time it was issued, probably because of Asquith's known lack of sympathy, but as recorded by Samuel Landman, the Zionist Organization was given official British facilities for its international correspondence.⁹⁶

Lloyd George, an earnest and powerful demagogue, was now prepared to oust Asquith, his chief, by a *coup de main*. With the death of Kitchener in the summer of 1916, he had passed from Munitions to the War Office and he saw the top of the parliamentary tree within his grasp. In this manoeuvre he was powerfully aided by the newspaper proprietor Northcliffe,* who turned all his publications from *The Times* downwards to depreciate Asquith, and by the newspaper-owing M.P., Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook).

With public sympathy well prepared, Lloyd George demanded virtual control of war policy. It was intended that Asquith should refuse. He did. Lloyd George resigned. Asquith, also resigned to facilitate the reconstruction of the Government. The King then sent for the Conservative leader, Bonar Law, as pre-arranged, advised him to offer the premiership to Lloyd George.⁹⁷

Asquith and Grey were out; Lloyd George and Balfour were in. With Lloyd George as Prime Minister from December 1916, Zionist relations with the British Government developed fast. Lloyd George had been legal counsel for the Zionists, and while Minister of Munitions, had had assistance from the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, who had devised the production of acetone from horse-chestnuts (buckeye); the new Foreign Minister, Arthur Balfour, was already known for his Zionist sympathies. 'By February 1917, matters had developed sufficiently for an informal committee of Zionists and representatives of the British Government to be formed. In the meantime Justice Brandeis, guided by Jacob de Haas, Executive Secretary of the Provisional Zionist Committee, had been able to convince President Wilson of the justice of the Zionist case.'⁹⁸

The Zionists had nearly cleared the wall between them and their Palestine objective which they had found impossible 'to surmount by ordinary political means' prior to the war.⁹⁹ Herzl's prophecy that they would get Palestine 'not from the goodwill but from the jealousy of the Powers,'¹⁰⁰ was being made to come true.

* Northcliffe was small-minded enough to have Lloyd George called to the telephone, in front of friends, to demonstrate the politician's need of the Press.¹⁰¹

CHAPTER V

The Balfour Declaration

THE INFORMAL committee of Zionists and Mark Sykes as representative of the British Government, met on 7 February 1917 at the house of Moses Gaster,* the Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic (Spanish and Portuguese) congregations in England. Gaster opened the meeting with a statement that stressed Zionist support for British strategic interests in Palestine which were to be an integral part of any agreement between them. As these interests might be considered paramount to British statesmen, support for Zionist aims there, Gaster said, was fully justified. Zionism was irrevocably opposed to any internationalization proposals, even an Anglo-French condominium.¹

Herbert Samuel followed with an expression of the hope that Jews in Palestine would receive full national status, which would be shared by Jews in the *Diaspora*. The question of conflict of nationality was not mentioned and a succeeding speaker, Harry Sacher, suggested that the sharing should not involve the political implications of citizenship.² Weizmann spoke of the necessity for unrestricted immigration. It is clear that the content of each speech was thoroughly prepared before the meeting.

Sykes outlined the obstacles: the inevitable Russian objections, the opposition of the Arabs, and strongly pressed French claims to all Syria, including Palestine.³ James de Rothschild and Nahum Sokolow, the international Zionist leader, also spoke.

The meeting ended with a summary of Zionist objectives:

- I. International recognition of Jewish right to Palestine;
- II. Juridical nationhood for the Jewish community in Palestine;
- III. The creation of a Jewish chartered company in Palestine with rights to acquire land;
- IV. Union and one administration for Palestine; and

* Born in Rumania in 1856, his imposing presence and scholarship combined with 'an oracular manner suggesting that he had access to mysteries hidden from others, had made him an important figure at Zionist Congresses and on Zionist platforms in England and abroad.' It was calculated that Sykes would be impressed by his personality and background.⁴

V. Extra-territorial status for the holy places.⁵

The first three points are Zionist, the last two were designed to placate England and Russia, respectively,⁶ and probably Italy and the Vatican. Sokolow was chosen to act as Zionist representative, to negotiate with Sir Mark Sykes.

The reports reaching England of impending dissolution of the Russian state practically removed the need for Russian endorsement of Zionist aims, but made French and Italian acceptance even more urgent. This at any rate was the belief of Sykes, Balfour, Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, who, as claimed in their subsequent statements, were convinced that proclaimed Allied support for Zionist aims would especially influence the United States. Events in Russia made the cooperation of Jewish groups with the Allies much easier. At a mass meeting in March 1917 to celebrate the revolution which had then taken place, Rabbi Stephen Wise, who had succeeded Brandeis as chairman of the American Provisional Zionist Committee after Brandeis's appointment to the Supreme Court, said: "I believe that of all the achievements of my people, none has been nobler than the part the sons and daughters of Israel have taken in the great movement which has culminated in free Russia."⁷

Negotiations for a series of loans totalling \$ 190,000,000 by the United States to the Provisional Government in Russia of Alexander Kerensky were begun on the advice of the U.S. ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, who noted in his telegram to Secretary of State Lansing, 'financial aid now from America would be a master-stroke. Confidential. Immeasurably important to the Jews that revolution succeed...'⁸

Sykes was the official negotiator for the whole project of assisting the Zionists. He acted immediately after the meeting at Gaster's house by asking his friend M. Picot to meet Nahum Sokolow at the French Embassy in London in an attempt to induce the French to give way on the question of British suzerainty in Palestine.⁹ James Malcolm was then asked to go alone to Paris to arrange an interview for Sokolow directly with the French Foreign Minister. Sokolow had been previously unsuccessful in obtaining the support of French Jewry for a meeting with the Minister: since the richest and most influential Jews in the United States and England, with the notable exception of the Rothschilds, who could have arranged such a meeting, were opposed to the political implications of Zionism. In Paris, the powerful *Alliance Israelite Universelle* had made every effort to dissuade him from his mission.¹⁰ Not that the Zionists had no supporters in France other than Edmond de Rothschild,*

* These included the socialist leader, Jules Guesde, who had joined Viviani's National Government as Minister of State; Gustave Hervé; the publicist and future Minister de Monzie; and others.

but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no reason to entangle itself with them.¹¹ Now James Malcolm opened the door directly to them as he had done in London.

Sykes joined Malcolm and Sokolow in Paris. Sykes and Malcolm, apart from the consideration of Zionism and future American support for the war, were concerned with the possibility of an Arab-Jewish-Armenian *entente* which, through amity between Islamic, Jewish and Christian peoples, would bring peace, stability and a bright new future for the inhabitants of this area where Europe, Asia Minor and Africa meet. Sokolow went along for the diplomatic ride, but in a letter to Weizmann (20 April 1917) he wrote: "I regard the idea as quite fantastic. It is difficult to reach an understanding with the Arabs, but we will have to try. There are no conflicts between Jews and Armenians because there are no common interests whatever."¹²

Several conversations were held with Picot, including one on 9 April when other officials included Jules Cambon, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, and the Minister's Chef de Cabinet. Exactly what assurances were given to Sokolow is uncertain, but he wrote to Weizmann "that they accept in principle the recognition of Jewish nationality in terms of a national home, local autonomy, etc."¹³ And to Brandeis and Tschlenow, he telegraphed through French official channels: "...Have full confidence Allied victory will realise our Palestine Zionist aspirations."¹⁴

Sokolow set off for Rome and the Vatican. 'There, thanks to the introductions of Fitzmaurice on the one hand and the help of Baron Sidney Sonnino** on the other', a Papal audience and interviews with leading Foreign Office officials were quickly arranged.¹⁵

When Sokolow returned to Paris, he requested and received a letter from the Foreign Minister (Document 6) dated 4 June, supporting the Zionist cause in general terms. He hastily wrote two telegrams which he gave to M. Picot for dispatch by official diplomatic channels. One was addressed to Louis D. Brandeis in the United States. It read: "Now you can move. We have the formal assurance of the French Government."¹⁶

"After many years", wrote M. Picot, "I am still moved by the thanks he poured out to me as he gave me the two telegrams... I do not say that it was the cause of the great upsurge of enthusiasm which occurred in the United States, but I say that Judge Brandeis, to whom this telegram was addressed, was certainly one of the elements determining the decision of President Wilson."¹⁷ This statement was confirmed by Lloyd George, who declared: "Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that if the Allies committed them-

* Privately, Sokolow resented Malcolm as 'a stranger in the centre of our work,' who was 'endowed with an *esprit* of a goyish kind.'¹⁸

** Of Jewish extraction.¹⁹

selves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word."²⁰

The French note represented a defeat for the 'Syrian Party' in the government who believed in French dominion over the entire area. This was not only due to the strong representations of Sykes on behalf of his Government, but was assisted by those of Baron Edmond de Rothschild,²¹ who prevailed upon the *Alliance Israelite* to back the Zionist cause.

The result of the no less successful conversations in Rome and the Vatican were cabled to the Zionist Organization over British controlled lines.²²

During March 1917, a number of American merchant ships carrying supplies to the Allies were sunk by German submarines operating a counter-blockade; the British and French fleets having blockaded the Central Powers from the beginning of the war. At a special session on 2 April, President Woodrow Wilson told Congress, as he asked for a declaration of war, that "wonderful and heartening things have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia."²³ That night crowds filled the streets, marching, shouting, singing 'Dixie' or 'The Star Spangled Banner'. Wilson turned to his secretary, Tumulty: "Think what it means, the applause. My message tonight was a message of death to our young men. How strange to applaud that!"²³ Congress voted the declaration of war on 6 April 1917.

This step had important effects upon the fate of Palestine since American participation in the war ensured its official influence on the peace, and ties between British and American Zionists both in and out of government could be more closely drawn. A *Statement of War Aims in the Near East* was issued under the auspices of the British Government directed towards mobilizing American Jewish support to the utmost, and also perhaps to honour the negotiations which had been conducted with the Zionists relative to America's entry into the war. After all, the war had still to be won.

The British Statement proposed that the following headings be adopted for a scheme for Jewish settlement in Palestine in accordance with Jewish national aspirations:

"(1). *Basis of Settlement*—Recognition of Palestine as the Jewish national home.

"(2) *Status of Jewish Population in Palestine generally*—The Jewish population present and future throughout Palestine is to enjoy and possess full national, political and civic rights.

"(3) *Immigration into Palestine*—The suzerain government shall grant full

* On 3 March 1917, a Provisional Government was formed in Russia, and as its first act, revoked all discriminatory legislation in respect of the Jews. The Czar was forced to abdicate on March 15.

and free rights of immigration into Palestine to Jews of all countries.

"(4). *The Establishment of a Chartered Company*—The suzerain government shall grant a charter to a Jewish company for the colonization and development of Palestine, the company to have power to acquire and take over any concessions for works of a public character, which may have been or which may hereafter be granted by the suzerain government and the rights of pre-emption of Crown lands or other lands not held in private or religious ownership, and such other powers and privileges as are usual in charters or statutes of similar colonizing bodies.

"(5). *Communal Autonomy*—Full autonomy is to be enjoyed by Jewish communities throughout Palestine in all matters bearing upon their religious or communal welfare or their education."²⁴

It can be seen that this *British Statement* is essentially the same as the formal Zionist Statement of October 1916. Apart from its commitment to Zionist aims, it is an official indication that there would be no British support for proposals for internationalization of Palestine according to the earlier Sykes-Picot Agreement, and an official intimation by omission that the *McMahon Pledge* was being ignored in respect of Palestine.

From London on 25 April 1917, James de Rothschild cabled to Brandeis that Balfour was coming to the United States, and urged American Jewry to support 'a Jewish Palestine under British protection', as well as to press their government to do so. He advised Brandeis to meet Balfour.²⁵ The meeting took place at a White House luncheon. "You are one of the Americans I wanted to meet", said the British Foreign Secretary.²⁶ Secret discussions, however, took place between them and Wilson on 10 May, and on 15 May Brandeis cabled Louis de Rothschild: "Have had a satisfactory talk with Mr. Balfour, also with our President. This is not for publication."²⁷

On 20 May 1917 at a British Zionist conference Dr. Weizmann announced: "I am entitled to state in this assembly that His Majesty's Government is ready to support our plans." He added: "While the creation of a Jewish commonwealth is our final ideal... the way to achieve it lies through a series of intermediary stages... Under the wing of this Power (Great Britain), Jews will be able to develop and to set up the administrative machinery which, while not interfering with the legitimate interests of the non-Jewish population, will enable us to carry out the Zionist scheme."²⁸

The Weizmann Statement of 20 May 1917 (Document 7) was made after consultations with Government representatives and was in agreed terms.

Four days later, a letter dated 17 May 1917 appeared in *The Times* (London) signed by the President of the Jewish Board of Deputies and the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association (Alexander and Montefiore, both men of wealth and eminence) stating their approval of Jewish settlement in Palestine as a source of inspiration for all Jews, but adding that they could

not favour the Zionists' political scheme. Jews, they believed, were a religious community and they opposed the creation of 'a secular Jewish nationality recruited on some loose and obscure principle of race and ethnological peculiarity.' They particularly took exception to Zionist pressure for a Jewish chartered company invested with political and economic privileges in which Jews alone would participate, since this was incompatible with the desires of world Jewry for equal rights wherever they lived.²⁹

A controversy then ensued in the British press, in Jewish associations and in the corridors of government, between the Zionist and non-Zionist Jews. In this, Weizmann really had less weight, but he mobilized the more forceful team. The Chief Rabbi dissociated himself from the non-Zionist statement and charged that the Alexander-Montefiore letter did not represent the views of their organizations.³⁰ Lord Rothschild wrote: "We Zionists cannot see how the establishment of an autonomous *Jewish State* under the aegis of one of the Allied Powers could be subversive to the loyalty of Jews to countries of which they were citizens. In the letter you have published, the question is also raised of a chartered company." He continued: "We Zionists have always felt that if Palestine is to be colonized by the Jews, some machinery must be set up to receive the immigrants, settle them on the land and develop the land, and to be generally a directing agency. I can only again emphasize that we Zionists have no wish for privileges at the expense of other nationalities, but only desire to be allowed to work out our destinies side by side with other nationalities in an autonomous state under the suzerainty of one of the Allied Powers."³¹ This letter stressed the colonialist aspect of Zionism, but detracted from the strong statist declaration of Weizmann. The Zionist body in Palestine was to be of a more organizational character for the Jewish community.

Perhaps feeling that his statement had been a little too strong for liberal acceptance, Weizmann also joined this correspondence in the *Times*. Writing as President of the English Zionist Federation, he first claimed that "it is strictly a question of fact that the Jews are a nationality. An overwhelming majority of them had always had the conviction that they were a nationality, which has been shared by non-Jews in all countries." The letter continued: "The Zionists are not demanding in Palestine monopolies or exclusive privileges, nor are they asking that any part of Palestine should be administered by a chartered company to the detriment of others. It always was and remains a cardinal principle of Zionism as a democratic movement that all races and sects in Palestine should enjoy full justice and liberty, and Zionists are confident that the new suzerain whom they hope Palestine will acquire as a result of the war will, in its administration of the country, be guided by the same principle."³²

The competition for the attention of the British public and British Jewry

by the Zionists and their Jewish opponents continued in the press and in their various special meetings. A manifesto of solidarity with the opinions of Alexander and Montefiore was sent to *The Times* on 1 June 1917; and in the same month at Buffalo, N.Y., the President of the Annual Convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis added his weight against Jewish nationalism: "I am not here to quarrel with Zionism. Mine is only the intention to declare that we, as rabbis, who are consecrated to the service of the Lord... have no place in a movement in which Jews band together on racial or national grounds, and for a political State or even for a legally-assured Home."³³

But while the controversy continued, the Zionists worked hard to produce a draft document which could form a declaration acceptable to the Allies, particularly Britain and the United States, and which would be in the nature of a charter of international status for their aims in Palestine. This was treated as a matter of urgency, as Weizmann believed it would remove the support from non-Zionist Jews³⁴ and ensure against the uncertainties inseparable from the war. 1917 was the year of Passchendaele, when men died in tens of thousands from wounds or from drowning in the mud of Flanders, as Haig's artillery breached the Belgian dykes; and only with the aid of British and French troops diverted from the Western Front were the Italians able to stand on the river Piave.

In July 1917, a special mission consisting of Henry Morgenthau, Sr., and Justice Brandeis's nephew, Felix Frankfurter, were charged by President Wilson to proceed to Turkey, against which the United States did not declare war, to sound out the possibility of peace negotiations between Turkey and the Allies. In this, Wilson may have been particularly motivated by his passion to stop the massacres of Armenian and Greek Christians which were then taking place in Turkey and for whom he expressed immense solicitude on many occasions. Weizmann, however, accompanied by the French Zionist M. Weyl, forewarned, proceeded to intercept them at Gibraltar and persuaded them to return home.³⁵ During 1917 and 1918 more Christians were massacred in Turkey. Had Morgenthau and Frankfurter carried out their mission successfully, may be this would have been avoided.

During September 1917, German peace proposals were submitted to the British Government and rejected (but not disclosed publicly until 11 December 1917, after the surrender of Jerusalem on 9 December).

Brandeis was in Washington during the summer of 1917 and conferred with Secretary of State Robert S. Lansing from time to time on Turkish-American relations and the treatment of Jews in Palestine.³⁶ He busied himself in particular with drafts of what later became the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate for Palestine, and in obtaining American approval

of them.³⁷ 'A considerable number of drafts were made in London and transmitted to the United States, through War Office channels, for the use of the American Zionist Political Committee. The field of international discussion was accordingly widened, and all the drafts of the proposed Declaration were submitted for approval to the White House.'³⁸ Some were detailed, but the British Government did not want to commit itself to more than a general statement of principles.

On 18 July, such a statement, approved in the United States, was forwarded by Lord Rothschild to Lord Balfour. It read as follows:

"His Majesty's Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organization, accepts the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home* of the Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up its national life in Palestine under a protection to be established at the conclusion of peace, following upon the successful issue of the war.

"His Majesty's Government regards as essential for the realization of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish national colonizing corporation for the resettlement and economic development of the country.

"The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a charter for the Jewish national colonizing corporation should, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be elaborated in detail, and determined with the representatives of the Zionist Organization."³⁹

It seems possible that Balfour would have issued this declaration, but strong representations against it were made directly to the Cabinet by Lucien Wolf, Claude Montefiore, Sir Mathew Nathan, Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu,** and other non-Zionist Jews. It was significant, they believed, that 'anti-semites are always very sympathetic to Zionism,' and though they would welcome the establishment in Palestine of a centre of Jewish culture, some—like Philip Magnes—feared that a political declaration would antagonize other sections of the population in Palestine, and might result

* The use of the term 'National Home' was a continuation of the euphemism deliberately adopted since the first Zionist Congress, when the term 'Heimstatte' was used instead of any of the possible German words signifying 'state'. At that time, its purpose was to avoid provoking the hostility of non-Zionist Jews.⁴⁰

The author or inventor of the term 'Heimstatte' was Max Nordau who coined it 'to deceive by its mildness' until such time as 'there was no reason to dissimulate our real aim.'⁴¹

The Arabic translation of 'National Home' ignores the intended subtlety, and the words employed: *watan*, *qawm*, and *sha'b*, are much stronger in meaning than an abstract notion of government.⁴²

** (1879-1924). His father, the first Lord Swaythling, and Herbert Samuel's father were brothers.

in the Turks dealing with the Jews as they had dealt with the Armenians.⁴³ The Jewish opposition was too important to ignore, and the preparation of a new draft was commenced. At about this time, Northcliffe and Reading* visited Washington and had a discussion with Brandeis at which they undoubtedly discussed Zionism.⁴⁴

Multiple pressures at key points led Lord Robert Cecil to telegraph to Col. E.M. House on 3 September 1917: "We are being pressed here for a declaration of sympathy with the Zionist movement and I should be very grateful if you felt able to ascertain unofficially if the President favours such a declaration."⁴⁵ House, who had performed services relating to Federal Reserve and currency legislation for Jacob W. Schiff and Paul Warburg,⁴⁶ and was Wilson's closest adviser, relayed the message, but a week later Cecil was still without a reply.

On 11 September the Foreign Office had ready for dispatch the following message for Sir William Wiseman,** head of the British Military Intelligence Service in the United States: "Had Colonel House been able to ascertain whether President favours sympathy with Zionist aspirations as asked in my telegram of September 3rd? We should be most grateful for an early reply as September 17th is the Jewish New Year and announcement of sympathy by or on that date would have excellent effect." But before it was sent, a telegram from Colonel House dated 11 September reached the Foreign Office.

Wilson had been approached as requested and had expressed the opinion that 'the time was not opportune for any definite statement further, perhaps, than one of sympathy, provided it can be made without conveying any real commitment.' Presumably, a formal declaration would presuppose the expulsion of the Turks from Palestine, but the United States was not at war with Turkey, and a declaration implying annexation would exclude an early and separate peace with that country.⁴⁷

In a widely publicized speech in Cincinnati on 21 May 1916, after temporarily relinquishing his appointment as Ambassador to Turkey in favour of a Jewish colleague, Henry Morgenthau had announced that he had recently suggested to the Turkish Government that Turkey should sell Palestine to the Zionists after the war. The proposal, he said, had been well received, but its publication caused anger in Turkey.⁴⁸

Weizmann was 'greatly astonished' at this news, especially as he had 'wired to Brandeis requesting him to use his influence in our favour... But

* Rufus Isaacs, a Jewish lawyer, who had quickly risen to fame in his profession, and then in politics. This was a period when elevations to the peerage for political and financial assistance to the party in power were so numerous that the whole system of British peerage was weakened. In 1916, Isaacs was a viscount; in 1917 an earl.

** Joined Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in 1921, and was responsible for their liaison with London banks, and was 'in charge of financing several large enterprises.'⁴⁹

up to now I have heard nothing from Brandeis.⁵⁰

On 19 September Weizmann cabled to Brandeis: "Following text declaration has been approved by Foreign Office and Prime Minister and submitted to War Cabinet:

(1) H.M. Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people.

(2) H.M. Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of the object and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization."⁵¹

Weizmann suggested that non-Zionist opposition should be forestalled, and in this it would 'greatly help if President Wilson and yourself support the text. Matter most urgent.'⁵² He followed this up with a telegram to two leading New York Zionists, asking them to 'see Brandeis and Frankfurter immediately discuss my last two telegrams with them,' adding that it might be necessary for him to come to the United States himself.⁵³

Brandeis saw House on 23 September and drafted a message, sent the following day through the British War Office. It advised that presidential support would be facilitated if the French and Italians made inquiry about the White House attitude, but he followed this the same day with another cable stating that from previous talks with the President and in the opinion of his close advisers, he could safely say that Wilson would be in complete sympathy.⁵⁴

Thus Brandeis had either persuaded Wilson that there was nothing in the draft (Rothschild) declaration of 19 September which could be interpreted as 'conveying any real commitment', which is difficult to believe, or he had induced the President to change his mind about the kind of declaration he could approve or was sure he and House could do so.⁵⁵

On 7 February 1917, Stephen Wise had written to Brandeis: "I sent the memorandum to Colonel House covering our question, and he writes, 'I hope the dream you have may soon become a reality'."⁵⁶ Now in October, after seeing House together with Wise, de Haas reported to Brandeis: "He has told us that he was as much interested in our success as ourselves." To Wilson, House stated that "The Jews from every tribe descended in force, and they seem determined to break in with a jemmy, if they are not let in."⁵⁷ A new draft declaration had been prepared; Wilson had to support it.

On 9 October 1917, Weizmann cabled again to Brandeis from London of difficulties from the 'assimilants' opposition: "They have found an excellent champion... in Mr. Edwin Montagu who is a member of the Government and has certainly made use of his position to injure the Zionist cause."⁵⁸

Weizmann also telegraphed to Brandeis a new (Milner-Amery) formula. The same draft was cabled by Balfour to House in Washington on 14 October:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race and will use its best endeavours to facilitate achievement of this object; it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship."⁵⁹

It was reinforced by a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in London direct to President Wilson (by-passing the State Department), stating that the "question of a message of sympathy with the (Zionist) movement" was being reconsidered by the British Cabinet "in view of reports that (the) German Government are making great efforts to capture (the) Zionist movement."⁶⁰

Brandeis and his associates found the draft unsatisfactory in two particulars. They disliked that part of the draft's second safeguard clause which read, 'by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship,' and substituted 'the rights and civil political status enjoyed by Jews in any country.' In addition, Brandeis apparently proposed the change of 'Jewish race' to 'Jewish people.'⁶¹

Jacob de Haas, then Executive Secretary of the Provisional Zionist Committee, has written that the pressure to issue the declaration was coming from the English Zionist leaders: 'they apparently needed it to stabilize their position against local anti-Zionism. If American Zionists were anxious about it, Washington would act.' De Haas continues: "Then one morning Baron Furness, one of England's unostentatious representatives, brought to 44 East 23rd Street, at that time headquarters of the Zionist Organization, the final draft ready for issue. "The language of the declaration accepted by the English Zionists based as it was on the theory of discontent was unacceptable to me. I informed Justice Brandeis of my views, called in Dr. Schmarya Levin and proceeded to change the text. Then with Dr. Wise, I hurried to Colonel House. By this time he had come to speak of Zionism as 'our cause'. Quietly he perused my proposed change, discussed its wisdom and promised to call President Wilson on his private wire and urge the change. He cabled to the British Cabinet. Next day he informed me that the President had approved. I had business that week-end in Boston and it was over the long distance wire that my secretary in New York read to me the final form as repeated by cable from London. It was the text as I had altered it."⁶²

"It seems clear", wrote Stein, "that it was not without some prompting by House that Wilson eventually authorized a favourable reply to the British enquiry." Sir William Wiseman, 'who was *persona grata* both with the President and with House, was relied upon by the Foreign Office for dealing with the declaration at the American end. Sir William's recollection is that Colonel House was influential in bringing the matter to the President's attention and

persuading him to approve the formula.⁶³

On 16 October 1917, after a conference with House, Wiseman telegraphed to Balfour's private secretary: "Colonel House put formula before the President, who approves of it but asks that no mention of his approval shall be made when His Majesty's Government makes formula public, as he had arranged that American Jews shall then ask him for his approval, which he will publicly give here."⁶⁴

The *Balfour Declaration* (Document 8) took the form of a letter from the Foreign Secretary to Lord Rothschild, as follows:

Foreign Office, November 2nd, 1917

"Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

I should be grateful if you would bring this Declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour."⁶⁵

Thus, in this Declaration 'one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third.'⁶⁶ No Arab interest was consulted, and it was decided by Lord Allenby that the 'Declaration' should not then be published in Palestine. This was not done officially until after the establishment of the Civil Administration in 1920.

There only remained certain courtesies to be effected. On 12 November 1917, Weizmann wrote a letter of thanks to Brandeis: "...I need hardly say how we all rejoice in this great event and how grateful we all feel to you for the valuable and efficient help which you have lent to the cause in the critical hour... Once more, dear Mr. Brandeis, I beg to tender to you our heartiest congratulations not only on my own behalf but also on behalf of our friends here and may this epoch-making be a beginning of great work for our sorely tried people and also of mankind."⁶⁷

The other principal Allied governments were approached with requests for similar pronouncements. The French simply supported the British Government in a short paragraph (Document 9(1)) on 9 February 1918. Italian support was contained in a note (Document 9 (2)) dated 9 May 1918 to Mr.

Sokolow by their ambassador in London in which he stressed the religious divisions of communities, grouping 'a Jewish national centre' with 'existing religious communities.'

On 31 August 1918, President Wilson wrote to Rabbi Wise 'to express the satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the Zionist movement... since... Great Britain's approval of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.' Brandeis joined in Zionist delight at the President's endorsement and wrote: "Since the President's letter, anti-Zionism is pretty near disloyalty and non-Zionism is slackening."⁶⁸ Non-Zionist Jews now had a hard time if they wanted to disseminate their views; if they could not support Zionism they were asked at least to remain silent.

On 30 June 1922, the following resolution was adopted by the United States Congress:

"Favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the United States of America favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which should prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christians and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."⁶⁹ (Document 9 (3)).

All people tend to see the world and its events in terms of their own experience, ideas and prejudices. This is natural. It is a fact used by master politicians and manipulators of opinion who form their appeals accordingly. The case of the Balfour Declaration is a fascinating example of a scheme presenting a multiplicity of images according to the facet of mind on which it reflected.

* This was introduced by Mr. Hamilton Fish. His interpretation of his action was clarified thirty-eight years later, when the World Zionists held their 25th Congress in Jerusalem. David Ben Gurion, as Prime Minister of Israel, in his address to the gathering stated: "every religious Jew has daily violated the precepts of Judaism by remaining in the diaspora"; and, citing the authority of the Jewish sages, said: "Whoever dwells outside the land of Israel is considered to have no god." He added: "Judaism is in danger of death by strangulation. In the free and prosperous countries it faces the kiss of death, a slow and imperceptible decline into the abyss of assimilation."⁷⁰

Mr. Hamilton Fish replied: "As author of the first Zionist Resolution patterned on the Balfour Resolution, I denounce and repudiate the Ben Gurion statements as irreconcilable with my Resolution as adopted by Congress, and if they represent the Government of Israel and public opinion there, then I shall disavow publicly my support of my own Resolution, as I do not want to be associated with such un-American doctrines."⁷¹

Only two persons near to the initiators of policy seem to have questioned its meaning and intention, and set down their views: One was the Jewish leader and statesman Mr. Edwin Montagu, who had no desire that Jews should be regarded as a separate race and a distinct nationality.⁷¹ The other was Lord Curzon, who became Foreign Secretary at the end of October 1918. He prepared a memorandum dated 26 October 1917, on the penultimate and final drafts of the Balfour Declaration and related documents, and circulated it in the Cabinet. It was titled 'The Future of Palestine'. Here are some extracts:

"I am not concerned to discuss the question in dispute between the Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews... I am only concerned in the more immediately practical questions:

- (a) What is the meaning of the phrase 'a national home for the Jewish race in Palestine', and what is the nature of the obligation that we shall assume if we accept this as a principle of British policy?
- (b) If such a policy be pursued what are the chances of its successful realisation?

"If I seek guidance from the latest collection of circulated papers (The Zionist Movement, G.-164) I find a fundamental disagreement among the authorities quoted there as to the scope and nature of their aim. A 'national home for the Jewish race or people' would seem, if the words are to bear their ordinary meaning, to imply a place where the Jews can be reassembled as a nation, and where they will enjoy the privileges of an independent national existence. Such is clearly the conception of those who, like Sir Alfred Mond, speak of the creation in Palestine of 'an autonomous Jewish State', words which appear to contemplate a State, i.e., a political entity, composed of Jews, governed by Jews, and administered mainly in the interests of Jews...

"The same conception appears to underlie several other of the phrases employed in these papers, e.g., when we are told that Palestine is to become 'a home for the Jewish nation', 'a national home for the Jewish race', 'a Jewish Palestine', and when we read of 'the resettlement of Palestine as a national centre', and 'the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people', all these phrases are variants of the same idea, viz., the recreation of Palestine as it was before the days of the dispersion.

"On the other hand, Lord Rothschild, when he speaks of Palestine as 'a home where the Jews could speak their own language, have their own education, their own civilization, and religious institutions under the protection of Allied governments', seems to postulate a much less definite form of political existence, one, indeed, which is quite compatible with the existence of an alien (so long as it is not Turkish) government.

"At the other extreme the late Lord Cromer, who favoured the Zionist cause, explains that the resuscitated Palestine is only to be 'the spiritual centre

of the Jews' and a reservoir of Jewish culture—aspirations which are wholly different from those which I have just recorded, and which appear to be incompatible with the evolution of a comparatively small and for the most part agricultural or pastoral community.

"I call attention to these contradictions because they suggest some hesitancy in espousing a cause whose advocates have such very different ideas of what they mean. . .

"Now what is the capacity as regards population of Palestine within any reasonable period of time? Under the Turks there is no such place or country as Palestine, because it is divided up between the *sanjak* of Jerusalem and the *vilayets* of Syria and Beirut. But let us assume that in speaking of Palestine in the present context we mean the old scriptural Palestine, extending from Dan to Beersheba, i.e., from Banias to Bir es-Sabi'. . . an area of less than 10,000 square miles. What is to become of the people of this country, assuming the Turk to be expelled, and the inhabitants not to have been exterminated by the war? There are over half a million of these, Syrian Arabs—a mixed community with Arab, Hebrew, Canaanite, Greek, Egyptian, and possibly Crusaders' blood. They and their forefathers have occupied the country for the best part of 1,500 years. They own the soil, which belongs either to individual landowners or to village communities. They profess the Mohammadan faith. They will not be content either to be expropriated for Jewish immigrants, or to act merely as hewers of wood and drawers of water to the latter.

"Further, there are other settlers who will have to be reckoned with. There are 100,000 Christians, who will not wish to be disturbed; east of the Jordan are large colonies of Circassian Mohammadans firmly established; there are also settlements of Druzes and Moslems from Algeria, Bulgaria and Egypt."⁷²

But 'Men like Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil, and myself', wrote Lloyd George, "were in wholehearted sympathy with the Zionist ideal."⁷³ For this, Dr. Weizmann deserves most credit. A British official who came into contact with him summarized his diplomatic victory in the following words:

"One of the best examples of . . . successful diplomacy is that by which Dr. Weizmann brought into existence the Jewish National Home. . . When (the First World War) began, his cause was hardly known to the principal statesmen of the victors. It had many enemies, and some of the most formidable were amongst the most highly placed of his own people. . . He once told me that 2,000 interviews had gone to the making of the Balfour Declaration. With unerring skill he adapted his arguments to the special circumstances of each statesman. To the British and Americans he could use biblical language and awake a deep emotional undertone; to other nationalities he more often talked in terms of interest. Mr. Lloyd George was told

that Palestine was a little mountainous country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour the philosophical background of Zionism could be surveyed; for Lord Cecil the problem was placed in the setting of a new world organization; while to Lord Milner the extension of imperial power could be vividly portrayed. To me, who dealt with these matters as a junior officer of the General Staff, he brought from many sources all the evidences that could be obtained of the importance of a Jewish national home to the strategical position of the British Empire, but he always indicated by a hundred shades and inflections of the voice that he believed that I could also appreciate better than my superiors other more subtle and recondite arguments.

"This skilful presentation of facts would, however, have been useless unless he had convinced all with whom he came into contact of the probity of his conduct and the reality of his trust in the will and strength of Britain."⁷⁴

Winston Churchill said: "The Balfour Declaration must, therefore, not be regarded as a promise given from sentimental motives; it was a practical measure taken in the interests of a common cause at a moment when that cause could afford to neglect no factor of material or moral assistance."⁷⁵

"To inform world Jewry of the Declaration, millions of leaflets were circulated throughout the Jewish communities. They were dropped from the air on German and Austrian towns, and widely distributed through the Jewish belt from Poland to the Black Sea."⁷⁶

There is every likelihood that one of these leaflets came into the hands of an Austrian corporal, Adolf Hitler; could it have influenced his life and the future of Europe, Palestine and the whole world? This is speculation, but there is no doubt that the Balfour Declaration made Germans suspect Jewish loyalty and give credence to Hitler's attacks.

According to Lloyd George, "There is no better proof of the value of the Balfour Declaration as a military move than the fact that Germany entered into negotiations with Turkey in an endeavour to provide an alternative scheme which would appeal to Zionists. A German-Jewish Society, the V.J.O.D.,* was formed, and in January 1918, Talaat, the Turkish Grand Vizier, at the instigation of the Germans, gave vague promises of legislation by means of which "all justifiable wishes of the Jews in Palestine would be able to meet their fulfilment".⁷⁷

"Another most cogent reason for the adoption by the Allies of the policy of the Declaration," wrote Lloyd George, "lay in the state of Russia herself. Russian Jews had been secretly active on behalf of the Central Powers from the first; they had become the chief agents of German pacifist propaganda

* Vereinigung Juedischer in Deutschland zur Wahrung der Rechte des Osten. (Alliance of the Jewish Organizations of Germany for the Safeguarding of the Rights of the East.)

in Russia; by 1917 they had done much in preparing for that general disintegration of Russian society, later recognised as the Revolution. It was believed that if Great Britain declared for the fulfilment of Zionist aspirations in Palestine under her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the Entente.

"It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. In America, their aid in this respect would have a special value when the Allies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable securities available for American purchases. Such were the chief considerations which, in 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry."⁷⁸

If this, and other similar statements by supporters of Balfour's Declaration, such as Winston Churchill, are a true record of their motives at the time, they suggest an exaggerated appraisal of international Jewish power and influence. Such exaggeration is siamese-twin to the anti-Jewish prejudice which sees in international Jewish activities a coordinated plan to impress their influence on the rest of the world. No evidence available proves a substantial Jewish contribution to Allied victory as a result of the Balfour Declaration. If there were such evidence, it would merely support the Hitlerian assertion that Jewish machinations were the main cause of Germany's defeat and subsequent impoverishment.*

Far from bringing Russian Jewry 'to the cause of the Entente,' though news of the Balfour Declaration 'was welcomed by the Zionists, and not by the Zionists only, with fervent demonstrations of gratitude to Great Britain,'⁷⁹ the Bolshevik *coup d'état* had just snatched power from Kerensky and it was now in the hands of Lenin and Trotsky. Leiber Davidvich Bronstein, alias Leon Trotsky, a Russian-born U.S. immigrant, had left the Bronx, New York, for Russia in March 1917 with a contingent of followers. His aims: to overthrow the Provisional Government and turn the imperialist war into a war of international revolution. In November 1917 the first aim was accomplished. Military factors primarily influenced Lenin to sign the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in 1918.

* "Measured by British interests alone," wrote the Oxford historian Elizabeth Monroe in 1963, the Balfour Declaration "was one of the greatest mistakes in our imperial history!"⁸⁰

CHAPTER VI

Allaying Arab Alarm (1918)

ARAB LEADERS and intellectuals, were suspicious of the intentions of the Western Powers, believing that when the Allies talked of *liberation*, their hidden intention was *annexation*. They particularly distrusted 'the French who had already annexed three great Arab countries in North Africa:'¹ Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. There was also the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 finally followed by the establishment of the protectorate in 1914; and Italy's occupation of Libya in 1911.

When Baghdad was taken in March 1917, the British Government authorized the issue of a proclamation in an attempt to strengthen Arab support for the Allied campaign. Written by Sir Mark Sykes, it invited the people of Baghdad to participate in the management of their civil affairs, in which the British would be pleased to assist in an advisory capacity, and 'to unite with your kinsmen in the north, east, south and west in realizing the aspirations of your race.'²

The long exchange of letters in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and the Sherif's repeated insistence that the British Government be precise in its statements of intention, were an expression of general Arab distrust. It was not only justified by subsequent events in the Arab world, but by the fact that the Peace Conference had to consider no less than seven major secret treaties made by the Allies during the war.³ The Sykes-Picot Agreement was one of these.

In early 1917, it became known to the British Government that the revolutionaries who had seized power in Russia might at any time make known and repudiate all secret pacts entered into by the Imperial ministers. Accordingly, on 19 and 20 May 1917, Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot, with T.E. Lawrence, went to the Hejaz and had two audiences with King Hussein. They found that he had learned nothing of their agreement with the Russians and they did not refer to it. Instead, they embarked on a circumlocution in which they stressed the Arab need for help in the governing of liberated territories.

The King 'admitted the necessity for European advisers to heads of departments and referred to Syria and Iraq,' but he rejected the suggestion that they have any executive authority.⁴ At the interview next day, a declaration by the King was read out to his visitors, as follows: "H.M. the King of the Hejaz learned with satisfaction that the French Government approved of Arab national aspirations; and that, as he had confidence in Great Britain, he would be content if the French Government pursued the same policy toward Arab aspirations on the Moslem-Syrian littoral as the British did in Baghdad."⁵

Hussein had faith 'in the word of the English': they had promised Arab freedom in Iraq; if the French agreed to follow British actions towards independence in Iraq, then Syria would be free also. The King was extremely pleased that M. Picot accepted his statement on behalf of the French Government. For King Hussein, the British reservations in the McMahon Correspondence respecting French interests had now been determined by him in direct negotiations with the French Government. When T.E. Lawrence visited him on 29 July 1917, he remarked that 'the only change in the situation caused by the meeting was the French renunciation of the ideas of annexation, permanent occupation, or suzerainty of any part of Syria.'⁶

Warning notes on the strength of resistance which might be expected from the Arabs should their will to independence be crossed or sacrificed to Zionism continued to be sent to Mark Sykes that summer of 1917 from a trusted informant in Egypt, and from General Clayton, Allenby's Chief Political Officer. Clayton telegraphed from Cairo on 20 August: "I am not sure that it is not as well to refrain from any public pronouncement just at present. It will not help matters if the Arabs... are given yet another bone of contention in the shape of Zionism in Palestine as against the interests of the Moslems resident there."⁷

From the time of American entry into the war in April and the Balfour Declaration in November, negotiations as to its text necessitated consideration of the attitude and future of the existing inhabitants. In March 1917, Weizmann told C.P. Scott, of the *Manchester Guardian*, that 'he was anxious to go to the East as soon as possible and enter there into negotiations with the leading Arabs of Palestine and see what can be done almost immediately in the way of acquisition of land in the Palestinian territory already occupied by the British. It is of the utmost importance... that the Palestinian people and the Jews at large should realize that we mean business...'⁸

"How heavily the problem of relations with the Arabs was weighing upon some, at least, of the more sophisticated Zionists is shown by one of Harry

* Lawrence reported the Sherif's comment that the discussions seemed all too short, and he was concerned with no documents offered, but 'According to the Sherif, he was satisfied that the status of Syria would be similar to that of Mesopotamia and there would be no annexation.'⁹

Sacher's letters to Leon Simon" of 14 June 1917, wrote Leonard Stein. In this, Sacher was concerned that, 'even if all our political schemings turn out in the way we desire, the Arabs will remain our most tremendous problem. I don't want us in Palestine to deal with the Arabs as the Poles deal with the Jews, and with the lesser excuse that belongs to a numerical minority. That kind of chauvinism might poison the whole Yishuv...' Here Sacher was thinking realistically 'of what the Arabs might have to fear from the Jews.'¹⁰

When the Balfour Declaration was published in *The Times*, Arab political exiles from Syria, in Cairo, immediately made a formal protest to the High Commissioner.¹¹ But it is not surprising that it was temporarily unheeded by the Arab monarch Hussein in far-away Mecca, or by his sons, busy with their military activities. No Arab interest had been consulted or informed, but Sykes sought to gain Arab acceptance for the idea on the basis of an Arab-Armenian-Zionist *entente* by informing the Arab nationalist leaders that if such an *entente* 'becomes a public fact, then your national movement becomes recognized in every country in the world.'¹²

As for the Sykes-Picot Agreement, its official text was only released by the British Government in 1939. No such reticence characterized the new Russian Bolshevik Government, however, and the records of these and other secret pacts negotiated by the Imperial Russian Government were given maximum exposure. Jemal Pasha and the German Arab Bureau were not slow to diffuse the news of both agreements. A carefully-worded letter, dated 26 November 1917, was sent to Emir Feisal* at Aqaba by special messenger. The letter suggested that he and his father had been duped by the utterly false promises of the Allies, who intended to partition the Arab countries and place them under non-Moslem control, namely, the French in Syria, the British in Iraq, and Palestine under international control. The letter invited Emir Feisal to come to Damascus to negotiate with the sincere believers in the Moslem faith, and offered full autonomy to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

These letters Jemal Pasha followed with a propaganda speech in Beirut on 4 December 1917, stating publicly that he had made a bid for rapprochement with Sherif Hussein, and repeated the charges of Allied duplicity and their treachery to the Arab leaders. The speech was printed in full in the local papers and read in part as follows:

"...I have been at pains to discover the process by which the British had won over the Sherif Hussein. The terms of the secret document just published in Petrograd, and certain information brought by recent comers, have

* Another personal letter in similar terms, was sent to Ja'far el-Askari, the field officer commanding the Arab army.

thrown light on the facts. The facts are that, in the early part of 1916, Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy entered into a secret compact in which they envisaged the establishment of an independent Arab State composed of all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, to be placed under the tutelage and protectorate of those Powers. . . In reality, the Agreement was a device for bringing about an Arab revolt to suit the designs of the British who, needing tools and catspaws to serve their own ends, encouraged certain Arabs to rebel by giving them mendacious promises and hoodwinking them with false hopes. . .

"Eventually, the unfortunate Sherif Hussein fell into the trap laid for him by the British, allowed himself to be ensnared by their cajoleries, and committed his offence against the unity and majesty of Islam. And the British, having received his assurance that he would revolt, then decided to secure the defence of the Suez Canal by advancing in the Sinai Peninsula. In fact, it was only after they had made certain of the Sherif's defection that they crossed the Canal. That they are outside the gates of Jerusalem today is the direct outcome of the Sherif's revolt in Mecca.

"Were not the liberation promised to the Sherif Hussein by the British a mirage and a delusion, had there been some prospect, however remote, of his dreams of independence being realized, I might have conceded some speck of reason for the revolt in the Hejaz. But, the real intentions of the British are now known: it has not taken them very long to come to light. And thus will the Sherif Hussein who, as I say, is responsible for the enemy's arrival at the ramparts of Jerusalem, be made to suffer the humiliation, which he has brought upon himself, of having bartered the dignity conferred upon him by the Khalif of Islam for a state of enslavement to the British. . .

"I have recently addressed a letter to the Sherif, in which I depicted the facts in their true light and represented to him the gravity and the dangers of the present situation. If he is a true Moslem and has the qualities and sentiments of a real Arab, he will turn against the British and return to the fold of the Khalif and of Islam. In thus writing to him, I have performed what I regard as my duty to our faith, and I pray God that He may inspire the Sherif to follow the way of wisdom, truth and divine guidance. . ."¹³

Feisal discussed the letter with Lawrence, and then sent a non-committal answer; but when the correspondence was passed to Hussein, he protested vehemently against any compromise with the Turk—"Only the sword lies between us!"¹⁴ He was sure that this was just a ruse and that the trusted English would explain everything. The letter and other information were at once sent by him to the High Commissioner for Egypt, now Sir Reginald Wingate.

Feisal's evasive reply to Jemal Pasha's letter in fact represented the advice of Lawrence. There was always the possibility that the Allies might

conclude a separate peace with Turkey; negotiations with that object had been tentatively opened in Geneva the year before, and if such a peace were made, it was possible that the Arabs might be left with promises rather than arms to defend themselves against the Turks.*

The Morgenthau peace mission to Turkey at the end of June 1917, was intercepted at Gibraltar by Weizmann and skillfully aborted.¹⁵ It was followed in August 1917 by a sounding of the United States by Kerensky's Foreign Minister (Terestchenko) as to its view on the future of joint action toward bringing the war with Turkey to an end.¹⁶ The Russian ambassador replied that he had broached the subject unofficially with Wilson's son-in-law, McAdoo, and had learned that there was support for the view that the United States was now in a position to put effective pressure on the Allies, and insist that they assist in the promotion of peace with Turkey by renouncing claims against its Empire.¹⁷

The news from Russia was unfavourable to the Arabs. In June, Jewish soldiers were given special leave to attend an All-Russian Zionist conference at Petrograd, where a message of good wishes from the Russian Foreign Minister was read.¹⁸ In August, the Russian consul-general at Salonica assured a Jewish deputation that there was every reason to believe that, 'on the day that the Jews demanded it, Russia would warmly support the creation of a Jewish Palestine'¹⁹—a promise that was kept on 29 November 1947,** exactly thirty years afterward. A few weeks later, the Petrograd correspondent of *The Jewish Chronicle* reported that Kerensky and Terestchenko were ready to support the Zionist movement 'on condition that the Jewish people should determine among themselves whether they constitute a nation or a religious sect.'²⁰ The international Zionist representative in Russia reported that he had been promised that at the forthcoming Inter-Allied War Aims Conference, the Russian delegate would consult representatives of the Zionist Organization on all matters relating to Palestine;²¹ but the Russian Zionists did not attempt to obtain any public declaration in support of the programme formulated in London, though they were repeatedly appealed to by Weizmann.²²

* As happened later in an analogous situation, Allied dissensions and the low spirits of 1922 led to the verbally-supported Greeks and Armenians being left alone to fight Turkey, then supported by a Treaty of Friendship with Russia (16 March 1921), and soon after by Turkish treaties with Italy and France.

** On this day, the United Nations General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine. In supporting the partition, Mr. Gromyko, speaking for the Soviet Union, said: "... we were gratified to find... the recommendation of the majority of the Committee coincided with one of the two resolutions advanced by the USSR delegation. I have in mind the solution of partitioning Palestine into two independent democratic States—one Arab and a Jewish one..."²³

The Arabs were therefore not good subjects for an appeal to 'Moslem workers in the East' on 3 December 1917, issued by Trotsky—now intent on turning the war into an international communist revolutionary war. To the Arabs, the revolutionaries proclaimed: "All you whose bodies and property, freedom and native land have been for centuries exploited by the European beasts of prey! All you whose countries the plunderers who began the war now desire to share among themselves!... Mohammedans in the East! We look to you for sympathy and support in the work of renewing the world!"²⁴ Lack of communication and the absence of press control or active agents, were additional factors acting against the Bolshevik appeal having any direct effect in the Near East. But indirectly there grew a tendency to examine even more closely Allied promises, and to ask for more detailed information on their value and the change that might be expected after the war.

While the Bolsheviks were making their declaration for independence, the British Assistant Foreign Secretary, Lord Robert Cecil, spoke to an audience of mainly Russian Jewish immigrants with 'a fair number of anglicised middle-class Jews', at the London Opera House. It was a thanksgiving meeting for the Balfour Declaration, organized by the English Zionist Federation and presided over by Lord Rothschild. 'For such an audience it was a revelation to see Herbert Samuel—a man from a different world—on a Zionist platform and to hear him speak, in Hebrew, the consecrated words, "Next year in Jerusalem".' Later, they heard Cecil sum up the Government's intentions in a loudly applauded sentence: "Our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians,* and Judea for the Jews."²⁵

To settle Hussein's anxieties on the Balfour Declaration as it concerned his interests, and to counter Jemal Pasha's charge of Allied duplicity, the British Government, on 4 January 1918, instructed Commander D.G. Hogarth, of the British Arab Bureau in Cairo, an archaeologist and authority on Arabian history, to deliver to Hussein, who had proclaimed himself King of Hejaz, a message affirming:

- (1) Allied support for Arab national unity;
- (2) that world opinion required a special regime to deal with the Pales-

* This is the Sykes-Malcolm formula. But with no prospect of peace before defeat, the Turks had already disarmed and killed or deported into desert or mountainous places without food, hundreds of thousands of the Christian Armenians, whom they considered potentially subversive. Thus many Armenian areas were already free of their inhabitants. One of the non-Zionist Jewish arguments that summer against the formulation of the Balfour Declaration had been the fear that 'such a declaration now contemplated would antagonize other sections of the population of Palestine and might result in the Turks dealing with the Jews as they had dealt with the Armenians.'²⁶ German-Jewish diplomatic activity with the Turks insured against this.²⁷

tine shrines, waqfs, and holy places, but the Mosque of Omar shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority;

(3) that since Jewish world opinion favoured a return of Jews to Palestine and would continue to do so, the British Government would put no obstacles in the way of such a movement as far as was 'compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political.'²⁸

Thus, in the *Hogarth Message* (Document 10), the question of political control in Palestine was diplomatically shifted to grounds of control over the religious places; and in assuring the King that 'as regards the Mosque of Omar it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone and shall not be subjected *directly or indirectly* to any non-Moslem authority', there appears to be the implication that the political control over the area would be Arab. The Message ends by stressing the importance to the Arabs of world Jewish friendship, since this was equivalent to pro-Arab 'support in all countries where Jews have a political influence.'²⁹

Hogarth reported on the King's reception of the Message as follows: "The King would not accept an independent Jewish state in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a State was contemplated by Great Britain. He probably knows nothing of the actual or possible economy of Palestine, and his ready assent to Jewish settlement there is not worth very much. But I think he appreciates the financial advantage of Arab co-operation with the Jews."³⁰

On 8 January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson made his epoch making address to Congress which became known as *The Fourteen Points of President Wilson* (Document 11). This address with the statements that followed and the evidence of American humanitarian work that they could see for themselves, were to make the peoples of Lebanon-Syria-Palestine, if they could not have unmolested autonomy, ask in 1919 for a United States mandate. The points which particularly appealed to the Arabs were:

(1) Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view (Point I);

(2) The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantee (Point XII).

In subsequent addresses, President Wilson declared as essential to any peace settlement that:

(3) Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another

by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists (11 February 1918).

(4) The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, (be) upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery (4 July 1918).³¹

These declarations reached the British-occupied part of Palestine through foreign and Egyptian newspapers and so became known to the Arabs.*³² By the end of the year, the United States became the preferred Power with which both vanquished and subject peoples wished to deal, rather than with European colonialists. But in early 1918, the Arabs were still primarily limited to contacts with Britain and France, and to a much lesser extent to Italy, as they were to remain until the middle of the century.

King Hussein was still awaiting a British explanation for the Sykes-Picot Agreement with which Jemal Pasha had charged them. This took the form of a telegram to the King from Wingate in Cairo, based on the following telegram to Wingate from the Foreign Office:

"His Majesty's Government along with their Allies, stand for the cause of the liberation of the oppressed nations, and are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the reconstruction of an Arab world, in which law shall once again replace Ottoman violence and unity the artificial rivalries promoted by Turkish officials. His Majesty's Government reaffirm their former pledges to His Highness in regard to the freeing of the Arab peoples. Liberation is the policy His Majesty's Government have pursued and intend to pursue with unswerving determination by protecting such Arabs as are already liberated from the danger of re-conquest, and assisting such Arabs as are still under the yoke of the oppressor to obtain their freedom."³³

It was followed by a message from the Foreign Secretary (Balfour) in the form of a formal note delivered by Lt.Col. J.R. Bassett, Acting British Agent in Jedda dated 8 February 1918. This may be termed *The Affirmation of the British Pledge to Hussein of Arab Independence* (Document 12). The document claims that the purpose of the letters directed to the Emir Feisal and Ja'far Pasha by the Turkish Commander-in-Chief in Syria was 'to sow doubt and suspicion' between the Allied Powers and the Arabs who were 'striving nobly to recover their ancient freedom.' It affirmed the 'former pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples,' but omitted any interpretation of what

* "It should be pointed out," writes William Yale in a personal communication, "that as Wilson did not make demands on the Allies to renounce their secret treaties, nor did anything effectively to carry out these proposals, the Fourteen Points must be considered as wartime propaganda."

the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration were likely to mean to the Arab world.

On 11 February 1918, Colonel Bassett wrote from Jedda to Sir Reginald Wingate that "King Hussein had read into the terms of His Majesty's Government's 'pledge' very wide territorial boundaries, and professes the most implicit trust in the intention and ability of Great Britain to redeem the 'pledge' as he reads it."³⁴

Hogarth's Message and the renewed pledge were accepted in good faith by Hussein, as Balfour intended them to be. Hussein sent messages to Arab leaders in the Arab forces and in Egypt, informing them that he had assurances from the British that the settlement of Jews would not conflict with their independence, and urging them to have faith in Britain and to fight harder for that independence.³⁵ A special emissary carried this message to Feisal, and the King directed the publication of an article in his official newspaper³⁶ reminding the Arabs that their sacred writings (the Holy Koran) exhorted them to tolerance and hospitality, so that they should welcome Jews and co-operate with them for the common good.

There was a particular reason for the article: a Zionist Commission arrived in Cairo in March 1918 on its way to the liberated area of Palestine. This Commission was to investigate means for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration.³⁷ The technical difficulties of organization and transport of its members were understandably great at such a critical period of the Great War, when the Germans were making tremendous attempts to bring about a decision on the Western Front, where 800,000 Germans were attacking British forces of less than half that number at the point where the British armies joined the French. Leader of the Commission, Chaim Weizmann, urged that Brandeis join it to 'checkmate possible unsympathetic influence against our efforts for British Palestine,' but Brandeis replied that the 'international situation definitely makes American membership impossible now.'³⁸

What led Brandeis to drop, at least temporarily, his efforts to secure open American involvement has not been defined, but it is known that on 11 March 1918 a report was dispatched to the State Department from William Yale in Cairo. This had described 'Discontent among the Arabs', including the confusion created 'by the policy of the British towards the Zionists and by the present activities permitted the Zionists.'

Recounting an interview with Major T.E. Lawrence, Yale reported that "Lawrence evidently fears the effect upon the Arabs of the present attitude of the Allies towards the Zionists, he characterizes it as a dangerous policy, and speaks of the activities permitted the Zionists in Egypt and in Palestine as being unwise and foolhardy." He continued, "I suppose that we are supporting the Zionists for the help it was thought that they could be to us in

Russia and because they brought America into the war.

"He declares that the Arabs have great faith in the United States, and that they believe in America's political honesty. He believes that later, if things should not turn out as well as is expected, and if there should be an eminent danger of the disaffection of the Arabs, a declaration by the United States concerning the future of the Arabs and their country would prove to be a 'trump card' to play against the Turko-German propaganda, and he feels that such a declaration would have an enormous effect upon the Arabs.

"Major Lawrence does not fear any immediate danger of a serious disaffection of the Arabs, but is counting very much on the success of military operations in the near future to obviate any danger. However, he implied that a reverse in military matters might render the situation critical and threaten the Arab movement. The effect of the Zionist movement upon the Arabs is feared by Major Lawrence."³⁹

The Lloyd George Government, however, was prepared to risk compromising itself with the Arabs in the hope of an accommodation between Arabs and Zionists, and a 'political officer', W. Ormsby-Gore,* personal assistant to Lord Milner and Sykes' under-study in the War Cabinet secretariat, was appointed to accompany the Commission and secure every facility for the movement of its members. A French non-Zionist representative and two Italians also accompanied it.

Dr. Weizmann gave Arab leaders in Cairo a comforting account of Zionist aims which dispelled many fears. The presence too of a British officer and his firm support for the Zionists, added to Arab confidence.

On 14 April 1918, the Zionist Commission arrived in Palestine where they found the small Zionist colonies for the most part unmolested by the Turks due to the good offices of Abram Elkus, the American Ambassador to Turkey and of Dr. Glazebrook, American Consul at Jerusalem. With ample funds at its disposal, the Commission took over the Palestine office which had been maintained in Jerusalem by the Zionists since 1908.

Weizmann carried with him a letter from Brandeis dated 13 January 1918, stressing what he thought should be the economic-social basis of the Commission's work, as follows:

"The utmost vigilance should be exercised to prevent the acquisition by private persons of land, water rights or other natural resources or any concessions for public utilities. These must all be secured for the whole Jewish people. In other ways, as well as this, the possibility of capitalistic exploitation must be guarded against. A high development of the Anglo-Palestine Company will doubtless prove one of the most effective means of protection. And the

* Later to become Colonial Secretary and Lord Harlech. Prior to the Spring of 1917, he had been with the Arab Bureau in Cairo, where he was introduced to Zionism by Aron Aaronsohn.⁴⁰

encouragement of all kinds of co-operate enterprise will be indispensable. Our pursuit must be primarily of agriculture in all its branches. The industries and commerce must be incidental merely—such as may be required to ensure independence and natural development.”⁴¹

The letter stressed that water rights and utility concessions should be secured for Jews, and further emphasized ‘getting Jews onto the land.’ These were significant policies pursued in later years.*

In May 1918, Weizmann and Ormsby-Gore paid a visit to Feisal at Aqaba to establish good relations. Jewish assistance in the development of the Palestine area was stressed by the Zionists, and the idea of mutual co-operation appealed to Feisal’s sympathies. But he made it clear that, despite the universality of its religious associations, Palestine was an Arab country and any Jewish settlement was and would be in Arab domain and under Arab suzerainty. He was not told how this conflicted with Zionist plans or British intentions.⁴²

The terms of reference of the Commission as supplied by the Foreign Office were described as a ‘definition of status’, empowering it to represent the Zionist Organization in Palestine and act as an advisory body to the British authorities there ‘in all matters relating to Jews or which may affect the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in accordance with the Declaration of His Majesty’s Government.’⁴³ This gave it an authority to act between the existing Jews in Palestine and British administrators. The indigenous Jews were not consulted, but a Jewish conference was held in Jaffa in June 1918.

The Jaffa conference was addressed by members of the Zionist Commission and by Ormsby-Gore, who said: “What do we understand by the Jewish national home? We mean that those Jews who voluntarily come to live in Palestine should live in Palestine as Jewish nationalists, that is, that they should be regarded as Jews and nothing else, and that they should be absolutely free to develop Hebrew education, to develop the country, and live their own life in their own way in Palestine freely, but only submitting equally with all others to the law of the land. . . I can say (to the British Government) when I go back that whether you come from Russia, from Salonica, from Bokhara, from Poland, from America, from England, or from the Yemen, you are bound together in Palestine by the ideal of building up a Jewish nation

* *Electricity* rights in all Palestine—except in Jerusalem because of a previous Ottoman concession to an Armenian which could not be cancelled—were acquired in 1926 by a Jewish concern (The Rutenberg Company);

a *Water* concession over the waters of the River Jordan was acquired by the same Company in 1927; and

substantial *Land* concessions were acquired in the Dead Sea, coastal plain, and northern areas.

in all its various aspects in Palestine, a national centre for Jewry all over the world to look to. This is the ideal of the future, an ideal which I am convinced will be realized without doing any injustice or injury to any of your neighbours here."⁴⁴

The Palestine Arabs were not convinced of that. Every action of the Zionists displayed a proprietary interest in the country which the Arab inhabitants found not at all to their liking; Weizmann announced plans for a 'Jewish constituent assembly,' and laid the foundation stone of a Hebrew university on Mount Scopus.* Arab indignation produced such tension that British G.H.Q., whose relations with the Zionists had been most cordial, asked them to curtail their activities in the interests of maintaining peace. They replied: "The Commission fully aware of the exigencies of the military situation, agreed that friction in the country might handicap operations, and that a full display of the Government's pro-Zionist attitude had better be postponed till after the victory."⁴⁵

But Hussein's desire to confirm Allied intentions regarding the future status of Arab territory had again been roused. On 5 June 1918, he protested officially against the dispositions of the Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) Agreement and arranged to publish in full the text of Jemal Pasha's speech of 4 December 1917, which had meanwhile been published in *Al-Mustaqbal*—an Arabic newspaper printed in Paris.⁴⁶ Sir Reginald Wingate, replying by telegram on behalf of the British Government on 8 June, assured Hussein that the documents published by the Russian revolutionaries 'do not constitute an actually concluded agreement but consist of records of provisional exchanges and conversations between Great Britain, France and Russia.' Wingate went on to say that Jemal Pasha, in giving publicity to the Agreement, 'has... ignored the fact that the subsequent outbreak and the striking success of the Arab revolt, as well as the withdrawal of Russia, had long ago created an altogether different situation.'⁴⁷

The interpolation of British, French and Zionist interests between them and self-rule were not the only concern of Arab leaders, many of whom from Syria, Palestine and Iraq, were in Cairo in 1918. Some supporters of King Hussein seemed to suggest that all Arab territories in that area would be subject to him rather than free to determine their own future. There is no evidence that this was his intention, but the situation had the elements on which suspicion could grow. So seven Arab leaders of the Party of Syrian Unity,** formed in Cairo in 1918, asked the British authorities to clarify their

* The opening of the Hebrew University by Arthur Balfour took place in 1925.

** This Party, wrote Amin Sa'id, "included a number of men who had worked long and well for the Arab cause and who had gradually dissociated themselves from Hussein in the first two years of the Revolt, owing to the inflexibility and obstinacy they encountered in him, and his disinclination to listen to those qualified to give it."⁴⁸

aims regarding the political future of these territories. The reply on 16 June 1918 is known as *The Declaration to the Seven* (Document 13). This Declaration 'is by far the most important statement of policy publicly made by Great Britain in connection with the Arab revolt; and yet, strangely enough, it has remained one of the least known outside the Arab world. Its significance lies in the fact that it confirms England's previous pledges to the Arabs in plainer language than in any former public utterance, and, more valuable still, provides an authoritative enunciation of the principles on which those pledges rested.

'In their statement, the Foreign Office dealt with the whole of the region claimed by the Sherif Hussein as the area of legitimate Arab independence, and defined the British Government's policy with regard to the future of that area. For the purposes of that definition, they regarded the area as falling into four categories determined by the military situation at the time':

- (1) Areas which were free and independent before the war.
- (2) Areas freed from the Turks by Arab action.

These two classes were accorded recognition of complete independence.

(3) Areas occupied by Allied forces—Their future to be based on consent of the governed. This would apply to southern Palestine as far as the existing battle-line at that date which ran north of Jaffa-Jericho-Es Salt, and of course included Jerusalem.

(4) Areas still under Turkish control—These peoples 'should obtain their freedom and independence.' This would mean northern Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.⁴⁹

The document was drawn up with the assistance of the French Government. It seemed to promise real independence and was, by British order, widely circulated in the Arab press.

In July 1918, the military governor of Jerusalem, at a celebration of the birthday of King George, 'proclaimed that the Arab movement would bring back the ancient lustre of past Arab greatness,' and when he quoted the epigram 'To be or not to be...', the Arabs further read into these words a manifestation that British officials would support their cause against France.⁵⁰

Through all these statements to the Arabs, the principle of self-determination was stressed⁵¹ and were thus in accord with the expressions of the American President.

But the Arabs were suspicious that their European allies, once the fighting was over, would try to become their European masters. A psychologically-important event occurred in October 1918 in Beirut. The Hejaz flag had been hoisted and Arab sovereignty proclaimed on 3 October—several days before the arrival of British (8 October) or French troops—by Shukri Pasha el-Ayyubi in the name of Emir Feisal, while a French warship lay at anchor in the harbour. When French military units arrived, the senior French officer

made representations to the British, as a result of which Allenby ordered the flag removed.

There was an instantaneous reaction by the Arab forces and population of the city. Feisal had to use all his authority to prevent its attempted replacement by force, and he informed Allenby that he would be unable to maintain effective control over his forces unless an unequivocal definition of Allied intentions was proclaimed.⁵²

An *Anglo-French Proclamation* (Document 14) followed on 7 November 1918, and like other assurances, defined war aims as the setting up of national governments freely chosen; their only concern being to support such 'governments and administrations' and to grant them recognition 'as soon as they are actually established.' It was printed in full in the Paris newspapers (e.g., *Journal* and *Petit Journal* on 9 November), and in *The Times* on 11 November, as well as in the Arab countries. Very significantly, the Northcliffe paper omitted the all-important first paragraph which says that the proclamation applies to all non-Turkish populations from Turkey to the 'Persian Gulf.' There was no suggestion of excluding Palestine.*

But the general armistice of the First World War was signed four days later and wartime promises became subject to the post-war realities of power. The promises to the Arabs were to be broken to satisfy the Zionist scheme for Palestine, British aims in Iraq, and French claims to Syria-Lebanon. With German and Russian rivalry apparently eliminated, there remained that between France and England. For the peoples of both, the dispositions in the Near and Middle East were of secondary importance. They 'incommoded nobody directly, in England or France. But the unpleasant consequences of the quarrels were to be visited on the luckless countries of the Near East. These were under military occupation and ravaged by four years of scarcity and war.' What government they had enjoyed had been destroyed.⁵³

* After the war, a controversy arose between the British Government and the Arabs over whether Palestine was or was not included in the British 'pledge' of Arab independence. Chapter XVI — The London Conferences and the New British Policy (1939) contains an authoritative study and conclusion that Palestine was included.

CHAPTER VII

The Spirit of the Peace (1919)

THE GREAT WAR had begun and ended with public expressions of the best intentions. At its beginning, Mr. Asquith had made a much quoted declaration that the sword would not be sheathed 'until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed on an unassailable foundation,' but there was no intention to make war for the liberation of oppressed peoples.¹ It ended on Germany's agreement to an Armistice signed 11 November 1918, on the understanding that a 'peace treaty would be based on Wilson's Fourteen Points and subsequent addresses.'²

There had been British and French reservations on Point II which dealt with freedom of the seas. Their representatives, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, wished to retain complete freedom on this issue until the conclusion of the peace conference. In the meantime the naval blockade could be maintained as a means of ensuring German compliance with any terms to be imposed at that conference. This can be explained by the fact that when Wilson had insisted on the immediate withdrawal of German troops from occupied territories and their demobilization as part of the Armistice terms beyond the Fourteen Points, Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff had refused and ordered a resumption of hostilities, only to be relieved of their commands by a new Chancellor, Prince Max.* The blockade was in fact continued for more than four months after the Armistice until General Lord Arthur Plumer, later to serve as High Commissioner in

* In view of the Churchill-Roosevelt policy of 'unconditional surrender' by Germany in World War II as an imperative before peace could be negotiated, as if this were something new, it is of interest to read General von Hindenburg's order to his troops, 24 October 1918, to resume hostilities:

"Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender. It is thus unacceptable to us soldiers. It proves that our enemies' desire for our destruction, which let loose the war in 1914, still exists undiminished. It proves, further, that our enemies use the phrase 'peace of justice' merely to deceive us and break our resistance. Wilson's answer can thus be nothing for us soldiers but a challenge to continue our resistance with all our strength."³

Palestine (1925–28), but at that time commander of the British Occupation Army in Germany, reported to Lloyd George at the Peace Conference that his army were sick and discontented because they were depriving themselves to feed the starving German children.⁴ Only when Lloyd George brought this complaint before the conference with the prophetic words, “The Allies are now on top, but the memories of starvation may one day turn against them,”⁵ and warned that this was increasing the strength of the communist (Spartacist) movement, could the French Minister of Finance, Lucien-Louis Klotz, be forced to give way. “Otherwise,” he said, “M. Klotz would rank with Lenin and Trotsky among those who had spread Bolshevism in Europe.”⁶

This gives a taste of the bitterness of the time, and the determination, especially of the French, to get something out of the war as compensation for their huge losses. In Britain, a general election was held ten days before Christmas 1918 and Lloyd George re-elected on such slogans as: ‘hang the Kaiser’; ‘make Germany pay for the war’; ‘make the country fit for heroes to live in.’ Feelings in France were just as high. To the jealousy of the Powers was now added hatred, fear and the wish for revenge.

To the fear of Germany was added the fear of communist Russia, and of Russia allied with a Germany driven to communism. Russia was not represented at the Peace Conference. For this, Russia’s separate peace, which had left Germany to fight on the Western Front only, and what Winston Churchill was calling the ‘foul buffoonery of communism... erected upon the ruins of Christian civilization,’⁷ were responsible.

Another mood of major importance at the Peace Conference was related to the principle of self-determination of peoples everywhere. Woodrow Wilson explained this principle publicly in a manner which had not been attempted before, and the great authority of his position carried his demands to the press of every nation of the world and to millions upon millions of subject peoples that:

“There shall be no annexations.

“National aspirations must be respected; peoples may not be dominated, and... (may now) be governed only by their own consent. ‘Self-determination’* is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action...

“Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game...

* Since, according to Felix Frankfurter, it was Walter Lippmann who ‘drafted more or less the Fourteen Points,’⁸ there is a possibility that his main thoughts in codifying the self-determination concept were for the Eastern European Jews. “Self-determination... was what the Jews of Poland demanded and what the Poles denied,” wrote Bernard Baruch’s biographer of this period.⁹ Frankfurter, ‘holding a “watching” brief for Zionists before the Peace Conference’ was directed to go to Poland on this account.¹⁰

"Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interests and for the benefit of the populations concerned.

"Peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty."¹¹

At the commencement of the war, there were about 100,000,000 European peoples who were still deprived of national independence, and that part of the peace settlement which assured it was the culmination of the struggles for national independence and regeneration which were a feature of Europe in the nineteenth century, as they are of the Afro-Asian peoples in the twentieth. Many great liberators of the nineteenth century, like the Hungarian Kossuth and his followers, had failed, but the spirit they had given birth to grew. Fiery and eloquent Mr. W.E. Gladstone had not only given his strength to the cause of national freedom in Greece, Italy and the Balkans, but had advocated it in the Transvaal and in Ireland. But the freedom of Europeans was not accepted as axiomatic, and there is Lloyd George's testimony that 'in 1914 we were on the brink of civil war over the granting of more limited powers of self-government for Ireland than those ultimately conceded by the war government of Britain.'¹²

If the freedom of European peoples from foreign domination was not considered an unchallengeable principle, the freedom of Arabs, Africans or Asians was even less generally accepted. Lloyd George saw the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, as the first promise of national liberation given by the Allies.*¹³ For with all its inconsistency when compared with the concomitant McMahon Pledge, and the subsequent clear declarations to the Arabs, it still proved unacceptable in practice to the French when it concerned Arab independence in part of Syria. This was recognized in the statement prepared for the representatives of the British Government at the Peace Conference concerning the post-war settlement of the Middle East. It stated that the reservation made within the area of Arab independence 'in favour of the interests of an outside Power, France, is hardly consistent with the Second Point in President Wilson's Mount Vernon speech of 4 July, 1918, unless these interests are interpreted as economic interests and not as political interests, incompatible, by implication, with the entire independence of the inhabitants.'¹⁴

But wide as the difference between promise and performance undoubtedly was, there was also the genuine belief by a majority of citizens of the colonial powers, including the United States, that the Arab, for example, would be better ruled if that rule were directed by the British, French or other Power.

* Although the Russian Czarist generalissimo, Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaievitch, had issued a manifesto to the Polish nation on 16 August 1914 promising autonomy; and on 17 September 1914 he issued a proclamation to the nations of Austria-Hungary, inviting them to throw off the Habsburg yoke and realize their national aspirations.

Many Arab leaders also envisaged a form of paternal assistance from the victorious Western Powers, and in return were prepared to enter into 'most favoured nation' agreements with the country which provided that assistance. But direct control was virtually the only system that most politicians of the day, including Americans, when it came to their own colonial territories, could conceive as workable. There was still also the general belief that direct exploitation of such territories was more profitable than normal trade freely negotiated and promoted, even if an army were required to secure it.

At the Peace Conference, as during the war, the French were suspicious of British intentions in the Near and Middle East. According to Lloyd George, 'They knew that, like all imperial races, the British always began their armed interventions in desirable territory by professions of disinterestedness, which gradually settled down into an unselfish acquisition for the benefit, of course, of the conquered province and its people.'¹⁵

Before the end of November 1918, Clemenceau visited London, driving with Lloyd George through cheering crowds to the French Embassy. Clemenceau, once a practising physician and teacher, was then 78 years old, receptive and spirited. At the Embassy he asked Lloyd George what he particularly wanted from the French, and was told: Mosul attached to Iraq, and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under British control.¹⁶ In return, France would receive 25 per cent of any oil exploited in the Mosul region.* Clemenceau agreed, and confirmed the arrangement in a letter of 5 February 1919 combining this with an account of French interests in Syria. See map 3 on page 111.


What was conceded by Clemenceau was a variation in the Sykes-Picot Agreement; the vilayet of Mosul being added to the Red Area (consisting of the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad), and British rule substituted for international supervision of the Brown Area (Palestine). See map 2 on page 55.

The concession rested on an assumption that the various pledges of complete independence for Arabs from the Taurus mountains to the Indian Ocean were not going to be kept. Once the extra demands of one party to the Sykes-Picot Agreement were conceded by the other (Russia being eliminated by its repudiation of secret agreements),** and once it was assumed that Arab

* An agreement to this effect was signed on 24 April 1920.¹⁷

** This is apart from Russian interests then existing. The Russian Orthodox Society, which provided assistance to pilgrims to the Holy Land, was dissolved in 1917 by a decree of the Soviet Government. The Society's properties in Palestine were ceded to the Soviet Union by the Israeli Government after the creation of the Jewish State in 1948. There was also in Palestine the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission but its properties consisted mainly of church buildings and convents. The Mission was responsible for the maintenance of these buildings and their religious inmates.

Map 3 – BRITISH AND FRENCH MANDATES OVER EASTERN ARAB WORLD



⋮⋮⋮ British Mandates – Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq.

////// French Mandates – Lebanon and Syria

freedom to choose their form of government in one part of the Arab territories was to be ignored, where would such compromise end? If the principle of self-determination were not to apply to Palestine, why should it be applied elsewhere?

British and French leaders had been born in areas in which conquest gave the right to exploitation and occupation, and when it suited their arguments, they chose to minimise the Arab contribution to the Allied-Turkish campaign. But as far as British claims for territorial control in the Palestine area were concerned, these were largely a result of the pledge made by Balfour to Rothschild.

A memorandum incorporating this thinking, which was to be a guide for the British Cabinet and Delegation to the Peace Conference, was the result of a meeting of the War Cabinet Eastern Committee in December 1918. In the course of his analysis at that time, Lord Curzon referred to Balfour's letter as the 'Zionist Declaration'. He stated: "The Zionist declaration by our Government has been followed by a very considerable immigration of Jews. One of the difficulties of the situation arises from the fact that the Zionists have taken full advantage, and are disposed to take even fuller advantage, of the opportunity which was then offered to them.

"The Zionist programme, and the energy with which it is being carried out, have not unnaturally had the consequence of arousing the keen suspicions of the Arabs. By 'the Arabs' I do not merely mean Feisal and his followers at Damascus, but the so-called Arabs who inhabit the country. There seems, from the telegrams we receive, to be growing up an increasing friction between the two communities, a feeling by the Arabs that we are really behind the Zionists and not behind the Arabs, and altogether (there is) a situation which is becoming rather critical."¹⁸

Strategically, he pointed out, the history of the war had shown that Palestine was really the buffer of Egypt, "and that the Canal, which is the weak side of Egypt, if it has to be defended in the future, will have to be defended...from the Palestine side." It was the Turkish threat to the Canal which had drawn the British "across the Sinai Peninsula, and involved us in Palestine itself. Therefore, from the strategical point of view there is a close community of interest between Palestine and Egypt. Another consideration is this: Ought we not to try and keep the Arabs of Palestine in close touch with the Arabs of the countries both to the east and to the north? If you, so to speak, segregate them under the charge of a separate Power which has no interest in those regions, you will really sterilise them." Therefore, he argued, Britain should assume mandatory power in Palestine.¹⁹

General McDonough, Director of Military Intelligence, joined the discussion by saying that "the most important thing in the consideration of the position of Palestine is not its topographical relation to Syria or anything

else, but its being, as Mr. Balfour says, the home of the Jewish people, and therefore interesting the whole of the Jews all over the world. I see a good many of the Zionists, and one suggested to me today that if the Jewish people did not get what they were asking for in Palestine, we should have the whole of Jewry turning Bolsheviks and supporting Bolshevism in all countries as they have done in Russia." "Yes," said Lord Robert Cecil. "I can conceive the Rothschilds leading a Bolshevik mob!"²⁰

The resulting secret *Memorandum on British Commitments to King Hussein*, therefore said, according to Lloyd George, that 'the problem of Palestine' (it was already a problem) 'cannot be exclusively solved on the principle of self-determination, because there is one element in the population, the Jews, which, for historical and religious reasons, is entitled to a greater influence than would be given to it if numbers were the sole test.' It opposed an international administration for Palestine, and recorded that if the offer of the mandate were made to Britain 'we ought not to decline.'²¹ But the Memorandum, a well-kept secret until after the founding of a Zionist state, was explicit that with regard to Palestine, H.M. Government are committed by Sir Henry McMahon's letter to the Sherif Hussein of 24 October 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence.²² Intimation that the commitment was to be modified mainly by 'a return of the Jews to Palestine', was believed to have been contained in the 'Hogarth Message' of 4 January 1918.

On 20 November 1918 the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington informed the U.S. Secretary of State "that the General Officer commanding the Egyptian Expeditionary Force recently reported that King Hussein had expressed his intention of sending a representative to the Peace Conference, who could enter into discussions with the Allied representatives concerning the definite settlement of Arab countries." To this, the British Government had replied "that the best course would be for the King to depute for this purpose Emir Feisal, who had been hitherto in close touch with both British and French authorities in Syria and Palestine..." And on 22 November, the Chargé issued a further memorandum with the information that King Hussein had asked the British High Commissioner in Cairo to notify his Government that Feisal was proceeding to Paris, and asked that "a similar notification be made by the British Government in his (Hussein's) name to the United States, French and Italian Governments."²³

Emir Feisal sailed for Europe with Col. T.E. Lawrence on *H.M.S. Gloucester*, arriving in Marseilles on 26 November 1918. He was met by two high-ranking French officers who made it clear that France welcomed him as a visitor, but did not recognise him as a representative or as having any official status. He accepted an invitation to tour the battlefields of the Western Front;

then resumed his journey, arriving in London on 10 December, 1918.

Feisal was in his middle thirties but looked years older. 'His personal charm, his imprudence, the pathetic hint of frailty as the sole reserve of this proud character made him the idol of his followers.'²⁴ His training in the entourage of the Ottoman Sultan had given him a mastery of diplomacy, and his early military service with the Turks a working knowledge of tactics and strategy. He had lived in Constantinople and had been a representative in the Turkish Parliament and was familiar with European questions and manners. But when he and his brothers had returned to Mecca, Hussein had ordered them to change their European clothes for those of the desert, and had sent them out to live among its tribes. Thus Feisal had never lost touch with his people.

In London, Emir Feisal was well received and entertained. The peremptory attitude of French officialdom in France and even in Syria before his departure, made him receptive to currents of rumour and pressure in the manoeuvring which was going on before the start of the Peace Conference. In particular, the Zionists courted his favour for accomodation in the matter of the Balfour Declaration. In return for his acquiescence, it was suggested that the Zionist Organization, which had demonstrated its power in obtaining the support from the British, French, Italian and United States Governments, could exercise that power in support of Arab freedom where it was obviously in danger, particularly from the French in Syria. Furthermore, they offered the prospect of Jewish financial assistance and technical advice to the underdeveloped Arab countries if Feisal did not make an issue of the Arab claim to rule Palestine.

Colonel Cornwallis, who had been in the war in Syria, and had arrived in Damascus with Allenby, corroborates this in a statement made at the time: "I understand that Dr. Weizmann, in return for the Emir's help in Palestine towards realization of Zionist aspirations, proposes to give money and advisers, if required, to the Arab government and claims that the Zionists can persuade the French Government to waive their claims of influence in the interior. The Emir is strongly inclined to come to an agreement, but matters are at present at a deadlock since the Emir asks the Zionists to throw in their lot definitely with the Arabs against the French while Dr. Weizmann is in favour of allowing the French to occupy the coastal districts saying that they can be squeezed out later."²⁵

The most immediate and strongest threat to Arab freedom was from the French, it appeared to Feisal. The British Government seemed in favour of rejecting French claims through the Sykes-Picot Agreement in order to secure acceptance of the Balfour Declaration. If he adopted a favourable attitude towards the Declaration was there not, it was suggested, the strong probability that Britain would support her allies, the Arabs, against French

pretensions to Arab territories? Of course, there was no disclosure by Lloyd George of his agreement with Clemenceau.

The public relations highlight of the Zionist courting of Emir Feisal was a banquet given by Lord Rothschild, to which leading Zionist figures, including Rabbi Stephen Wise of the United States, were invited, as well as members of the Arab delegation. Feisal is reported to have said: "I have been told by people who regard themselves as civilized that the Jews want our Mosque in Jerusalem as a temple, and to grind down and stamp out the peasantry of Palestine. For my part, I know that no true Jew holds these views. These insinuations have no effect on any of us. We are demanding Arab freedom, and we would show ourselves unworthy of it, if we did not now, as I do, say to the Jews welcome back home and cooperate with them to the limit of the ability of the Arab State."²⁶

Evidently Feisal had been warned but remained unaware of the true aims of the Zionist movement. His only European ally, now pressing for an agreement with the Zionists before the Peace Conference, had promised that 'nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants in Palestine.' In these circumstances, it was perfectly understandable that he should not have barred Jewish immigration into Palestine. His last sentence is quite clear. Such immigration was to be into an *Arab State*.

The American Zionists responded to the declaration 'with exultant rejoicing and an outpouring of gratitude to Great Britain.'²⁷ The American Jewish Congress met in December 1918, and though unqualified to speak for the whole of American Jewry, it resolved by a large majority to send a delegation to the Peace Conference and to instruct its delegates to cooperate with other Jewish organizations, specifically with the World Zionist Organization, 'to the end that the Peace Conference may declare that, in accordance with the British Government's Declaration of November 2nd, 1917... there shall be established such political, administrative and economic conditions in Palestine as will assure, under the trusteeship of Great Britain, acting on behalf of such League of Nations as may be formed, the development of Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which shall prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'²⁸

Specific participation at the Peace Conference by an American Zionist delegation* was solicited by direct American involvement in European

* Consisting of Judge Julian Mack, as chairman, Louis Marshall, Colonel Harry Cutler, Jacob de Haas, Rabbi B.L. Levinthal, Joseph Barondess, Nachman Syrkin, Leopold Benedict, Bernard Richards and Rabbi S.S. Wise.

relief distribution, by Woodrow Wilson's decision to visit Europe and take a personal part in the peace talks, and made more urgent by the conditions of Eastern European Jews. "To many of us it was clear that the demands of the Jewish people had to be formulated for the peace conferences that would follow the war," wrote Rabbi Wise, who had left for London and Paris 'as soon as the war ended in order to begin discussions with Jewish and governmental leaders.' Thus he was able to present to Mr. Balfour, the day after its adoption, the resolution of the American Jewish Congress 'calling on Britain to assume a trusteeship over Palestine.'²⁹

In Paris, the Congress delegation joined forces with and became part of the *Comité des Délégations Juives* 'which was made up, as far as war exigencies permitted, of democratically elected representatives of the Jewish populations of Europe.'³⁰ They were strengthened by the fact that the American delegation to the Peace Conference itself included Frankfurter's friend Bernard Baruch,* whom M. Clemenceau called '*un prince d'Israel*';³¹ '*Dr. Fact*, as he called himself.'³²

It was agreed by the American Commissioners Plenipotentiary on 3 February 1919 that Mr. Baruch might draw supplies at the Commission's expense,³³ and Mr. Herter said that 'ill-feeling was being aroused at the fact' that he and others were not allowed to receive secret minutes of the conferences at the Quai d'Orsay. It was later agreed that he should have access to them.³⁴ He asked for a \$150,000 allowance and eight or ten men 'for the purpose of creating and maintaining such an organization as he considered necessary' in relation to the Peace Conference.³⁵ 'Technical advisers' working with him included Albert Strauss and Thos. W. Lamont;** and as a member of the Commission on Reparation and Damages, he exercised influence over a staff of 24, including Walter Lippmann.

"Of all the collectivities whose interests were furthered at the conference," wrote an observer, "the Jews had perhaps the most resourceful and certainly the most influential exponents. There were Jews from Palestine, from Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, Rumania, Greece, Britain, Holland and Belgium; but the largest and most brilliant contingent was sent by the United States... Western Jews, who championed their Eastern brothers,

* His titles, if not his duties, were impressive. He enumerated them in a letter to his son: Technical Adviser of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; American Delegate and Economic Adviser to the Peace Conference; Chairman of the Raw Materials Section, Supreme Economic Council; Technical Adviser to the Economic Drafting Committee; member of the Economic Commission; member of the Reparation Commission, and of the Inter-Allied Supreme Economic Council. On the last, he and McCormick had privately agreed not to push for an American as chairman, since they knew that whatever was finally accomplished would disappoint the hopes of the world.'³⁶

** Also associated with the Commission were: John Foster Dulles, A.A. Berle Jr., Christian Herter and others who were in later years to play roles in U.S. foreign policy.

proceeded to demand a further concession (aside from removing existing disabilities) which many of their co-religionists hastened to disclaim as dangerous, a kind of autonomy which Rumanian, Polish and Russian statesmen, as well as many of their Jewish fellow subjects, regarded as tantamount to the creation of a state within a state." Dr. Emile Dillon recorded that some of the delegates had misgivings and 'They feared that a religious (some would call it racial) bias lay at the root of Mr. Wilson's policy. It may seem amazing to some readers, but it is none the less a fact that a considerable number of delegates believed the real influences behind the Anglo-Saxon people were semitic.'³⁷

The prevalence of this attitude is confirmed by Thomas G. Masaryk,* from the newborn state of Czechoslovakia, in acknowledging Jewish assistance for his cause: "In America, as in Europe, the Jews have great influence in the field of journalism; it was highly advantageous to us not to have this Great Power against us."³⁸ The Paris correspondent of the Polish paper *Kurier Poranny* reported his belief that the clauses of the Polish treaty relating to the protection of national minorities was solely to please Jacob Schiff** and the Rothschilds.³⁹

On the other hand, the *Comité des Délégations Juives*, under the presidency of Nahum Sokolow, was publishing stories of alleged anti-Jewish activities in Eastern Europe: '*Des flots de sang Juif coulent en Ukraine*,'⁴⁰ at Minsk,⁴¹ and protested against such acts in the territories controlled by the White Russian General Denikin's army and at Ekaterinoslav (now Sverdlovsk),⁴² where the ex-Tzar and his family had been murdered on 16 July,† just a few days before the town's capture by the Whites.

Denikin denied these general charges, which were based upon an isolated incident in October 1919 when the Ossetin regiment of Cossacks (Moslems from central Caucasia) were being pressed by the Red Army. Prisoners, Jews and non-Jews, were similarly treated.

The *Comité* was joined by Louis D. Brandeis on 4 August 1919, and before ceasing publication of its bulletin, carried a memorandum on the Palestine Mandate by the Zionist Organization to the League of Nations

* Theodor Herzl had told Rabbi S.S. Wise in 1898 of the Czech leader 'and his magnificently courageous defense of a wretched young Jew of Polna, Slovakia, who had violated and slain a non-Jewish girl.' To the suggestion that it was 'ritual murder', Masaryk had taken the position that there could be no such thing.

'The very day that the political independence of Czechoslovakia was recognized, Masaryk turned to one of his adjutants, saying, "Now I am repaid for Polna".'⁴³

** 'Today it is estimated even by Jacob's grandson, John Schiff, a prominent member of New York society, that the old man sank about \$20,000,000 for the final triumph of Bolshevism in Russia. Other New York banking firms also contributed.'⁴⁴

† For an account of the murder by a communist Jewish leader, see *Fall of the Russian Monarchy*, by Bernard Pares, (London, Jonathan Angel, 1939) pp. 480 et seq.

giving the number of world Jewry as 14 million.⁴⁵

In President Wilson, Brandeis and Rabbi Wise knew that they 'had and would always have understanding and sympathy with the Zionist programme and purpose.' From Colonel House, 'close friend of the President and his unofficial secretary of state,' they received 'warm and heartening help.' "House not only made our cause the object of his very special concern," wrote the rabbi, "but served as liaison officer between the Wilson administration and the Zionist movement."⁴⁶ 'During the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson's influence for Zion's cause made itself felt in the conduct of Secretary of State Lansing... tested friend of the Zionist cause,' who presided over critical sessions when the Zionist cause was heard and neither Wilson nor House were present.⁴⁷

In England, Mr. Balfour told Rabbi Wise in reponse to the declaration of the American Jewish Congress that "American Jews have honoured my country and its Government by this request." He also asked Balfour "for a further definition of the term of the declaration, 'a national home for the Jewish people'." His reply was prompt but well considered: "This means that Jews who either wish or require, now or in the future, to go to Palestine shall have the right to do so."⁴⁸ "I need not tell you that the phrase, 'that Palestine be established as a Jewish Home' was a phrase of purposeful ambiguity," recorded Felix Frankfurter,⁴⁹ but Balfour in his vanity was thinking of it as his own.

At this time, December 1918, Lloyd George was 'continuously eager to bring about the fulfilment of the Zionist hope. He informally assembled the Jewish members of both Houses of Parliament and read passage after passage prophesying the restoration of Zion to the Jewish people and the Jewish people to Zion. Triumphant, he closed with these words to the Jewish members of Parliament: "Now, gentlemen, you know what your Bible says. That closes the matter". But 'not a few' persisted in their opposition to the Zionist position.⁵⁰

The Zionists had other sympathizers in key positions at the conference: South Africa's Jan Christian Smuts, Balfour, who renewed the acquaintance with Bernard Baruch he had made in Washington,⁵¹ Lord Robert Cecil, Baron Sidney Sonnino from Italy and Masaryk and Benes from Czechoslovakia.

President Wilson arrived in Paris on 14 December 1918. He drove through crowds of cheering people. 'Mr. Wilson had become a transcendental hero to the European proletarians, who in their homely way adjusted his mental and moral attributes to their own ideal of the latter-day Messiah.'⁵² Banners welcomed 'Wilson le Juste'. Two days later he had an interview

with Herbert Hoover* who commented that he must not ignore the evils inherent in the Old World system, but Wilson brushed this aside with a remark that the spirit of Europe had changed as a result of the blood bath through which it had passed. Three months later an exhausted President admitted that Hoover had been right.⁵³

Before the opening of the Peace Conference, Wilson was enthusiastically received by the people of London and Rome, and in the three countries he made seven speeches on 'friendship between peoples', 'independence of peoples', 'self-determination', 'no annexations', and a League of Nations as bases of lasting peace. That sort of talk was, to the Allied politicians, all very well when the war was on, but now it was a little alarming. When Wilson elaborated to European statesmen his opposition to the old 'balances of power' concept, they were positively hostile. In the press of Britain, France and Italy the hostility was turned to bitterness. What right had this American President, interloper at the eleventh hour of the war, to dictate terms only a few miles from where a generation of young French and English men had died? But where his own interests of power and vanity were concerned, was he impartial?

When Rabbi S.S. Wise saw him in Paris, he promised he would receive a delegation of the American Jewish Congress during a brief stay in the United States between his two Paris trips. "We were concerned both with the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration and the assurance of minority rights for Jews in East European lands," wrote Wise. When the delegation including Wise, Judge Mack, Louis Marshall, and Bernard C. Richards presented their case, the President made 'a vigorous affirmation both on behalf of a Jewish Palestine and minority Jewish rights in Central and Eastern Europe.'

Wise stayed behind after the others had left. "Mr. President," I said, "World Jewry counts upon you in its hour of need and hope." Placing his hand on my shoulder, he quietly and firmly said, "Have no fear, Palestine will be yours."***⁵⁴

* Hoover's appointment appears to have been on the recommendation of Lewis L. Strauss, a partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., then in the U.S. Food Administration.

** It was not possible to verify this assertion of Wilson's support.

CHAPTER VIII

The Peace Conference (1919)

THE PEACE CONFERENCE opened in Paris on 1 January 1919. Feisal attended as representative of Hussein, King of the Hejaz, but the French representatives declined to agree that he be accorded the status of a delegate, on the plea that Hejaz was not officially recognized as one of the Allied belligerent states. Moreover, Feisal found that in the skeleton draft of the Peace Treaty prepared by the U.S. State Department, the Hejaz was not recognized as a belligerent and prospective signatory, though countries as far removed from hostilities as Haiti and Siam were. In listing the contracting Powers to the Treaty, though Santo Domingo and Ecuador, for example, were included, a marginal note to the secretary read, 'Omitted: Hejaz.'*

Though the Quai d'Orsay eventually gave way to the Foreign Office, and the Hejaz Delegation was granted two seats at the conference, Arab hopes for Syrian freedom against the French desire for control had little to sustain them. The application of the Fourteen Points to Arab independence was not, apparently, to be discussed (and never was).¹ When, therefore, Dr. Weizmann presented Feisal with an agreement and the old argument about 'Zionist friends in high places', including the French Government, he was more receptive than he had been in London.

Feisal was also under British pressure to accommodate the Zionists. He had been brought to England in a British warship; the expenses of his delegation at the Paris Conference were paid by Britain. He was receiving from the United Kingdom a subsidy of £150,000 a month to carry on his government, and so far Britain had defended Arab rights everywhere but in Pales-

* This exclusion was explained by lumping the Arabs with other nationalist groups which were claiming independence, though they had taken, with some exceptions, no direct part in the war. The explanation continued: "The separate kingdom of Hejaz has to some extent been recognized by Great Britain, and independence is claimed for Armenia. It is possible that an independent State may be created in Palestine, but also possible that all the peoples redeemed from Turkish domination will desire some connection with existing States."²

tine.³ Feisal could not do without the funds on which his administration depended, or jeopardise what seemed the only possible help against French designs on north Syria. In return, it appeared, all he was asked to do was to be more flexible in his stand for independence of the whole Arab area and trust that British intentions in Palestine were honourable.

The text of the *Feisal-Weizmann Agreement* (Document 15) had all the speciousness of the Balfour Declaration with expressions of solicitude for the native Arab peasants and tenant farmers and the intention of giving assistance 'in forwarding their economic development.' The Agreement was in English but Feisal added a significant stipulation in Arabic after the last article:

"Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated the 4th of January 1919 to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made [i.e., in relation to the demands in the Memorandum], I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever."

To this were appended the signatures of both Emir Feisal and Dr. Weizmann.*⁴

Emir Feisal's *Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference* (Document 16), started with a definition of Arab territories from Alexandretta to the Indian Ocean, and a settlement of the aims of Arab nationalism to secure 'our ideal of Arab unity...' Such unity had been made more easy by 'the development of railways, telegraphs and air-roads.' Syria was sufficiently advanced politically to manage her own internal affairs.

'The aim of the Arab nationalist movements... is to unite the Arabs eventually into one nation...' The Arabs 'expect the powers to think of them as one potential people, jealous of their language and liberty, and ask that no step be taken inconsistent with the prospect of an eventual union of these areas under one sovereign government.'

'In Palestine, the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character bet-

* The existence of this alleged Agreement was made known by the Zionists only in 1936, after the death of King Feisal. Awni Abdul Hadi, a prominent Palestinian leader and head of the 'Palestine Independence Party' during the Mandate, 'promptly issued a denial of the Zionist allegations'. He said "he was secretary to Feisal at London and Paris, but had no knowledge of this. News of such an agreement was especially surprising since Feisal never concealed anything from members of his delegation." Abdul Hadi pointed out that Fayez al-Ghusain, a confidant of Feisal, "has assured me personally that he never heard of this agreement." He added: "Besides, the Zionists claim that the agreement was signed in London on 3 January 1919, while Feisal's reservation refers to a memorandum 'dated the 4th of January 1919'."*

ween the two races. In principle, we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-imposition of a great trustee, so long as a representative administration commended itself by actively promoting the prosperity of the country.⁵

The Memorandum concluded by asking the Allies to facilitate Arab unity by ensuring 'open internal frontiers, common railways and telegraphs, and uniform systems of education. To achieve this, they must lay aside the thought of individual profits, and of their old jealousies.'⁶

On 21 January 1919, *Tentative Recommendations for President Wilson by the Intelligence Section of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference* (Document 17) were offered. This reflects the sympathies of E.M. House, which have already been stated, and British Foreign Office influence.⁷ It was also influenced by Brandeis. After interviewing Balfour in mid-December 1918, Rabbi Wise had cabled Brandeis from London that "support must be given to British trusteeship proposition." And Brandeis replied that Wise should inform the President and House that "I favour and have long advocated British trusteeship under League of Nations; the resolution of the American Jewish Congress to this effect expressed the will and judgement of the vast majority of Jews of America."⁸

The Recommendations suggested 'that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there', and that the policy of the League of Nations should be 'to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact.' 'At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of 700,000 in Palestine... England, as mandatory, can be relied on to give the Jews the privileged position they should have without sacrificing the rights of non-Jews.'^{*}

The Zionist Organization's Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference (Document 18) was tabled on 3 February 1919. Its territorial claims went far beyond the description 'from Dan to Beersheba' which Lloyd George had learned in his Welsh Sunday school was once promised to the Hebrew tribes. These boundaries were geopolitical and designed to exploit water resources and existing soil fertility over the widest possible area. The boundaries of the territory demanded were as follows:

"Starting on the north at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity of Sidon and following the water-sheds of the foothills of the Lebanon

* The inherent contradiction between a 'privileged position' and 'the rights of non-Jews' apparently escaped notice.

as far as Jisr El-Kara'on, thence to El-Bire, following the dividing line between the two basins of the Wadi El-Korn and the Wadi Et-Teim, thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the eastern and western slopes of the Hermon, to the vicinity west of Beit Jenn, thence eastward following the northern watersheds of the Nahr Mughaniye, close to and west of the Hejaz railway.

"In the east, a line close to and west of the Hejaz railway terminating in the Gulf of Aqaba.

"In the south, a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian Government. [It has been indicated that the southern border would extend from El-Arish in northern Sinai to Aqaba in the south.]

"In the west, the Mediterranean Sea."*⁹ (See map 4 on page 125)*

This area, the Zionist memorandum stated, 'shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will ensure the establishment therein of the Jewish national home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Jewish commonwealth.'**¹⁰

* The boundaries shown on this map are less than those demanded as the boundaries of the 'state for the Jews' as indicated in *Der Judenstaat* (1896). Herzl then defined the boundaries as, "the northern frontier is to be the mountains facing Cappadocia (in Turkey); the southern, the Suez Canal. Our slogan shall be: 'The Palestine of David and Solomon'."¹¹

On another occasion, the area was described as "from the Brook [presumably meaning the 'Nile'] to the Euphrates."¹²


On 29 October 1899, David Trietsch wrote to Theodor Herzl: "I would suggest to you to come round in time to the 'Greater Palestine' programme before it is too late... The Basle Programme must contain the words 'Great Palestine' or 'Palestine and its neighbouring lands'—otherwise it's nonsense. You do not get the ten million Jews into a land of 25,000 kilometers."¹³

The extent of the area demanded by the Zionist delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was less than the Herzl plan. It comprises, in current terms, the following:

- (a) The whole of mandated Palestine;
- (b) *Southern Lebanon*, including the towns of Tyre and Sidon, the headwaters of the River Jordan on Mount Hermon and the southern portion of the Litani River;
- (c) *Syria*—The Golan heights, including the town of Kuneitra, the River Yarmuk and El-Himmeh Hot Springs;
- (d) *Jordan*—The whole of the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea, and the eastern highlands up to the outskirts of Amman, running southwards along the Hejaz railway to the Gulf of Aqaba, leaving Jordan with no access to the sea.
- (e) *U.A.R.*—From El-Arish on the Mediterranean in a straight southerly direction to the Gulf of Aqaba.

** Many of the suggestions of the 'Memorandum', after revision, were incorporated into the draft mandate for Palestine formulated by the Zionist Organization and circulated at the Peace Conference at the end of March 1919. After revision, much of the Zionist draft mandate became part of the Mandate for Palestine eventually approved by the Council of the League of Nations.

Map 4



Emir Feisal presented the Arab case to the Peace Conference at the Quai d'Orsay on 6 February 1919. Beside him sat Colonel Lawrence. Both wore traditional Arab dress. This was probably a psychological mistake, for it added an air of the exotic at a time when westerners consciously classified peoples according to the degree to which they had adopted European dress and customs.* However, Lloyd George, whose recording of the official transcript has been used, believed that Feisal's intellectual and striking countenance would have made an impression on any assembly.¹⁴

Basing his statement on his Memorandum, Feisal spoke with clarity, conciseness and dignity. But at one point one of the delegates observed that the Arabs were an uncultured or semi-civilized people. Feisal immediately fired back, and in the sternest tone said ringingly: "I belong to a people who were civilized when every other country represented in this room was populated by barbarians." The Italian Prime Minister Orlando bridled at what he felt was an attack on Rome, but Feisal retorted sharply: "Yes, even before Rome came into existence."

He emphasized that from Turkey southwards the Arab world formed a unit, socially, economically and ethnically, with foreigners less than one per cent. Arabic-speaking peoples, Syrians, Lebanese, Hejazis, Mesopotamians, Palestinians and Yemenis, had fulfilled their promises to aid the Allies. In return they had been promised independence. This was also in accordance with the principles laid down by President Wilson which had been accepted by the Allies. If the indications for independence were anywhere not conclusive, an international enquiry should be made in the particular area to determine the wishes of its inhabitants. His speech as recorded was as follows:

Emir Feisal said he had asked for the independence of all the Arabic-speaking peoples in Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbakir southward. He based his request on the following grounds:

- (i) This area was once the home of important civilizations, and its people still have the capacity to play their part in the world.
- (ii) All its inhabitants speak one language—Arabic.
- (iii) The area has natural frontiers which ensure its unity and its future.
- (iv) Its inhabitants are of one stock, Semitic, and foreigners do not number one per cent among them.
- (v) Socially and economically it forms a unit. With each improvement of the means of communication its unity becomes more evident. There are

* When Mahatma Gandhi went to London in 1931 for the Round Table Conference on India, he insisted on wearing the traditional Indian *dhota* or loin-cloth, and drinking goat's milk. This was used by the British Press and politicians to make him an object of ridicule. Winston Churchill said it was a disgrace that Gandhi, 'this naked *faker*,' should be so much as seen walking up the steps of Government House in New Delhi. The symbolic nature of his dress was completely misunderstood.

few nations in the world as homogeneous as this.

(vi) The Arabic-speaking peoples fought on the side of the Allies in their time of greatest stress and fulfilled their promises.

(vii) At the end of the war the Allies promised them independence. The Allies had now won the war, and the Arabic-speaking peoples thought themselves entitled to independence and worthy of it. It was in accord with the principles laid down by President Wilson, and accepted by all the Allies.

(viii) The Arab army had fought to win its freedom. It lost heavily, some 20,000 men having been killed. General Allenby acknowledged its service in his despatches. The army was representative of Arab ideals and was composed of young Syrians, Lebanese, Hejazis, Mesopotamians, Palestinians and Yemenis.

(ix) The blood of Arab soldiers, the massacres among the civilian populations and the economic ruin of the country in the war deserved a recompense.

(x) In Damascus, Beirut, Tripoli, Aleppo, Latakia, and other districts of Syria, the civilian population had declared its independence and hoisted the Arab flag before the Allied troops arrived. The Allied commander-in-chief afterwards insisted that the flag be lowered to instal temporary military governors. This, he explained to the Arabs, was provisional, till the Peace Conference settled the future of the country. Had the Arabs known it was in compliance with a secret treaty they would not have permitted it.

(xi) The Syrians who joined the northern army were recognized by the Allies as belligerents. They demand through this Delegation their independence.

His father did not risk his life and his kingdom by joining in the war at its most critical time to further any personal ambitions. He was not seeking an empire. He rose up to free all the Arab provinces from their Turkish masters. He did not wish to extend the boundaries of the Hejaz Kingdom.

His ideal was the ideal of all Arab patriots. He could not believe that the Allies would run counter to their wishes. If they did so the consequences would be grave. The Arabs were most grateful to England and France for the help given them to free their country. The Arabs now ask them to fulfill their promises of November, 1918. It was a momentous decision which the conference had to take, since on it depended the future of an area of great strategic importance between Europe and Asia.

The greatest difficulty would be over Syria. Syria had claimed her unity and her independence, and the other liberated areas of Arabia wished Syria to take her natural place in the future confederation of liberated Arabic-speaking Asia, the object of all Arab aims.

Some of the people of the province of Lebanon were asking for French protection and guarantees; some of them did not wish to sever their connections

with Syria. He was willing to admit their independence, but thought it essential to maintain some form of economic union in the interest of mutual development. He hoped nothing would be done now to render impossible the admission of the Lebanon to the future confederation, if it desired admission. For the moment, the inhabitants of the rest of Syria also hoped that the people of Lebanon would of their own accord decide on federal union with Syria.

The Arabs realised how much their country lacked development. They wanted it to be the link between the East and West and to be the bridge of western civilisation to Asia. They did not wish to close their doors to the developed nations; on the contrary, in their zeal for their country's betterment, they wanted to seek help from everyone who wished them well; but they could not sacrifice for this help any of the independence for which they had fought, since they regarded it as a necessary basis of future prosperity. They must also safeguard their economic interests, as part of their duty as governors. He hoped no power imagined that it had the right to limit the independence of a people because it had material interests in their country.

Arab religious differences were being exploited. These had been overcome in the Hejaz army in which all creeds cooperated to free their country. The first efforts of the Arab government would be to maintain this welding of the faiths in their common service of the principle of nationality.

Palestine, because of its universal character, he left on one side for the consideration of all parties interested. With this exception, he asked for the independence of the Arab areas enumerated in his memorandum.

When this principle was admitted, he asked that the various provinces, on the principle of self-determination, should be allowed to indicate to the League of Nations the nature of the assistance they required. If the indications before the conference in any one case were not conclusive as to their wishes regarding their complete independence, or regarding the power which they chose as their mandatory power, he suggested that an international enquiry, made in the area concerned, might be a quick, easy, sure and just way of determining their wishes.¹⁵

President Wilson asked Feisal 'whether, seeing that the plan of mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations had been adopted, he would prefer for his people a single mandatory, or several. Feisal replied that it was not for him but for the Arab peoples to be given the opportunity to decide such questions. When pressed by Wilson to give a personal opinion, he said that he was afraid of partition. His principle was Arab unity. It was for this the Arabs had fought.

Dr. Howard Bliss, President of the American University of Beirut, of American parentage but born in Syria, also gave evidence on 13 February

1919 before the Council of Ten. 'He called for the sending of a commission to Syria to find out the facts in the case.' Syria, he said, was under martial law and it was impossible to obtain an 'accurate statement of the Syrian point of view except by an examination on the spot by commissioners authorized by the Peace Conference.'

On 26 February, Bliss appeared before the American Commission to Negotiate Peace and 'urgently reiterated his hope that an inter-allied commission be sent to Syria and the Near East.' Whatever its findings, he said, "it would satisfy the demands of honour." If it were impossible to send an inter-allied commission, Bliss strongly recommended that an American group go out 'which could talk freely to all classes of Syrians'.¹⁶

Dr. Bliss was followed by the chairman of the so-called National Syrian Committee. He claimed that he represented Syrian and Syro-Lebanese committees and associations in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and Africa (Egypt) with a membership estimated at over a million. He was strongly opposed to the inclusion of Syria in a unified Arab state based on common racial and religious affinities. He contemptuously dismissed a rhetorical idea that a 'highly civilized people' like the Syrians should be governed from the Hejaz,¹⁷ revealing a concern for the effect of the domination of 'Mecca' on political and religious liberalization. Those he represented either did not know or did not trust King Hussein and Emir Feisal's intentions on representative government. The impassioned speech by the leader of this expatriate group was favourable to the idea of French control of Syria and of Palestine. He said: "Palestine is incontestably the southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have endured too many sufferings like theirs not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those among them who are oppressed in retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, but in an autonomous Palestine connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them sufficient guarantee?"¹⁸

The Zionist Mission, headed by Sokolow and Weizmann, representing 'The Zionist Organization and the Jewish population of Palestine', was received by the Allied Supreme Council on 27 February 1919. Adhering to his custom of having private talks with key personalities capable of influencing the course of events, Weizmann had had a private interview with President Wilson on 15 January 1919.¹⁹

Sokolow read extracts from the Zionist Memorandum and was followed by Weizmann who, in a speech heavy with emotion, said: "The Zionist Association demanded, in the name of the people who had suffered martyrdom for eighteen centuries, that they should be able, immediately peace was sig-

ned, to tell their co-religionists in the Ukraine, in Poland and in other parts of Eastern Europe, that some of them would be taken to Palestine to be established on the land, and that there was therefore a hopeful prospect for Jewry." That was the essence of what the Zionists required, and with that object in view, they had taken the liberty of drawing up the following resolution:

"To this end the Mandatoty Power shall, *inter alia*:

(a) Promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded;

(b) Accept the cooperation in such measures of a council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world, that may be established for the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine and entrust the organisation of Jewish education to such council;

(c) On being satisfied that the constitution of such council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the council in priority any concession for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant."²⁰

Weizmann was questioned by Robert Lansing, U.S. Secretary of State. Woodrow Wilson had left for the United States on 14 February 1919 and considered asking for Lansing's resignation because of his lack of enthusiasm for the League of Nations.* He did not do so, but appointed Colonel House as the effective head of the American Delegation.²¹

Lansing asked Weizmann to clear up some confusion which existed in his mind as to the correct meaning conveyed by the words 'Jewish national home.' Did that mean an autonomous Jewish government?

Weizmann replied in the negative. The Zionist Organization, he said, did not want an autonomous Jewish government but merely to establish in Palestine, under a mandatory power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Organization would require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and to develop institutions of every kind. Thus, it would build up gradually a nationality, and so make Palestine as Jewish as America is American or England

* Lansing's account of his incurring Wilson's disfavour is quite at variance with this. At a meeting with Wilson on the evening of 29 January 1919, he writes: "I told him bluntly, perhaps too bluntly from the point of view of policy, that I considered the secret interviews which he was holding with the European statesmen, where no witnesses were present, were unwise; that he was far more successful in accomplishment and less liable to be misunderstood if he confined his negotiating to the Council of Ten; and that, furthermore, acting through the Council he would be much less subject to public criticism... The only result of my representations, it would seem, was to cause Mr. Wilson to realize that I was not in sympathy with his way of conducting the negotiations. In the circumstances, I think now that it was a blunder on my part to have stated my views so frankly."²²

English. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals.²³

No resumé of Feisal's speech was published, but *Le Temps* condensed a few lines about his '*vaste programme du rêve panarabe*.' Weizmann's programme, however, was printed at length in *The Times* of 1 March 1919, in the form of an interview. But Weizmann's reply to Lansing had exposed the Zionist aim for Palestine clearly to Feisal, and in an interview with a Paris newspaper, he was reported as having stated that he was opposed to the setting up of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.²⁴ 'Weizmann pressed for a denial and was supported in his protest by an influential American member of the Zionist Delegation in Paris, Felix Frankfurter. Feisal must have been advised that the Zionists, and especially the American Zionists, might be useful friends and had better be appeased.'²⁵ This took the form of an alleged letter from Feisal to Felix Frankfurter declaring a compatibility of interests. It was drafted by Felix Frankfurter, T.E. Lawrence for Emir Feisal, Weizmann, and a British Zionist, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, who had been transferred from Allenby's Intelligence section to the British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. A copy was sent by Frankfurter to the American Peace Delegation.

Headed 'Delegation Hedjazienne', 1 March 1919, the letter (Document 19) commenced: "Dear Mr. Frankfurter, I want to take this opportunity of my first contact with American Zionists to tell you what I have often been able to say to Dr. Weizmann in the past." The statement of so-called Arab and Jewish kinship was repeated. He believed that Arabs and Zionists "are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complement one another. The Jewish movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for both of us. . ."

"I look forward and my people with me look forward to a future in which we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries in which we are mutually interested may once again take their place in the community of civilized peoples of the world. Believe me, Yours sincerely

(signed) Feisal."^{*}

* The Arabs claim that the letter 'is certainly a forgery'. Awni Abdul Hadi has stated: "I can make assurances that Feisal never wrote such a letter. If the letter was real, why have the Zionists failed to produce its original text with Feisal's signature? All they did produce was a second typewritten carbon copy with the word 'Feisal' in one corner." Abdul Hadi added, "The first time the Jews produced this alleged letter was before the Shaw Committee in Palestine in 1929. When I looked at the letter," he said, "it immediately struck me as being a forgery. Nevertheless, I cabled Feisal, who was then king of Iraq, and received a reply from the chief of protocol at the Royal Iraqi Court, saying: 'His Majesty does not recall writing anything of the sort with his knowledge'."²⁶

Meinertzhagen had actually advised Weizmann 'to go all out for Jewish sovereignty in Palestine.' He had 'good reason to believe' that Lloyd George and Wilson would support it. Clemenceau and the Italians would oppose it because of their own schemes. Smuts agreed to support the suggestion, as did Venizelos of Greece. Meinertzhagen also sounded the Japanese who were not interested 'and would only go so far as to say that they would support the idea if the others proposed it.' But Weizmann thought the 'time inopportune and might wreck the whole idea of mandatory Zionism.'²⁷

President Wilson arrived back in Europe on the S.S. *George Washington* on 13 March and Colonel House came on board to report to the President the same evening. Mrs. Wilson wrote: "... My husband and Colonel House talked while I waited in my adjoining stateroom. It was after midnight... when I heard my husband's door open and the Colonel take his leave. I opened the door connecting our rooms. Woodrow was standing. The change in his appearance shocked me. He seemed to have aged ten years..." Mrs. Wilson asked: "What is the matter? What has happened?" He replied: "House has given away everything I had won before we left Paris. He has compromised on every side, and so I shall have to start all over again and this time it will be harder..."²⁸ Could it be that this referred to House's part in the secret meetings of the Allied Governments 'wherein annexations had already been agreed upon'²⁹ without regard for the principle of self-determination?*

Josephus Daniels noticed that then and during the dark days thereafter, Wilson was coming to lean more on Bernard M. Baruch and his friend Vance McCormick. 'Baruch knew that it was not so much advice that Wilson was seeking as a strong arm to lift the burdens from his tired shoulders.'³⁰

So ended the staged presentations to the Peace Conference on the Lebanon-Syria-Palestine area. Before arriving in Paris, President Wilson had believed that the so-called 'backward peoples' which had been a part of the empires of Germany, Russia and Turkey needed a transitional period of guardianship. He proposed that they be entrusted to the League of Nations and that mandates for the administration of trusteeships be given to small neutral states, such as Holland or the Scandinavian nations. However, this conception of mandates freed from the domination of great power imperialism

* On 7 March 1919 Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Colonel House met secretly to discuss, among other matters, the allocation of mandates for the territories to be detached from the Turkish Ottoman Empire. It having been agreed that Syria would go to France, Lloyd George then said "that America would accept a Mandate for Constantinople (and) Armenia, France would be Mandatory for Syria and such part of Cilicia as would be agreed upon between the Americans and the French; we would take Palestine and Mesopotamia, which includes Mosul."³¹

was unacceptable to the ambitions of the Allied governments, and the leaders of Australia, Britain, Italy and South Africa had already reached general agreement on certain annexations at a meeting in Paris on 24 January 1919.³²

In Paris, the President put into action an idea which he had expressed on the voyage, that of conducting direct and secret negotiations between himself and the Prime Ministers of Britain, France and Italy, with only interpreters present, and such specialists as might be required for the particular subject under discussion. These Big Four meetings now constituted the Supreme Council and sessions lasted many hours each day. By this secrecy, Woodrow Wilson deprived himself of his greatest weapon, an appeal to that great public of the world who regarded him as the leader of a crusade for the emancipation and freedom of peoples everywhere.³³

Lansing said that Wilson pursued this method of negotiation 'because he was by nature and by inclination secretive.'³⁴

We have the *Summary Record of a Secret Meeting of the Supreme Council at Paris* (Document 20) dated 20 March 1919 to consider the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The meeting was necessitated by Britain's separate arrangements with the Zionists and the Arabs which were already obviously contradictory, and by France's determination to establish direct rule in Zone A (Syria) as well as in the Blue Zone (Lebanon, the Syrian coast and Cilicia).³⁵

Britain felt bound to obstruct this French intention which was contrary

* 'A week after the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of the Heads of States, the official title of the Council of Four, and the Council of Foreign Ministers, the official title of the Council of Five (popularly nicknamed 'The Big Four' and 'The Little Five'). Lansing made the following note on the subject of secret negotiations:

"After the experience of the last three months (January-March, 1919) I am convinced that the method of personal interviews and private conclaves is a failure. It has given every opportunity for intrigue, plotting, bargaining and combining. The President, as I now see it, should have insisted on everything being brought before the Plenary Conference. He would then have had the confidence and support of all the smaller nations because they would have looked up to him as their champion and guide. They would have followed him.

"The result of the present method has been to destroy their faith and arouse their resentment. They look upon the President as in favour of a world ruled by Five Great Powers, an international despotism of the strong, in which the little nations are merely rubber-stamps.

"The President has undoubtedly found himself in a most difficult position. He has put himself on a level with politicians experienced in intrigue, whom he will find a pretty difficult lot. He will sink in the estimation of the delegates who are not within the inner circle, and what will be still more disastrous will be the loss of confidence among the peoples of the nations represented here. A grievous blunder has been made".³⁵

** See map 2 on page 55. For final partition of Eastern Arab World between Britain and France, see map 3 on page 111.

to the Hussein-McMahon Agreement not to mention the other declarations, both British and joint Anglo-French, of support for Arab independence.

M. Stephen J.M. Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, was asked by M. Clemenceau to open the discussion. He recalled the Sykes-Picot Agreement emphasizing that Britain was to be accorded the ports of Haifa and Acre, but that Haifa was to be a free port as regards the trade of France, and there was to be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and its railway and similar freedom for British goods through Alexandretta and its railway.

From all the declarations made by the British and French Governments he only quoted one, namely, that of 9 November 1918 (Document 14) This was particularly important as showing the disinterested attitude of both governments towards the Arabs. This declaration had been communicated shortly after its issue by the French Ambassador in Washington to President Wilson.

Mr. Lloyd George interpolated at this point that this proclamation, which was the latest expression of policy by the two governments, was more important than all the old agreements.

M. Pichon then read the Declaration of 9 November 1918, and added: "France strongly protested against any idea of dividing Syria. Syria had geographical and historic unity. The French Government frankly avowed that they did not want the responsibility of administering Palestine, though they would prefer to see it under an international administration." Apart from this, France should become the mandatory of the League of Nations for the whole Syrian region.

Lloyd George pointed out that M. Pichon had omitted in his lucid statement to explain that the blue area in which France was 'allowed to establish such direct control or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States' did not include Damascus, Homs, Hama or Aleppo. In area A, France was 'prepared to recognize and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States . . . under the suzerainty of an Arab chief.' This, however, was not just a question between Great Britain and France. 'It was a question between France and an agreement we had signed with King Hussein.'

France's involvement in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence was denied by M. Pichon but Lloyd George put forward the thesis that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was based on a letter from Sir Henry McMahon to King Hussein from which he quoted (Letter 4 dated 24 October 1915). England had organized the whole of the Syrian campaign. Great Britain had put near a million men in the field against Turkey, 'but Arab help had been essential; that was a point of which General Allenby could speak.'

General Allenby said it had been 'invaluable.'

Lloyd George continued: since France had assented in the Sykes-Picot

Agreement 'that France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States in areas A and B marked on the annexed map [map 2 on page 55] under the suzerainty of an Arab chief,' this constituted a practical recognition of the British 'agreement with King Hussein by excluding Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo from the zone of direct administration, for the map attached to the agreement showed that Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo were included, not in the zone of direct administration, but in the independent Arab State.' If the British Government now supported direct French influence in those areas, 'they would be breaking faith with the Arabs, and they could not face this.'

The ensuing wrangle was interrupted by President Wilson who said that he would now seek to establish his place in the conference.

It was not permissible for him to express an opinion on the undertakings to King Hussein and the 1916 (Sykes-Picot) agreement, though the disappearance of Russia seemed to alter the basis of the latter. The United States, however, was indifferent to the claims of both Great Britain and France unless the peoples of the area wanted them. Consent of the governed was a fundamental principle of his country and was ingrained in American thought. Was France wanted by the Syrians? Or Great Britain by the inhabitants of Mesopotamia? He recalled that in the Council of Ten, resolutions had been adopted in regard to mandatories with different stages of mandate according to the civilization of the peoples concerned. One of the elements in the mandates was the desire of the people over whom the mandate was to be exercised. The controversy affected the peace in the region, and he hoped that the question would be discussed from this point of view. 'The only way to deal with it was to discover the desires of the population of these regions.'

Wilson, in other words, was trying to bring the Allied Supreme Council back to the principle of self-determination from which Allied leaders had strayed during Wilson's absence and House's erring stewardship as the surest foundation for future peace.

President Wilson then asked General Allenby, "If before we arrive at a permanent settlement under the League of Nations we invite France to occupy the region of Syria, even as narrowly defined, what would the result be?"

General Allenby replied that there would be the strongest possible opposition. After the capture of Damascus, Feisal had administered the city. Feisal had originally asked if he could also occupy Beirut and the ports. Allenby had replied in the affirmative, but had told Feisal that the Arab forces must withdraw when the Allied armies came along, and this Feisal had done. To Emir Feisal's protests against the occupation by the French of places in the blue zone, General Allenby had replied that he himself was in charge of

the administration as Commander-in-Chief; and that French officers appointed as administrators must not be regarded as French, but as Allied military officers. Feisal had said he would consent for the present, but would their presence last forever? General Allenby had replied that the League of Nations intended to give the small nations the right of self-determination. Feisal, in reply, had insisted that 'if put under French control' his opposition would be to the utmost of his ability.

After an adjournment, President Wilson 'suggested that the fittest men that could be obtained should be selected to form an inter-allied commission to go to Syria, extending their inquiries, if they led them beyond the confines of Syria. Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the obligation to the mandatory. They should be asked to come back and tell the conference what they found with regard to these matters. He made the suggestion, not because he lacked confidence in the experts whose views he had heard, such as Dr. Howard Bliss and General Allenby. These, however, had been involved in some way with the population, with special objects either educational or military... The commission should be composed of an equal number of French, British, Italian and American representatives. He would send it with *carte blanche* to tell the facts as they found them.'³⁶

M. Clemenceau 'agreed in principle to an inquiry' but thought it 'should not be confined to Syria.' Mandates were required for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and other parts of the Turkish Empire as well as Syria. The peoples of these districts were all connected by historical, religious and other links. He had made every effort to bring himself 'to agree with the principles propounded by President Wilson', but something must be said for the historical claims and for the efforts that nations had made in different regions. He believed that 'the members of the commission should be carefully chosen and should inquire into every Near East mandate' of former Turkish territory. Subject to these reservations Clemenceau would accept the Wilson proposal "in principle".³⁷

Lloyd George said he 'had no objection to an investigation in Palestine and Mesopotamia', and President Wilson said that he saw advantages 'in a unified inquiry' into mandates for formerly Turkish territories.

Balfour said that these proposals might postpone the making of peace, but President Wilson disagreed.

At Lloyd George's request, President Wilson undertook to draft the terms of reference of the commission.*³⁸

* Alarmed at the results to be expected of such an inquiry, Felix Frankfurter, on behalf of the Zionist Delegation in Paris, appealed to the President to use his influence in favour of an early settlement in harmony with the Balfour Declaration. Wilson replied on 16 May: "I never dreamed that it was necessary to give you any renewed assurance of my adhesion to the Balfour Declaration, and so far I have found no one who is seriously opposing the purpose which it embodies."³⁹

For this inter-allied commission on Turkish mandates, later known as the *King-Crane Commission*, the President nominated Dr. Henry Churchill King and Mr. Charles R. Crane. They were assisted by Captain William Yale, Professor Albert Howe Lybyer and Dr. George Redington Montgomery. A Captain Donald M. Brodie acted as secretary and Dr. Sami Haddad of the School of Medicine, Syrian Protestant College, was appointed interpreter. All the assistant members of the Commission had already made some study of Near East questions.⁴⁰

The British delegates, provisionally appointed, were Sir Henry McMahon and Commander Hogarth, with historian Professor Arnold J. Toynbee as secretary. These three came to Paris early in May 1919, but the French had not appointed their delegates. M. Clemenceau said that he "wanted the Syrian business put on a satisfactory basis before any international committee of inquiry should start."⁴¹ But the agreement to send the commission had been signed by the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.⁴² Lloyd George says that he charged Clemenceau with not carrying out his bargain, but excused his own failure to send British representatives by saying that this might cause further Anglo-French unpleasantness and that the British Government was willing to agree to a purely American delegation investigating the wishes of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Palestine, in the same way as they might investigate Syrian opinion. 'I was quite willing to abide by the decision of the inhabitants as interpreted by the Commission.'⁴³ The King-Crane Commission left for the Syrian 'Fertile Crescent' on 29 May 1919. Though officially approved by the Allies, it is doubtful if they ever had expectations of being seriously influenced by its findings.*

After the King-Crane Commission had left for Syria-Palestine, Louis Brandeis arrived in London. On 22 June 1919 he wrote to his wife of a meeting with Dr. Weizmann: "Weizmann is neither as great nor as objectionable as he was painted." After conferring with British officials, he was convinced that "My coming was very much more needed than could have been conceived possible and I feel that I may be of real value all along the line with the British quite as much as with our own people."⁴⁴ Brandeis went on to Paris and conferred, presumably on Zionist ambitions in Palestine, with President Wilson,

* A telegram 'For President Wilson' was sent from Jerusalem by Mr. C.R. Crane and Dr. H.C. King on 20 June 1919. It warned that, "Probably at no time has race feeling been so sensitive as just now. There was deep belief in American peace declarations 'as in those of the British and French Governments of 9 November 1918 on right of people to self-determination.' Here older population, both Moslem and Christian, take united and most hostile attitude towards any extent of Jewish immigration or towards any effort to establish Jewish sovereignty over them. We doubt if any British Government or American official here believes that it is possible to carry out Zionist program except through support of large army."⁴⁵

Colonel House, Lord Balfour, the French cabinet, the Italian ambassador and Baron Edmond de Rothschild.⁴⁶ He then left Paris immediately afterwards, on 25 June 1919, en route to Palestine.

After extensive interviewing and after studying 1863 petitions from groups in Greater Syria, the King-Crane Commission reported (Document 21) on 28 August 1919. By then the Versailles Treaty had been signed and President Wilson had returned to America, his health still impaired from a mild stroke. In the Treaty, as distinguished from the Covenant of the League of Nations, the conception of a just peace had been distorted not only by Britain, France and Italy, but by the extreme nationalism of the new states, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, which rejected self-determination of the minorities included within their new boundaries.

On 28 June 1919, the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations (Documents 22) were signed. Article 22 of the Covenant contained the following paragraph:

“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be of principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”

Though Feisal had signed the Versailles Treaty, King Hussein refused to ratify it,* since it gave no certainty of Arab independence which Great Britain had guaranteed.⁴⁷

A summary of the report of the King-Crane Commission was cabled by Crane to Wilson on 30 August 1919 as follows:

“We are recommending for Syria first that whatever administration go in be a true mandatory under League of Nations; second that Syria including Palestine and Lebanon be kept a unity according to desires of great majority; third that Syria be under a single mandate; fourth that Emir Feisal be King of the new Syrian State; fifth that extreme Zionist program be seriously modified; sixth that America be asked to take single mandate for Syria; seventh that if for any reason America does not take mandate then it be given to Great Britain.”⁴⁸

For Palestine, the Commission recommended serious modification of the extreme Zionist program ‘of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking

* The Versailles Treaty was first rejected by the United States Senate on 19 November 1919. It had been submitted on 10 July, and from 4 September to his second stroke on 25 September, Wilson made speeches across the country in favour of its acceptance.

finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish state.' The Balfour Declaration in favour of 'a national home for the Jewish people' was not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish state; nor could the erection of such a state be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the 'civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.' This fact was repeatedly exposed in the Commission's conferences with Jewish representatives, for 'the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.' Subjecting the Palestinians 'to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle (self-determination) just quoted, and of the peoples' rights, though it kept within the forms of law. The feeling against the Zionist program was not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally throughout Syria...' One effect of urging the extreme Zionist program would be an intensification of 'anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as the *Holy Land*.'

The Commission stated that 'from the point of view of the people concerned, the mandate should certainly go to America.' This mandate for 'all Syria' was to include Palestine.

In conclusion, they recommended that if America could not take the mandate for all Syria, it should be given to Great Britain, and though they did not recommend, it, if French feeling on their claims was very high, they could be given a mandate for Lebanon only.

Permission was not given for the printing of extracts of the Report until after the United States Congress had confirmed the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations had approved the proposed Mandate for Palestine. According to Lloyd George, 'The Report was so hostile to the French claims in Syria that the President decided not to send it in to the Peace Conference on Turkey.'⁴⁹ But it was at least as critical of British-Zionist pretensions in Palestine. Was the suppression of the Report influenced by this? Was Wilson still influenced by Brandeis? There is no direct evidence, but Wilson cannot escape being hoisted on his own petard of self-determination,* for he did not

* When Balfour met Brandeis in Paris in June 1919, he remarked, according to Frankfurter's note of the conversation, that "Palestine presented a unique situation. We are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to re-constitute a new community and definitely building for a numerical majority in the future." He had, he went on, great difficulty in seeing how President Wilson could reconcile his adherence to Zionism with the doctrine of self-determination, to which Brandeis replied that "the whole conception of Zionism as a Jewish homeland was a definite building up for the future as the means of dealing with a world problem and not merely with the disposition of an existing community." Balfour gave the argument a slightly different turn at his interview with Meinertzhagen a few weeks later. 'He agreed... in principle,' Meinertzhagen wrote in his diary (30 July 1919), "to the creed of self-

give it support or publicity in the one area where the wishes of the inhabitants had been fairly determined.

When he returned to Europe in September 1919, refreshed by renewed contact with his compatriots, Feisal informed the Zionists that he could only agree to limited Jewish immigration into the Palestine area. "I quite understand," he said, "the desire of the Jews to acquire a country, a homeland. But so far as Palestine is concerned... it must be subject to the rights, aspirations and the sentiments of the present possessors of the land." If the Jews' claim to historic rights in Palestine were accepted, it would be equitable to give the Arabs the right to take over Spain, which they had ruled as long as the Jews had Palestine.⁵⁰

Neither France nor Britain expected to be influenced by the Report of the King-Crane Commission and the wishes of the Syrian people, but they had not yet finally demarcated the boundaries of their interests, especially the boundaries of Palestine. M. Clemenceau retired from the Premiership early in 1920, and there was a perceptible hardening of the French Government, especially in their attitude toward the idea of a British mandate for Palestine.⁵¹

At the San Remo Conference early in 1920 French, British, and Italian representatives met to define the boundaries of the Palestine area, America was represented only by an observer, but the 'Zionists found in Lansing's successor, Bainbridge Colby, an equally sympathetic furtherer of the cause supported by his chief.⁵² For France, M. Berthelot claimed a special position in respect of protection of the holy places, the French attitude toward the establishment of a Jewish national home now being critical or even hostile.⁵³

For Italy, Signor Nitti believed that the question on Palestine was of a spiritual nature, but he believed 'the holy places should be so administered to ensure complete equality to all nations concerned.'⁵⁴

M. Cambon was asked by M. Berthelot to deal with the religious question. He expressed the view that the question of a protectorate over the holy places was one which concerned only the Allied Powers, and should find no place in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The holy places had been in the hands of the French since the 15th century. The Vatican* had always recognized

determination but it could not be indiscriminately applied to the whole world and Palestine was a case in point... In any Palestinian plebiscite the Jews of the world must be consulted, in which case he sincerely believed that an overwhelming majority would declare for Zionism under a British Mandate.'⁵⁵

* On 20 May 1917 Weizmann had told a London Zionist Conference "We have assurances from the highest Catholic circles that they will view with favour the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and from their religious point of view they see no

that fact, and every French Government, even those who had broken with Rome, had accepted that responsibility... The question was one of the greatest importance to French Catholics. Consequently, should a mandate in Palestine be granted to Great Britain, France would be bound to make certain reservations in regard to the holy places. Otherwise it would be difficult to induce the French Senate to accept the arrangement.⁵⁶

The Italian then spoke of his country's religious interest in Palestine, and emphasized that 'Each country must protect its own nationals quite independently from their religious status.'⁵⁷

Lloyd George, pressing hard for a British mandate without international control, brought all his oratorical talents to bear on the meeting: There were also millions of Catholics in Britain 'whose interests could not be overlooked.'⁵⁸ Did her Allies wish to imply that they no longer trusted Great Britain to treat their nationals fairly? Should Great Britain merely sweep the streets of Jerusalem, patrol the highways, and see that no one robbed either an Italian or a Frenchman travelling to Jerusalem on a spiritual mission whilst she was not considered fit to protect the shrines? Apparently Great Britain was expected to supply funds to govern the country; but she was not fit to protect the sacred shrines of Jerusalem. Obviously, Great Britain could not accept any such suggestions... it would be impossible to create an empire within an empire. When the whole responsibility for the administration of the country fell on Great Britain, she could not agree to be left outside in questions pertaining to the holy places.

Signor Nitti submitted an addition to the British text of the mandate, as follows:

"All privileges and all prerogatives in regard to religious communities will terminate. The Mandatory Power undertakes to appoint, in as short a time as possible, a special commission to study and determine all questions and claims, concerning the different religious communities. Account will be taken, in the composition of this commission, of the religious interests involved. The chairman of the commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations."⁵⁹

After discussion in which the French made much of the safeguarding of the political rights, or in British parlance 'the civil and religious rights

objection to it and no reason why we should not be good neighbours."⁶⁰

But *The Tablet*, 1 March 1919, published a denial of 'the story which is being circulated that the Holy Father is a supporter of Zionism,' and while he had offered his good wishes to 'any who desired to take part in a Jewish *Home* in Palestine,' there could be no approval of 'a sort of Jewish State.'

The Times, 12 March 1919, reported that at a Consistory in Rome on 10 March the Pope had declared that 'it would be for us and for all Christians a bitter grief if unbelievers in Palestine were put into a superior or more privileged position.'

of non-Jewish communities', it was finally agreed:

(a) To accept the terms of the Mandate's article with reference to Palestine, on the understanding that there was inserted in the *procès-verbal* an understanding by the Mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognized this protectorate as being at an end.

(b) The mandatories chosen by the principal Allied Powers are: France for Syria and Great Britain for Mesopotamia and Palestine.*⁶¹

The boundaries of the Palestine mandated territory occupied a good deal of time at the conference. According to Lloyd George, there were two difficulties: where the northern boundary was to be drawn, and the matter of a French guarantee, as Syrian mandatory, that the head-waters of the Jordan should not be diverted so as to deprive Palestine of its essential water supply.

In line with the spirit of their deliberations, no reference was made to the wishes of the local inhabitants. Instead, Lloyd George produced a book by Scottish theological professor George Adam Smith, which he commended to M. Berthelot for its maps of the biblical boundaries of Palestine. 'In the days of Agrippa the boundaries had stretched slightly beyond Dan and Beersheba but these latter had always remained Palestine's historic limits.'⁶²

On the question of water supply, Lloyd George said that acceptance of the Palestine Mandate involved the assumption of a very heavy burden. Britain would, therefore, only accept a Mandate for the Palestine of ancient history; which should not merely include the barren rocks of Judea, that might at any moment be rendered a desert through the cutting off of the waters flowing through it.

M. Berthelot pointedly replied that "Palestine would obviously constitute a heavy load for Great Britain to bear; but Britain had herself claimed to shoulder that burden." In regard to a proposal by Lloyd George "that President Wilson should be asked to arbitrate should difference of opinion arise as to the territorial limits of Palestine, the French were unable to accept any such proposal, since President Wilson was entirely guided by Mr. Brandeis who held very decided views."⁶³

While these discussions were proceeding, a telegram addressed to Dr. Weizmann was received from Judge Brandeis and brought to the conference.

* President Herbert Hoover wrote: "The people of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon were demanding self-government and independence. These aspirations were bottled up for many years by these people being placed under mandates."⁶⁴

It read: "16 February. Please convey Prime Minister Lloyd George following message from myself and all those associated with me in the Zionist Organization in America quote My associates of the Zionist Organization of America cable me from Paris that in conference on Turkish Treaty France now insists upon terms of Sykes-Picot Agreement stop If this contention of French should prevail it would defeat full realization of promise of Jewish Home for Sykes-Picot Agreement divides country in complete disregard historic boundaries and actual necessity rational northern and eastern boundaries indispensable to self-sustaining community and economic development of country on north Palestine must include Litani river watersheds of Hermon on East must include Plain of Jaulan Hauran if Balfour Declaration subscribed to by France as well as other Allied and associated Powers is to be made effective these boundaries must be conceded to Palestine stop less than this would produce mutilation Promised Home stop Balfour Declaration was public promise proclaimed by your government and subscribed to by Allied Powers I venture to suggest that in assuring just settlement boundaries Palestine statesmen Christian nations keep this solemn promise to Israel."⁶⁵


M. Berthelot commented that the contents of the telegram seemed to indicate that Judge Brandeis had a much exaggerated sense of his own importance. He then said that he had studied George Adam Smith's book, *"Historical Geography of the Holy Land,"* which Lloyd George had lent him. The book 'clearly showed that the historic boundaries of Palestine had never extended beyond Dan and Beersheba, and he was prepared to recommend to his Government that these should be recognized as the current boundaries. Brandeis's idea that the Jewish Home should include the Litani River, the watershed of Hermon, the Plain of Jaulan and Hauran was, in his opinion, too extravagant to be considered for a single moment. What was a legitimate demand was that the Palestinians should have the use of the waters to the south of Dan. The Litani River, however, had never been included in the Jewish state.'⁶⁶

Lloyd George agreed. 'After consultation with Lord Allenby and other authorities, the British Government had decided to accept Dan and Beersheba as the future boundaries of Palestine (See map 5 on page 144). He proposed therefore to reply to Judge Brandeis in the sense that the Judge's geography was at fault and that it might be as well if he studied more authoritative and accurate maps than were apparently at present at his disposal.'⁶⁷

M. Berthelot asked Lloyd George to add to his reply 'that while France could not for a moment admit the extravagant claims put forward by Judge Brandeis, she had no intention of adopting a hostile attitude, but was quite prepared to make liberal arrangements for the supply of water to the Zionist population.'⁶⁸

It was at British insistence that the terms of the Balfour Declaration

Map. 5



were inserted into the Mandate for Palestine. The *Argument for Inclusion* of the Balfour Declaration in the Palestine Mandate is given in Document 23 with the British for it, the French against. The French Delegation ultimately dropped their objection to this and agreed on 26 April 1920 to Britain receiving the Mandate.⁶⁹

The *Mandate for Palestine* (Document 24) differed in fundamental respects from those for Syria and Iraq. Where the mandatory was required to form an organic law within three years of the commencement of the mandate and 'to facilitate the progressive development' of these countries 'as independent states'; comparable clauses were omitted from the Palestine Mandate, which provided only for 'the development of self-governing institutions' (Article 2). It was formulated palpably in the Zionist interest,⁷⁰ especially attested by Articles 2, 4, 6, 11, 22 and 23. Article 25 was inserted in August 1921 and stipulated that, with the League Council's consent, the mandatory was entitled 'to postpone or withhold application' of the provisions for a Jewish national home from 'the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined.' This right was exercised to create the emirate of Trans-Jordan.

In terms of the procedure of the League of Nations Council, the mandates for the territories of former Ottoman Asia did not go into effect until 29 September 1923, but this did not affect the policies and actions of the British and French Governments.

Britain had swallowed the hook of the Palestine Mandate baited with the Balfour Declaration; France was determined to take Syria whether covered by a mandate or not. For these colonialist and imperialist adventures, the people of Britain and France were destined to pay, and the people of the Syrian 'Fertile Crescent' to suffer.

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise wrote to Wilson: My first impulse upon learning of the consummation of our hopes is to write to you and to express to you the deep and abiding gratitude of the Jewish people, for whom I speak, for all you have done to make this great consummation possible... The cabled reports indicate that the Mandate has gone to Great Britain, and we are of the hope that ultimately things will be so adjusted as to give to Jews the best possible opportunity for realizing their hopes in the noblest way—in a way that shall be in accord with your ideals of the new freedom of peoples...⁷¹

CHAPTER IX

A 'Colonial Imperialist Policy' (1919)

EMIR FEISAL preceded the King-Crane Commission to Syria in May 1919. One of his first acts was to set in motion the convening of a national assembly or General Syrian Congress. Arab leaders had been expecting such a move, and many were already in Damascus.¹ Much of the organization for the Congress was carried out by surviving members of the 1914 Damascus Committee and their friends, the men who had formulated the terms for Arab cooperation with the British which formed the basis of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. There was great difficulty in organizing the election of representatives since the British and French authorities refused to allow official elections in their zones of occupation. The only electoral role available, therefore, was the Turkish register of electors which had been used for elections to the Turkish Parliament of 1908.

In spite of all difficulties, the Congress delegates from Syria-Lebanon-Palestine convened in Damascus and debated a programme for the future of their country.

The opening session was attended by 69 of a total of 85 elected delegates, with Christian representatives forming a higher proportion than their numerical strength in the country. The delegates who failed to appear were prevented from doing so by the French authorities, who controlled the area from which they were elected.² *The Resolutions of the General Syrian Congress at Damascus* of 2 July 1919 (Document 25), are an important guide to the political aspirations of the native population who were still free to express them—a freedom which was soon to be suppressed by the two great imperialist Powers of the day.

The Resolutions were presented to the King-Crane Commission. All were eventually passed unanimously except that which affirmed the need for British assistance, 'In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance,' which was passed by a majority. They contained the following points:

That Syria, from Turkey to 'Aqaba, should have 'absolutely complete

political independence.'

That the government should be a democratic, civil, constitutional monarchy with decentralized controls, with Emir Feisal as King. Minority rights must be safeguarded.

That Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing the Syrians among nations 'in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power,' is protested.

That French rights or claims 'in any part whatever of our Syrian country' are denied, and we refuse any assistance from France in all circumstances.

That Iraq should be completely independent, and that there should be no economic barriers between Syria and Iraq.

That the fundamental peace principles laid down by President Wilson specifically condemned secret treaties. We therefore 'enter an emphatic protest' against any such treaties which the Allies may have entered into 'providing for the dismemberment of Syria (the Sykes-Picot Agreement), and against any undertaking envisaging the recognition of Zionism in Southern Syria (the Balfour Declaration); and we ask for the explicit annulment of all such agreements and undertakings.'

That the Zionist claim 'for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of Southern Syria which is known as Palestine' is rejected. Jewish immigration is a grave menace to 'our national, political and economic life,' and is opposed; but 'our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and bear the responsibilities which are ours in common.'³

The Congress also asked to be allowed to send a delegation to the Peace Conference, since Feisal* was official representative from the Hejaz only. They emphasized that they would not have risen against Turkish rule solely to obtain the same civic and political privileges and rights, which had previously been enjoyed by them. It was the 'right to a national existence' which was demanded and denied. Would the Peace Conference not prove more just than the Turk?

To facilitate negotiations on the implementation of policy, the General Syrian Congress elected 'The Arab Executive Committee' which, as constituted from time to time by successive Arab congresses, controlled the Pales-

* To a telegram dated 10 July 1919 from Crane and King to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, reporting the Congress, they added that Feisal 'has become unique outstanding figure capable of rendering greatest service for world peace. He is heart of Moslem world, with enormous prestige and popularity, confirmed believer in Anglo-Saxon race; real (ly) great lover of Christians (Christianity). Could do more to reconcile Christians (Christianity) and Islam and longs to do so. Even talks seriously of American college for women at Mecca. Most important Feisal be encouraged, support(ed) and given opportunity to work out his plan...'⁴

tine Arab political movement from 1919 until the formation of political parties in 1935.

Many Zionists believed that the delegates to the Congress were so adamantly and decisively against Zionist immigration to Palestine because the Arabs were encouraged by anti-Zionist sentiment among the British army officers still in Palestine who had until recently been comrades-in-arms with the Arab nationalists. In the same way, French imperialists were blaming the British for the mounting opposition in Syria to French pretensions in the area.⁵ Both believed that if the British, whether politicians at home or soldiers and administrators in the area, were to withdraw their apparent support from the Arabs, those in Palestine or in Lebanon and northern Syria would simply accept the new situations envisaged.

The reason for the mounting opposition was very simple: French and Zionist aims were quite clear to the Arabs, and the Arabs did not like them because they did not like the idea of a secondary role in their own country. In the area they controlled, the French were denying to the population the right of any manifestation of nationalism or any part or partnership in administration.

At the Peace Conference, Weizmann had clearly stated the Zionist intention to 'make Palestine as Jewish as America is American or England English.' Locally, the Zionist Commission had asked for Jewish participation in the military administration; had demanded and begun to train their own military forces; claimed the right to select and supplement the pay of Jewish candidates for the police force; and proposed the appointment of a land commission composed of nominees of the Zionist Organization.⁶ Furthermore, a Zionist conference in Jaffa had formulated and published an 'Outline for the Provisional Government of Palestine', which demanded that 'Palestine should be recognized as the Jewish homeland in the affairs of which the Jewish people as a whole shall have a determining voice': it affirmed the aim of creating a large Jewish majority in Palestine; and urged that 'the purpose of creating a large Jewish homeland should receive recognition by adopting the name *Eretz Israel* for the land and by recognizing the 'Jewish flag as the flag of the country.'

The opposition to Zionism represented by the delegates to the General Syrian Congress had been previously estimated by Allenby's Chief Political Officer, General Sir Gilbert Clayton, who had been responsible for the administration of the Palestine area up to the armistice. After the armistice, General Sir Arthur Money was appointed Chief Administrator, and General Clayton became Chief Political Officer for the entire Ottoman Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). In a dispatch to the Foreign Office of 2 May 1919, while the Peace Conference was in progress, Clayton presumably considered it his duty to warn that persistence in the policy of

the Balfour Declaration might strain the relationship between Britain and the Arabs of Palestine. A report from General Money accompanying his dispatch stated that "the Palestinians desire their country for themselves and will resist any immigration of Jews...by any measure in their power including active hostilities...No mandatory power can carry through the Zionist programme except by force... By Zionist programme I do not mean the interpretation of extreme Zionists but the comparatively moderate programme presented to the Peace Conference."⁸

This dispatch, which was intended for the information of the Foreign Office and Balfour, its spokesman at the Peace Conference, produced a sharp reaction. On 19 May 1919 Balfour released a counter-dispatch to the Foreign Office which was forwarded to Clayton on 31 May. This reminded Clayton that the National Home policy had been approved by the principal Allies, *advised* him to impress this fact on the inhabitants of Palestine, and suggested that he be sent an adviser on the subject of Zionism to assist him.⁹ In other words, Balfour, like the Zionists, believed that British officers were stating prejudices not facts, but Clayton defended his position by replying that approval of the Balfour Declaration by the principal Allies would not alter the disapproval felt by the inhabitants of Palestine.¹⁰

Clayton's dispatch was offered to Herbert Samuel for comment. He consulted with Weizmann and Sokolow and issued a carefully-worded statement that 'the attitude of the Administration (in Palestine) does not appear to be in harmony with that of His Majesty's Government.' But Palestinian resistance to Zionism, if it existed, was a result of the Administration not conducting its 'relations with the Arabs on the basis of the Balfour Declaration,' and consequently, 'there would naturally arise among the Arabs a feeling of doubt whether the establishment of a Jewish national home was really a decided issue.' Samuel suggested that the administrators of Palestine be told that British policy for Palestine consisted in a British Mandate which included the Balfour Declaration, and that as a result large sums of money would be injected into the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants.¹¹

At the end of June 1919 Clayton arrived in London. In an address on 9 July to the Zionist Organization, he expressed the view that 'the Military Administration are not there to carry out any particular policy but to maintain security. They were in the position of a trustee awaiting a decision regarding the future of the country.' However, he appeared to have reconsidered his support for General Money's views which had been part of the dispatch to the Foreign Office on 2 May, for he told the Zionists that if British policy favouring their aims in Palestine were stated clearly and unequivocally, seventy-five per cent of the Arabs would accept the *fait accompli*¹² or, as it was called later, a *chose jugée*. This was in line with Herbert Samuel's comment on his dispatch, and the way was now clear for such a statement. In

a telegram dated 4 August 1919, the British Government officially informed the Military Administration that British policy envisages the grant of a Mandate for Palestine to Great Britain and that 'the terms of the Mandate will embody the substance of the Balfour Declaration.'¹³ It was now presumably for the Administration to act as if British policy were to be accepted by France and the United States, as well as by the Arabs. The British Cabinet were evidently quite sure that they would get what they wanted at the San Remo conference which was to be held in the following year.

It is not yet quite clear to what extent the directive to the Military Administration, which was not published in Palestine, was a result of the visit of Supreme Court Justice Brandeis to the area and his subsequent representations to Lord Balfour. On 1 July he arrived in Cairo after conferences in Paris with President Wilson, Colonel House, Lord Balfour, the French Cabinet, the Italian ambassador, Louis Marshall and Baron Edmond de Rothschild. Brandeis was warmly feted by Egyptian Zionists, and welcomed by T.E. Lawrence and other British notables. He was asked to await the return of General Allenby,* before entering Palestine, and he took this to be evidence that it was the British army, and not his friends among British politicians or the Zionist Commission who were dictating policy.¹⁴

His spirited approach may be gauged from a letter he wrote his wife on arrival in Cairo: "The problems... are serious, of course, but no more so than we anticipated; and, of course, they will be solved if only the British and we bear constantly in mind, that it is a question not of whether, but of how and when, Palestine shall become in fact the Jewish homeland; that the irreducible minimum is a Palestine large enough, with the water, land, and ports requisite to a self-supporting and reasonably self-sufficient community."¹⁵

On arrival in Jerusalem, Brandeis went straight to British headquarters on the Mount of Olives and, according to Jacob de Haas, told the Chief Administrator that "ordinances of the military authorities should be submitted first to the Zionist Commission." The General's A.D.C. replied to what his superior officer regarded as insufferable impertinence, "For a government to do that would be to derogate its position. As a lawyer you realize this."¹⁶ But Brandeis proceeded to lay down the law as he saw it almost as if Palestine were under his jurisdiction. He continued, "It must be understood that the British Government is committed to the support of the Zionist cause. Unless this is accepted as a guiding principle, I shall have to report it to the Foreign

* On 8 March 1919, four Egyptian leaders who were campaigning for Egyptian independence were arrested and exiled to Malta. On 9 March rioting began in Cairo and spread to the provinces. Lloyd George and Allenby were then at the Peace Conference. Allenby was sent to replace Sir Reginald Wingate as High Commissioner, but before he arrived from Europe, 'order was restored' by the British troops.¹⁷

Office."¹⁸

On 10 July 1919 he wrote Mrs. Brandeis from Jerusalem: "We have been in Palestine forty-eight hours. . . It is a wonderful country, a wonderful city. . . What I saw of California and the Grand Canyon seemed less beautiful than the view from the Mount of Olives upon the Dead Sea and the country beyond. And all yet say that northern Palestine is far more beautiful, and that in this extra dry season we are seeing the country at its worst." In another letter to her on 3 August he summed up his views: "What I have seen and heard strengthened greatly my conviction that Palestine can and must become the Jewish homeland as promised in the Balfour Declaration. The problems and the difficulties are serious and numerous, even more than I had anticipated; but there is none which will not be solved and overcome by the indomitable spirit of the Jews here and elsewhere."¹⁹

Back in the United States he reported to the National Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America on 9 September 1919. He urged, among other things, fund-raising for reafforestation and the acquisition of land beyond the Jordan to the east, and Beersheba in the south to include 'Aqaba. "So far as the Arabs in Palestine are concerned," he said, "they do not present a serious obstacle. The conditions under which immigration must proceed are such that the Arab question, if properly handled by us, will in my opinion settle itself."²⁰

Following Brandeis's visit and its directive of 4 August 1919, the British Government replaced General Money by General Watson. The Zionist commentator Mr. Kallen, claimed that this change was a direct result of Brandeis's influence.²¹ Watson was soon replaced by General Sir Louis Bols, and Clayton's appointment as Chief Political Officer at Allenby's G.H.Q. Cairo was given to Richard Meinertzhagen, an ardent Zionist.* This was the outcome of a suggestion by Weizmann to the Foreign Office that Meinertzhagen was 'one who would have the full confidence of the Zionist Organization.'²² In a dispatch to the Foreign Office on 26 September 1919, he retracted slightly from the general Zionist view he had expressed at the time of his appointment that Arab opposition would disappear once British support for Zionism was made unequivocally clear. "The people of Palestine," he wrote, "are not in a fit state to be told openly that the establishment of Zionism in Palestine is the policy to which H.M.G., America and France are committed. . . It has, therefore, been thought advisable to withhold for the present your telegram of August 4th, 1919, from general publication. On the whole our Administration has exhibited a laudable toleration towards

* Meinertzhagen's appointment was announced on 29 July 1919. He had lunch next day with Balfour who told him he 'had a very difficult task to perform in establishing Zionism in Palestine and in bringing about a workable state of affairs in Syria.'²³

a subject (Zionism) they dislike and towards a community which is often unreasonable and by nature exacting... I am insisting on official recognition of the established policy of His Majesty's Government and its being the main factor in considering the many Palestine questions always arising, subject always, until the treaty with Turkey is signed, to the Administration being conducted in accordance with the Laws and Usages of War."²⁴

Thus British policy in Palestine was now moving onto the course it would run for the next twenty years. The Zionists too began to prepare for the next phase of their operation. Towards the end of 1919 the Zionist Commission was reformed and enlarged. The new vice-president under Weizmann, Menahem Ussishkin, had recently arrived from Russia. His attitude toward the British was described by Meinertzhagen as being 'at the outset of overbearing intolerance with a contempt for compromise.'²⁵ This is confirmed by the Zionist historian Louis Lipsky who wrote of him: "There were many obstinate Zionists in the early days but none had his arrogance. He was rude and despotic, paternal and sentimental... Had he been asked he would have said he could not stomach the Arabs or the English. He ignored them both as long as possible."

'To his way of thinking the English had no business to be in Palestine at all. God had made a promise to the Jews and there was no need for the English to endorse the promise or fulfill it. The Arabs were the Ishmaelites; obviously they had no share in the covenant, and they should be made to know their place.'^{* 26} Even Meinertzhagen could find no meeting point between such attitudes and those of the military administration, whose departments were now duplicated by the departments of the Zionist Commission, designed to supplant their British counterparts. Neither could it be long before the Arabs and non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine clashed with those who chose to ignore them. Each party became more dissatisfied with the action of the other two, as was inherent in the situation which was being created.

The Zionist Commission complained that British officials refused to learn Hebrew, though several knew or were learning Arabic, and sometimes evaded the use of Hebrew as an official language as was laid down in Article 22 of the draft Mandate. They complained that Christian Arabs were being given preference over Jews in government appointments, that Arab meetings pro-

* Dr. Alfred Guillaume, Professor of Old Testament Studies at the University of London and author of various works on the Old Testament, explained that it is "generally supposed that these promises were made to the Jews, and to the Jews alone. But this is not what the Bible says. The words 'to thy seed' inevitably include Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, who claim descent from Abraham through his son Ishmael." Guillaume further points out that "When Abraham made a covenant with God through circumcision all the land of Canaan was promised to him as 'an everlasting possession.'" It should be remembered that "it was Ishmael who was circumcized; Isaac had not then been born."²⁷

testing Zionism were permitted, and that the Military Administration forbade land sales to Jews on the ground that the Turks had destroyed or removed the land registers.*²⁸ The Arabs were becoming bitter as they saw fulfilment of the war promises of independence and the peace promises of self-determination being treated as a dream which ought to be forgotten. For their part, the Administration officials were disturbed by the restlessness of the inhabitants; they complained that the Zionist Commission sought to control Jewish employees in Government offices and that its proprietary utterances increased Arab tension.

With the increase in tension among the peoples of Palestine, Egypt and Iraq, and an intensification of French suspicion of its activities, the British Government wished to withdraw its forces from Syria. "We could not indefinitely keep a large body of troops in a country for which we were not going to undertake any responsibility as a mandatory," wrote the Prime Minister.²⁹ An agreement was concluded in Paris on 15 September 1919 for the evacuation of the British Army in Syria to be concluded by 1 November 1919, with the simultaneous replacement of the French garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo by Arab forces.

At the meeting, Lloyd George pressed the Arab cause strongly, saying that they "had greatly harassed the Turks, and kept some thirty or forty thousand of them constantly occupied and given us very material assistance in conquering the country." He mentioned British commitments to the Arabs, and handed Clemenceau a document showing that the French Government had been notified of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Continuing, he said that the Sykes-Picot Agreement had also been based on the engagements of the British Government with the Arabs. Though Feisal had declared that the Agreement 'had given away something which was promised to him' the British Government could not accept this view, 'and felt certain they could convince the Emir Feisal on the matter.'³⁰

Feisal, who had been invited in August to visit Europe again, did not arrive in London until 19 September, when he was received by the Prime Minister and the acting Foreign Secretary and was informed of what had just taken place in Paris. The Emir at once protested against the proposal, as it left the Arabs 'at the mercy of greedy imperialistic ideas.'³¹ After a series of inconclusive conferences with Lloyd George and other ministers, he found

* On the British occupation, the land registries were temporarily closed because the Turks, in their withdrawal from Palestine had either removed or destroyed some of the land registers. This closure was not directed against land purchases by Jews but affected all land transactions.

The land registries were re-opened in September 1920 when the civil administration replaced the military occupation authority.

it necessary to address a formal note to the British Government on 11 October 1919, stating the reasons why the Arabs could not consent to the Anglo-French accommodation.

The note reminded the British Government that when, shortly after the Armistice, he had withdrawn his troops to the interior of Syria, he had only done so on Allenby's explicit assurance that the country would remain garrisoned by British troops until the final settlement by the Peace Conference. The measures were not only objectionable in themselves, but were being put forward as a corollary to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, to which the Arabs had not been a party. He asked the British Government to respect his stand upon the explicit assurances contained in the 'Declaration to the Seven' of 16 June 1918 and in the 'Anglo-French Declarations' and stated that the British proposal was unacceptable. His note ended with a strong plea for the summoning of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France and the United States, specifically to discuss and settle the future of the Arab countries on the basis of the pledges made and the principles proclaimed as peace aims by the Allies.³²

The prospects for such an Allied-Arab examination were nil. Allied schemes for Arab territories would not bear investigation on such basis. Yet it is interesting that when, at this time, Lloyd George received a strongly-worded telegram from Clemenceau full of resentment and insinuations that Britain was intriguing with the Arabs to increase resistance to French designs, he retaliated with a very long telegram in which he summarized British-French-Arab developments and commitments during and after the war, and made an excellent case for Arab independence in the area to be evacuated by British troops. Among other points, he stressed that even the Sykes-Picot Agreement made it binding on Britain and France to 'uphold' (*soutenir*) an independent Arab state, not to 'protect' (*protéger*) it, an alteration deliberately made in August 1916,³³ but 'protéger' was now being used by the French Government in its reference to Syria.

This reply may have impressed upon Feisal somewhat the fact of British support and good faith, for he was persuaded by Lloyd George to go to Paris for talks. These were held on 27 November 1919 with Clemenceau. A Franco-Arab agreement resulted stipulating that the occupation by France of the Lebanon and the rest of the coastal regions of Syria as far north as Alexandretta would be respected by the Arab Government in the interior, but that occupation would not extend to the region of the Biqaa,* which was to become a neutral zone between the French and Arab administrations. Further, the Arab State should turn to France for any assistance it required.

* The plan of coele-Syria between the Lebanon and Ante-Lebanon ranges on which Baalbeck stands.

The arrangement was to be provisional.³⁴

It can be appreciated that Feisal's major efforts were in combating the French threat to Syria. He could ill-afford to attack the British on the Palestine issue at the same time. Yet many Syrians believed that Feisal had sold their country.³⁵ He believed that he should stay in Europe to negotiate if possible on the mandate questions which were to be discussed at the San Remo conference in April 1920, and on questions which were bound to arise following the British withdrawal from Syria, maintaining close touch with the Syrian National Congress through his younger brother, Emir Zaid, in Damascus. Reports of unrest, however, made him return for a visit. He arrived in Beirut on 14 January 1920, and then visited Damascus and Aleppo. Everywhere his reception was cold and reserved. He used all his authority and personality to obtain the assent of Arab leaders to return to Paris with a small delegation, but crowds paraded the streets shouting 'Unity' and 'Independence', and to all his arguments the retort came again and again that, since the Paris conversations had implied and 'envisaged the dismemberment of Syria (into Palestine, Lebanon and eastern Syria) and the occupation of parts of it by foreign troops, they could not be regarded as offering a basis for discussion.'³⁶

Feisal argued in vain that his agreement with Clemenceau did not necessarily mean the permanent dismemberment of Syria, and that in consenting to it as a temporary measure, he had only accepted the inevitable. But it was not possible for him to form the delegation he had hoped for.³⁷

On 8 March 1920 the General Syrian Congress in Damascus proclaimed the independence of Syria (including Palestine and Lebanon) as a sovereign state and constitutional monarchy, with Feisal as King. A meeting of Iraqi leaders passed a similar resolution with respect to Iraq, choosing Emir Abdullah as their King. Lebanon was to have autonomy within the framework of Syrian unity, and the structure of government in Syria and Iraq would be based on decentralization, 'the old bone of contention between Turks and Arabs.'³⁸ However, the British and French Governments announced that they did not recognize the validity of the proceedings at Damascus, and invited Feisal to return to Europe for further conference. This attempt to dissociate Feisal from the expression of popular Arab aspirations could only serve to weaken his standing in Arab countries and make it quite impossible for Feisal to obtain a mandate to represent the national delegates.

The decisions of the San Remo conference were made known on 28 April 1920 by General Watson's successor as Chief Administrator of Palestine, General Sir Louis Bols, who gathered representatives of the Moslem and Christian communities in Nablus in order to read to them the text of the Balfour Declaration, its first official communication to those whom it would affect so deeply, two and a half years after its publication in London.³⁹

"The Supreme Council," he said, "has decided upon the Mandate for Palestine and that Mr. Balfour's Declaration regarding a Jewish National Home in Palestine is to be included in the Turkish Peace Treaty... I will now read to you Mr. Balfour's Declaration, the inclusion of which in the Treaty means that there will be no interference with religious customs or the holy places or any curtailment whatever of the religious liberty of the subject, but only the maintenance of public order and security. Immigrants will be allowed to enter only as required for the development of the country, and immigration will be controlled by the British Government of the country... The British Government will govern, and in no sense will a minority be allowed to control the majority of the population when the time arrives for any form of representative government..."

After reading the Balfour Declaration, he concluded: "The decision has at last been given and henceforward there must be an end to political strife and unrest. All true Palestinians must now strive with one another in healthy rivalry to the good of Palestine and the welfare of future generations..."^{*40}

* The statement was an adaptation of a draft sent to Cairo by the Foreign Office on 7 November 1919,⁴¹ and was in substitution of a draft previously submitted by Colonel Meinertzhagen but rejected as going too far in endorsing Zionist aspirations, as well as prejudging the decision of the Peace Conference.⁴²

Sir Louis Bols's own assessment had been given in March 1920 in a letter to the British Government: "It must be understood that approximately 90 per cent of the population of Palestine is deeply anti-Zionist. This opposition comprises all Moslems and Christians and a not inconsiderable proportion of Jews."

Referring to the Zionist policy, he said, "I wish to state clearly that if such a policy is proposed it is certain that a revolution would ensue which would result in the Jews being driven out of the land unless they are covered by powerful military forces of the mandatory power."

Just after the conference had opened at San Remo the Chief Administrator sent home a considered statement of the whole case, of which the conclusions are memorable. After detailing various of the acts of the Commission which have been quoted, he went on:

"It will be recognized from the foregoing, my own authority and that of every department of my Administration is claimed or impinged upon by the Zionist Commission, and I am definitely of opinion that this state of affairs cannot continue without grave danger to the public peace and to the prejudice of my Administration.

"It is no use saying to the Moslem and Christian elements of the population that our declaration as to the maintenance of the status-quo on our entry into Jerusalem has been observed. Facts witness otherwise. The introduction of the Hebrew tongue as an official language; the setting-up of a Jewish judicature; the whole fabric of government of the Zionist Commission, of which they are well aware; the special travelling privileges to members of the Zionist Commission; these have firmly and absolutely convinced the non-Jewish elements of our partiality. On the other hand, the Zionist Commission accuses me and my officers of anti-Zionism. The situation is intolerable, and in justice to my officers and myself must be fairly faced.

"This Administration has loyally carried out the wishes of his Majesty's Government

On Easter Sunday 1920, rioting broke out between Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem. Order was restored by the intervention of British troops, now used for the first time in the intermediary role between two forces who wished them gone. A military (Palin) commission of inquiry (not made public at the time) reported the reasons for the trouble as:

"(a) Arab disappointment at the non-fulfilment of the promises of independence which they claimed had been given to them during the war.

"(b) Arab belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination and their fear that the establishment of a national home would mean a great increase in Jewish immigration and would lead to their economic and political subjection to the Jews.

"(c) The aggravation of these sentiments on the one hand by propaganda from outside Palestine associated with the proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of a re-united Syria and with the growth of Pan-Arab and Pan-Moslem ideas, and on the other hand by the resources of the Zionist Commission supported by the resources and influence of Jews throughout the world."⁴³

On the other hand, Colonel Meinertzhagen who, since General Bols's appointment, had found himself increasingly in disagreement with the Administration, and who resigned soon after the riots, reported that: "The officers of the Administration are, almost without exception, anti-Zionist in their views... I am convinced that the general anti-Zionist attitude of the Administration has been reflected among the Arabs of Palestine to the extent that they believe that the Administration has their sympathy... I believe that the Arabs considered that they had the sympathy of our British administration and intended to test their theory. I am convinced that if our British administration were imbued with an understanding of and sympathy for Zionism which your Lordship has a right to expect, the risk of anti-Jewish riots might have been minimized, if not altogether avoided."⁴⁴

Certainly, General Bols was out of sympathy with 'the cloudless benevolence prevailing in every Government office in London' towards Zionism,⁴⁵ for he wrote, "They (the Zionist Commission) seek, not justice from the military occupant, but that in every question in which a Jew is interested, discrimination shall be shown in his favour."⁴⁶ But Bols's term of office was already at an end. With their own handwritten cheque for Palestine, made out in

and has succeeded in so doing by strict adherence to the laws governing the conduct of the Military Occupant of Enemy Territory, but this has not satisfied the Zionists, who appear bent on committing the temporary Military Administration to a partialist policy before the issue of the Mandate. It is manifestly impossible to please partisans who officially claim nothing more than a 'National Home' but in reality will be satisfied with nothing less than a Jewish State and all that it politically implies.

"I recommend therefore, in the interests of peace, of development, of the Zionists themselves, that the Zionist Commission in Palestine be abolished"⁴⁷

favour of Zionism at San Remo and endorsed by the French, the British Government through Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill,* invited Herbert Samuel, who had presented his 'almost lyrical outburst' in favour of Zionism to Asquith only five years before, to become first High Commissioner for Palestine.

Samuel, independently wealthy from his family's banking interests, accepted readily, and on 1 July 1920 took office in a Palestine which was stirred and tense. In the United States a year later, Weizmann disclosed: "I was mainly responsible for the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel to Palestine. Sir Herbert Samuel is our friend. At our request he accepted that difficult position. We put him in that position. He is our Samuel."⁴⁸

Further north, there was increasing disorder in Syria. King Feisal accused the French of fomenting trouble with *agents provocateurs* in order to justify the use of force in establishing themselves;** while the French General Gouraud accused the Damascus government of hostility to the policy of collaboration to which it was pledged.⁴⁹ 'Incidents' increased. With an army of 80,000 men, mostly African colonial troops, which had just been forced to leave the Sanjak of Marash by the Kemalist Turks, the French did not need much time for 'their patience to become exhausted.' On 14 July 1920 Gouraud issued an ultimatum to Damascus demanding French control of Rayak, Baalbeck, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, the acceptance of French mandatory control and other measures.

Feisal secured an extension of the time limit of four days in order to enable him to make the necessary arrangements for meeting the French demands. He said his reply was given 6½ hours before the expiration of the ultimatum, but that General Gouraud pretended to have received it on the morning of 21 July. Gouraud had already given orders for his troops to take Damascus, which they eventually occupied, "as cynical an instance of aggression," said Feisal, "as modern history records."⁵⁰

Lloyd George believed: "The feeling created by the disregard of solemn

* In an article in the *Illustrated Sunday Herald*, 8 February 1920, Churchill had pictured the emergence of 'a Jewish State under the protection of a British Crown which might comprise three or four millions of Jews.'

** "No one," he said, "is under any illusions regarding the aim of French policy, which is to create trouble throughout the country, make my task in the Eastern Zone impossible, and then intervene with their army and impose their will by force of arms upon the entire nation... It is clear that the French are pursuing a purely colonial imperialist policy."⁵¹

† On 31 July 1920 French aircraft were dropping proclamations denouncing Feisal and threatening reprisals if he did not leave Syria immediately.⁵² 'He really believed that Lord Allenby would intervene or even support him against our French Allies, and his disillusion and expulsion in 1920 after so glorious an entry a bare twelve months earlier was a pathetic, almost a tragic episode.'⁵³

treaties with the Arabs spread throughout the Arab world and left the impression that the only straight word spoken by the western nations was the one that bellowed from the cannon's mouth. It made the Arabs hostile in Mesopotamia and Palestine and accentuated inevitable difficulties in both countries... We know today how completely Lord Allenby's judgement as to the position in Syria has been vindicated by the event."⁵⁴

In the Syrian area, the French had three distinguished soldiers—Gouraud, Sarraill and Weygand—and expended French blood and money in a vain attempt to reconcile the inhabitants to French rule between the wars.

Rebellion against British control in Iraq between July and October 1920 cost 4,000 Arab lives and 2,220 British casualties, and the British taxpayer £ 40,000,000.

The fighting over Palestine was to become even costlier in money and human suffering.

CHAPTER X

Samuel Starts a Jewish National Home (1920-1925)

THE LEGALITY of the appointment of Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner for Palestine has been called 'questionable'. But the British were following a prearranged pattern, though circumstances did not always develop according to their limited plans. Thus, the settlement of British-French differences over the projected mandates at San Remo provided agreement for the clauses of an Ottoman treaty. The Turkish delegation at the Peace Conference received the instrument in Paris on 11 May 1920 and reluctantly signed it at Sèvres three months later. The British Government had hoped, presumably, that it would be signed before Samuel's appointment became operative.

In fact, the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified by the Turks; for by the summer of 1920 the nationalists under Mustapha Kemal (later Atatürk) were progressively gaining political authority and military success. Kemal would not touch the Treaty. The first forcible rejection of the Allies' collection of post-war impositions had been accomplished by the militant nationalism of the Kemalist movement. This surely served as a precedent for the Arabs and perhaps, later, for the Germans. The political clauses of the *Treaty of Sèvres* (Document 26) surrendered all non-Turkish provinces and much of Anatolia, with control over the Dardanelles vested in an international commission. It repeated the formula for the Balfour Declaration and the San Remo agreement to form 'as soon as possible a special commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities' of Palestine.

According to the interpretation of the then-current Manual of Military Law, pending the signing of a Turkish treaty, the existing armistice was 'not a temporary peace. It merely supersedes hostilities without putting an end to the war.' Under such circumstances, 'It is no longer considered permissible for him (i.e. the occupant of conquered enemy territory) to work his will

unhindered, altering the existing form of government, upsetting the constitution and domestic laws, and ignoring the rights of the inhabitants.¹ But rampant victorious Powers have neither before nor since been careful to observe previous undertakings entered into in times of peace. One British writer coined the phrase 'anticipatory rights' to denote the rights his Government assumed from the Mandates before it possessed them.² Certainly Herbert Samuel had no time for anything which might restrict the carrying out of the policy in Palestine he had helped to formulate. "The policy of His Majesty's Government that I have come out to execute", he said, "is to encourage the immigration of Jews until a point shall be reached (it may be fifty or even a hundred years hence) at which their interests shall be sufficiently predominant to warrant the establishment of Jewish government in Palestine."³

As soon as the San Remo conference had been concluded, preparations began for a Zionist conference to be held in London in July 1920. Brandeis duly sailed for Europe with his wife and daughter, the Felix Frankfurters and De Haas. They participated in long pre-conference discussions with Weizmann, Sokolow and Lord Reading.⁴ At the opening session, Weizmann's proposal that Brandeis be elected chairman was adopted, and Brandeis immediately outlined a policy which had been formulated at the pre-conference meetings.

He spoke of the double victory for Zionism of the San Remo decisions and the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel as Palestine High Commissioner with an end to the Military Administration which had curbed their activities. What was needed now was *action*. The largely-political Zionist Commission should be abolished, and all efforts directed toward getting more Jews and money into Palestine. For this purpose, an executive committee of three should be formed. Conference members at once raised the question as to whether this judge of the United States Supreme Court would be willing to serve as a committee member. Brandeis took pains to explain why he would not do so, concluding that he had decided that he could best serve their cause by staying on 'the highest Bench in the world' where he could use his influence, and by remaining in America. At most, all he could accept would be an honorary presidency, in which capacity he could continue to tender his advice on the one hand and use his influence on the other.⁵ Two days of semi-private discussions followed, when Brandeis informed the American delegation that he now refused to serve even as honorary president, and could no longer assume any responsibility in the Zionist international organization 'in view of the unreliability of Dr. Weizmann's methods.'⁶

The long drawn-out debates in a number of languages had exhausted Brandeis. 'He felt that he was talking to an alien audience.' He had sharply criticized Arthur Ruppin, the pioneer of Zionist colonization who was then

in Turkey, for using the profits earned in money-changing of dollar relief funds 'to bolster up the bankrupt Zionist corporations of pre-war days,' and he now opposed unsuccessfully the establishment of a huge Palestine Foundation Fund (the *Keren Hayesod*) 'because it co-mingled investments and contributions.'⁸

Returning to America late in August 1920, Brandeis drafted a memorandum of the policy he favoured. "We have reached the parting of the ways," he wrote. "We are no longer a propaganda movement except the propaganda that comes from understanding and achieving concrete enterprises. Furthermore, we must never lose sight of the fact that our plans should be such as to elicit the full cooperation of all Jews, those who do not want to build up the Zionist Organization but who do want to share with the Zionist Organization in the upbuilding of Palestine."⁹ He left London with the 'very clear conviction' that 'the responsibility for the immediate future in Palestine must be left or placed upon Dr. Weizmann and the British Jews primarily, and that no consideration should permit any taking away of that responsibility from those shoulders.'¹⁰

British Zionists had little need for the prompting of Brandeis. When Sir Herbert Samuel, in white diplomatic uniform decorated with the Star and purple ribbon of the Order of the British Empire and the Star of the Belgian Order of Leopold, entered Jerusalem to a salute of 17 guns, it merely represented another link forged in their growing chain of success. According to Sir Ronald Storrs who, as Governor of Jerusalem, welcomed Samuel, by this time the two or three officers, 'overtly against the declared policy of His Majesty's Government. . . were eliminated (for one only saw fit to resign).'¹¹

A message from His Majesty the King of Great Britain 'To the People of Palestine,' read by Sir Herbert Samuel one week after his arrival in Palestine on 1 July 1920, proclaimed:

"The Allied Powers, whose arms were victorious in the late war have entrusted to my country a Mandate to watch over the interests of Palestine and to ensure to your country that peaceful and prosperous development which has so long been denied to you.

"I recall with pride the large part played by my troops, under the command of Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, in freeing your country from Turkish rule, and I shall indeed rejoice if I and my people can also be the instruments of bringing within your reach the blessing of a wise and liberal administration.

"I desire to assure you of the absolute impartiality with which the duties of the Mandatory Power will be carried out, and of the determination of my Government to respect the rights of every race and every creed represented among you, both for the period which has still to elapse before the terms of the Mandate can be finally approved by the League of Nations,

and in the future when the Mandate has become an accomplished fact.

"You are well aware that the allied and associated Powers have decided that measures shall be adopted to secure the gradual establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People. These measures will not in any way affect the civil or religious rights or diminish the prosperity of the general population of Palestine.

"The High Commissioner, whom I have appointed to carry out these principles, will, I am confident, do so wholeheartedly and effectively, and will endeavour to promote in every possible way the welfare and unity of all classes and sections among you.

"I realize profoundly the solemnity of the trust involved in the government of a country which is sacred alike to Christian, Mohammedan and Jew, and I shall watch with deep interest and warm sympathy the future progress and development of a State whose history has been of such tremendous import to the world."¹²

Among Samuel's first legislative acts was an agreement satisfying to the Zionist Commission on the extent of Jewish immigration and the establishment of Hebrew as an official language.

The use of Hebrew was gradually extended throughout governmental and municipal activities, entailing the use of 'an ever-increasing staff of Hebrew interpreters, translators, stenographers, typists, printers and administrative officers, all supported by the (Arab) tax-paying majority, which contemplated unedified the refusal of linguistic (Jewish) martyrs to part with cash against receipts in Arabic.'¹³

Storrs was the best of the types of British colonial official which characterized the Empire. He was, in the accepted sense, incorruptible. He saw his duty plainly: to implement 'the declared policy of His Majesty's Government.' He prided himself on his mastery of local 'parish-pump' politics, but was insensitive and unaware of their relationship to the larger evolution of international relations, as were the makers of His Majesty's Government policy. During the Arab Revolt, he had discharged with kindness the overall direction of relief for the 7000 refugees, Armenian, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant and Moslem, who had first welcomed British troops to Es-Salt, a town across the Jordan, and had been forced to withdraw with them. As soon as was possible, he founded a Pro-Jerusalem Society for 'The protection of and the addition to the amenities of Jerusalem, the provision and maintenance of parks, gardens and open spaces, the protection and preservation, with the consent of the Government, of the antiquities, the encouragement of arts, handicrafts and industries in consonance with the general objects of the Society,' and certain other cultural activities.¹⁴ He borrowed the services of W.H. Maclean, the town-planner of Alexandria and Khartoum, to formulate

'regulations which will at any rate preserve the unique character and tradition of Jerusalem,' and appointed C.R. Ashbee, a disciple of William Morris, civic adviser and secretary to the society. From Ernest Richmond, once architect to the Egyptian Department of *Waqfs*, (charitable endowments) and later Director of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine, he obtained a technical report on the state of the Dome of the Rock. Richmond also reported the discovery of the original furnaces and kilns in which the brilliant tiles of the mosque had been fired, many of which were now missing. Storrs, remembering that an Armenian had created a magnificent tiled 'Persian' bathroom for Sir Mark Sykes' English country home at Sledmere, invited the man (David Ohanessian, from Damascus, and other Armenian ceramicists from Kutahia) to design, paint, glaze and fire new tiles in the ancient furnaces. The Mufti, the Moslem religious leader in Palestine, launched an appeal to Islam for the necessary funds; and to Storrs' appeal for funds to his Pro-Jerusalem Society, liberal subscriptions came at first from Egypt, England and America, from Moslems, Christians and Jews 'to a Jerusalem which represented all three.' "I realized then the power of the name of Jerusalem," wrote Storrs.¹⁵

Storrs prized the neutrality which he felt these subscriptions recognized. Lloyd George had impressed him during the Peace Conference by saying sternly that complaints relating to his administration were reaching the Government from Arabs and Jews alike; Storrs answered that this was all too probable and thought that the conversation was leading to his 'resignation', only to be told as they sat down, "If either one side stops complaining you'll be dismissed."¹⁶ He believed it no part of his business to weigh the relative merits of the Zionist claim to colonize Palestine and the Arabs' effort to oppose that claim. He was proud of the British rule which ensured that 'every piastre (of Moslem religious contributions) was now used exclusively for Moslem purposes in Palestine, instead of being largely diverted to Constantinople; and certain wealthy endowments, sequestered by the Turks eighty years before, were returned to the *Waqf* authority.¹⁷ He sometimes felt that the Arabs should show their appreciation by being more acquiescent in British support for Jewish ambitions. But he believed the Mufti to be 'on unshakable ground' when he declared (to a Royal Commission): "We have not the least power, nothing to do with the administration of the country, and we are completely unrepresented."¹⁸

Like most men brought up in the tradition of western industrialized society, he admired the 'great adventure of Zionism' and its eagerness to direct more Jews and money into Palestine, though at that time the Zionist aim was thought to be largely based on collective farms or farm settlements, rather than industrialization. Like most non-Jews of his time and many today, Storrs believed that the Jews who were coming to Palestine were the

descendants of the ancient Hebrew tribes who had waited 'for nearly two thousand years' to 'return home'.^{*19} He was sorry that 'The Hebrew press in general shared with the Arab the defect of refusing to verify information before casting it into print.'²⁰ He wrote: "Being neither Jew (British or foreign) nor Arab, but English, I am not wholly for either but for both. Two hours of Arab grievances drive me into the synagogue, while after an intensive course of Zionist propaganda I am prepared to embrace Islam."²¹

In Government, he and his colleagues stuck as closely to precedent as precedent permitted, anxious to finish their terms of service and pass to their pension and rest, or else move upward unmarked to less exacting appointments in the Colonial Service. Culturally, they not only supported or even restored tradition and the care of ancient monuments, but innovated also an annual salon or academy of the visual arts; exhibitions of town-planning and modern Palestinian crafts; a public reading-room well-provided with the latest newspapers and periodicals in English, French, Italian, Arabic, Greek and Armenian. Storrs founded a Chess Club with a Christian (himself) as president, a Jewish treasurer, Latin Catholic secretary, and Moslem members of committee. His musical parties prepared the way for his founding of the Jerusalem School of Music, which he later presented to the Jewish community. And his founding of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce can be set alongside his prohibition of all bars in his district.

In early August 1920, Storrs and Samuel went to Lydda to greet Feisal and his brother Zaid as they passed through from Haifa, 'eager and fretting' to reach Alexandria before Allenby, the professional soldier, the sort of man they felt they could trust, left for England. The Administration mounted a guard-of-honour a hundred strong; Feisal 'carried himself with dignity and the noble resignation of Islam... though tears stood in his eyes and he was wounded to the soul.' In Egypt, the 'Sultanate did not *recognize* him, and at Qantara station he awaited his train sitting on his luggage.'²²

The British civil servants had the satisfaction that at least they had observed a certain protocol, and Storrs felt genuinely sorry for Feisal. But British failure to support Syrian independence was the affair of Parliament, a matter decided by the representatives of the British people. Any feeling of personal moral responsibility was interred in 'the policy of His Majesty's Government.' It was a role that T.E. Lawrence could not play.

In general, the British colonial administrator was probably the finest ruler of subject peoples that the world has seen, but much of the goodwill they worked to create was destroyed by unrealistic policies promulgated by

* A racial theory discredited by a UNESCO study²³ and by many post-World War II Jewish and other distinguished anthropologists that '... the Jews do not belong to a single homogeneous racial group.'²⁴

British politicians who knew more about the grouse moors or trade union rates than the far away places and peoples for whom they legislated.

In December 1920, Feisal was in London seeking redress for the loss of Syrian independence and his loss of the Syrian throne. This time it was Ronald Storrs who persuaded him to wear Arab robes; 'with no little difficulty...for he really believed he would create a better impression in faultless evening dress.' There is no doubt that Feisal was right and Storrs wrong, for at one reception, 'After enduring a ten minute's questionnaire from Rudyard Kipling as to the size, number, origin and significance of camel brands in the Hejaz, he asked me (Storrs) in Arabic over the poet's shoulder: "Does this man take me for a camel dealer"?'²⁵ London did not want to recognize that it was not the literature of archaeology of the Arab world that he had come to discuss, but Arab unity and sovereignty. On 8 February 1921, he publicly protested that the proposed Mandate for Palestine violated the pledge to King Hussein for Arab independence there.

Overall, Zionist influence on British policy was being exerted in three ways: centrally, by British Zionists in London* securing appointments for their British nominees to the Palestine Administration where they could exert local pressure, while many Zionists of Russian and Eastern European origin were channelled into the Zionist Organization in Palestine where they could confront the Administration. The pressure-system was closed with the appointment of Lt. Colonel F.H. Kisch, the son of an East-European immigrant Jew, who had belonged to *Choveve Zion*, an ex-Indian Civil Service official, and an officer in the British army. He was chosen by the Zionist Commission to head their Political Department, and, as such, became the Zionist official responsible for liaison with the Palestine Administration. Within the Administration, the post of Attorney-General to the Civil Government was filled by the British Zionist, Norman Bentwich, who previously had held the position of assistant to the legal adviser of the Military Administration. Albert Hyamson, 'a learned and agreeable North-London Orthodox Jew,'²⁶ who had been a British civil servant in the General Post Office, now found himself employed in the key position of head of the Immigration Department, applying the complicated regulations for the admission of Jews resulting from the *de facto* operation of the draft Mandate. Max Nurock was transferred from the Zionist Organization and appointed a Principal Assistant Chief Secretary to the Palestine Government.

* '...one further inequality. This was inequality of access to the ear of the British democracy. Jewry was represented in every layer of British society—in the Lords and the Commons, in powerful capitalistic organizations and the Labour Party, in the press and in the universities.'²⁷ But not all Jews were Zionists. The Zionists were active; non-Zionists largely inactive.

It is clear that the cooperation of Samuel, Bentwich, Hyamson and Nurock greatly facilitated the enactment of the first Immigration Ordinance on 26 August 1920, fixing a quota of 16,500 immigrant Jews for the first year. As to the future, the Ordinance stipulated that the quota depended upon the 'economic needs of the country,'²⁸ a term which in later years became flexible and indeterminable. In May 1921 immigration was suspended temporarily following a second series of Arab attacks on Zionists and their settlements, but was soon after resumed with lesser restrictions on immigration than previously.

While Zionist activity directed toward influencing events in Palestine was international and local, Arab political influence was necessarily local. When Feisal's Government ruled in Damascus, Moslem-Christian Associations throughout Lebanon-Syria-Palestine had as their aim the unity of the whole area, but following the extinction of Syrian independence by the French in July 1920, they concentrated their attention on Palestine²⁹ where they were still fairly free to organize. In December 1920 they convened what was called the Third Arab (formerly termed 'Syrian') Congress. The delegates passed a resolution demanding, as had the previous congresses, that the Allied pledge of self-determination be honoured, and a national representative government be established in Palestine. An executive committee was appointed to represent all Arabs of Palestine in negotiating with the British Government for these objectives, and a Palestine Moslem-Christian Association was set up. This act dissociated the Palestinians from Emir Feisal who, they felt, had risked their homeland to gain independence for Northern Syria, only to lose his kingdom and all to the Powers who were playing a colonial game and setting the rules to suit themselves.

It was the Arab Executive Committee which repeated the demands of the Third Arab Congress to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, when he visited Palestine for a week in March 1921.

Churchill had established a Middle East Department attached to the Colonial Office, and subsequently decided to call a conference of senior British officials in the Arab territories. The purpose was to find means of reducing British expenditure on administration and military forces through a political settlement of the area. Before leaving London, it had been decided that the settlement would be assisted if Emir Abdullah, the second son of King Hussein, were made ruler of Transjordan and Feisal King of Iraq.

The visit to the Near East was momentous, with Churchill in high spirits as he presided, with the glamorous 'Lawrence of Arabia' at his side, at meetings in Cairo. An agreement was signed with Emir Abdullah recognizing him as Emir of Transjordan (followed in July 1921 by an undertaking to

provide him with an annual subsidy of 180,000 pounds sterling). This regularized the existing position and ensured a measure of British control because Feisal's administration in Damascus had treated O.E.T.A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration), which included Transjordan, as an independent state. When the French under General Gouraud entered Damascus, Transjordan was left practically without a government which Abdullah began to use as a base to harrass the French. To forestall French counter-action, an Anglo-French convention had defined the boundaries between French Syria and Lebanon and British Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine (then including Transjordan).^{*30}

Following the conclusion of his Cairo conference on 24 March 1921, Churchill left for Palestine. Soon after his arrival, Mr. Churchill met Emir Abdullah who was escorted from Transjordan by T.E. Lawrence. In a brief conference, the Emir agreed to acknowledge the British mandate for his territory, in return for which he would receive financial aid and guidance; he agreed also to abandon his project for liberating Syria from French control.

Churchill then visited the principal cities and some of the Jewish agricultural settlements where he was warmly received. But when he visited Jaffa, he drove through streets in which the houses were shuttered in protest against the pro-Zionist sympathies of his Government.

In Jerusalem he was visited by the Executive Committee of the Moslem-Christian Association which claimed to represent the whole Arabic-speaking community of Palestine. Its leader was Musa Kazim Pasha el-Husseini, a relative of the Mufti, who had been Governor of Jaffa under the Ottoman Empire. He had also been Mayor of Jerusalem in the days of O.E.T.A. but had resigned in protest against the imposition of Hebrew as an official language. So, only three and a half years after the Balfour Declaration, Churchill was confronted with a representative delegation of protesting Palestinian Arabs. They petitioned for revocation of the Balfour Declaration, cessation of Jewish immigration, and appointment of a national government answerable to a popularly elected parliament.

"You ask me," replied Churchill, "to repudiate the Balfour Declaration and to stop immigration. This is not in my power, and it is not my wish." Arab interests would be safeguarded: the establishment of a national home did not mean "a Jewish government to dominate the Arabs," but the present form of government would continue for many years; representative institutions leading to full self-government would only be accomplished after "our childrens' children will have passed away..." (Document 27).

Nothing in Churchill's assurances dispelled the concern of the delegation.

* This was followed in June 1921 by a Government 'Statement of Policy' on Iraq, and soon afterwards Emir Feisal arrived in Baghdad as a candidate for the throne. He was accepted by popular referendum, and on 23 August 1921, was crowned King of Iraq.

They resolved to go to London and Geneva later in the year to try and change this policy. But the Zionists had cause for celebration and 10,000 demonstrated their regard for Churchill when he visited Mount Scopus on 30 March before returning to London.

In London, the efforts of those who still hoped that Britain could break the tenuous commitment of the Balfour Declaration in favour of the definite commitments to the Arabs, continued. On 20 April 1921, Lord Lamington asked whether, when referring the Mandate for Palestine to the League of Nations, attention would be called to the fact that in framing the Mandate the wishes of the inhabitants of Palestine had not been consulted as directed by Article 22 of the Covenant, but that an inquiry had been made by an American [King-Crane] Commission, the report of which had never been published,* and that it might be desirable for the League to ask for it.

The Marquess of Londonderry replied for the Government that it was hardly for H.M.G. to draw the attention of the Council of the League to a document which was the property of another Government, and which that Government had not thought fit either to publish or to communicate to other Governments. The draft mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia were communicated to the Council in December 1920, and the time for such action as was contemplated in the question had gone by.

Thus the critics of the Government's pro-Zionist policy were again denied factual data which would strengthen their case, this time from the omission or commission of president Wilson and his Secretary of State both of whose pro-Zionist positions are recorded.

In March 1921, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Kamel Eff. el-Husseini, died and the High Commissioner, following Turkish system of selection, appointed the young Haj Amin Eff. el-Husseini to succeed him as from 8 May 1921. Before he could take office, a serious riot had occurred.

By 1921, the smuggling of immigrants into Palestine, supported by international Zionist funds, had become an organized business. Notably from Galati in Rumania, near the Soviet Russian border, through agents in

* Officially, the U.S. peace delegation never presented the Report to the Paris Peace Conference. Private copies did bring compliments from Lord Allenby and his aides and, according to U.S. Peace Commissioner Frank L. Folk, had an excellent moral effect on the French Government. However, the U.S. State Department classified it as a secret document, though *Editor and Publisher* magazine obtained Ray Stannard Baker's personal copy and printed the full text, in 1922, with the permission of then *ex-President* Wilson. It is not proved who suppressed the Report, but Crane blamed 'the opposition of the Zionists.' Zionist historian Jacob de Haas stated that "the official suppression of the King-Crane Report was probably the only way of ending the situation created by the appointment of the Commission."

French-controlled Beirut for example, Jews from Russia and eastern Europe, whose political records made them unacceptable to the British authorities, were being brought into the country outside the quota. Passports were forged in a bureau in Berlin. Among the clandestine immigrants were Bolsheviks whose leaders, Chalidi, Lomosoneff and Myerson, organized a group, *Mitlagat Poalim Sozialistim*, generally called the M.P.S. or *Mopsi*. Myerson had attended a Jewish congress in Moscow in August 1920 at which a committee for 'Propaganda and Action' in Palestine had been appointed; Leon Trotsky, who addressed the congress recommended that 'other objects be used as a cloak' by the committee.³¹

In March 1921, *Mopsi* members in Palestine, roughly two hundred, issued a handbill-proclamation calling on all workers, Jew or Arab, 'to join their ranks as members of the red army of workers.'³² They were actively opposed by a less-violent group, *Ahdot ha Avodah* (*Unity of Work*), which was affiliated to the First and Second Socialist Internationals, whereas *Mopsi* was affiliated to the Third.* May Day 1921 was to be a test of strength. *Ahdot ha Avodah* held a large officially recognized and licensed demonstration and procession. *Mopsi* held a counter-procession, and the resultant clash, noisy and alien, led groups of Jews to the seashore on the outskirts of the Arab city of Jaffa. To the Arabs it seemed that they were being invaded by the Zionists. "Bolsheviki! Bolsheviki! The Zionists are flooding the country with Bolsheviks," they cried.³³ It 'was not so much a riot as a miniature rising against the presence of the Zionists.'³⁴ As so often happens, many of the resulting victims were not originally active participants. Suddenly 'the mad shout arose that "the mosques are being attacked by the Bolsheviks" (Jews).'³⁵ The Arab mob surged to the immigrant hostel maintained by the Zionist Commission, and killed thirteen of the inmates. From Jaffa action spread into the countryside and five Jewish colonies were attacked. Martial law was proclaimed on 2 May one day after the riots had started, but the country stayed excited and agitated for weeks. The disorders were suppressed by British soldiers and by the police. '47 Jews were killed and 146 wounded, mostly by Arabs, and 48 Arabs were killed and 73 wounded, mostly by police and military action.'³⁶

A Commission of Inquiry, headed by the Chief Justice, Sir Thomas Haycraft, was appointed by Herbert Samuel. While the inquiry was in

* The First Socialist International was formed in London in 1864 to promote the replacement of wage labour by associated free labour; for this objective the working class must acquire political control of the State, and use it to obtain possession of the means of production.

The Second International started in 1890 as a 'social democratic' movement, with militarism as the main object of its attacks.

The Third or Communist International (Comintern) was officially organized in Moscow 2-6 March 1919. A majority of its members were Jews.

progress, on 3 June 1921, the King's birthday, only one month after the riots, Samuel made a definitive statement on the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration:

"I hear it said in many quarters that the Arab population of Palestine will never agree to their country, their holy places, and their lands being taken from them and given to strangers. People say that they cannot understand how it is that the British Government, which is famous throughout the world for its justice, could ever have consented to such a policy.

"I answer that the British Government... has never consented and will never consent to such a policy... (The Balfour Declaration) means that the Jews, a people who are scattered throughout the world, but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be enabled to find their homes, and that some among them, within the limits that are fixed by the numbers and interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its inhabitants.

"If any measures are needed to convince the Moslem and Christian population... that their rights are really safe, such measures will be taken. For the British Government, the trustee under the Mandate for the happiness of the people of Palestine, would never impose upon them a policy which that people had reason to think was contrary to their religious, their political, and their economic interests."³⁷

Samuel's statement was based on his belief that Arab objections were better met, as far as possible, rather than suppressed. He went on to the subject of Jewish immigration, saying that although forthcoming regulations would be liberal, 'the conditions of Palestine are such as do not permit anything in the nature of a mass immigration.' He admitted the validity of Arab objections to the threat of communism from the members of *Mopsi*. A small number of "new arrivals," he said, "are tainted with the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevism which carry with them the economic ruin of all classes in any country that they enter." He promised the suppression of *Mopsi*; and after referring to the Haycraft Commission, he concluded with an expression of hope that representative government would soon be established in Palestine.

The speech discomfited militant Zionist leaders. They had three main objections: The first was that it implied that the blame for the disorders lay with *Mopsi* rather than with Arab agitators. The second objection was to the policy of equality of obligation to Arab and Jew, though they did not describe it so directly. Their third objection, which could hardly be made openly, was to representative government in Palestine, the last thing the Zionists wanted.³⁸

The Arabs, Christian and Moslem, still demanded the reversal of the

Balfour Declaration, but moderates were mollified and merely regretted that the terms of the 'Statement' had not been more far-reaching and specifically favourable (to them). The 'Statement' thus tended to divide these Arabs from those who took a more pessimistic view of their future. But all Arabs were heartened by Pope Benedict who, on 13 June 1921, directly criticized the Jews for the disorders in Palestine, and urged that an appeal be made to the League of Nations to define the Mandate.³⁹

On 14 June 1921 Winston Churchill addressed the House of Commons on the arrangements he had concluded and the intentions of the Government in the Middle East. Of Palestine, he admitted that British undertakings were in conflict and that "the cause of unrest in Palestine, and the only cause, arises from the Zionist movement and from our promises and pledges to it." In a later passage he said: "The difficulty about this promise of a national home for the Jews in Palestine is that it conflicts with our regular policy of consulting the wishes of the people in the mandated territories and of giving them representative institutions as soon as they are fitted for them, which institutions, in this case, they would use in order to veto any further Jewish immigration." But of such immigration, he said, "There is really nothing for the Arabs to be frightened about."

The debate which followed brought from Zionist supporters Josiah Wedgwood and commander Kenworthy expressions of the supposed strategic value to Britain of Palestine, with Wedgwood calling it an injustice to accuse the Jews of involving Britain in expenses when these would in any case be incurred by a garrison there for the purpose of guarding the Suez Canal. In vain did Lord Robert Cecil, who followed him in the debate, assert that the Balfour Declaration had been issued from no such motive.

The House of Commons debate in June brought Weizmann to London, and a month after it he had a meeting with the Prime Minister and the key policy-makers associated with him. It was one of the many occasions when Dr. Weizmann's informal personal diplomacy produced formal results from individual commitments. The degree of partiality to Zionism of the participants is revealed in Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen's *Middle East Diary 1917-1956* with this account of the meeting:

Notes on conversation held at Mr. Balfour's house on July 22nd, 1921.
Present: Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. A. J. Balfour, Mr. Winston Churchill,
Sir Maurice Hankey, Mr. Edward Russell, Dr. Weizmann.

Dr. W. reported on his visit to America, explaining the situation there—Zionist, Jewish and general—and delivered message to British Government entrusted to him by Sir A. Geddes.

L.G. very interested.

Dr. W. further explained the fight with the Anglo-Zionist Organization at the results of which L.G. expressed great satisfaction and said "it is very creditable to you."

A.J.B. "You ought to tell the P.M. the position of Zionism at present."

Dr. W. replied that while he was away in America 'building up', the whole position became vitiated by the developments of the situation in Palestine, e.g. Samuel's speech which was a negation of the Balfour Declaration.

W.C. (interrupting) "Why?"

Dr. W. produced speech and read it, showing difference between it and the Declaration. The Declaration meant an ultimate Jewish majority, and this speech would never permit such a majority to eventuate.

W.C. demurred at this interpretation of the speech.

L.G. And A.J.B. both said that by the Declaration they always meant an eventual Jewish State.

Dr. W. continuing on position of Zionism, stoppage of immigration, non-granting of necessary concessions for development, lack of security for Jewish population, *a propos* of which he said "We were gun-running and I can't allow it."

W.C. (interrupting) "We won't mind it, but don't speak of it."

Dr. W. "I would like it sanctioned. Is it agreed?"

They all agreed to this.

W.C. took official view of the Administration showing the difficult situation that had arisen owing to the Balfour Declaration which was opposed by the Arabs, nine-tenths of the British officials on the spot, and some of the Jews in Palestine. He said it was a poor country in which destitute immigrants could not be dumped.

Dr. W. refuted this and spoke of 'representative government project.'

W.C. quoted Mesopotamia and Transjordan to which

Dr. W. replied, "You will not convince me that self-government has been given to these two lands because you think it right; it has only been done because you must", to which L.G. A.J.B. and W.C. all agreed.

Dr. W. "If you do the same thing with Palestine it means giving up Palestine, and that is what I want to know."

L.G. to W.C. "you mustn't give representative government to Palestine."

W.C. "I might have to bring it before the Cabinet." Of course questions affecting the Jewish national home would be eliminated from the purview of the representative government.

Dr. W. said this was impossible, and after a general refutation of arguments used, the talk became general and felt sure that a *modus operandi* could be worked out with them for the next three years.

Dr. W. doubted this. He regarded the Arabs as political blackmailers and

could only talk with them when he knew the position of the British Government.

L.G. "Frankly speaking, you want to know whether we are going to keep our pledges?"

Dr. W. "Yes." A.J.B. nodded.

L.G. "You must do a lot of propaganda. Samuel is rather weak."

Dr. W. "The irony of the situation is that we are charged with being a burden on the British taxpayer which is nonsense." He pointed out why, to which L.G. and A.J.B. agreed but not W.C.

Dr. W. pointed out absurdity of charge that we were taking the bread of the Arabs. L.G. laughed and asked how much money we had spent, and he was impressed by Dr. W.'s answer. Further, Dr. W. explained how difficult it was and how much this money represented for Zionists in present situation and insisted that everything depended on their having confidence.

W.C. "Well, what would satisfy you in the way of immigration?"

Dr. W. "I can't formulate it in numbers, but in conditions, e.g., the granting of the large Rutenberg concession—he agreed to the severance of the Palestinian Army from H.Q. in Egypt—he looked upon the formation of a neutral police as a very good idea.

W.C. at the end of the conversation suggested that a part of the money should be set aside for the purpose of bribing the Arabs.

Dr. W. said that this was neither moral nor rational and the price is very heavy. It is easy to work with the Arab nationalist leader 'on your backs, but that we won't do.' Now the presence of the British makes it difficult to enter into intimate relations with the Arabs.

All felt, as Arab Delegation was coming, a practical way out must be found.

L.G. to A.J.B. "You ought to make a big speech again in the Albert Hall on Zionism."

A.J.B. "I will do it with pleasure."

W.C. then left.

A.J.B. accompanied L.G. to his car talking over affairs and on his return said, "It was a very satisfactory conversation and action will follow. You must write out your desiderata."

Dr. W. "You have the document", to which A.J.B. said he had read it and it seemed all could be accepted and some had already been agreed upon. Then he added, "It is all right, the P.M. is very keen on the affair, has a high regard for you, and understands your difficult position."⁴⁰

The Arab delegation arrived in London in August 1921. In September, they went to Geneva where they eventually succeeded in meeting Arthur Balfour who spoke to them with graceful vagueness of the 'experiment' of

Zionism. They returned to London in the autumn for the publication of the report of the Haycraft Commission.⁴¹

For the first time, a commission appointed by a Jewish High Commissioner, headed by men* conscious of the traditional impartiality of British law, with a first-hand knowledge of local conditions, had issued a report on Arab-Jewish relations which the British people could read. The Report, as we have seen, was a censure on 'the policy of His Majesty's Government' and that of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. It criticized Dr. Eder,** the Zionist Commission's head, for his suggestion that only Jews should be allowed to bear arms, and Zionists for refusing to recognize traditions of nationality and solidarity among the Arabs. These simple inequities the British people who read of them could understand and reject.

The Haycraft Commission, reporting in October 1921 (Document 28), 'found that the fundamental cause of these acts of violence was "a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents".' They observed, in relation to the Zionist Commission, 'a belief among the Arabs that the Commission has either desired to ignore them as a factor to be taken into serious consideration, or else has combatted their interests to the advantage of the Jews.'⁴²

'It has been suggested by Jews that the riots had been artificially stimulated among the uneducated mass of the Arab population by the *effendi* class who were discontented on account of the loss of privileges which they enjoyed under the Turks; but the Commission declared that "the feeling against the Jews was too genuine, too widespread, and too intense to be accounted for in this superficial manner." They maintained that the root of the trouble lay in Arab fear of the consequences of a steady increase in Jewish immigration; the Arabs regarded Jewish immigration not only as an ultimate means of Arab political and economic subjection, but also as an immediate cause of Arab unemployment. The Commission found that the Arabs were aware that Jewish predominance was envisaged not only by extremists but also by the responsible representatives of Zionism. The Commission also reported that the Arabs had observed with disquiet the attitude and behaviour

* Sir Thomas Haycraft, Mr. (later Sir) Harry Luke, Deputy Governor of Jerusalem, Mr. J.N. Stubbs of the Land Department, with Jewish and Arab assessors to aid them. Their terms of reference were: 'To enquire into the recent disturbances in the town and neighbourhood of Jaffa and to report thereon.'

** Mr. Eder 'boldly told the Court of Inquiry, following the Jaffa disturbances of 1921, that "there can be only one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish preponderance as soon as the numbers of the race are sufficiently increased".'⁴³

of certain of the younger immigrants from Europe.'

'The hostility shown towards the Jews during the riots was shared by Arabs of all classes; Moslem and Christian Arabs, whose relations had hitherto been uneasy, were now united.'⁴⁴

In the same month as the Jaffa riots had occurred, a fourth Arab Congress was held in Jerusalem, and in July an Arab delegation appointed by this Congress went to London. After the report of the Haycraft Commission, an 'Order' was issued in December 1921 creating a Supreme Moslem Council which, without government control, was to administer the *Awqaf* and to appoint and dismiss the judges and officers of the *Shari'a* Courts.* In 1922 the Mufti of Jerusalem was elected President of this body.

The delegation of Palestinian Arab leaders in London provided an opportunity for the first time for direct press reporting of their views and for meetings with British parliamentarians. It established for the first time the principle of consultation with the Arabs in matters affecting the future government of Palestine,⁴⁵ and its presence reminded the British Government of its declared policy of 'equality of obligation' towards Arabs and Jews.

Two changes were now offered in the draft Mandate which had been presented to the League Council in December 1920:⁴⁶ The clause of the Balfour Declaration concerning the civil and religious rights of Palestine's non-Jewish inhabitants was inserted in the preamble to the draft; it had pre-

* During the Ottoman Regime in Palestine, laws affecting the constitution, jurisdiction, procedure, and internal organization of *Waqf* (Benevolent or Religious Endowment) property were promulgated by the legislative authority of the Ottoman Empire. Before the Turkish Constitution of 1908, this authority was the Sultan, who was also *Caliph* (Spiritual Leader); after 1908, it was the legislative body created by the Constitution. Since the Ottoman Empire was a Moslem state, that authority was also Moslem.

By the time of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the administrative powers in regard to the procedure and organization of the *Shari'a* (Moslem Religious) Courts had passed to the control of the Ottoman Ministry of Justice; and the Ministry of *Awqaf* (plural for *Waqf*) supervised the administration of the 'trust property' or administered it directly.

When Palestine was detached from the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and came under the rule of a non-Moslem government, it became necessary to create a new machinery for Moslem *Waqf* property and other religious matters to be administered and controlled by a Moslem body in accordance with Moslem tradition and practice during past centuries. Consequently, by an Order issued by the High Commissioner for Palestine in December 1921, a Supreme Moslem Council was constituted for 'the control and management of Moslem *Awqaf* and *Shari'a* affairs in Palestine.'⁴⁷ The Palestine Mandate, on the other hand, included in Article 9 a condition that 'the control and administration of *Waqf* shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.'⁴⁸ This meant, in effect, that the *status quo* existing prior to the British occupation, that the Moslems themselves should administer and control Moslem religious affairs, shall be maintained.

viously appeared in one of the articles of the 1920 draft. The other change was the insertion of an article (*Cmd 1785*, Art. 25) which allowed the exemption of the territory of Transjordan from the provisions of the Mandate and the Declaration. This was regarded as a serious whittling down of the original Zionist aspiration,⁴⁹ though no territorial limits were set in the Balfour Declaration and the boundaries of the Palestine State as defined in the Anglo-French Convention of December 1920 went far beyond the area 'from Dan to Beersheba' which had been originally discussed at the Peace Conference.

The Zionists felt they were being squeezed, and partly for this reason, to gain political support against British policy, and partly to raise money, Weizmann set out on a tour of European capitals.⁵⁰ In Rome he assured the Vatican, as Herzl had done before him, that Zionism was not concerned with the Christian holy places in Palestine; to the Italian Government he emphasized that the Zionists did not intend to allow the Mandate to be used as an instrument for the establishment of a British outpost in the eastern Mediterranean.⁵¹ Weizmann's next stops were Paris and Berlin to raise money from Jewish groups. In Paris, he also held talks with officials aimed at support in the League of Nations for increasing or at least maintaining the political and military boundaries for Palestine defined in the Anglo-French Convention of 1920 (including Transjordan). He discussed with M. de Monzie and General Gouraud the northern frontiers of Palestine⁵² and French ratification of the Palestine Mandate, for there was a strong body of French opinion which did not wish to approve the Mandate believing that France should be the mandatory for all Syria, including Palestine.* This was the view of General Gouraud, who felt that the essence of the British Mandate was a design to expand British influence in the Levant.⁵³ He was therefore impervious to Weizmann's pleading for the inclusion of the drainage basin and waters of the *Litani* river in the newly-drawn Palestine, a suggestion of Judge Brandeis which had been rejected at the San Remo conference.

On 17 April 1921 Weizmann unilaterally 'proclaimed' the establishment of the *Keren Hayesod*, on his, and the World Zionist Organization's, own terms, *The New York Times* for the following day carried 'The Proclamation' in full.

Weizmann put it in these terms: "Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the World Zionist Organization, and pursuant to the resolutions of the London World Zionist Conference adopted in July, 1920, I announce the opening of the *Keren Hayesod* Bureau for America, and call upon all American Jews to come forward and to make their sacrifices

* The Latin Patriarch, head of the Roman Catholic Church in Palestine, refused to recognize the authority of the Palestine Administration during the first years of British occupation.

in order that the Jewish national home may be speedily established.

"No casual charity will suffice. The exceptional effort which is called for today must take the form of self-taxation inspired by the noble Jewish tradition of the tithe. A heavy load of taxation is today imposed upon the people of the world in the name of national reconstruction. The appeal we make is to the Jewish conscience. We have no power to enforce an adequate response, but no Jew worthy of the name will at this solemn moment shelter himself behind the inability of his people to enforce compliance with duty.

"The gates of Palestine are no longer barred from within by an unfriendly government. The key is in the hands of the Jewish people. It is for Jewry to decide whether the gates are to remain un-opened or whether they are to welcome the multitudes that are anxiously awaiting the hour of restoration."⁵⁴

On 19 April Judge Mack responded, also in *The New York Times*, with a disclaimer for the administration of the Zionist Organization of America: "The officers of the Zionist Organization of America are not parties to this proclamation. They had not been asked to sign it and they could not have become parties thereto, because it completely fails either to limit the fund as agreed to a donation fund or to embody therein any safeguards with respect to expenditures, conditions indispensably precedent to our co-operation in the solicitation of these funds."⁵⁵

On 20 April an office for the *Keren Hayesod* was opened and a campaign begun for \$ 100,000,000.⁵⁶

On 10 February 1922 *The Times* published an account of a draft order-in-council providing for a constitution for Palestine, with a partially elective legislative council. The next day Vladimir Jabotinsky cabled from New York to the London Executive: "Disquieting reports (on) constitution project. Please cable essentials, instruct secretariat (to) send me all political correspondence from September (1921) and future." Leonard Stein, the Executive's political secretary, replied that this was difficult and costly but sent instead the newspaper article.⁵⁷

Leading the movement to inform the British people on Palestine realities were the newspapers of Lord Northcliffe, particularly the *Daily Mail*. In mid-February he visited Palestine to see the conditions of the territory in which he had become so concerned during the war. Petitions were drawn up and presented to him not only by Arabs but by Jewish groups who resented the Zionists' arrogation of the right to represent them. He recognized the flaw in the Zionist position and made a prediction: "This country runs the risk of becoming a second Ireland."^{*58}

* In 1919, shortly before his death, Sir Mark Sykes had visited Palestine and had also found conditions far different from those imagined by him during the war when it had been, of course, impossible to visit the country. In north Syria "and in Palestine he found affairs

On 21 February 1922 the Arab Delegation informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies that 'the People of Palestine' could not accept the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate and demanded their national independence. They declared their refusal to cooperate in any form of government other than a government responsible to the Palestinian people and requested that the constitution for Palestine should:

- (1) Safeguard the civil, political and economic interests of the people.
- (2) Provide for the creation of a national independent government in accordance with the spirit of paragraph 4, Article 12, of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- (3) Safeguard the legal rights of foreigners.
- (4) Guarantee religious equality to all peoples.
- (5) Guarantee the rights of minorities.
- (6) Guarantee the rights of the assisting Power.⁵⁹

Once again Arabs were asking Europeans to allow them democratic government, once again they were pleading for assistance and not imperial rule, just as Feisal had asked for these at the Peace Conference.

Apart from their claim being founded on a natural right, including the Wilsonian peace aims advertised by the Allies during the war, they based their demand for self-government on the promises made to the Arabs in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. But Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill claimed that Palestine was excluded from the promise, namely, independence for the entire 'Fertile Crescent' and Arabia except a portion of Syria lying to the west of 'the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo.'⁶⁰ As the 'Correspondence' was not published in England until 1939, and its existence unknown except to a few officials in the Colonial and Foreign Offices, there was no way for the British public to judge whether this was true or not. Churchill's office it appears, altered the above phrase from the Correspondence to 'the country lying to the west of the vilayet of Damascus' in his reply to the Arab Delegation on this point,⁶¹ The four towns mentioned lie in an almost straight line running north and south, and the country to the west of them was precisely the area in which the British supported a French mandate that corresponded roughly to the present Lebanon.

The Arabs did not give the letters to the press, as the Zionists would have done, but at once set off for the Colonial Office to protest that there never was a 'vilayet of Damascus'. The Ottoman dominions between Anatolia and Egypt had contained three vilayets or provinces, Beirut, Suriya and Aleppo, each being subdivided into sanjaks. Three sanjaks, Lebanon Jerusalem and Zor, were independent of the vilayets and communicated

politically far more complicated than he had hoped, and I had never known him so uncertain of the practical truth of his dearest convictions," wrote his friend Storrs.⁶²

directly with Constantinople. The imaginary 'vilayet of Damascus' was mentioned in a draft of a 'White Paper' which the British Government was preparing on their policy for Palestine, received by the Delegation on 31 May 1922. As a result of their visit to the Colonial Office, where they were met by a permanent official and Herbert Samuel, they were told the following: "The comments you were good enough to offer were carefully considered by the Secretary of State who, after consulting the authorities concerned with the early correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the King of the Hejaz, decided to make a modification in the draft on a point of fact."⁶³

Possibly this misrepresentation was not the fault of Churchill who may have known little more about the delineations of the vilayet system of Ottoman rule in Syria than Lloyd George knew about Teschen (a principal area of territorial dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia between 1919 and 1939) not even its whereabouts! What is more likely is that the permanent officials were acting under a general directive that Palestine was to be treated as excluded from the agreement with Hussein, a directive which it was their job to support as best they could.

March 1922 saw the resignation of Edwin Montagu from the Cabinet. His action was said to be due to the publication, authorized by him without consent of the Cabinet, of a dispatch sent by the Indian Government to the Imperial Government. This stressed the need to allay the rising discontent of Indian Moslems against Allied imperialist actions in the Near and Middle East and asked that Constantinople be evacuated, the Sultan's suzerainty over the holy places re-established, and that Thrace, Adrianople and Smyrna be restored to Turkey. For the first time the brotherhood of Indian Moslems with those of the Arab countries was having a repercussion under the seat of imperial power. But it was ironical that the only man displaced by the blast was a Jew and perhaps the firmest opponent of Zionist pretensions in the Government.

The British Government's first attempt at a definitive public statement of policy in Palestine, the *Churchill Memorandum* (Document 29) was issued on 3 June 1922.⁶⁴ 'The British Government' in this instance was virtually the same small group around Lloyd George which had been responsible for the whole Balfour Declaration complex of 1917, but their statement of policy was now tempered by the advice of some permanent British officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices with a perspective improved by the absence of the war factor in their analysis. Now that the terms of the draft mandate were considered under lower pressure, there was a moving away from additional Zionist formulas, including the idea of the eventual establishment of a Jewish state or commonwealth in Palestine, which the more aggressive mem-

bers of the Zionist General Council were insisting should be inserted in the Mandate. Weizmann had been warned that the Zionists must desist from pressing this point if they wanted a British Mandate.⁶⁵

The Hussein-McMahon pledge of independence raised by the Arab Delegation was treated by asserting that a reservation was made excluding 'the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus.' This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge. *Inter alia*, this recognized Palestine as being a part of Syria, and continued the fiction, knowingly, that the letter of Sir H. McMahon to King Hussein of 24 October 1915 (unpublished in 1922) was not a commitment to an independent Arab Palestine.

The 'Memorandum' offered what was considered to be a forward step in the development of self-governing institutions by a proposal to establish a legislative council containing a large number of members to be elected on a wide franchise. The view that the Balfour Declaration entitled the Jews to look forward to the emergence of a Jewish state was rejected. The British promise had been to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home *in Palestine*; 'the terms of the Declaration...do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home,' nor was there anything in it to warrant the suggestion that Palestine was destined to become 'as Jewish as England is English.' Moreover, 'His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view.'

The principal points were:

- (1) His Majesty's Government re-affirmed the Balfour Declaration.
- (2) A Jewish national home would be founded in Palestine as of right and not of sufferance, but there would be no imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole.
- (3) Nor did His Majesty's Government contemplate the disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, language or culture.
- (4) The status of all citizens of Palestine should be Palestinian. No section of the population would have any other status in the eyes of the law.
- (5) His Majesty's Government intended to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine, and as the next step, a legislative council with a majority of elected members would be set up immediately.
- (6) The special position of the Zionist Executive did not entitle it to share in any degree in the government of the country.
- (7) Immigration would not exceed the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals.

(8) A committee of the elected members of the legislative council would confer with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Any difference of opinion would be referred to His Majesty's Government.

(9) Any religious community or considerable section of the population claiming that the terms of the Mandate are not being fulfilled, would have the right of appeal to the League of Nations.

It was hoped that this 'Statement', while firmly reasserting the Government's adherence to the Balfour Declaration, would, by its definition of the *National Home*, remove strong Arab opposition to it. The Order-in-Council which followed this announcement on 10 August 1922, provided for a legislative council to be composed of eleven officials and twelve elected members, the latter to consist of eight Moslems, two Jews and two Christians. The Zionist Organization formally accepted the policy set forth in the 'Statement',* but the Palestinian Arab Delegation at that time in London declined to concur in it.⁶⁶

To most British observers the intransigence of the Arab Delegation seemed to show a complete lack of political realism,⁶⁷ compromise by others being regarded as the highest virtue by British diplomacy. Though the 'Memorandum' appeared to offer the Arabs proportional representation in the government, the Arabs perceived that the line of division was likely to be pro-Balfour Declaration 13 and anti-Balfour Declaration 10, making them a permanent minority in voting on the most important issues of land policy, utility concessions, immigration and Zionism. Thus, according to the rules of the British parliamentary type of democracy they would be committed to accept majority decisions which they considered against the interests of those they represented, and actively support or acquiesce in the implementation of those decisions.

The Arabs not only dissected the ambiguities of the 'Memorandum' but attacked the existing Palestine Administration. Samuel was accused of grossly favouring the Zionist purchase of land by 'prohibiting exportation of local products' in 1920 when farmers were short of cash and the crops had been plentiful. Taxes were too high, the government too large and worse for the inhabitants than the Ottoman administration.⁶⁸ But the High Commissioner expressed the view to a Cabinet committee that the rejection of the proposals by the Arab Delegation was due to the advice of its English friends.⁶⁹ This tended to smear English friends of the Arab peoples as obstructing compromise and agreement. This was in line with the tactic that

* Jabotinsky had just returned to London on 17 June after eight months in the United States organizing the collection of funds for the *Keren Hayesod*. He claimed that he voted against acceptance, but did not resign and therefore accepted responsibility. The disagreement with Weizmann was aired at the Fifteenth Zionist Congress in August 1927.⁷⁰

had branded Feisal as unrepresentative of the Arabs, and then attacked other Arab leaders as unrepresentative of the interests of the Arab peasant and worker.

In the parliamentary debate in June 1922 which followed publication of the '*Statement of Policy*' (The Churchill Memorandum), the coalition government was defeated in the House of Lords on a motion introduced by the Liberal statesman Lord Islington. It ran: "The Mandate for Palestine in its present form is unacceptable to this House because it directly violates the pledges made by His Majesty's Government to the people of Palestine in the Declaration of October 1915, and again in the Declaration of November 1918, as is, as at present framed, opposed to the sentiments and wishes of the great majority of the people of Palestine; that therefore its acceptance by the Council of the League of Nations should be postponed until such modifications have therein been effected as will comply with the pledges given by His Majesty's Government."

Lord Islington's speech was a most able performance, but he was unable to strengthen it with an analysis of the McMahon Correspondence, since, with the exception of the small ruling clique, no Englishmen were aware of its existence beyond the letter of October 1915. He was perhaps embarrassed by the support of Lord Sydenham, who appeared to have been influenced by the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and who charged that the Zionist extremists 'seem to have been quite aware that a world war was coming' in 1914.

Weizmann, fully realizing the potential significance of this penetration of the Zionist position, hurried to London to rally his forces to meet the threat.

In the House of Commons, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, two weeks after the Lords debate, called for the submission of the Mandate to Parliament and the referral of the Rutenberg* Concession to a select committee for in-

* Pinchas Rutenberg was born in a Ukrainian village and grew up to be a revolutionary and Menshevik official in the Kerensky regime which followed the overthrow of the Czarist government. After Kerensky's defeat, he went to Odessa and thence to Palestine. He came to the United States frequently, seeking funds for 'harnessing the waters of the Jordan,' as his prospectus had it. 'His pockets seemed always to be stuffed with secret communications, plans and orders, and he walked the streets of New York furtively, glancing over his shoulder to see whether spies were following him.'¹ This was the man to whom the Samuel administration had given a concession for the supply of electric power to the whole of Palestine, excluding Jerusalem, a monopoly. To obtain this, 'He had to seek the favour of the Mandatory Government. He was aided by Dr. Weizmann, Alfred (Lord) Mond and Rufus Isaacs (Lord Reading).'² However, though he was to become very rich in the process, Rutenberg was merely an agent for the Zionist Organization, but the concession, giving Zionist exclusive development rights over British or Palestinian native contenders for them, was extremely important to the development of Jewish-Zionist strength.

Behind the Zionists lay the great power and funds of Edmond de Rothschild, which 'facilitated the formation of the Palestine Electric Corporation Ltd., the Portland Cement

vestigation. But, wrote Weizmann, "With such champions as Mr. Churchill and Major Ormsby-Gore, we had better luck, and a similar motion was heavily defeated."⁷³

On 30 June 1922 a *Resolution* (Document 9(3)) similar to the Balfour Declaration was adopted by the United States Congress stating that "owing to the outcome of the World War and their part therein, the Jewish people, under definite and adequate international guarantee, are to be enabled... to recreate and reorganize a national home in the land of their fathers," commending "this act of historic justice about to be consummated" as "an undertaking which will do honour to Christendom."⁷⁴

'A confirmed Zionist, President Harding had made his interest known unofficially,'⁷⁵ and formal American endorsement of the Balfour Declaration took the form of a Joint Resolution of both Houses of Congress, signed by President Harding in September 1922.⁷⁶ Up to April 1922, the insertion of a provision in the Mandate forbidding any monopolistic concession in Palestine was being insisted upon by the United States, formal diplomatic notes on the subject having been exchanged over a year before. This provision would have largely voided the Rutenberg Concessions and perhaps cracked the delicate surface of the draft of the Mandate itself. Mr. Balfour is said to have intervened secretly with the U.S. Administration to withdraw from its position.⁷⁷

In 1922 negotiations began leading up to the Anglo-American Convention of 1924, by which the United States secured privileges for American commercial and other interests in Palestine, notably the Standard Oil Company's exploration rights in the Negeb, and, in return, formally 'consented' to the exercise of the Mandate by Great Britain.*⁷⁸

The Balfour Declaration was inserted in the preamble to the British draft, but the State Department asked (12 July 1922) that it be struck out. The British argued that there should be reference to the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, 'having regard to the interest taken in this policy in the United States... of which the recent resolutions of both Houses of Congress have offered striking evidence.'⁷⁹ In the end, the American negotiators conceded that the preamble to the Convention should recite the full text of the Mandate, including its preamble.⁸⁰ This included the Balfour Declaration, which was thus introduced unobtrusively

Company's *Nesher Ltd.*, the Palestine Salt Company and the Samaritan Water Company.'⁸¹

* D.P. Brown oil geologist for the Oil Trust Ltd., after exploration in 1911 and 1912, stated that "there is every indication of petroleum existing in depth." Professor Day of Beirut and the German expert Blankenhorn arrived at much the same conclusion. In 1926 the alleged presence of oil was recorded in the report of an expedition to southern Palestine by the Hebrew University.⁸²

into the Convention.

On 24 July 1922 the *Mandate for Palestine* (Document 30) was approved by the Council of the League of Nations, to come into force officially on 22 December 1923.⁸³ A last attempt by the Vatican to block its approval failed. The Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, submitted a memorandum dated 15 May 1922 severely criticising the Mandate articles designed to give effect to the Balfour Declaration, declaring, *inter alia*, that they were incompatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations.*

The caucus concerned with this aspect of British policy countered criticism with a special Command Paper. This stated that "H.M.G. fully share the opinion expressed by Cardinal Gasparri that article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations would be incompatible with a mandate that proved to be an instrument for the subjection of the native populations for the benefit of another nationality. H.M.G. contemplate that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and that it has never been intended that they or any sect of them should possess any other juridical status. Regarding Cardinal Gasparri's allusion to article 11 of the draft mandate in support of his contention that 'the Jews are to be given a privileged and preponderating position as against other nationalities and creeds,' this was answered by the assertion that 'the Jewish people...are ready and willing to contribute by their resources and efforts to develop the country for the good of all its inhabitants.' As to the provision of 'adequate safeguards for the rights of the Christian denominations,' the apprehensions of the Cardinal were unfounded. As a Christian Power they (H.M.G.) are fully alive to the paramount necessity of ensuring to all Christian communities that nothing will be done in Palestine which might be construed as negligence or indifference to Christian sentiment. Impartiality in regard to existing rights would be assured by a commission appointed by the mandatory, subject to the approval of the Council of the League."⁸⁴

On 16 September 1922 a memorandum from the British Government declared that by virtue of Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate, the articles of that mandate relative to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine would be inapplicable to Trans-Jordan, and Jews were forbidden to buy land there.⁸⁵ The Zionists maintained that this amounted to religious discrimination and was therefore a violation of the Mandate,⁸⁶ and that the

* The Zionist Executive asked Jabotinsky 'to utilize his old journalistic connections in Italy and try to improve the "political climate" for Zionism.' He accepted the assignment, and reported to Weizmann from Milan on 10 July 1922 that 'the tone of the press was slightly improving.'⁸⁷

land across the Jordan was necessary to their national development. This sort of appeal was difficult to counter once the premises of the Mandate and Balfour Declaration were accepted, for while these favoured people of Jewish faith over Christians, Moslems or any others in Palestine, giving them a Jewish national status where no Jewish nation existed, the two instruments also accepted the Zionist conception of Judaism as a national religion which should be treated as a world religion. The British did not distinguish between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, between those whose schemes used Judaism and Hebrew as a catalyst for synthesizing a national identity, and those who believed Judaism to be a non-exclusive faith.

In the World Zionist Organization, meeting in Carlsbad in July and August 1922, Weizmann carried the delegates for acceptance of the 'Churchill Memorandum', though many maintained that he should have held out for a Jewish charter. In this, and in his willingness not to press alleged Zionist claims to Transjordan, he saw the advantage of seeking fulfilment of aims by stages. The 'White Paper' existed, the charter did not,⁸⁸ and he firmly believed that Transjordan would become a part of the Jewish state once Zionist aims in Palestine had been attained.⁸⁹ The Council of the League of Nations agreed to the exclusion of Transjordan from the Mandate at its twenty-first session in 1922.

The 'Churchill Memorandum' established the support of the coalition government for the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate at the expense of the wartime pledge to the Arabs. It paved the way for the acceptance of the Mandate by the League,⁹⁰ and established the right of Zionists to demand British administrative and, if necessary, military aid in colonizing Palestine.

The wartime fishers in the troubled waters of Eastern European and Russian Jewish nationalism (Lloyd George, Balfour, Winston Churchill), still manned the ship of state and gave the orders, though the much-respected Mr. Bonar Law had been put at the helm as Leader of the House of Commons until poor health forced his temporary retirement from political activity. "He is honest," said Lloyd George, "to the verge of simplicity."⁹¹ By October 1922 the country had lost the impetus of the short post-war boom and was heavy with economic depression. The numbers of unemployed had slightly fallen from a peak of two million some months before; British debts* to the United States remained unfunded: interest was not being paid but

* Great Britain emerged with victory in the war and a debt to the United States on account of credits to finance war purchases of nearly \$ 1,000,000,000. France and Italy together owed to Britain a larger sum than Britain owed to America, and there were also the vast debts contracted to her Allies by Tsarist Russia and repudiated by the Bolsheviks. The period when Britain could claim the highest per capita national income and standard of living in the world was over.

added to the capital amount, and the creditor was theoretically entitled to demand the immediate payment of the whole outstanding sum; Germany's 'flight from the mark' had begun which was to make a gold mark worth one trillion paper marks by November 1923; the French entered the Ruhr to try to secure the payment of reparations. But important as these conditions were in bringing about the fall of the government, there was also an unsavory scandal in connection with the bestowal of titles, which shook public confidence in the Prime Minister.*⁹³ Before this, he was still thought of as a shining leader. Even to the sophisticated Storrs in Jerusalem the fall of Lloyd George seemed dynastic, 'almost like the passing of the great Duke of Wellington.'⁹³

Now the spell was broken and the coalition government collapsed. The double-headed coin of policy which it had not put into circulation in Palestine was emblematic of much of its activities. 'It had blown hot and cold. It had contradicted and stultified itself in relation to every subject it had touched. It had poured out money on social reforms, and subsequently repealed them. It had prosecuted a barbarous war against Sinn Fein, and subsequently capitulated to Sinn Fein. It had imposed an unworkable settlement on Germany, and was now quarrelling with France in an attempt to whittle away the settlement it had imposed. It had promised everything and accomplished nothing. It had proved a false start. What was wanted was a new beginning, a new government with a clean sheet.'⁹⁴

The British Labour Party offered as policy revision of the peace treaties, nationalization of the mines and railways, a capital levy, higher living standards, better housing and education. Regarding Palestine, the Labour Party's policy was represented by a resolution which had earlier been sent to the Prime Minister. 'At meetings held in London this week the Parliamentary Labour Party, the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, and the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress have adopted resolutions to remind the British Government of the Declaration made on November

* The virtual sale of honours for contributions to Party funds has been revealed as only part of the background. Not only was Lloyd George vulnerable because of his extra-marital relations and the end to his career which revelation of their scandalous details would bring, but the doubts and unpleasant aftertaste of the Marconi scandal were revived. Prior to the War he was accused with Rufus Isaacs (Reading) and Herbert Samuel of corruptly influencing a government contract in order to make a fortune out of speculation in Marconi shares. Samuel was not, apparently implicated, but Lloyd George and Isaacs, as well as the Liberal Whip, the Master of Elibank, on behalf of the Liberal Party fund, had bought shares in the American Marconi Company which had the same managing director as the British Marconi Company—Geoffrey Isaacs, the brother of Rufus, and the share values of the American Company were bound to be affected by the success of the British Company's contract.⁹⁵

When Isaacs, with an insensitivity almost unknown in British politics, was offered and accepted the post of Lord Chief Justice less than six months later, Kipling wrote *Gehazi*, a poem of genius, described also as 'one of the greatest hate poems ever written.'⁹⁶

2nd, 1917, that the Government would endeavour to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, a declaration that was in harmony with the declared war aims of the British Labour movement, and was reaffirmed by Lord Curzon on November 2nd, 1919. The National Labour Organizations indicated now urge upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of redeeming this pledge by the acceptance of a Mandate under the League of Nations for the administration of Palestine with a view to *its being reconstituted the National Home of the Jewish people*. The National Committees' desire to associate themselves with the many similar representations being made to the Government urging the settlement of this question with the utmost dispatch both in the interests of Palestine itself as well as in the interest of the Jewish People.*⁹⁷

Lloyd George, his private and political looseness condoned by Asquith, was still to a segment of the public a programme in himself. He had been seventeen years in cabinet office and felt far from spent, but his Party, as an effective force in British politics, was. Just as President Harding had succeeded Wilson with a profession for 'normalcy' and 'serenity', so the Conservative Party campaigned for tranquility. It was a wishful word for a return to the placid greatness of the Edwardian era. That was impossible, but a majority of conservatives were returned at the election.

The Palestinian Arabs hoped that this election victory would bring them tranquility also,⁹⁸ that is, an end to British sponsorship of preferential treatment for Jews and their immigration to Palestine. The pressure of Zionist promotion of a national home was already beginning to affect the population proportions as the first census of October 1922 showed: total population: 757,182, of whom 78 percent were Moslems, 11 percent Jews and 9.6 percent Christians.⁹⁹

Early in 1923 there were published in England a series of articles by J.M.N. Jeffries, a journalist who had been dispatched to Palestine in the autumn of 1932 by Lord Rothermere, the brother of Lord Northcliffe who had died that August. He was able to obtain copies of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and published salient portions of these in the *Daily Mail*. Previously, the only public knowledge of the Correspondence 'had come from the single-line excerpt made by the Arab Delegates the previous year and from Mr. Churchill's brief quotation in reply, if indeed this can be des-

* After the War, wrote a Zionist leader, "Zionism was adopted as part of the international politics of the socialist world. A Socialist Pro-Palestine Committee was created to place the mighty strength of the movement behind Zionism. Among the most wordy in their enthusiasm for this fabulous commission were the English members, MacDonald, Lansbury and others, who were later to disembowel their little Jewish brother with their left hand while they embraced him with their right."¹⁰⁰

cribed as a quotation from the text.¹⁰¹ Their appearance caused such a stir that an immediate debate took place in the House of Lords, Lord Islington moving that 'The Mandate for Palestine in its present form is unacceptable to this House because it directly violates the pledges made by His Majesty's Government to the people of Palestine in the declaration of October 1915 (in the McMahon Correspondence), and again in the Declaration of 9 November 1918 and is, as at present framed, opposed to the sentiments and to the wishes of the great majority of the people of Palestine: that therefore its acceptance by the League of Nations should be postponed until such modifications have been effected therein as will comply with the pledges given by His Majesty's Government.'¹⁰²

In his speech Islington quoted extracts from the 'Correspondence' which had appeared in the *Daily Mail* and emphasized British commitment to the pledges of Arab independence.

The contribution of Edward Grey, now in the Lords, to the debate was eagerly awaited. Surely the man who had been Foreign Secretary at the time would now take the opportunity to divulge to his peers and the British people the truth on a matter which seemed to involve the honour of British obligations. But Grey spoke with detachment and said that he did not propose to go into any detail on the points raised by Islington. He had the English upper-class facility of speaking in a sincere, gentlemanly way, but apparently without personal knowledge. His indirect manner of criticism was in keeping with the Anglo-Saxon attitude which abhors outspoken denunciation as being vulgar. His censure was evident to his peers but such sophistication limited communication.

Lord Islington may also have intended to encourage the Government to come forward and present the facts officially to the people, rather than launch an attack on the policy of the Lloyd George administration based, as far as public knowledge was concerned, on newspaper reports. He said: "A considerable number of these engagements, or some of them, which have not been officially made public by the Government, have become public through other sources. Whether all have become public I do not know, but I seriously suggest to the Government that the best way of clearing our honour in this matter is officially to publish the whole of the engagements relating to the matter, which we entered into during the war. If they are found to be not inconsistent with one another our honour is cleared. If they turn out to be inconsistent, I think it will be very much better that the amount, character and extent of the inconsistencies should be known, and that we should state frankly that, in the urgency of the war, engagements were entered into which were not entirely consistent with each other.

"I am sure that we cannot redeem our honour by covering up our engagements and pretending that there is no inconsistency, if there really is inconsis-

tency. I am sure that the most honourable course will be to let it be known what the engagements are, and, if there is inconsistency, then to admit it frankly, and, admitting that fact, and having enabled people to judge exactly what is the amount of the inconsistency, to consider what is the most fair and honourable way out of the impasse into which the engagements may have led us. Without comparing one engagement with another, I think that we are placed in considerable difficulty by the Balfour Declaration itself. I have not the actual words here, but I think the noble Duke opposite will not find fault with my summary of it. It promised a Zionist home without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of the population of Palestine. *A Zionist home, my Lords, undoubtedly means, or implies, a Zionist government over the district in which the home is placed, and if 93 per cent of the population of Palestine are Arabs, I do not see how you can establish other than an Arab government, without prejudice to their civil rights.* That one sentence alone of the Balfour Declaration seems to me to involve, without over-stating the case, very great difficulty of fulfilment." (Emphasis added).

"It is not from any prejudice with regard to that matter that I speak, but I do see that the situation is an exceedingly difficult one, when it is compared with the pledges which undoubtedly were given to the Arabs. It would be very desirable, from the point of view of honour, that all these various pledges should be set out side by side, and then, I think, the most honourable thing would be to look at them fairly, see what inconsistencies there are between them, and, having regard to the nature of each pledge and the date at which it was given, with all the facts before us, consider what is the fair thing to be done."¹⁰³

Islington was supported by Lord Buckmaster, one of England's outstanding law lords of the period who had been Lord Chancellor, who referred to the Hussein-McMahon quotations in the *Daily Mail*:

"If those documents are accurate, and I am bound to say that, upon the face of them, they appear to me to be perfectly sound, they show unmistakably that there has not been, as the noble Viscount Lord Grey suggested, something in the nature of casual inconsistency between different announcements at different times, but that a deliberate pledge has been given on the one hand, which has been abandoned on the other. No amount of examination and no amount of comparison will ever enable the two things to be reconciled, because these documents show that, after elaborate correspondence in which King Hussein particularly asked to have his position made plain and definite so that there should be no possibility of any lurking doubt as to where he stood as from that moment, he was assured that within a line that ran almost due north from the south and away to the west, should be the area that should be excluded from their independence, and that the rest should be theirs. . .

"I do not profess to have any knowledge of foreign politics. I have always believed that they can be summed up in two sentences: I believe that we ought to say what we mean, and I think we ought to do what we say. I believe it was because the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, took those simple phrases as his motto that he achieved the astonishing success which followed his discharge of the great and responsible duties of the Foreign Office. We certainly meant what we said in 1915. We did not do what we said in 1918. I would ask the Government even now to retrace their steps at the earliest moment, and go back to obedience to the promise that we gave at a moment when we were gravely beset by difficulties, to the relief of which the Arab help in no slight degree contributed."¹⁰⁴

The main reply came from Balfour now in the Upper House, and speaking in it for the first time. His style, though eloquent and emotional, was unsupported by facts. He used the argument which Weizmann had employed in his attempt to gain Feisal's acquiescence in Zionist immigration: "I ask my noble friend who takes up the cause of the Arabs, and who seems to think that their material well-being is going to be diminished, how he thinks that the existing population of Palestine is going to be effective unless and until you get capitalists to invest their money in developing the resources of this small country...I cannot imagine any political interests exercised under greater safeguards than the political interests of the Arab population of Palestine...This is a great adventure. Are we never to have adventures?"¹⁰⁵ As for the McMahon pledges, he slid past them.

On the division, the Government's case was defeated by 50 votes to 29, and Islington's motion carried. British support for the Palestinian Arabs never went beyond this motion, which is what it remained, and never again reached towards this degree of sympathy. However, the leaders of the Arab Delegation, who had returned to London at the end of 1922, cabled the news to Palestine where hopes rose.¹⁰⁶ But internal politics became pressing: the McMahon pledges remained unacknowledged until 16 years later.

What could not be ignored was the fact that the cost of Palestine to the British tax-payer for 1922-23 was £ 2,024,000,¹⁰⁷ at a time of acute economic depression. The Cabinet therefore called for memoranda from the Colonial Office and the three armed services on the strategic importance of Palestine. These were considered by the Cabinet in the summer of 1923. The Middle East Department of the Colonial Office suggested that abandonment of the Balfour Declaration policy would lead to the abandonment of the Mandate, and that this would be inadvisable for reasons of strategy and prestige. The memorandum concluded that the policy of the 1922 Churchill Memorandum, 'which definitely ruled out the idea of a Jewish State,' should be continued.¹⁰⁸ The Middle East Departments of the Naval and Air Staffs expressed the

view that a British regime in Palestine was vital to the defence of the Suez Canal, especially in the event of a withdrawal from Egypt. The General Staff, however, considered that the Canal could only be defended from Egypt, Palestine being strategically irrelevant.

These memoranda were considered, in the presence of the High Commissioner, with another from some eighty Conservative Members of Parliament drawing attention to Arab grievances in Palestine. The Cabinet committee, after stating that 'some of our number' believed the Balfour Declaration to be 'both unnecessary and unwise', suggested that 'it is well nigh impossible for any Government to extricate itself (from the Balfour Declaration) without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect, if not honour.' The committee repeated other points made by the Colonial Office, but attempted to meet Arab complaints of discrimination against them by recommending that the Arabs be offered an Arab Agency which would have the same status as the Jewish Agency was to secure by Article 4 of the Mandate.

Early in 1923, Palestinian elections were held for the Legislative Council proposed in the 'Churchill Memorandum'. A fifth Arab Congress, held in Nablus after the return of the Arab Delegation from London in September 1922, had resolved to boycott the elections and the great majority of Arabs showed their support and solidarity by refusing to vote. The proceedings were therefore nullified by an amending order-in-council, and an attempt made to reconstitute an advisory council* on the same basis of representation as that of the proposed legislative council. The invitation of the High Commissioner to eight Moslem and two Christian Arabs was accepted, but seven acceptances were subsequently withdrawn under pressure from the Arab Executive.¹⁰⁹ The attempt was abandoned and the Advisory Council remained a Council of British officials, including British Zionists, only.

In June 1923 a sixth Arab Congress was held at Jaffa, and a new Arab Delegation appointed to go to London. On the basis of the findings of the Cabinet Committee, the Colonial Office opened negotiations with the Delegation who were, however, hostile to the concept of even equal status with what they considered to be the small alien minority in their country. So the Colonial Office decided to by-pass the Delegation and make the offer direct to the Palestinians through the High Commissioner. A proposal was therefore made to him which stated, *inter alia*, "(Arab) hostility is aroused not so much by the policy as actually enunciated and carried out by His Majesty's Government as by the apprehension that, whatever may be the objects of this policy, the ultimate result will be the establishment of Jewish ascendancy...it is

* Since 1920, there had been a nominated Advisory Council of ten British, four Moslem, two Christian and two Jewish members. It had been dissolved in anticipation of the Legislative Council.

possible to argue that existing arrangements fall short of securing complete equality between the different communities... His Majesty's Government are accordingly prepared to favour the establishment of an Arab Agency in Palestine which will occupy a position exactly analogous to that of the Jewish Agency under Article 4, i.e., it will be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration in such economic, social, and other matters as may affect the non-Jewish population and, subject to the control of the Administration, of assisting and taking part in the development of the country. As regards immigration (Article 6 of the Mandate), the Arab Agency will have the right to be consulted as to the means of ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced."¹¹⁰

In the House of Lords on 27 June 1923 Lord Islington asked for publication of the cost of British administration in Palestine, publication of British commitments, and whether in view of the recent election being declared void by the Government and the new advisory council being boycotted by the Arab community, would the Government now reconsider their policy since the hostility of the people of Palestine to Zionist policy had become clear. But it was no surprise, 'because it had always been anticipated that we should never be able to persuade the Arab and Christian population of Palestine to assent to the Zionist system of government. Unless the Government were prepared to modify the present system, they would find themselves obliged to shoulder the responsibility of forcing on a native community a form of government which they greatly disliked, and the Government must be prepared to face the consequences.'

The Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Devonshire, replied that his colleagues at the Foreign Office had advised that 'it was contrary to the public interest' to publish the correspondence relating to British engagements and commitments in Palestine. He was explicit in repudiating the idea of a Jewish state. 'Again and again it has been stated that the intention from the beginning has been to make a national home for the Jews, but every provision has been made to prevent it from becoming in any sense a Jewish state or a state under Jewish domination.'¹¹¹

While the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner were preparing to offer direct concessions to the Palestinians, two events of major technical importance to the British position took place. A peace treaty with Turkey was signed at Lausanne on 24 July, and the Mandate came into force officially on 29 September, 1923. The effort to write-in the Balfour Declaration, which had marked the Treaty of Sèvres, was abandoned in the Lausanne Treaty. Clause 16 registered the cession of Arab territories as follows:

"Turkey declares her renunciation of all rights and titles whatsoever

over or concerning the territories situated beyond the frontiers anticipated by the present treaty and over the islands other than those over which her sovereignty has been recognized by the said treaty, the destiny of these territories and islands being settled or yet to be settled by those concerned."

The British civil administration in Palestine could now claim legality according to international law three years after its inauguration.

On 11 October 1923, the offer of an Arab Agency was made by the High Commissioner on behalf of the Colonial Secretary to 'a fully representative gathering of Arab leaders, who unanimously declined to accept it on the grounds that it would not satisfy the aspirations of the Arab people... It had become obvious that the Arab objection was not to the way in which the Mandate might be worked, but to the whole policy of the Mandatory and that by no concession, however liberal, were the Arabs prepared to be reconciled to a regime which recognized the implications of the Balfour Declaration.'¹¹²

From then onwards, British rule was conducted by the High Commissioner with the assistance of executive and advisory councils, both consisting entirely of official British members.

In the spring of 1925, preparations were made for an impressive opening of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem by Lord Balfour. To the Governor of Jerusalem 'It seemed incredible that so distinguished and delightful a person could be for the Arabs Public Enemy Number One, yet the anxiety lest they might somehow succeed in treating him as such was upon me day and night... What chance indeed had he of being allowed to realize the depth of Arab feeling when the scores of abusive telegrams awaiting him at Government House were destroyed by his secretary without his being informed of their existence?... At the opening ceremony on Mount Scopus, he impressed that critical gathering less by his eloquence, which was easily surpassed by Sir Herbert Samuel's, than by the splendour of his personality.'¹¹³ He had been greeted with delirious enthusiasm in Tel Aviv, and on his return journey through Damascus, 'but for the swift diversion of his train to an unexpected station, he must inevitably have been torn in pieces. And the journey that had begun so brilliantly ended in two days' marooning on a liner in Beirut harbour, guarded from a hostile shore by the circling of a French torpedo-destroyer.'¹¹⁴ This anger of the Syrian Arabs, and a general strike by the Palestinian Arabs protesting all that Balfour meant to them, demonstrated general Syrian-Palestine Arab solidarity even though they were now under subjection by differing colonial Powers. Similarly, in November 1925, there was a general strike in Palestine in protest against French conduct in Syria, and another in March 1926, on the occasion of the official visit of the French

High Commissioner for Syria to Jerusalem.

1925 saw Samuel's departure from Palestine. During his term the Balfour Declaration had become firmly embedded in British policy and Zionist policy and organization firmly embedded in Palestine. When the Chief Administrator, Sir Louis Bols, had formally handed over the Administration to the High Commissioner on 30 June 1920, he had prepared for Samuel's signature, a typed receipt—which Samuel signed under protest—'Received from Major-General Sir Louis Bols, one Palestine, complete.'¹¹⁵ Samuel left Palestine externally 'complete' but internally rent with hate and bitterness.

CHAPTER XI

Strife Mounts Between Arab and Jew (1926 - 1930)

THE TERM of office of the new High Commissioner, Field Marshal Lord Plumer, from 1925 to 1928, coincided with a period of relative tranquility in Palestine. The calm had nothing to do with the presence of this honoured soldier and devoted servant of imperial Britain. In 1925 there had been a total of 33,135 Jewish immigrants, of whom 17,115 were from Poland and 7,780 from Russia;¹ a large proportion were small capitalists, and a collapse of the Polish currency,* together with this influx of non-productive middlemen, brought acute economic depression to Palestine. By 1926 there were 6,000 unemployed, and by 1927 a thousand more.² In 1926 there were 13,081 Jewish immigrants, in 1927 only 2,713, and in 1928, 2,178.³ In 1927 the Jewish community had 2,358 more emigrants than immigrants. Significantly, from 1925 to 1928 no meetings of the Palestine Arab Congress were held and no organized protests made over Jewish immigration. Arab fears of becoming a minority in their own country faded.⁴ Zionism had burned itself out, they thought, and the 'Palestine problem' had solved itself. But the common belief of Moslem and Christian Arabs that God had answered their prayers rested on a superficial appraisal of the situation and an under-estimation of the vigour and determination of the Zionist leaders.

During all those years, Weizmann spent the bulk of his time travelling to build up 'the Movement', especially in America, Germany, France, Belgium, Holland and Britain, 'making contacts with governments and Jewish communities, and in the process acquiring a good many friendships in political, literary and scientific circles in different countries.'⁵ The task of drawing

* Extreme fluctuations in currency values in 1925 were managed by the Rothschilds. 'With the French house in the lead (Baron Edouard was a director of the Bank of France), they had organized an international syndicate that stretched from J.P. Morgan in New York to the Baron Louis-controlled Creditanstalt in Vienna. Everywhere, at a pre-arranged signal, the Rothschild syndicate began to depress pounds and push up francs. As in the past, nobody could withstand such wealth juggled with such split-second skill.'⁶

into their work those Jews who were not prepared to declare themselves Zionists had been faced by the Zionist Organization in 1923. In February of that year, its Actions Committee, meeting in Berlin, had adopted the formula for a Jewish Agency, laying down as a guiding principle 'that the controlling organ of the Jewish Agency shall be responsible to a body representative of the Jewish people.'⁷ 'This beautifully vague statement'⁸ left Weizmann free to contact influential Jews who might be persuaded that it was their duty to moderate or help in exercising control over the work of this Jewish Agency, but who would have nothing to do with a 'full-fledged "World Jewish Congress" with elected delegates from every Jewish community.'⁹

In the United States, Weizmann first approached Louis Marshall whom he had met in 1919, when Marshall came to Paris as head of the American Jewish Delegation to the Peace Conference.¹⁰ 'As one travelled up and down the States one could not but be impressed by the extent and power of his influence.'¹¹ He was sceptical about Weizmann's grandiose plans for Palestine saying, "You will need half a billion dollars to build up this country." Said Weizmann, "You'll need much more, Mr. Marshall. The money is there, in the pockets of the American Jews. It's your business and my business to get at some of it."¹² Perhaps of equal importance was Weizmann's winning of Felix Warburg,¹³ of the Kuhn, Loeb Banking group in New York City. Their foreign interests were closely associated with Central Europe,¹⁴ with Max Warburg of Hamburg, and Rothschild interests in Sweden and other parts of western Europe. The weight of their influence made things easier for Weizmann in the United States, as well as for Leonard Stein, Kisch, Morris Rothenberg and other intermediaries who carried on the work when Weizmann was not available.¹⁵ In New Orleans he made a 'find' in Samuel Zemurray, the 'Banana King' and later head of the United Fruit Corporation, 'one of the most powerful American produce companies,' which proved 'profitable for the Funds.'¹⁶

While work was in progress on the tough job of aligning firstly Jewish leadership and then rank-and-file in the United States and elsewhere with Zionist plans, influence on the League of Nations was not neglected. In 1924, the Mandates Commission had recorded that the Palestine Mandate had created a conflict of interests between which the balance had to be held,¹⁷ and expressed the wish that Jewish immigration should remain in proportion to the capacity of the economic absorption of the country.¹⁸

Specifically the Mandates Commission had stated: "...the policy of the Mandatory Power as regards immigration gives rise to acute controversy. It does not afford entire satisfaction to the Zionists, who feel that the establishment of a Jewish national home is the first duty of the Mandatory Power, and manifest a certain impatience at the restrictions which are placed in the way of immigration and in respect to the granting of land to immigrants.

This policy is, on the other hand, rejected by the Arab majority of the country, which refuses to accept the idea of a Jewish national home, and regards the action of the Administration as a menace to its traditional patrimony. . . ."¹⁹

Weizmann believed that the implications of the statement indicated a possible ensuing 'policy which would have completely nullified the Balfour Declaration,' and that the attitude of the Mandates Commission owed something to the fact that its President, the Italian Marquis Theodoli, was said to have married into an Arab family.²⁰ To combat lack of sympathy with Zionism, especially among delegates to the League's Permanent Commission, a Zionist office was opened in Geneva under the guidance of Dr. Victor Jacobson. "Gradually succeeding sessions of the Mandates Commission were to show traces of its effect. My own contacts with the leading personalities of the Mandates Commission were, I believe, also of value," wrote Weizmann modestly.²¹

At the next session, the Commission expressed itself as impressed with the broad-minded view presented by Great Britain on the relations between the different racial and religious groups. Regret was expressed that 'certain elements' (the Arabs) of the population did not appear to recognize that the essential principles of the Mandate provided the only substantial basis for the economic and political development of the country.²² Another possible opponent of the national home had been eliminated. Ironically, the only member of the Commission to protest that not enough was being done to provide free political institutions in Palestine was Herr Ludwig Kastl, formerly a senior official in the German colonial administration, the first German to be so appointed.²³

There is no evidence to indicate that the British Government recognized the Palestine period of calm of 1925-1928 as being due to the decrease in the influx of foreign Jews into Palestine. In 1926, the British armed forces in Palestine were reduced to one squadron of the Royal Air Force and two companies of armoured cars, but the Mandates Commission called attention to the danger of not maintaining adequate local forces.²⁴ In 1927 only 2,713 Jews entered the country while 5,071 departed.²⁵ The Palestine Government Report for 1927 referred to 'a period of financial stress which has borne hardly on Jewish settlement in Palestine.'²⁶ The Jews who had come to Palestine full of hope in the early twenties were returning to Europe disillusioned, others sought entry to the United States. For Zionism the situation was serious; more capital was urgently needed.²⁷ Jewish immigrants demonstrated before the offices of the Jewish Agency demanding either work or food or return to their countries of origin. The Agency's funds were exhausted and the Government was obliged to provide 'relief works' in various towns in the nature of road building to meet the contingency. This situation continued until disturbances, which broke out in August 1929, brought financial aid for 'distressed

Jews' pouring into Palestine. The financial troubles of the Jewish Agency thus came to an end.

The four years since the Zionist Actions Committee had empowered Weizmann to win the cooperation of non-Zionist Jews for assistance in Palestine immigration, settlement, commercial and communal ventures had produced dividends. A provisional pact, joining Zionists and non-Zionists in a Jewish Agency, was signed at the Biltmore Hotel in New York on 22 March 1927. Anti-Zionist Jews in the United States had now suffered the same profound defeat as their fellow believers in Great Britain; the Zionist Organization had created a means of organizing Jews everywhere through official organizations. From this new position of strength, Weizmann was able to look back over the preceding ten years: "The Balfour Declaration of 1917," he said, "was built on air... I thought...the British Government would call me and ask: 'Tell us, what is this Zionist Organization? Where are they, your Zionists?' The Jews, they knew, were against us..."²⁸ The Zionists' success in removing the grounds for Weizmann's fears was largely a measure of his remarkable achievement.

In 1927, the case of the Mavrommatis concessions, which had been outstanding since the war, was finally closed. Euripides Mavrommatis was a Greek engineer and contractor who had obtained from the Turkish Government before World War I concessions to carry out certain public works in the area which came under the British Palestine Administration. Among these were concessions for irrigation works and general agricultural development in the Jordan valley; irrigation works, water supply and hydro-electric works for Jaffa, based on the El-Auja river; the provision of water and electricity supplies to Jerusalem, and the establishment of a tramway system there. The concessions for Jerusalem had been signed before, and the other concessions just after the war had begun. Because of the war, Mavrommatis was unable to carry out these commitments, but his right to do so at the end of hostilities was ensured by the Peace Treaty.²⁹

As soon as the Civil Administration was set up in 1920, Mavrommatis approached his pre-war backers, the French Banque Perier, and by early 1921 he again had their assurances of credit, provided his claims were ratified

* Four years later, at the 17th Zionist Congress in Basle, in July 1931, Weizmann declared: "...I often asked myself what we, I and my friends who were speaking for the Jewish people, could answer were we asked to 'show our credentials' and to prove our right to act as the representatives of world Jewry. That no such question was ever put is perhaps the strongest proof of the intuitive understanding of those men who spoke with us on behalf of Great Britain, and who saw us, not as the nominated or elected representatives of this or that group, but as the spokesmen of a people in the making. And this attitude is the more surprising when one remembers that these so-called 'big Jews' and the official Jews, were then very strongly opposed to Zionist ideals and aspirations."³⁰

by the new Government of Palestine. On 4 April 1921, Mr. L.S. Amery announced in the House of Commons that the Government would entertain applications for Palestine concessions. Mavrommatis filed a formal application to be allowed to take up his concessions. Nevertheless, in July 1921, Herbert Samuel invited applications for the concessions, and although the Mavrommatis application was forwarded to the Colonial Office, the 'officials' there on 12 and 21 September 1921 made agreements with Pinchas Rutenberg, (who had been entrusted by the socialist revolutionary central committee with organizing the reception of smuggled arms into pre-war Russia, then made Minister of Police under Kerensky and was now a Zionist agent), granting him the water and electricity concessions.

As Mavrommatis was a Greek citizen, his case was taken by his Government to the Hague Court in 1924 and 1925. The Greek lawyers dropped the Jordan claim, were not confident about the Jaffa concession, but felt certain of success on the one for Jerusalem.³¹ In fact, in 1924 the court judged that the Jaffa concessions did not come under Article 11 of the Mandate, and were therefore outside its jurisdiction; the contentions of the British Government on the Jerusalem concessions were dismissed, judgment being deferred. This was delivered on 26 March 1925. The verdict was unanimous. It was to the effect that, the existence, for a certain time, of a right of M. Rutenberg to require the annulment of the aforesaid concessions of M. Mavrommatis was not in conformity with the international obligations accepted by the Mandatory for Palestine.³² The monopoly it had granted to the Zionists' agent was therefore not legal in their opinion. United States' support for it had been obtained by Lord Balfour without informing the Secretary of State of the Mavrommatis claim.³³

But the Greek could not win even though he had won the legal case. The Colonial Office found his plans unsatisfactory, and delayed action on them for two years until his backers, British this time, withdrew. He was then obliged to sell his interests to a British-registered Jewish-financed concern which established itself as the 'Jerusalem Electrical Corporation.'

The whole manner in which the Rutenberg concession had been granted 'showed scandalous favouritism, and to add to resentment, Pinchas Rutenberg was an active Zionist politician who often took the extreme side.'³⁴

The peace of Plumer's last year of office was broken on 24 September 1928 by a Zionist attempt to introduce a screen to divide men and women during prayers at the Wailing Wall* on the Jewish Day of Atonement. To

* The *Buraq* (Wailing Wall) is geographically the western wall of the Haram El-Aqsa within the Haram Esh-Sharif area, the third holiest shrine in Islam. Structurally and archeologically it is presumed to be the wall of the Temple of Herod, or his predecessors.

The Land in front of the Wall, a strip of pavement some six yards deep and some stone

outsiders this seemed a triviality, but the Arabs believed, as Zionist advocates have since claimed,³⁵ that nearly all Zionist acts were the result of conscious planning. Whether the apparently innocent screen incident was meant as a planned provocation with a view to establishing a precedent or not is difficult to say, but the effect was certainly to stir Arab feelings and focus the world's press again on Palestine.

The erection of the screen was contrary to the *status quo ante* and orders were given for its removal. The Jews refused, and it was forcibly removed by the police in the course of prayers at the Wall. This incident engendered high feeling and was a prelude to the disturbances of the following year. Haj Amin Eff. el-Husseini and members of the Arab Executive took the incident very seriously while Arab nationalist feeling was revived throughout the country; branches of Moslem societies were established in the provincial towns,³⁶ to defend Arab rights.

In December 1928, Sir John Chancellor succeeded Lord Plumer as High Commissioner. The Arab Executive immediately submitted a request to him for the re-opening of negotiations for the establishment of a representative assembly.³⁷ They were doubtless influenced by the fact that in February 1928 a representative government under a provisional constitution was established in Transjordan; British-Egyptian treaty negotiations were in progress for more independence; Iraq was promised that Britain would soon support its entry into the League of Nations; and even in Syria, where a major rebellion had been quelled in 1925, reforms were promised and a constituent assembly set up to draft a constitution.*

In 1928 the figures for Jewish immigration were only 781, but early in 1929 Jewish immigration figures rose and Jewish emigration slackened. The fears of the Arabs were re-awakened and the old antagonism revived.³⁸

Histadruth, the Zionist labour organization, intensified its activities against Jewish enterprises and employers who engaged Arab rather than Jewish workers. Even groups of Jewish colonists sometimes appealed to the British district commissioner for police protection against Zionist pickets

shelters and paths on a space a little deeper than a square described by the length of the Wall, constitutes the Jerusalem section of the *Abu Midian Waqf*, a pious bequest dating from the reign of Nur-ed-Din, suzerain of Saladin, in favour originally of North African Moslem pilgrims, some of whom became residents. Under Turkish rule Jews had established a limited privilege of access but with no right to place any fixtures, and the Palestine Government maintained the *status quo*, which it had undertaken to do on its occupation of the country.

* The Royal (Peel) Commission of 1937 supported this view by pointing out, 'among all that group of kindred countries it was only in Palestine that no advance whatever had been made towards popular government or national independence.'³⁹

who 'drove the Arabs away by all manner of violence and vilification.'⁴⁰ Many of the individuals and groups who resisted these methods were colonists of longer, even pre-war, standing. They had lived in complete harmony with their Arab neighbours and most of their Arab farm-hands had been working on the land from one generation to another. These Jewish colonists had become accustomed to preferential minority status. They preferred the Arab worker who, 'on a low subsistence level, is content with a smaller wage and is ready to give his master grace until the harvest before he gets it, which the Jewish worker cannot possibly do.'⁴¹

Against the Jewish colonists were the younger, more aggressive activists who had more recently come from the Russian and Eastern European countries. On the one hand there were general or 'bourgeois' Zionists; on the other the collectivist-idealists who talked of 'labour, language, land.'⁴² It was the latter whose 'unalterable purpose was to remain Jewish; and this purpose was inextricably bound up with the other: to bring forth a new and just society on Marxist lines.'⁴³ It was they who, assisted by the Jewish National Fund,* fervently supported the idea of the *kibbutz*, the collective farm, which is now the rule throughout the area of eastern Europe and Russia from which these *Chalutzim* (Pioneers) came.

In 1929, the Palestine population comprised 634,811 Moslems, 81,776 Christians, 156,481 Jews and 9,443 'Others'.⁴⁴ Of the Jews, some 9,000 were employed in about 2,200 Jewish industrial enterprises,⁴⁵ and 37,000 were employed in 111 agricultural settlements, of which 32 belonged to the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (P.I.C.A.), 32 were in private ownership, and 47 were in colonies settled by means of Zionist funds.⁴⁶ The remainder were either self-employed or were in commerce and distribution or public services. Thus the communal-collectivist sector was not predominant, and in fact a rough and conservative estimate of the amount of private Jewish capital invested in Palestine during the years 1917 to 1942 is given as £100,000,000 while communal investment has been estimated at about £26,000,000 sterling.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the Jewish Federation of Labour (*Histadruth*), developing as a combined trades union and cooperative movement, exerted a dominant political and social influence. The Zionist Organization used *Histadruth* to impose a pattern of nationalism on Jewish labour; *Histadruth* used the Zionist Organization to impose a socialist pattern on the small capitalists and im-

* Menahem Ussishkin was appointed chairman of the Jewish National Fund which he defended for the rest of his life with effectiveness. "Why must you people go around making speeches and attracting attention?" Edmond de Rothschild, a strong supporter of the Fund, once asked him. "Baron Edmond," the man answered, "give us the key to your safe, and we promise not to make any more speeches."⁴⁸

migrant labour of the Jewish population which, left to itself, might easily have foregone the nationalist and idealist concept of the national home ideology.⁴⁹ Between them they increasingly enforced the exclusive employment of Jews in Jewish undertakings, which drew an 'iron curtain' between the Arab and Jewish communities.⁵⁰ The 'closed shop' movement against the Arabs in Jewish agricultural, industrial and commercial undertakings went with preferential wage rates for Jews. This economic discrimination was paralleled by the separate development of Jewish community life, and its organization through a Jewish National Assembly (*Asphat Nivharim*) and the Jewish Community Council (*Vaad Leumi*), which held elections, raised taxes, and ran schools, hospitals and social services only for the Jews. They did not normally use the government health and educational services, and the Administration recognized the position by making grants to their communal organizations from general taxation to which the Jewish community had contributed.⁵¹

On 30 May 1929 there was a British general election and the Labour Party had a majority of representatives, though the Tories polled more votes. In spite of pre-election stunts (pledging the expenditure of £200,000,000 in relief works),⁵² the future of the ageing Lloyd George and his Liberal Party was blank, since Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had ruled out any negotiations with the Liberals for a Conservative-Liberal arrangement which would keep him in office.⁵³ J. Ramsay MacDonald became Prime Minister, and appointed the Fabian socialist Sidney Webb (made Lord Passfield) Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Webb's second day at the Colonial Office was marked by visits from the professed Zionist sympathizers L.S. Amery and W.G. Ormsby-Gore, the men who, with Winston Churchill, Amery's school friend at Harrow, had dominated almost the entire decade of British-Palestine relations. They were very friendly to Webb, 'offering to give him any information etc.'⁵⁴ Perhaps for the first time Britain had in this vital office a man with a trained analytic mind, a student of sociology and social history. The Arab Executive at once renewed its demand of 1928 for a representative Assembly, and the High Commissioner returned to London to discuss the matter at the Colonial Office.⁵⁵ But the Colonial Office officials may have been influenced by the views of Webb's predecessors, for his would-be visitors were selectively censored. "Not desirable you should see Philby; he has been most troublesome to the office fomenting discontent over there," said his official adviser.⁵⁶ Beatrice Webb suggested meeting him in the Fabian Society office, which her husband later did.⁵⁷

The Webbs were already elderly but vigorous in mind, and through the years their thinking had become almost homogeneous. Lady Passfield's

views on the Palestine problem are therefore important. She admired Jews and disliked Arabs: but she noticed that while there 'buzzed' around her husband 'Jews and admirers of Jews, great and small,' no representative of the Arabs, 'not even a casual admirer of the Arabs, appeared on the scene.' To her, the Zionist movement seemed 'a gross violation of the right of the native to remain where he was born and his father and grandfather were born,' and talk about the return of the Jew 'to the land of his inheritance after 2,000 years' seemed 'sheer nonsense.' 'From whom were descended these Russian and Polish Jews?' She was unable to understand how influential members of Parliament like Josiah Wedgwood* could 'denounce the settlers in Kenya as unwarranted intruders,' but be hotly in favour of the 'brand-new Jewish colonies in Palestine!'⁵⁸

With such views at the Colonial Office, Zionists must have recognized that they were facing the possibility of another major crisis. At the Sixteenth Zionist Congress in Zurich in August 1929, agreement was finally reached between Zionists and non-Zionist Jews resulting in the creation of an enlarged Jewish Agency for Palestine which was officially recognized, in a letter from Lord Passfield dated 6 August 1930, 'as the agency referred to in Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine.'⁵⁹ The Congress was also important in the development of an old dispute between the Herzlian 'political' Zionists who wished to subordinate all other considerations to getting more Jews into Palestine as quickly as possible, and the 'practical' Zionism of Weizmann which promoted overtones of idealism and gradualism in their Palestine plans.⁶⁰ The 'political' group was headed by Revisionist Vladimir Jabotinsky who 'was a remarkable performer on any stage, at a Congress or mass meeting. He was doubtless influenced by his admiration for Mussolini, not as a political theorist but as a performer.'⁶¹ Weizmann was therefore hard pressed when Jabotinsky demanded the repudiation of the 1922 'Churchill Memorandum,'⁶² scorned any attempt at Arab-Jewish cooperation until the Jews were in a majority and could negotiate from strength, and defined the national home as a 'national state with a preponderant Jewish majority.'⁶³

* Wedgwood met Chaim Weizmann in 1916 and 'was deeply impressed.' 'He also discussed with Colonel House the question of making a national home for the Jews one of the Allies war aims.'⁶³ He had seen the Poles freed from oppression 'set on the Jews...' and wondered 'Would the Jews turn out the same way?'⁶⁴ In 1930 he solicited funds for Zionism in South Africa,⁶⁵ and in 1936 fought hard against the suggested constitution for Palestine.⁶⁶ In 1941 he went to the United States, 'chiefly to speak for Zionism but no doubt he was also hoping to do as much as he had done in the previous war to bring America in on the side of democracy.'⁶⁷ As far as personification is possible, he may be studied as fairly typical of the non-Jewish 'true believer' in Zionism.

** "What is the Jewish national home? It is a national state, a state with a predominant Jewish majority, where the will of the Jewish people will determine the forms and ways of collective life.

On 15 August 1929, the Jewish fast of *Ab*, while the Zionist hierarchy was still in Switzerland, Jabotinsky's followers went in procession to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem and held an anti-Arab demonstration.⁶⁸ On the following day Moslem Arabs held a counter-demonstration. Violence was in the air, heated by a series of inflammatory articles in Jabotinsky's paper *Doar Hayom* calling for revolt and violence, and lesser incitement by the papers *Haaretz* and *Davar*. During their demonstration, Jabotinsky's followers had raised the Zionist flag and sung the Zionist anthem, thereby adding support to the contention of the Mufti of Jerusalem that the Jews intended to take over the entire Moslem shrine.⁶⁹ In fact some years before, Weizmann had suggested to the Governor of Jerusalem that the space in front of the Wall should be acquired by the Jews by 'exchange against some other acreage.* He offered to expend £75,000, which sum was to include the re-

"What is Palestine? It is an area, whose essential geographical characteristic is that the Jordan River flows not along its frontier, but through the middle of it.

"What is the meaning of Zionism? Zionism aims at the actual solution to the political, economic and cultural tragedy of many millions of Jews. Its purpose is, therefore, not only to create a (Jewish) majority in Palestine, but to create living space for millions on both sides of the Jordan. A 'Charter' or a 'Mandate' implies an obligation on the part of the civilized world, and also on the part of a great nation not simply to 'favour' us, not only to 'treat us friendly', but a solemn pledge to establish in Palestine a colonizing regime, so that the entire administrative system would be so organised as to prepare and develop the land on both sides of the Jordan for the absorption of great masses of colonists..."

By the Fourth Revisionist World Conference (Prague, 15 August 1930), Jabotinsky had developed the concept that there was little chance of 'conquering' the world Zionist Organization, because Revisionism was not only a political party and a *Weltanschauung*, but an essence of a 'psychological race,' a definite inborn mentality, which could hardly be communicated to those not possessing it inherently. Part of the Revisionist mission was therefore to find and organize people of its own 'race', and not to waste its energies in attempts to 'conquer' Zionists with a different outlook.⁷⁰

- * In 1967, immediately after the '5th of June war' and the occupation of the Arab sector of Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities sent bulldozers into the Old City to carry out what the Zionists could not accomplish with Arab acquiescence in 1920. Correspondent G.H. Jansen, writing in *The Statesman of India* of 22 July 1967, described the Israeli action in these words: "One approaches the Wailing Wall across what is now a very large open space with a dusty, uneven surface. If one looks down carefully one sees the reason for the unevenness. Underfoot one has the rubble of a thickly populated area from which 1000 Arabs were expelled at three hours' notice by the Jews; these people took what they could carry on their heads and backs and their houses were bulldozed. And so one walks over scraps of food, bits of clothing, broken furniture and twisted water pipes..." Jansen then remarked: "Perhaps the worst thing that the Nazi persecution did to the Jews was to make them indifferent to the sufferings produced by persecution." He then enquired: "Who, indeed, should now be wailing at the Wall—Jew or Arab?" Excavations at the foot of the Wailing Wall followed the demolition of the Arab homes for purposes better known to the Israelis themselves. Commenting on the work, *Time* magazine of 20 June 1967 wrote: "The Temple must be reconstructed on its original site;

housing of the occupants, and he was prepared if necessary to raise his offer much higher.⁷¹

We have no evidence as to the motive for the Zionist demonstration, but it may have been designed to produce such disorders indicating that the country was unprepared for self-government; at the same time, probably the opportunity was seized to assert the Zionist claim to the Wailing Wall as a Jewish possession. If the former was their aim, it was entirely successful. The High Commissioner returned in haste from London and 'issued a proclamation announcing the suspension of discussions on the constitutional issue.'⁷²

Rumours spread throughout Palestine of Jewish designs on the Moslem holy places; at the same time, postcards showing the *Haram esh-Sharif* (Mosque of Omar) surmounted by the Star of David, the emblem of Zionism, were said to have been distributed by Zionist agents among the Arab peasantry, apparently in an attempt to incite them to riot. The subsequent Commission of Inquiry (with one dissentient) into the riots which followed, absolved the Mufti of responsibility for these rumours. Zionists contended that 'in the Arab press an intensive anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish campaign was going full blast,' and '*The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* were being widely circulated,' as part of a campaign of deliberate incitement.⁷³

Arab peasants streamed into Jerusalem determined to defend their holy shrine, and fighting broke out on 23 August 1929, spreading to provincial towns and into remote districts. Violent attacks were made on the old established Jewish communities at Safad and at Hebron, and 'if it had not been for some friendly Arab families, not a single Jewish soul in Hebron would have remained alive.'⁷⁴ 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded. British troops were rushed from Egypt and aided local forces in restoring order; most of the 116 Arabs killed and 232 wounded were casualties of the British troops and police.⁷⁵

On 6 September 1929 the League of Nations Council suggested that if Great Britain could collect the necessary information by March 1930, an extraordinary session of the Mandates Commission could then be held to examine the causes of the Palestine incidents, and the measures to be taken to restore order and prevent their recurrence.⁷⁶ On 14 September 1929, the British Government announced that a Special Commission* under the chair-

this could only be done by demolishing Islam's sacred Dome of the Rock. When asked how this might be done, Israeli historian El-Dad said: 'Who knows? Perhaps there will be an earthquake'."

On 21 August 1969, the El-Aqsa Mosque was badly damaged by fire alleged to have been deliberately started by an Australian Christian who was arrested.

* Composed of Sir Walter Shaw, who had had a long career in the colonial service in the West Indies, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements where he had been Chief Justice; Sir Henry Betterton, who had been Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour;

manship of colonial judge Sir Walter S. Shaw would proceed at once to Palestine, its terms of reference being only 'to inquire into the immediate causes which led to the recent outbreak in Palestine and to make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence.'⁷⁷

In the United States, 29 October 1929 brought the Stock Market collapse which was to produce a decline in stock values of \$15,000,000,000 by the end of the year, and depression, unemployment and political upheavals in an incalculable chain-reaction.*

The British Government had little insight into the problems ahead of the British people, preferring the comfort of a policy of 'sufficient unto the day.' It is therefore in character that a proposal from the British Government was made to the Mandates Commission in November 1929 that a special commission be appointed by the Council under Article 14 of the Palestine Mandate to study, define and determine the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Wailing Wall.⁷⁸ It is characteristic of the Commission and the League that they declined on the grounds that Article 14 stipulated that a special commission for the holy places should be appointed by the British Government with the approval of the Council, the Commission expressing its willingness to examine any other proposal on the issue which did not derogate from the terms of Article 14.⁷⁹

On 14 January 1930, a commission was established by His Majesty's Government with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, 'to determine the rights and claims of Moslems and Jews in connection with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem.' The Commission was composed of three members not of British nationality.**

'When the Commission arrived in Palestine in June 1930, the Government attempted in vain to persuade the Arab and Jewish leaders to come together and frame a voluntary agreement.'⁸⁰

The conclusions arrived at by the Commission (Document 30) on the

and three Members of Parliament.

The Executive of the Jewish Agency retained the gentile Sir Boyd (later Lord) Merriman as their legal counsel and representative, with Solomon Horowitz as his adviser.

The Arab Executive retained the services of Mr. Stocker, K.C. as their legal counsel, with leading Arab lawyers as his advisors.

* The great banking houses shuddered and investors panicked. Trusts like the Shenandoah Trust of Goldman, Sachs, which had sold at 104, plummeted to 1¾. On their Board was a New York attorney who was destined one day to play an important but transient part in the drama of Arab-Zionist relations, John Foster Dulles.

** Eliel Lofgren, formerly Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs (Chairman), Charles Barde, Vice-President of the Court of Justice at Geneva (Member), C. J. Van Kempen, formerly Governor of the East Coast of Sumatra (Member).

basis of the reasoning and evidence adduced, were to the effect that 'to the Moslems belong the sole ownership of, and the sole proprietary right to, the Western Wall, seeing that it forms an integral part of the Haram Esh-Sharif area, which is a *Waqf* property.' To the Moslems also belongs 'the ownership of the Pavement in front of the Wall and of the adjacent so-called Moghrabi (Moroccan) Quarter opposite the Wall, inasmuch as the last-mentioned property was made *Waqf* under Moslem Sharia Law, it being dedicated to charitable purposes.'

The 'Verdict' gave the Jews certain privileges which they were to enjoy unhindered. These were 'the right to place near the Wall the Cabinet or Ark containing the Scroll or Scrolls of the Law and the Table on which the Ark stands and the Table on which the Scroll is laid when being read from,' but only on certain specified occasions. 'No objection or obstacle was to be raised to the Jews, in their individual capacity, carrying with them to the Wall hand-books or other articles customarily used at their devotions either as a general thing or upon special occasions, nor to their wearing such garments as were of old used at their devotions.'

The Jews are prohibited from 'bringing to the Wall benches, carpets or mattings, chairs, curtains, screens, tents or any similar object with a view to placing it there, even though for a limited space of time.' The Jews are also 'not permitted to blow the ram's horn (*shofar*) near the Wall nor cause any other disturbance to the Moslems that is avoidable.'

'Such appurtenances of worship and/or such other objects as the Jews may be entitled to place near the Wall in conformity with the provisions of the present *Verdict* shall under no circumstances be considered as, or have the effect of, establishing for them any sort of propriety right to the adjacent Pavement.'

'On the other hand, the Moslems shall be under the obligation not to construct or build any edifice or to demolish or repair any building within the *Waqf* property (Haram area and Moghrabi Quarter) adjacent to the Wall, in such a manner that the said work would encroach on the Pavement or impair the access of the Jews to the Wall or involve any disturbance to, or interference with, the Jews during the times of their devotional visits to the Wall, if it can in any way be avoided.'

The Moslems were also prohibited from the 'driving of animals at certain hours along the Pavement and to keep the door at the southern end of the Wall locked during certain hours. The right, however, for Moslems to go to and fro in an ordinary way along the Pavement shall be respected and remain inviolable as hitherto.' Furthermore, 'the Moslems shall not be permitted to carry out the *Zikr* ceremony close to the Pavement during the progress of the Jewish devotions or to cause annoyance to the Jews in any other way.'⁸¹

'The Report of this international Commission which, generally speaking,

confirmed the *status quo*, was presented in December 1930, and the recommendations it contained were implemented in June 1931, by an Order-in-Council,⁸² in accordance with which order at the Wall was maintained until the termination of the Mandate in 1948.

The Shaw Commission reported on 30 March 1930 (Document 31)⁸³ to the British Government. The Prime Minister thought it far too pro-Arab and was very perturbed as to what to do before the report was published.⁸⁴ At his request Webb gave a lunch at which the Prime Minister met the leading Zionists, and in the afternoon there was a private meeting with Baldwin, Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel. A decision was taken to employ General Smuts with a Colonial Office official, to report on the Mandate; Smuts was cabled and it was arranged for Baldwin to 'ask the appropriate questions in the House of Commons.' But Ramsay MacDonald, on second thought, decided against Smuts as 'too Zionist' and allowed Sidney Webb to engage Sir John Hope-Simpson to inquire into the land question. Beatrice Webb was amazed that even the Cabinet was not shown the report or her husband's memo on it at that time. 'As for the Parliamentary Party or the House of Commons as a whole, neither one nor the other comes into the picture...'⁸⁵

The Shaw Commission noted: "In less than ten years three serious attacks have been made by the Arabs on Jews. For eighty years before the first of these there is no recorded instance of any similar incidents...representatives of all parties told us that before the (First World) War the Jews and Arabs lived side by side if not in amity, at least with tolerance, a quality which today is almost unknown in Palestine."

They also reported: "In pre-war days the Jews in Palestine, regarded collectively, had formed an unobtrusive minority; individually many of them were dependent on charity for their living, while many of the remainder, in particular the colonists, brought direct and obvious material benefit to the inhabitants of the area in which they settled. The Jewish immigrant of the post-war period, on the other hand, is a person of greater energy and initiative than were the majority of the Jewish community of pre-war days. He represents a movement created by an important international organization supported by funds which, judged by Arab standards, seem inexhaustible. To the Arabs it must appear improbable that such competitors will in years to come be content to share the country with them. These fears have been intensified by the more extreme statements of Zionist policy and the Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigrant not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future."

These political and economic fears, the Report explained, had been intensified on the one hand by the number of Jewish immigrants who, despite the set-back of 1926-28, had already settled in the country, and on the other

hand by the amount of land they had already acquired.

The Report added: "Though Jewish immigration and enterprise have been of great advantage to Palestine, the direct benefit to individual Arabs, which alone is likely to be appreciated, has been small, almost negligible, by comparison with what it might have been had the pre-war methods of settlement been continued. When trade depression and unemployment followed the period of heavy immigration the indirect benefits which Jewish activities had brought to many parts of Palestine were forgotten and everywhere among the Arab people the Zionist movement was regarded as the cause of the economic problems of the country. The sale of the Sursock* lands and other Jewish land purchases in districts where the soil is most productive were regarded as showing that the immigrants would not be content to occupy undeveloped areas and that economic pressure upon the Arab population was likely to increase.

"In other words, those consequences of Jewish enterprise which have most closely affected the Arab people have been such that the Arab leaders could use them as the means of impressing upon their followers that a continuance of a Jewish immigration and land purchases could have no other result than that the Arabs would in time be deprived of their livelihood and that they, and their country, might ultimately come under the political dominion of the Jews. Racial antipathy needed no other stimulus, but it was further encouraged by a spirit of mutual intolerance which has unfortunately been a marked feature of the past decade in Palestine. From the beginning the two races had no common interest. They differed in language, in religion and in outlook. Only by mutual toleration and by compromise could the views of the leaders of the two peoples have been reconciled and a joint endeavour for the common good have been brought about. Instead, neither side had made any sustained attempt to improve racial relationships. The Jews, prompted by eager desire to see their hopes fulfilled, have pressed on with a policy at least as comprehensive as the 'White Paper' of 1922 (Cmd. 1700) can warrant. The Arabs, with unrelenting opposition, have refused to accept that document and have prosecuted a political campaign designed to counter Jewish activities and to realize their own political ambitions."⁸⁶

Limiting the Commission's inquiry to 'the immediate causes' of the riots and recommendations 'to avoid a recurrence,' precluded criticism of the Balfour Declaration and its basic implications. It was easier for Ramsay MacDonald to glance at one side of the issue, and offer the unproven premise that Arab objections arose instead from incidental and removable hardships and injustices suffered by them in the course of the development of a Jewish national home.⁸⁷ But the Commission at least went back to 1921, to point

* Lebanese absentee land-owner.

out that between then and 1929 'there were large sales of land in consequences of which numbers of Arabs were evicted without promise of other land for their occupation... Palestine cannot support a larger agricultural population than it at present carries unless methods of farming undergo a radical change. With more intensive cultivation, should this prove to be possible, room might be found for a number of new-comers in certain districts.'⁸⁸

The Shaw Commission Report found that the outbreak 'neither was nor was intended to be a revolt against British authority in Palestine,'⁸⁹ and in fact no anti-British incidents occurred until 1937-1939, when these were directed against British authority rather than against British individuals. The Arabs still thought kindly of the British people as their one-time allies in war.

The recommendations of the commissioners have been officially summarized as follows:

"(1) That the British Government should issue a clear statement of policy defining the meaning it attached to the passages in the Mandate providing for the safeguarding of the rights of the non-Jewish communities and laying down more explicit directions as to the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land tenure and immigration.

"(2) That the Government should make a clear statement regarding Jewish immigration, and should review the machinery for its regulation and control with the object of preventing 'a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926' and that non-Jewish interests should be given some voice in discussions on immigration.

"(3) That a scientific enquiry should be held into land cultivation and settlement possibilities; and that, pending this enquiry, the eviction of peasant cultivators from the land should be checked.

"(4) That, as regards the Zionist Organization, Government should reaffirm the statement made in 1922, that the special position assigned to it by the Mandate did not entitle it to share in any degree in the Government of Palestine; and that the Government should, if possible, lay down some precise definition of the meaning of Article 4 of the Mandate.

"(5) That it was essential to the peace and security of Palestine that a commission should be appointed to determine the rights of both parties at the Wailing Wall.

"(6) That advice should be taken as to the most suitable form of garrison; that no reduction should be made till then in the existing garrison; and that an independent enquiry should be made into the Department of Police."⁹⁰

When the Shaw Report was published, 'the Zionists were stunned. It was evident that the "comrades" in Downing Street had let them down pretty badly,'⁹¹ although the Prime Minister repeated in the House of Com-

mons the formula that "His Majesty's Government will continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the Mandate,"⁹² and the following day, 4 April 1930, the Colonial Secretary dwelt on the prescription of 'equal obligation', not whether it was possible to dispense it. 'A double undertaking is involved and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty's Government to give effect in equal measure to both parts of the (Balfour) Declaration and to do equal justice to all sections of the population.'⁹³ These sentences make it clear that the MacDonald Administration intended to continue the old policy, even though it had already proved explosive. Discussions between the Government and a delegation selected by the Palestine Arab Executive, which had arrived in London on 30 March 1930 had, therefore, no chance of positive result.

On 12 May 1930, after this became obvious to the Arabs, the delegation revealed that their demands had been rejected for (a) the cessation of immigration, (b) a declaration that Arab lands were inalienable, (c) the establishment of democratic government with representation on a population basis. The British Government declared that 'these sweeping constitutional changes were incompatible with the requirements of the Mandate.'⁹⁴ A strike was declared in Palestine and mass meetings held to demand fulfilment of the Covenant of the League and of Great Britain's own pledge of Arab independence. More important to Britain, an all-India Moslem conference for Palestine was held in Bombay, where a resolution was passed that Palestine and the Moslem holy places were the trust of the whole Moslem world and not of the Moslems of Palestine alone. It demanded annulment of the Balfour Declaration, termination of the Mandate, and the establishment of self-government in Palestine. Friday the 16th was designated 'Palestine Day', to be celebrated throughout India, Burma and Ceylon after prayers in the mosques. In Bombay, Reuters cabled that an evening meeting was attended by 100,000 persons.⁹⁵

The next month, the British Government reported to the Extraordinary Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, to which the Shaw Report had previously been circulated. The tone of this statement of the British Government seemed more exploratory and flexible than all previous ones. For example, it suggested that '...whereas all the other mandates...were only intended to give effect to the general principle of Article 22⁹⁶... the Mandate for Palestine was of a more complex nature...in that it involved a twofold duty... The result was to create a conflict of interest between which the balance was to be held. This conflict of interest remains ... the situation is one of great delicacy...conditions under which remedial measures can be applied are strictly limited; they are governed by the terms of the Mandate and the dual obligation which it imposes. Such measures cannot be devised or introduced at a moment's notice.'

Two conclusions may be drawn from this Report. First, that the new British Government, whose predecessors had in fact drafted the Mandate in cooperation with the Zionist Organization, was implying that the Mandate was a burdensome obligation which they were attempting to fulfill out of loyalty to the League of Nations. Secondly, having regard for the fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission, 'more interested in legal interpretations than in political realities,' had been inclined to criticize restrictions on the development of the national home, the Report minimized those aspects of the Shaw Report which appeared to recommend such restrictions.⁹⁷

For the Mandates Commission, M. van Rees rejected the finding that the outbreak at the Wailing Wall and its aftermath were unexpected, unpremeditated, and not directed against British authority. He said: "No one would deny that the initial cause of the hostility of the influential Arabs lay in the deep disappointment which they felt upon realizing that their national and political aspirations would not be fulfilled. This fact was recognized in the report on several occasions, and the Arabs themselves made no secret of it. The British Government was held responsible for this disappointment. It was said that the British Government had broken its solemn promises to the Arabs, and that the Zionists, using their influence with the British Government succeeded in obtaining the Balfour Declaration which was an insuperable obstacle to the realization of the national ambitions awakened by and during the war."⁹⁸ The British Government spokesman replied that it was a fact that during the disturbances no attack was made or attempted on representatives of British authority.⁹⁹

Van Rees accused that there had been premeditation and organization of the disturbances by the Arabs, and Great Britain replied that the opinion of the Shaw Commission was arrived at by exhaustive enquiry and rigorous cross-examination.¹⁰⁰

The Mandates Commission also contended that Britain had paid insufficient attention to adapting the social and economic conditions of the Arab population to changes due to Jewish immigration, and that more should have been done to divert antagonism.¹⁰¹ Britain replied that its task was not only to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home and the development of self-governing institutions, but to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine regardless of race or religion. This last obligation was the core of the problem, and its bearing upon the dilemma as to how to execute the other two obligations was ignored by the Commission.¹⁰² There were more cross-purpose exchanges, with each party going through the motions expected of them. The Mandates Commission concluded its own deliberations on the riots by declaring that if those responsible for the agitation 'hoped by its means to secure the triumph of their opposition to the League of Nations as a party to the Mandate, they will find

no encouragement from the Mandates Commission.¹⁰³

The report of the exchanges between the Mandates Commission and the British Government were published in London and Geneva on 25 August 1930, the British reply remonstrating that the Commission hardly appreciated the complexity of the problem as it actually existed in Palestine.¹⁰⁴ But the international effect or image which emerged was of Britain, with its great Empire, being berated in an international arena for apparent failure to preserve order in a comparatively tiny territory and its inability to implement a policy to which it had professed adherence. India was becoming more restless; at home unemployment and poverty mounted. On 9 September 1930 Beatrice Webb wrote in her diary, "Whoever else won the Great War, Great Britain lost it!"^{*105}

* World War I changed the status of the United States from that of a debtor nation to the position of the world's greatest creditor nation, a title formerly held by Britain. The war caused the removal of the world's banking acceptance market from London to New York. Even in 1917 Thomas Lamont had told the American Academy of Political Science that, "The dollar, not the pound, is now the basis for international exchange." (Chairman of the Board of the International Acceptance Bank of New York was the Zionist Paul Warburg. His brother Felix, was also a director, and a partner also in Kuhn, Loeb Company. As chairman of the Federal Reserve Board during the war he had exercised, with Eugene Meyer (chairman of the War Finance Committee) and Bernard Baruch (chairman of the War Industries Board), virtual control over American finance and industry.)

CHAPTER XII

Immigration, Land Settlement and Development

SINCE THE SCOPE of the inquiry of the Shaw Commission had been specifically directed to the immediate causes of the outbreak of Arab-Jewish violence in 1929, it is not surprising that a man of Sidney Webb's calibre saw in its findings and those of the Haycraft Commission of 1921, as well as in the news coming to him daily, the need for an inquiry into three critical issues in Palestine: immigration, land settlement and development. Then from the facts elicited by such an inquiry, more explicit direction could be given to policy on these vital issues. A clear statement of policy had also been urged by the Shaw Commission.

At this period, Zionist efforts to promote their plans for mass Jewish immigration to Palestine, calling this a return to the 'Jewish Homeland', the idea was growing in European countries especially, that Jews, however long in the country, were rootless aliens. In the United States, Henry Morgenthau Sr., said that Zionism must fail, citing the strife that it had already caused between Arab and Jew where none had previously existed;¹ but this view was not shared in 1917 by people like Felix Frankfurter, who still carried on active propaganda for Zionism, as did his uncle, Judge Louis Brandeis.² Albert Einstein urged Jews to seek an understanding with the Arabs rather than continue their aggressive policy in Palestine.³ Count Karolyi, an internationally-known Hungarian liberal living in exile, called Zionism reactionary and detractive of the internationalism of Judaism.⁴ Thomas Mann likened Zionism to German romanticism,⁵ and the German spokesman, Count von Bernstorff, said that the Government and German public backed the Zionist movement and its efforts to move Jews to Palestine.⁶

American contributions to Zionist projects increased, however,⁷ as a result of appeals made for relief work in Palestine to aid those who had suffered in the 1929 riots, and for the purchase of more Arab land. The Arab counter-move was a new appeal to the League of Nations to nullify the Man-

date. A joint Syrian-Palestinian delegation protested once more against the partition of Syria into Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan and Palestine, saying that this and British-French failure to allow them self-government conflicted with their joint declaration made to the Arabs on 9 November 1918. This emphasizes the Arab view that, apart from the 1915 pledges of Arab independence made to them in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the assurances subsequently given in 1918 that this promise of independence would be upheld, nullified the Balfour Declaration. But in Geneva, however, the hopes of the Arab delegation died as surely as had those of Arab delegations to London.

Certainly though, in the Colonial Office there was a break in the romantic tradition of the previous decade. Passfield had worked there from 1881 to 1891 which probably helped him to master the demands of his office. Of every project he asked, "how will it work, what state of affairs will it actually bring about? How will all the persons concerned—for after all they are all God's creatures—like it and benefit or lose by it?"⁸

He instructed Sir John Hope Simpson, formerly of the Indian Civil Service and a member of the League of Nations Commission for the resettlement of Greek refugees, to go to Palestine and report on immigration, land settlement and development, so that his policy could be based on facts. Simpson was thus temporarily transferred from an assignment to ameliorate the consequences of one of Lloyd George's Near Eastern policies, to a task based on the maintenance of another.⁹ Hope Simpson reached Jerusalem on 20 May 1930, and commenced work immediately, in constant consultation with the High Commissioner. Pending his report, the undistributed balance of immigration certificates under the 1930 schedule was suspended. Strong criticism by the Mandates Commission of British policy must be read in the light of this fact, and the Colonial Secretary recorded that 'Considerable pressure has been brought to bear on His Majesty's Government to anticipate the receipt of John Hope Simpson's Report by a declaration of policy...'¹⁰

Sir John Hope Simpson left Palestine in August and went to Athens to write his report. It was published on 20 October 1930 (Document 32)¹¹ together with the Government 'Statement of Policy' generally known as 'the 1930,' or 'Passfield White Paper.' (Document 33).¹²

Sidney Webb and the Labour Government became immediately involved in a storm of anger from Zionist Jews throughout the world,¹³ but Arabs said that Britain had at last recognized their rights.¹⁴ The American Jewish Committee stated that the United Kingdom's 'Statement of Policy' was a repudiation of pledges to the Jews,¹⁵ and Weizmann said that he would make an appeal to the League of Nations against it.¹⁶ From South Africa, General Smuts cabled the MacDonald Government that the Balfour De-

claration pledge must not be broken, to which MacDonald replied that the policy did not retreat from the Declaration.¹⁷ On the same day that it printed this news, the *New York Times* also published an alleged 'revelation' from a friend of MacDonald that there had been a Cabinet fight before the 'Statement' was published, and that Passfield had forced the policy on the Cabinet.¹⁸ This was possibly a canard put out to weaken Passfield and the Government's policy or to provide a convenient let-out for MacDonald if criticism became too hot.

Hope Simpson emphasized the smallness of Palestine, an area of only 10,435 square miles, of which more than three-quarters was 'uncultivable' by current economic standards. Of the 'cultivable' land, about 14 per cent had been bought by Jews with the displacement of the indigenous Arab tenant farmers and labourers. This indicated that Zionist plans, which were said to be based on their ability to make the desert blossom, included the acquisition of as much cultivable land as could be bought from Arab landowners. The largest sale, with which the Report dealt in some detail, concerned the Vale of Esdraelon. 'In ancient times Esdraelon was the granary, and by the Arabs is still regarded as the most fertile tract of Palestine. The soreness felt owing to the sale of large areas by the absentee Sursock family to the Jews and the displacement of the Arab tenants is still acute. It is evident on every occasion of discussion with the Arabs, both effendi and fellahin.'¹⁹

The Sursocks,* a Lebanese family, had been granted the title to a large tract of land in the Esdraelon Valley, known as *Marj ibn Amer*, for 'services rendered' to the Sultan of Turkey. While legal ownership became invested in the Sursocks, in effect, the grant did not alter the existing relationship between landlord and tenant, and the Arab cultivators continued in full possession, paying a portion of their annual produce to the new landlords as rent.

With the partition of Syria after World War I between the British and French, the Sursocks, living in Beirut, had been separated from the lands to which they held title in Palestine. They proved not unwilling to accept the tempting offer of the Zionists to sell even though that meant the dispossession and eviction of the occupants of the land.

As a result of the Sursock sale, 688 Arab agricultural families had to leave their lands and homes. Of these, 309 families had 'joined the landless

* The Sursocks are an example of many very rich Levantine families with European connections. One branch, the Negib Sursocks, had two daughters, one of whom became Countess Max de Zogheb and the other, first the wife of the Emir Loutfallah then Countess Lareinty-Tholozan. The Alexander Sursocks married their children even more brilliantly, Mathilda married the Marchese Theodoli di Sambucci; Isabelle became Princess Colonna; Dimitri acquired the title of Duke of Cervinara whilst Nicholas married Donna Vittoria, daughter of the Duke of Serra Cassano.

classes' while the remainder drifted either into towns and cities or became hired ploughmen and labourers in other villages. Although eviction of the Arab cultivators took place in 1921, the problem of finding land for some of these displaced persons remained with the Palestine Government until the termination of the Mandate in 1948.

The laws governing agricultural tenancies were carefully examined in respect of their efficacy in protecting Arab land tenants. They were:

The Land Transfer Ordinance, September 1920—This Ordinance was designed to secure the protection of agricultural tenants from eviction when land was sold by the landlord. Its object was political rather than economic, namely, to maintain tenants of long standing on land, large tracts of which were being sold by absentee Arab landowners to Jews during the first substantial immigration of Jews into Palestine after the British occupation. It provided for the control of land transactions. 'To all such transactions the consent of the Administration must be obtained; this consent was given through the district governor, where he was satisfied that the person about to acquire the property (1) was resident in Palestine, (2) would not obtain property exceeding in value £3,000 or in area 300 dunums (75 acres), (3) intended himself to cultivate the land immediately. It was also a condition (4) that the transferor, if in possession, or the tenant in occupation of the property leased, would retain sufficient land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself and his family.

'If an application were rejected by the district governor, an appeal lay to the High Commissioner, whose decision was final.

'The High Commissioner also had the power to consent to the sale of large areas of land, if he were satisfied that the transfer was in the public interest...'²⁰

Arabs appearing before the Commission of Inquiry which reported on the riots of 1921, had 'regarded with suspicion (these) measures' believing the Ordinance to be designed 'to keep down the price of land and to throw land which is in the market into the hands of the Jews at a low price...'²¹

Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920-21—This replaced the earlier ordinance. 'The Director of Lands was constituted as the authority to grant permission for disposition of land, and he was bound to grant that consent if satisfied that the transferor had a title, provided that, in the case of agricultural land which is leased, he shall also satisfy himself that any tenant in occupation will retain sufficient land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself and his family...'

'This ordinance in fact remained a dead letter. It was circumvented in one of two ways: either the landlord, who desired to dispose of his land, ejected his tenants as a preliminary operation, and so sold the land with vacant

possession to the purchaser, or the landlord or the purchaser induced the tenant to withdraw on payment of compensation. In both of these cases there was no tenant in occupation, and the conditions of the ordinance consequently failed to operate."²²

Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, 1929—Prepared by Norman Bentwich whose duty, as Attorney General, was 'to draft and to advise the Palestine Government upon laws, proclamations and situations frequently of extreme interest to Jews and Arabs alike, and nothing on earth would convince the Arabs of the impartial purity of his conclusions.'²³

To the British, his British nationality and his legal position and training made the suggestion of partiality seem unworthy of consideration; but the Arabs saw him as the son of an original *Choveve* Zionist and the author of a Zionist book written before, though appearing after his appointment. "It is not possible," they would say, "the better Zionist he is, the worse Attorney-General..."²⁴

He refused all promotions, including the chief justiceship of Cyprus, as it meant transfer from Palestine, and finally left the government service for the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

His Ordinance cancelled the provision of 1921, 'which required that, on sale, arrangements should be made to provide a tenant in occupation with land in lieu of the holding from which he was dispossessed.'²⁵ It appeared to aim at protecting the cultivator who had been at least two years in a holding, 'by requiring the landlord to give him a full year's notice before the tenancy can be terminated or before the rent may be increased, and by providing for compensation for the tenant for disturbance and for improvements, which he has carried out himself. It provides further that where the tenant has cultivated a holding for five years or more, the landlord shall pay him as additional compensation a sum equal to one year's average rent.

'Its practical effect—This Ordinance is of little value in preventing the displacement of tenants from the soil. There is no record of tenancies in Palestine, as there is, for instance, of agricultural tenancies

* This requirement was restored in 1931 mainly by reason of the recrudescence at that time of large-scale land sales by Arabs to Jews and the emergence into prominence of the problem of the landless Arab. (In 1933, a committee of enquiry found that some 644 Arab families who had been displaced by land sales had been unable to obtain other holdings on which they could establish themselves, or to find other equally satisfactory occupation).

The amending Ordinance of 1931 also protected from eviction persons who had exercised continuously for a period of five years a practice of grazing or watering animals or the cutting of wood or reeds or other beneficial occupation of a similar character, unless the landlord had made equivalent provision towards the livelihood of such persons.

in India. It would be extremely difficult for any tenant to establish a tenancy of five years on the same holding. In any case, at its best, the Ordinance would only provide money compensation, while what is eminently required is, not compensation for disturbance, but a provision against disturbance.²⁶ Such was Hope Simpson's appraisal.

The 1929 Ordinance and its amendments were repealed and replaced in 1933 by the 'Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance' which was substantially the law as it existed to the end of the Mandate. The salient provisions of this law were that:

(a) It defined a 'statutory tenant' as any person, family or tribe occupying and cultivating a holding otherwise than as owner thereof. The term included the relatives of any person occupying and cultivating a holding who may have, with the knowledge of the landlord, cultivated such holding: it included the heirs of a tenant; and also any person who was hired by the landlord to do agricultural work and receive as remuneration a portion of the produce of the holding which he cultivates.

(b) It provided that a 'statutory tenant' who has occupied and cultivated a holding for a period of not less than one year shall not, provided that he has paid his rent and that he had not grossly neglected his holding, be ejected therefrom unless he has been provided with a subsistence area which was to be, as far as possible, in the vicinity of the land from which he has been displaced.

(c) It provided for the protection of the rights of persons who have exercised on land the practice of grazing or watering animals, or cutting wood or reeds, unless provision of equivalent value is secured towards their livelihood; provided that such persons have exercised the practice concerned, by themselves or their agents, habitually, at the appropriate season, for not less than five consecutive years within a period of not more than seven years prior to the date when any application is made to a court for their eviction.

Like the laws which it replaced, this new legislation failed to protect the interests of legitimate tenants without prejudicing the rights of the landlords. It encouraged tenants who had entered into a lease agreement with a landlord, to refuse to honour their obligations under the lease once they had acquired the rights of a 'statutory tenant', and to avail themselves of the provisions of the Ordinance to remain in occupation without paying rent. The Ordinance also encouraged trespassers and squatters whom it was never intended to protect but who, by the definition of 'statutory tenant', became legally entitled to its protection. Such persons entered upon land without the knowledge or consent of the owner, often without paying rent, and sometimes remained on the land not as *bona fide* cultivators but rather with a view to exploiting the pecuniary value of their gratuitously acquired rights. The provisions of the Ordinance made their eviction by the landlord a process

which was not only lengthy but which was not assured of success, owing to the difficulty of finding alternative subsistence areas as required. Consequently, the landlord was obliged to have recourse to either buying the occupier off his land with no effective guarantee that he will not return to the land and acquire fresh rights and a fresh nuisance value as a 'statutory tenant', or to dispose of the property to the Zionist land broker who was always at hand.

The Arabs protested that the law was designed to encourage the sale of Arab lands to Jews; while the Jews complained that 'it affords too great an opportunity for bogus claims and puts a premium on trespassing, with the result that endless delays and great expense are incurred in resisting and buying off these claims before a clear title and undisputed possession of land can be obtained.'*

Simpson's Report also briefly drew attention to the customary rights of the nomadic beduin population of Palestine. He referred to the 1922 census figure of 103,331, belonging to five main tribes and 75 sub-tribes, and reported, "The majority of these beduins wander over the country in the Beersheba area and the region south and east of it, but they are found in considerable numbers in the Jordan valley and in smaller numbers in the four other plains. Their rights had never been determined. They claim rights of cultivation and grazing of an indefinite character over indefinite areas... In any solution of the Palestine problem, they are an element which must be recognized. Also in any plans of development it will be necessary to consider, and scrupulously to record and deal with their rights.

"Complaints are made by these people in respect of the Jewish settlements both in the Vale of Esdraelon and in the Maritime Plain. Their substance was that the beduin custom over many centuries of taking their stock to the north of Palestine during the summer months when there is no grazing in the south, and grazing 'their flocks and herds on the stubbles after the harvest had been carried, was being obstructed by the new Zionist settlers'."²⁸

Simpson investigated the effects of Jewish settlements on the Arab, and differentiated between those of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (P.I.C.A.) and the Zionist Organization. In the colonies of the former, 'Relations between the colonists and their Arab neighbours were excellent.

* In 1942, the High Commissioner appointed a committee to consider the provisions of the Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance. The committee reported in January 1943, and expressed the view that, although before 1933 it was the landlord who had abused the legislation and the tenant who accordingly needed increased protection, since that date 'it had been the landlord's rights which have increasingly stood in need of protection, so that today the Ordinance is widely regarded as an instrument to facilitate the exploitation of landlords by tenants than as an instrument for the protection of tenants from the exploitation of landlords.'²⁸

In many cases, when land was bought by the P.I.C.A. for settlement, they combined with the development of the land for their own settlers similar development for the Arabs who previously occupied the land.' But attempts by the Jewish Agency to establish that the purchase of villages in the Esdraelon Valley and their settlement with Zionist immigrants 'had not had the effect of causing the previous tenants to join the landless class,' were shown by Simpson not to be in accord with all the facts.²⁹

He declared that 'the principle of the persistent and deliberate boycott of Arab labour in the Zionist colonies is not only contrary to article 6 of the Mandate, but it is in addition a constant and increasing source of danger to the country. At the moment this policy is confined to the Zionist colonies, but the General Federation of Jewish Labour is using every effort to ensure that it shall be extended to the colonies of the P.I.C.A., and this with some considerable success. Great pressure is being brought to bear on the old P.I.C.A. colonies in the Maritime Plain and its neighbourhood, pressure which in one instance at least has compelled police intervention.' Simpson thought Zionist arguments in favour of discrimination against Arab labour might have a basis in fact, but were irrelevant since it was contrary to the provisions of the Mandate.³⁰

Examples were given of discriminatory Zionist practices and of the arguments used to defend them:

The Constitution of the Jewish Agency: Land Holding and Employment Clauses—The Constitution of the Jewish Agency for Palestine was signed at Zurich on 14th August, 1929. Sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of Article 3 read as follows:

"(d) Land is to be acquired as Jewish property, and subject to the provision of Article 10 of this Agreement, the title to the lands acquired is to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.

"(e) The Agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour, and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed..."

Keren-Kayemeth draft lease: Employment of Jewish labour only—"I have been favoured" wrote Hope Simpson, "with copies of the draft of the lease which it is proposed to execute in respect of all holdings granted by the *Keren-Kayemeth* (Jewish National Fund). The following is Article 23 of this lease:

'...The lessee undertakes to execute all works connected with the cultivation of the holding only with Jewish labour. Failure to comply with this duty by the employment of non-Jewish labour shall render the lessee

liable to the payment of a compensation of ten Palestinian pounds for each default. The fact of the employment of non-Jewish labour shall constitute adequate proof as to the damages and the amount thereof, and the right of the Fund to be paid the compensation referred to, and it shall not be necessary to serve on the lessee any notarial or other notice. Where the lessee has contravened the provisions of this Article three times, the Fund may apply the right of restitution of the holding without paying any compensation whatever.'

"The lease also provides that the holding shall never be held by any but a Jew. If the holder, being a Jew, leaving as his heir a non-Jew, the Fund shall obtain the right of restitution. Prior to the enforcement of the right of restitution, the Fund must give the heir three months' notice, within which period the heir shall transfer his rights to a Jew, otherwise the Fund may enforce the right of restitution and the heir may not oppose such enforcement."

Keren-Hayesod Agreements: Employment of labour—In the agreement for the repayment of advances made by the *Keren-Hayesod* (Palestine Foundation Fund) to settlers in the colonies in the Maritime Plain, the following provisions are included:

"Article 7—The settler hereby undertakes that he will during the continuance of any of the said advances, reside upon the said agricultural holding and do all his farm work by himself or with the aid of his family, and that, if and whenever he may be obliged to hire help, he will hire Jewish workmen only."

In the similar agreement for the *Emek* colonies there is a provision as follows:

"Article 11—The settler undertakes to work the said holding personally, or with the aid of his family, and not to hire any outside labour except Jewish labourers."

Zionist policy towards the Arabs in their colonies—These provisions illustrate Zionist policy with regard to Arab labour in their colonies. They contradict attempts to establish the advantage which Jewish settlement brought to the Arab. A resolution passed at the Zionist Congress in 1921 which 'solemnly declared the desire of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people in relations of friendship and mutual respect, and, together with the Arab people, to develop the homeland common to both into a prosperous community which would ensure the growth of the peoples,' is frequently quoted in proof of the excellent sentiments which Zionism cherished towards the people of Palestine. The provisions quoted above, which were included in legal documents binding on every settler in a Zionist colony, are not compatible with the sentiments publicly expressed.

The same criticism applies to the following extract from the memo-

random submitted by the General Federation of Jewish Labour to the 'Palestine Commission of Enquiry' (i.e., the Commission on the Palestine disturbances of August, 1929):

"The Jewish labour movement considers the Arab population as an integral element in this country. It is not to be thought of that Jewish settlers should displace this population, nor establish themselves at its expense. This would not only be impossible both from the political and economic standpoint but it would run counter to the moral conception lying at the root of the Zionist movement. Jewish immigrants who come to this country to live by their own labour regard the Arab working man as their compatriot and fellow worker, whose needs are their needs and whose future is their future."

'The effect of the Zionist colonization policy on the Arab—Actually the result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish National Fund has been that land became extra-territorial. It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but, by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived forever from employment on that land. Nor can anyone help him by purchasing the land and restoring it to common use. The land is in mort-main and inalienable. It is for this reason that Arabs discount the professions of friendship and good will on the part of the Zionists in view of the policy which the Zionist Organization deliberately adopted.'

'Reasons for the exclusion of the Arab—Attempts were made to ascertain the reasons for these drastic provisions directed to exclude every Arab from the land purchased. The Executive of the General Federation of Jewish Labour were perfectly frank on the subject. They pointed out that the Jewish colonies were founded and established by Jewish capital, and that the subscriptions of which this capital is composed were given with the intention that Jews should emigrate to Palestine and be settled there; that these subscriptions would never have been given had it been thought that they would be employed to support Arab labourers; that it was the business of the Zionist Organization to cause immigration into Palestine of as many Jews as possible, and that, if Arabs were employed, posts would thus be filled up for which Jews might have immigrated; that the position of agricultural labour in the colonies, when occupied by a Jew, serves as a training for the immigrant and prepares him to take a holding himself at a later date; and, finally, that if these posts were left open to the ordinary competition of the labour market, the standard of life of the Jewish labourer would be liable to fall to the lower standard of the Arab.'³¹

Though Simpson was unequivocal on the need for agricultural development, including irrigation, and detailed the formation of cooperative credit societies for the fellahin, and improvement in the quality of olive oil, vini-

culture, sericulture, and the better disposal of dairy and other products as being desirable, he nevertheless quoted a leading Jewish agricultural expert in defense of the Arab fellah cultivator. 'It is a common impression that the fellah's cultivation is entirely inadequate, and a good deal of ridicule has been and is poured upon the nail-plough which he uses. In the stony country of the hills no other plough would be able to do the work at all.' Regarding the use of this plough, Dr. Wilansky was quoted as saying: "Its distinguishing characteristic is that it cuts the surface soil and does not turn it up. It performs, very slowly, it is true, but very thoroughly, all the functions for which a combination of modern machines is required—a plough, a roller and a harrow . . . The ploughing of the fellah is above reproach. His field, prepared for sowing, is never inferior to that prepared by the most perfect implements, and sometimes it even surpasses all others. The defect lies only in the slowness, which calls for modification in order to adapt the working process to the rate of speed in our time."

'The fellah as a cultivator'—The fellah is neither lazy nor unintelligent. He is a competent and capable agriculturist, and there is little doubt that were he to be given the chance of learning better methods, and the capital, which is the necessary preliminary to their employment, he would rapidly improve his position. Meanwhile, however, the income which he can procure from his inadequate farm is insufficient to maintain him at a decent standard of comfort and leaves no margin whatever for improvements.³²

Of education, the Report stated that 'The budget for education is far too small for the requirements of the country, and it is recommended that it be increased.'³³ This militated against the Arab population since the Zionists maintained excellent all-Jewish schools as a prime part of their programme. (In 1931, the education budget amounted to only 6.19 per cent of total expenditure; by 1936 it was down to 3.99 per cent).³⁴

On new immigration for land settlement, Hope Simpson's study showed 'quite definitely that there is at the present time . . . no margin of land available for new immigrants . . .'³⁵

He was critical of the influence over immigration exercised by *Histadruth*, which he investigated and reported on in some detail. It was their instructors in Poland, Germany, France and elsewhere who trained potential Palestine immigrants. 'It is therefore somewhat disingenuous to suggest that the General Federation of Jewish Labour is unconnected with the choice of the individual immigrant. In the great majority of cases the immigrant would have no chance of a permit, unless he were *persona grata* to the labour authorities.' A communication from *Agudath Israel*, the body of orthodox Jews, claiming discrimination against their members in Poland in the distribution of permits, was also quoted in support of this.³⁶

Simpson reviewed Palestinian industry, Arab and Jewish. He believed that

the future of the Haifa area and Palestinian exports would be advantageously affected by the construction of Haifa Harbour, which the British Administration was undertaking. A subsidiary of the British Portland Cement Company in Haifa was specifically criticized by him for exporting cement at 9 shillings a ton below the price in Palestine where 'the industry could not be maintained were it not for the protective tariff,' but his review embraced many products. 'It would be bad, and might prove a fatal policy, to attract large capital in order to start doubtful industries in Palestine, with the object of justifying an increase in the number of immigrants. The memorandum (written by a Zionist for the Palestine Corporation Ltd.) spends much effort in an attempt to establish that the year of "so-called" crisis in 1926 was not in fact a year of crisis at all. It is a question, somewhat academic, of the meaning to be attached to the word *crisis*. In that year the provision of relief works for the Jewish immigrants who could not otherwise obtain a living was actually necessary. Whether or not that should be designated a crisis is immaterial. It was an episode of which no government would willingly contemplate the recurrence. The importation of large numbers of immigrants to be employed on new industries of extensive character whose economic success is quite problematical, might well cause a crisis compared with which the so-called crisis of 1926 would indeed seem unimportant.'³⁷

The extension of Jewish enterprise, 'unless some departure from existing practice is effected' would, even if successful, be of no assistance to the Arab unemployed, since 'the policy of the Jewish Labour Federation is successful in impeding the employment of Arabs both in Jewish colonies and in Jewish enterprises of every kind.'

Hope Simpson's conclusions were full of constructive suggestions for the improvement and development of all Palestine's services and living standards. He expressed the personal belief, 'that with thorough development of the country there will be room, not only for all the present agricultural population on a higher standard of life than it at present enjoys, but for not less than 20,000 families of settlers from outside.' 'Any scheme for development presents serious difficulties. Unless such a scheme is accepted by both Jew and Arab, it may very well fail.'³⁸

The concurrently published 'Statement of Policy', soon to be known as the 'Passfield White Paper',³⁹ attempted to define Palestine policy and expressed determination to give effect to that policy as recommended by the Shaw Commission.⁴⁰ It quoted the words used by the Prime Minister (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald) in the House of Commons a few months earlier: "a double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other."⁴¹

'Much of the agitation which has taken place during the past year seems

to have arisen from a failure to realize the full import of this fundamental fact. Both Arabs and Jews have assailed the Government with demands and reproaches based on the false assumption that it was the duty of His Majesty's Government to execute policies from which they are, in fact, debarred by the explicit terms of the Mandate. "That", said Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, "is an international obligation from which there can be no question of receding".⁴² It was 'useless for Arab leaders to maintain their demands for a form of constitution, which would render it impossible for His Majesty's Government to carry out, in the fullest sense, the double undertaking already referred to.'⁴²

Since the Mandate was an instrument drawn up for a British Government which had insisted upon its containing the Balfour Declaration, in spite of French protests, it is notable that only very minor amendments were inserted in the Mandate by the League of Nations. A possible explanation of the determination of a great number of non-Zionists in Britain to adhere at all costs to the Mandate formula may lie in British tradition: a precedent had been created—precedents were best followed as closely as possible, nose to the ground... Large quotations were made in the 'Statement' from the Mandate, and from the 1922 White Paper, and another from the report to the League Council by the Permanent Mandates Commission which contained the following:

"(1) that the obligations laid down by the Mandate in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight;

"(2) that the two obligations imposed on the Mandatory are in no sense irreconcilable."⁴³

The White Paper then dealt with what were stated to be 'the practical problems with which His Majesty's Government are faced in Palestine...'

Security—Two battalions of infantry, two squadrons of aircraft and four sections of armoured cars would be stationed in Palestine and Trans-Jordan.

Constitutional Development—'...a measure of self-government in Palestine must, in the interests of the community as a whole, be taken in hand without further delay.'

His Majesty's Government 'accordingly intend to set up a legislative council generally on the lines indicated (in the 1922 White Paper)...' and 'trust that on this occasion they will secure the cooperation of all sections of the population of Palestine.'

Economic and Social Development—The conclusions of Hope Simpson were briefly outlined, including his examination of the colonization methods of P.I.C.A. and those under Zionist auspices, to the discredit of the latter. The provision of the Constitution of the Enlarged Jewish Agency, 'signed at Zurich on the 14th August 1929 (Article 3 (d) and (e)), that the land ac-

quired shall be held as the "inalienable property of the Jewish people," and that in "all the works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed";' was criticized as prejudicial to 'the rights and position of other sections of the population.'

Agricultural Development—To ensure that the position of the 'other sections of the population' was not prejudiced by Jewish immigration, and because of the 'duty under the Mandate to encourage close settlement of the Jews on the land,... a more methodical agricultural development is called for with the object of ensuring better use of the land.'

'Only by the adoption of such a policy will additional Jewish agricultural settlement be possible consistently with the conditions laid down in Article 6 of the Mandate.' Meanwhile, 'control of all dispositions of land must rest with the authorities in charge of development. Transfers of land will only be permitted in so far as they do not interfere with the plans of that authority (the Palestine Administration)...'

'Closely associated with any development must be the acceleration of the work of settlement by the ascertainment of title and the registration of tenancies. In this connection an important problem is presented by the large proportion of Arab village land which is held under the tenure-in-common known as *masha'*. Nearly half of the Arab villages are held in *masha'* tenure and there is a consensus of opinion that this system is a great obstacle to the agricultural development of the country.'*

Immigration—The important part played in Jewish immigration by *Histadruth* was examined and criticized. 'The influence of the General Federation is far-reaching and its activities are manifold. It constitutes an important factor within the world Zionist movement, and at the last Zionist Congress more than a quarter of the total number of delegates represented such Zionist circles, both in Palestine and abroad, as are identified with the Federation. The influence which the Federation is able to exert upon immigrants is shown by the fact that its members are not permitted to have recourse to

* The Jews welcomed the introduction of settlement of title to land operations in Palestine and pressed that the work should start with the fertile lands of the coastal and other plains which they planned to acquire. The Arabs on the other hand, protested the Land Settlement Ordinance on the grounds that it was a political move designed to facilitate the sale of Arab lands to the Jews.

If the intention were honourable, the Arabs maintained, settlement operations would have been taken up first in areas where there were inheritance and other problems, such as the *Masha'* (communal) system where family and other frictions were constantly taking place.

By the end of the Mandate in 1948, settlement operations had been completed in one-fifth of the lands of Palestine which included the majority of Jewish land purchases in the coastal and other plains.

the courts of the country in case of dispute with another member. It has its own courts of first and second instance and its labour high court, to which appeals from the subordinate tribunals lie. The Federation has adopted a policy which implies the introduction in Palestine of a new social order based on communal settlements and the principle of "self-labour". Where self-labour is impossible, it insists on the employment of Jewish labour exclusively by all employers.'

The Palestine Government 'should be the deciding authority in all matters of policy relating to immigration, especially having regard to its close relation to unemployment and land development policy.' But it was stressed that a *modus vivendi* was essential between the Government and the Jewish Agency, taking into account 'the influence exerted in the policy of the Agency' by the Labour Federation for the setting up of any new immigration system. The 'preparation of the Labour Schedule must depend on the ascertainment of the total unemployed in Palestine.'

The 'Statement of Policy' concluded, 'To the Arabs His Majesty's Government would appeal for a recognition of the facts of the situation... from the Jewish leaders His Majesty's Government ask for a recognition of the necessity for making some concessions on their side in regard to the independent and separatist ideals which have developed in some quarters in connection with the Jewish national home, and for accepting it as an active factor in the orientation of their policy that the general development of the country shall be carried out in such a way that the interests of the Arabs and Jews may each receive adequate consideration...'⁴⁴

To the British journalist and Palestine expert J.M.M. Jeffries 'the White Paper of 1930 boiled down only to this, that the Government, through the Palestine Administration, would keep its hand on Zionist immigration and land-purchase and would prevent the increase of either throwing the country into economic disorder.'⁴⁵ The political rumblings which followed, were louder than the protests of May 1930 against the suspension of the undistributed balance of immigration certificates for that year.

On 25 October 1930, 250 of the wealthiest Jews in New York City were called together by the political Zionist Stephen S. Wise 'to protest Jewish rights under the Mandate,' and Wise appealed to non-Jews for support.⁴⁶ On the same day, Weizmann and Felix M. Warburg issued statements denouncing British policy.⁴⁷ A few days later a suggestion by the Zionist Revisionists of America was adopted that British trade be boycotted until the Passfield policy was revoked.⁴⁸

The day following the meeting, Lady Passfield wrote in her diary that what interested her about all 'this ferment over Palestine' was the absence of any consideration of Palestine as the Holy Land of Christendom. She was not a Christian and had never been drawn to the country, but she imagined

the 'awful shock to the mediaeval crusaders if they had foreseen the Christian kingdoms of England, France and Italy withdrawing Jerusalem from Islam to hand it over to Jews.' She quoted from a speech of Lloyd George denouncing the 'Statement of Policy' and urging Zionist claims to 'the land which their ancestors made famous for all time.' To her, this was an additional irony in the crisis which was being built up to remove her husband, for she was conscious, as were few other people, 'that the Jewish immigrants are Slavs or Mongols [a reference to their Khazar ancestry] and not semites, and the vast majority are not followers of Moses and the prophets, but of Karl Marx and the Soviet Republic.'⁴⁹

She was fully aware, through her husband's official sources, of the war-time promises to the Arabs, as well as she was of Balfour's declaration to Lord Rothschild. Now, ten years after, she believed it clear to 'all who study the question that these promises were and are incompatible,' but, 'Owing to the superior wealth and capacity of the Jews, it is the Arab who has suffered damage during the last ten years.'⁵⁰

For several weeks the columns of *The Times*, which exerted potent force in British political life, were filled with denunciations of the Government's Palestine policy. There was an open letter from Weizmann to the Colonial Secretary,⁵¹ followed next day by one from the Jewish peer, Lord Melchett, whose grandfather Ludwig Mond, had come from Germany to make a great fortune in Imperial Chemical Industries. He wrote that "the grotesque travesty of the purpose of the Mandate given in the Government Paper can only be described as an insult to the intelligence of Jewry and deliberate affront to the Mandates Commission." Conservative Party leaders, Baldwin, Austen Chamberlain and L.S. Amery equalled him in extremity of language,⁵² and the two lawyers, Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon, eminent in the Establishment, argued that the White Paper was contrary to the terms of the Mandate.⁵³

This then was the topic which was engaging the minds and energies of the men who led Britain as the economic crisis of the country grew deeper and deeper. Between May, when Palestine immigration had been temporarily suspended, and November 1930, British unemployment had increased from 1,712,000 to 2,285,987, or 19 per cent of the insured labour force. The total figure of unemployed was probably much greater.

In view of this pressure at home and the threats of financial reprisals from the United States, Ramsay MacDonald backed down. According to his colleague Herbert Morrison, he had already shown 'evidence of that remote and defensive attitude to those around him which in the end left him with virtually no friends in the real sense of the word,' and sometimes gave the impression of 'an objectionable evasiveness' and a 'shilly-shallying which was to prove so disastrous to his reputation.'⁵⁴ Passfield defended his policy,

denying that Palestine was barred to Jews. He said that the suspension of immigration was only contingent on unemployment in Palestine. Internationally, he was supported by Judge Loefgren, Chairman of the League of Nations Wailing Wall Commission, who defended British policy as a compromise between the promises made to the Arabs and the Jews.⁵⁵

On 14 November 1930 it was announced that 'doubts have been expressed as to the compatibility of some passages of the White Paper of October with certain articles of the Palestine Mandate, and other passages having proved liable to misunderstanding,' MacDonald had 'invited members of the Jewish Agency to confer on these matters.' Perhaps in an attempt to soften the blow to the Arabs, on 17 November 1930 it was announced by MacDonald that Britain would guarantee, and for a few years provide, the services of a loan of £2,500,000 to increase the general productivity of Palestine. This loan was never raised.

As a result of these discussions with the Zionists, a letter from J. Ramsay MacDonald, Prime Minister, to Dr. Weizmann was published on 14 February 1931 (Document 34). This is referred to by the Arabs as the 'Black Letter'. According to the official description, the letter 'did not repudiate the policy of the White Paper of 1930, but set out to explain it; on important points, such as the prospective availability of State land for Jewish settlers and the admission of Jewish labour maintained by Jewish capital, its interpretation was more favourable to Jewish claims than the White Paper had seemed to be.'⁵⁶ But on the whole it was interpreted as a complete reversal of policy. Britain had surrendered to Zionist political pressure applied through the threat of international economic boycott and British Zionist supporters.

Jewish sources now describe the Ramsay MacDonald Letter as in fact cancelling the Passfield White Paper of 1930, and pay tribute to the role played by Lewis Namier* as go-between in obtaining it.⁵⁷ Weizmann summarizes the significance of the letter in the following words: "...it was under MacDonald's letter to me that the change came about in the Government's attitude, and in the attitude of the Palestine Administration, which enabled us to make the magnificent gains of the ensuing years. It was under Mac-

* Arrived in London from Eastern Galicia (where his parents were large landowners) in 1908 as L. Bernstein-Namierowski. Attended the London School of Economics 'attracted by the Fabianism of its faculty.' From 1914, he served for a time in the Foreign Office Intelligence Service, and was brought to the Versailles Peace Conference to advise on the problems concerning the old Habsburg Empire, Poland, and Eastern Europe generally. There is reason to believe that he played some part in the rejection of the Andrassy note—a last attempt to ward off the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy through a separate peace with the Allied Powers... He and Mrs. Blanche Dugdale, the niece of Arthur Balfour, were the chief draftsmen of the Jewish Agency. The infinite pains Namier would take to eliminate a superfluous word or to dig up the most telling and most idiomatic adjective became a legend, and a source of much mirth.⁵⁸

Donald's letter that Jewish immigration into Palestine was permitted to reach figures like forty thousand for 1934 and sixty-two thousand for 1935, figures undreamed of in 1930.⁵⁹

The Arabs regarded it as plain proof of the power which world Jewry could exercise in London and their confidence in British determination was shaken. The result was that, following the publication of this letter, although some of the main recommendations of the Shaw and Hope Simpson reports had been promptly adopted and put into effect, Arab antagonism to the principles of the Mandate increased.

The validity of Arab apprehensions can be illustrated by some significant figures. In 1918, when the British forces occupied Palestine, the total estimated population of the country was 689,000. Of these 563,000 were Moslems, 70,000 were Christians, and 56,000 were Jews.⁶⁰

During the period of the Mandate two censuses were taken: the first in 1922 and the second in 1931. The population figures⁶¹ for the intervening ten-year period were as follows:

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Moslems</i> | <i>Christians</i> | <i>Jews</i> | <i>Others**</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|-------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 1922 | 589,177 | 71,464 | 83,790 | 7,617 | 752,048 |
| 1923 | 609,331 | 72,090 | 89,660 | 7,908 | 778,989 |
| 1924 | 627,660 | 74,094 | 94,945 | 8,263 | 804,962 |
| 1925 | 641,494 | 75,512 | 121,725 | 8,507 | 847,238 |
| 1926 | 663,613 | 76,467 | 149,500 | 8,782 | 898,902 |
| 1927 | 680,725 | 77,880 | 149,789 | 8,921 | 917,315 |
| 1928 | 695,280 | 79,812 | 151,656 | 9,203 | 935,951 |
| 1929 | 712,343 | 81,776 | 156,481 | 9,443 | 960,043 |
| 1930 | 733,149 | 84,986 | 164,796 | 9,628 | 992,559 |
| 1931 | 759,700 | 88,907 | 174,606 | 10,101 | 1,033,314 |

While the Arab population of Palestine increased in these ten years by natural growth from 668,258 to 858,708 or 29 per cent, the Jewish population increased, largely through immigration, from 83,790 to 174,606, or 108 per cent.

* At this time, the height of the depression, Zionism was out of funds. Dr. Weizmann was dispatched to the Baron, the eighty-six year old Edmond de Rothschild. In Paris, Weizmann contracted influenza, and the Baron came to see him: In his hand he carried a cheque for 40,000 pounds. This should help bring your temperature down," Edmond growled.⁶²

** Druze, Bahais, etc. who are considered Arabs.

During the parliamentary recess of the summer of 1931, the Cabinet was hastily summoned. The financial situation was bad and there was a need to ask the House of Commons for a supplementary budget. This the Chancellor of the Exchequer was unwilling to do, because he agreed with his 'city friends' that Government financial policy was unsound.⁶³ The Cabinet decided to resign. On his return from offering the Government's resignation to the King, MacDonald brusquely told his former colleagues that he was joining Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative, and Sir Herbert Samuel, who was now leading the Liberals, in forming a so-called National Government. This became known to the British Labour movement as the 'great betrayal.' Passfield left the Colonial Office and active government for ever.

CHAPTER XIII

Arab Resistance to National Home Policy Stiffens (1931 - 1935)

At the opening debate of the 17th Zionist Congress at Basle, June-July 1931, the mood was exultant and militant. The tone was set by the speech of a colonist who had come to Palestine before World War I, when the great migration of Russian Jews westward had taken place, largely to the United States and Britain. And he had adopted a name in keeping with the mood—*Ben Gurion*, son of the Young Lion, instead of his own, Gruen, or Green. He said, "We are come not as a party's envoys, but as couriers from a battle-front. . . You know of the riots enquiry, of the wicked Shaw Commission which of a sudden thrust us into the dock. You know of the stoppage of immigration in May, the mandatory's first report to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the factual survey and scientific expertise of Hope Simpson, and, in last and lowliest place, Lord Passfield's White Paper. . . In eastern Palestine, there are broader and emptier acres, and Jordan is not necessarily the perpetual limit to our immigration and settlement. . . we are entitled to ask the right to enter and settle in Trans-Jordan; its closure in our faces neither accords with the Mandate as it stands, nor considers the crying economic needs of a fertile but underpopulated and impecunious region.

"This too we were taught: we have not only to do with local Arabs. We are encircled by Arab countries, and we must also reckon with Egypt and North Africa, all Moslems, all speaking Arabic. I implore you to draw the deadly conclusions."¹

In the charged atmosphere which such words tended to intensify, the British High Commissioner laboured to 'bring the two peoples of Palestine and the Administration into closer touch with each other.'² He succeeded in getting Jews and Arabs to work together as individuals, rather than representatives, on the Agricultural Council, the Road and Railway Boards, the Labour Legislation Committee, and the Committee for Commerce and Industry. Cooperation was generally good among postal and railway employees,

and between Government officials, though the fact that a few key officials were Zionists first meant that the Administration could have no secrets from the Jewish Agency.

Of all the acknowledged political and religious leaders of the time, Mahatma Gandhi was the only one outside the Arab world who saw a clear picture of what was happening in Palestine. Interviewed by an official of the Jewish Telegraph Agency on his 63rd birthday, he said, "Zionism in its spiritual sense is a lofty aspiration, but Zionism meaning the reoccupation of Palestine has no attraction for me. I understand the longing of the Jew to return to Palestine. He can do so provided it is done without the help of bayonets belonging either to Britain or the Jews. In that event the Jew would proceed to Palestine peacefully in perfect friendliness with the Arabs."

"Real Zionism, which lies in one's heart, is a thing to strive for and die for," asserted Mr. Gandhi. "It is the abode of good. The real Jerusalem is the spiritual Jerusalem. Thus the Jews can realize this Zionism in any part of the world."³ But Zionism, though using religious and cultural symbols, remained political and militant.

That autumn of 1931 there were riots of hungry unemployed men in Glasgow, with looting of food and clothing shops,⁴ the Reichsbank lost \$56,000,000 the same week, and tons of gold were withdrawn from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,⁵ as other countries followed Britain in devaluing their currency. On Broadway, the lines of ragged, shivering, hungry men waiting to get a container of coffee and a sandwich or two, grew longer. Yet in the same year, a meeting of Zionist and non-Zionist Jews in New York had voted \$2,500,000 in one day 'for reconstruction work in Palestine.'⁶ Such comparisons tended to generate anti-Jewish feeling, and they were not only confined to the United States, for conditions were similar in Britain, Germany and other countries.

In Palestine, the year ended with a Moslem Congress under the chairmanship of the Grand Mufti in Jerusalem, attended by 145 delegates from all parts of the Moslem world. Although its public proceedings were not political, and there were no demonstrations, the *New York Times* reported the Congress as being solidly against further colonization of Palestine by Jews.⁷

The year 1932 brought another boycott by the Arabs in the already lengthy list of these acts of passive resistance against Zionist nationalism. The Zionists claimed to have broken through the boycott by capturing new markets in South Africa, and even in Egypt and Syria.⁸ But the belief had grown up among the Palestinian Arabs that the Jews had agreed 'To buy nothing from Arabs except land, and to sell everything to the Arabs but land;' so that when the Jews opened a trade exhibition, the 'Levant Fair', in Tel

Aviv, the Arab Executive not only declared its boycott, but announced that Jews would not be invited to the Arab Fair to be held in the following year.

Also noteworthy was the creation of a new Arab party, the *Istiqlal* (Independence) Party which, if it could not compete with the hitherto two dominant factions, the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, appealed to the younger generation of Arab nationalists by its uncompromising concentration on the demand for national freedom. From the beginning of British occupation, neither the British nor the Zionists had ever been prepared to concede any validity to the growing Arab nationalist movement.⁹ Instead, Arab resistance had been 'explained' by many lecturers on 'the Palestine Problem', as being entirely the product of frustration of the ambitions of the two clan-partisan-ships of the Moslem community, the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. The fact that the Nashashibis held for years the mayoralty of Jerusalem, while the Grand Mufti was a Husseini, were cited to support this view. It was held too by many Zionists, who sought to separate the Arab ruling-class, stigmatizing them as 'feudal exploiters', from the unorganized fellahin and urban workers; the former were promised appropriate material benefits, and the latter trade-union organization. These tactics, failed almost completely.¹⁰ In fact, under the Ottoman Empire the opportunities for advancement in its service were not confined to those from rich families, and Sir Ronald Storrs, unlike most Englishmen, was aware of the possibilities open to Arabs, whether in an independent State or under Ottoman rule, which were denied under the British imperialist Palestine Administration. 'The eagerness of the Arabs, north and south, for a united Syria was not merely anti-French or anti-Zionist. Even if they had obtained this, the career previously open to talent in the Ottoman Empire would have been reduced by two-thirds. Kiamil Pasha, a Cypriot villager, had been four times Grand Vizier... The two Arab Pashas I found in Jerusalem had held positions of administrative responsibility in Arabia and Mesopotamia. After the partition of Syria the leading Palestine Arabs... found their ambitions henceforth confined to subordinate or municipal functions, with preference given to two foreign races...'¹¹

However, in 1932 further British attempts to promote more political and economic advancement broke down as a result of the essential dissimilarity of views of the Palestinians and the Zionist colonists. A draft Municipal Corporations Ordinance was communicated to the Arab Executive, the Jewish Agency, and local authorities for comment and criticism, and the Government declared its intention of taking steps towards the formation of a legislative council as soon as the ordinance in its final form had come into operation. But on the economic side there was a refusal to cooperate with Mr. Lewis French, who had been appointed Director of Development the year before; the Arabs demanding an assurance that the development scheme would not be based on the principles laid down in Mr. MacDonald's

letter to Dr. Weizmann; while the Jewish refusal represented a protest against the tightening up of the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance designed to restrict Jewish purchases of Arab land.¹²

Outside Palestine, Zionist campaigns for funds for a Jewish exodus to Palestine, and for political support, increased. Their efforts were soon to receive unwelcome impetus from an apparently unexpected quarter. In Germany the feebleness and uncertainty of previous governments had resulted in an increase of unemployment figures to six million. Fritz von Papen, who headed a new cabinet in the middle of 1932, was at least able to negotiate an end to the disastrous war reparations policies of the Allies at a Lausanne conference in the latter half of July. Only a few days after this success the Reichstag elections, instigated by von Papen, took place. "They achieved the unprecedented result of 230 seats for Adolf Hitler, making the National Socialists the largest party in the Reichstag. From now on no government could obtain a majority in the Reichstag without either the National Socialists or the Communists, who had managed to secure 89 seats."¹³ The ensuing months were occupied with attempts to get Hitler to participate in a coalition.

It was in this political climate that an address delivered before the convention of German Zionists, September 1932, by Arthur Ruppin, of German birth but already active in the Zionist cause in Damascus, Constantinople and Copenhagen in World War I, and for many years member of the executive council of the Jewish Agency, opened with the following words: "Zionism, like all new political movements, appeared on the stage of history in the role of aggressor. It took up a definite attitude toward all those movements which had preceded it and which dedicated themselves to the preservation of Jewry: it declared them to be either useless in their purpose or insignificant in their effects. Such an attitude was necessary in those days. Had it not begun as the aggressor, Zionism would never have found the strength which it needed forty years ago to bring life and movement into the stagnation of Jewish life. But in these forty years the position of the Zionist movement has become so strong that it can permit itself the luxury of objectivity, and to estimate the movements which preceded it in their right historic setting and necessity.

"Seen in the perspective of the past, movements are perceived otherwise than in the course of their development. All of you know that the Jewish emancipation goes back to the ideas of the French Revolution..."¹⁴

The necessity for assuming an aggressive role as a new and expanding movement was certainly subscribed to by the National Socialist movement, and Hitler's obsession with Jewish methods, organization and objectives made him their ardent student. We know that the Zionist Organization was at this time strengthening its position among Jews by organizing suppor-

ters according to their trade or profession—lawyers, accountants, doctors, real estate builders, managers, etc., and we also know that Hitler organized unions of Nazi lawyers, Nazi physicians, teachers, a Nazi Students' League, etc...¹⁵

On 23 January 1933 there was a climactic clash between the National Socialists and the Communists in the streets of Berlin. On 28 January the Weimar Republic finally collapsed; and by the morning of 30 January Hitler accepted from President von Hindenburg the Chancellorship and the task of forming a new government. A new cabinet had been formed and the majority in the Reichstag required by constitution was assured.

On the night of 30 January, a gigantic National Socialist demonstration in honour of the new cabinet was staged. 'Unter den Linden was packed with people as the torchlight procession went by. To the observer it seemed as though all of young Germany and middle-class Germany was there. The deep and fervent enthusiasm of this huge crowd as it sung the Horst Wessel song, *Deutschland Uber Alles* and the old Prussian marching songs made an indelible impression.'¹⁶ Elections on 5 March 1933 gave the National Socialist Party control of the Reichstag, which set aside the Weimar Constitution on 23 March, granting virtually dictatorial power to Chancellor Hitler.

As Hitler called Germany to attention, a voice from Washington said to the American people, "My friends... The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." Franklin D. Roosevelt became President of the United States on 4 March. Almost simultaneously with the granting of special powers by the Reichstag to Hitler, 'F.D.R.' was voted emergency powers by the American Congress. One promised a New Order, the other a New Deal. Around Hitler was a small band of trusted Party comrades; around Roosevelt was his Brains Trust, Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Professor Raymond Moley of Columbia, R.G. Tugwell, and 'Professor Emeritus' Bernard Baruch.¹⁷ The significant role played by Felix Frankfurter, who had known Roosevelt since the Peace Conference, in filling the structure of government with his appointees who, if not sharing Frankfurter's fervent Zionism, at least were unlikely to oppose its aims, is documented by Professor Moley: "Felix Frankfurter had been recommending promising young lawyers to presidents and justices for so many years that it became routine not only for me, but many other departments to 'talk to Felix about men.' Before long he had placed Nathan E. Marigold as Solicitor in the Interior; Charles E. Wyzansky, Jr., in Labour; Jerome Franks in AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Administration), and Dean Acheson in the State Department. This infiltration was to take on an extraordinary character after it became known as a 'well integrated group'."¹⁸

The relationship between the establishment of a National Socialist regime in Germany and an increase in the number of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, from 9,553 in 1932 to 30,327 in 1933,¹⁹ is perhaps not as simple as has been generally believed. At the German elections on 4 March 1933, the Nazis won a majority in the Reichstag, but their victory was not used against Jews as such, but against the Communists who constituted a large militant and aggressive group. Jews started leaving Germany, but at this time, the majority were those who had capital invested abroad or who had relatives elsewhere, especially in Britain or the United States. The number of Palestine immigrants from Germany in 1933 was only 5,392 as against 13,125 from Poland.²⁰ Poland still continued to provide the largest percentage of immigrants to Palestine until after 1937. This is shown in the following table:²¹

| <i>Country of previous abode</i> | <i>Percentage of Total</i> | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1922-29 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 |
| Germany (including Austria) | — | 14 | 27 | 34 | 52 |
| Poland | 46 | 46 | 41 | 35 | 25 |
| Rumania | 6 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
| U.S.S.R. | 20 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Lithuania | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| U.S.A. | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Others | 20 | 27 | 21 | 21 | 16 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

In spite of denials by the Central Union of German Citizens of Jewish Faith of reports in the foreign press of atrocities,²² their reality is attested by a direct order of Hitler against anti-Jewish acts on 13 March 1933, which caused them to cease.²³ There were cables from German religious leaders to Zionist leaders in America denying persecution reports,²⁴ but a boycott of German goods was organized in Poland,²⁵ as well as in the United States and Britain. The Zionist threat of boycott of British goods had been successful against the Passfield policy in 1930 (Chapter 12), and the prospects for its employment against an unstable Germany seemed good.

The Nazis warned that if the Zionist-organized boycott of German goods continued, a counter-boycott would be instituted against Jews in Germany.²⁶ With unemployment such a critical issue, it was to be expected that anti-Jewish feelings in Germany would rise. 'Great public meetings were held in order to stimulate the public to take part in the boycott. Huge posters were pasted up denouncing the Jews and arousing the public to the support of the boycott programme...²⁷ As a result of the desperate efforts of the

Foreign Office and the conservative nationalists, the boycott was almost called off at the last moment. Finally a compromise was reached by which it was agreed that the boycott should only be carried on for one day. It was publicly given out that the boycott was to be carried out on Saturday, 1 April. Then there was to be a pause until the following Wednesday. "If in the meantime," said the Nazis, "the press of the world had received and obeyed instructions from its Jewish masters to call off the atrocity campaign, the boycott would not be continued. If, on the other hand, the campaign were to continue, the boycott would be reimposed and carried through till the power of Judea was finally broken."²⁸

Hermann W. Goering, in a telegram to the German-American Chamber of Commerce on 25 March 1933, opposed persecution of Jews saying that they would be protected, and that socialism and not race was the basis of the suppressions which had taken place.²⁹ However, the Jewish global boycott of German goods was adopted by the Palestine Jews on 28 March, and the Jews of Egypt on the same day, followed by the Jews of Greece on 30 March³⁰ Hitler endorsed the German counter-boycott on 6 April and said that the United States had the least right to protest because of her immigration policy.³¹

Herbert Samuel** opposed the boycott of German goods,³² but it was pressed by Samuel Untermyer of New York as leader of those who refused to accept National Socialist denials of Jewish persecution.³³

Untermyer, a Zionist with extensive Wall Street banking and New York City financial interests, assailed Hitlerism at a ceremony dedicating the Untermyer Memorial Theater as part of the Hebrew University in Palestine on 13 April 1933.³⁴ The wide publicity given the speech fitted into a campaign of the Zionist Organization of America to seek the aid of the United States, the United Kingdom and the League of Nations in cancelling restrictions on immigration and 'obtaining Palestine as a haven for refugees' from the conditions being created in Germany.³⁵ In June, he accepted the honorary presidency of the National Boycott Committee of America, sponsoring the Jewish boycott of German goods;³⁶ and on 20 July in Amsterdam, Untermyer was elected president of the World Jewish Economic Federation which was coordinating plans to extend the boycott of German goods.³⁷ The

* The United States Government had adopted a quota system for immigrants in 1924, which substantially reduced the migration of European Jews to the U.S.A.

** Samuel's liberalism was sometimes mocked by militant Zionists. A prominent Zionist wrote in his diary in March 1933 (London): "We were guests of the Zionist Organization . . . Herbert Samuel emphasized the need of co-operation with the Arabs and said that the Jews could never make a success of Palestine without taking the Arabs along with them. At this point Weizmann winked at me. One might as well expect a ferret to co-operate with the rabbit."³⁸

boycott could be expected to cut German trade in half, said Untermeyer as he left Europe for the United States,³⁹ and when the ship docked in New York he was given an enthusiastic welcome. That night he broadcast an appeal for support of the boycott.*⁴⁰

* Station WABC, New York, 6 August 1933:

"Our campaign is two-fold—defensive and constructive. On the defensive side will be the economic boycott against all German goods, shipping and service. On the constructive side will be an appeal to the League of Nations to construe and enforce the labour union provision of the Versailles Treaty and the written promise made by Germany, while the treaty was under negotiation, to protect its minorities, which have been flagrantly violated by its disfranchisement and persecution of the German Jews.

"As to the boycott, strange to say a mere handful in number, but powerful in influence, of our thoughtless but doubtless well intentioned Jews seem obsessed and frightened at the bare mention of the word 'boycott'. It signifies and conjures up to them images of force and illegality, such as have on occasions in the past characterized struggles between labour unions and their employers. As these timid souls are capitalists and employers, the word and all that it implies are hateful to their ears. . .

"What we are proposing and have already gone far towards doing, is to prosecute a purely defensive economic boycott that will undermine the Hitler regime and bring the German people to their senses by destroying their export trade on which their very existence depends.

"They have flaunted and persisted in flaunting and defying world opinion: We propose to and are organizing world opinion to express itself in the only way Germany can be made to understand. Hitler and his mob will not permit their people to know how they are regarded by the outside world. We shall force them to learn in the only way open to us. . .

"With this explanation of our aims, I appeal to the American Jewish Committee, whose public spirit and good intentions I do not for a moment question, but the wisdom of whose judgment I challenge, no longer to hold aloof but to rid themselves of their timid and ill-considered prejudices and join in actively pressing this boycott as our only weapon except the appeal to the League, which I shall discuss at a later time.

"I purposely refrain from including the American Jewish Congress in this appeal because I am satisfied that 95 per cent of their members are already with us and that they are being misrepresented by two or three men now abroad. Of them I ask that, prior to the meeting to be held this month in Prague by their executive committee, they instruct these false leaders in no uncertain terms as to the stand they must take on this all important subject and demand that they shall either openly represent their views or resign their office.

"There is not time now, but I hope and expect in the near future to be able to report to you the steps that have been taken and that are already under way, and the surprising and gratifying progress already made in many countries toward the success of the economic boycott in which we are engaged. Although considerable progress in that direction has already been made in Great Britain and the United States, you will be surprised to learn that they are the least advanced and as yet the most inadequately organized of all the countries that were represented at the Amsterdam World Economic Conference where the boycott was unanimously and enthusiastically approved by formal resolution by a rising vote.

"With us in America the delay has been due in part to lack of funds and the vast territory to be covered, but it is hoped and expected that this condition will soon be corrected.

Gentile cooperation in the boycott was enlisted through the 'Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League and Champions of Human Rights' headed by Untermeyer, whose members included several Revisionists (Elias Ginsburg, Israel Posnonsky, and others). In April 1933 their leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky, had written: "If Hitler's regime is destined to stay, world Jewry is doomed." He declared a global 'German-Jewish War' in which the German Jewish community was 'but a minor detail. . . The Jewish people finds itself face to face not with a party within the German people, but with the German nation as such, or at least one half of it. At the 15 March election, Hitler received seventeen million votes, and seventeen million are already no longer a party.'⁴¹ Jabotinsky also broadcast over the Polish Government-controlled Warsaw radio by permission of Foreign Minister Joseph Beck on 28 April 1933, on 'Hitlerism and Palestine.' Speaking in Polish and French, he called for a world-wide boycott of Germany and for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, as the only answer to the Hitlerite menace. 'It was the first time that a foreign Jew was allowed to appear on a Polish radio programme.' He followed it with 69 mass meetings throughout Eastern Europe which pressed on Jews the boycott of German goods.

Jabotinsky questioned the adequacy of the negative slogan 'boycott' meaning 'Don't buy German goods;' he urged it be replaced by a positive formula—buy produce 'of more acceptable origin,' this to be accompanied by: exact descriptions of all articles recommended for purchase, and of shops where these articles were to be found. "We Jews," he said, "are not more than one per cent of purchasing humanity: it is for the remaining 99 per cent to follow our example if they want the blockade to become decisively efficient."⁴²

Although the Zionists were at first generally solid on the boycott issue, there were differences of opinion in Jewish communities and organizations. Some related to methods, some to attitudes toward socialism and commu-

The object-lesson we are determined to teach is so priceless to all humanity that we dare not fail.

"Each of you Jew and Gentile alike, who has not already enlisted in this sacred war should do so now and here. It is not sufficient that you buy no goods made in Germany. You must refuse to deal with any merchant or shopkeeper who sells any German-made goods or who patronizes German ships or shipping. To our shame be it said that there are a few Jews among us, but fortunately only a few, so wanting in dignity and self-respect that they are willing to travel on German ships where they are despised and meet with the just contempt of the servants who wait upon them and of their fellow passengers. Their names should be heralded far and wide. They are traitors to their race.

"In conclusion, permit me again to thank you for this heartening reception and to assure you that, with your support and that of our millions of non-Jewish friends we will drive the last nail in the coffin of bigotry and fanaticism that has dared raise its ugly head to slander, belie and disgrace twentieth century civilization."

munism. Dr. Horne M. Kallen, a leading American Jew, blamed 'oligarchic and Fascist methods' in Jewish organizations for the anarchy in Jewish affairs.*⁴³ By the middle of 1933, there were almost violent differences between an uncompromising but less powerful minority as compared with the 'politicians' of the Jewish Agency who, taking advantage of the desire of the German national socialists to promote Jewish emigration, treated with them to assist Jewish immigration into Palestine and the transfer there of Jewish assets paid for in German goods.⁴⁴

The adaptation of the Zionist and Zionist-Revisionist movements to certain features of the Nazi regime was condemned by Jabotinsky in a letter to the former chairman of his party in Germany. 'I do not know what has happened, but any flirting with the (Nazi) Government or its representatives and ideas I would consider simply criminal. I understand that one can silently bear *Schweinerei* (hoggishness, dirtiness); but to adapt oneself to *Schweinerei* is *verboten* (forbidden), and Hitlerism remains *Schweinerei* in spite of the enthusiasm of millions which impresses our youth so much in a manner in which communism impresses other Jews; it is a very cheap and common type of assimilation.'⁴⁵

Although negotiations between the Hitler Government and Zionist and other Jewish organizations were carried on from time to time on questions of mutual interest, the international Jewish boycott was extended into the following years, and Germany became the hated enemy for Eastern Jews that Czarist Russia had been.

Towards the end of 1933, the Jewish Agency announced that it had spent \$25,000,000 raised by public subscriptions,⁴⁶ and the huge sums now available undoubtedly enabled them to increase the pressure in Palestine, as well as more effectively persuade and assist more Jews in Poland, Germany and elsewhere that emigration to Palestine was the only answer to their problems.

In response to this situation, the British doubled the authorized rate of Jewish immigration between 1932 and 1933; and with compassion for the Jews rising high in Britain, the British trebled the 1932 figure (and went on raising the quota until 1935, when they admitted over 60,000 Jews, a number large

* Even among the Revisionists there were at least two disputing groups—the 25 strong 'Club of Revisionist-Maximalists,' headed by Abba Achimeir, and the 40 or so 'Activists,' headed by Wolfgang von Weisl, advocating a dictatorial regime in the Revisionist movement, which Jabotinsky is said to have rejected.⁴⁷

In the Prague Review *Das Neue Tagebuch* of 3 March 1934, a certain Ben Gavriel published an article 'Die Braunhemden Zions,' in which he wrote of Jabotinsky: "His role became tragically grotesque as he, financed by the rising Italian and in particular German Fascism, started to form in Jewry a Fascist party, or to be more precise, a more extremely anti-labour and anti-Arab, though naturally not anti-semitic brand of Hitler party."

in relation to the population of Palestine).

The first manifestation of Arab reaction to this rising pressure of Jewish immigration was the publication by the Arab Executive Committee in March 1933, of a manifesto to the Arab Nation. It declared that "the general tendency of Jews is to take possession of the lands of this holy country, and their streaming into it by hundreds and thousands through legal and illegal means has terrified the country." The country, it went on, was fully aware that the object of the Government's policy was "to pave the road for driving the nation away from its homeland for foreigners to supersede it:" they "will not expect any good from this Government and its oppression," and "it will be looked upon as the true enemy whom they must get rid of through every legal means." The manifesto concluded with an announcement of a meeting to be held at Jaffa and appealed to the nation "to get ready for the serious acts which will be imposed by the resolutions of this assembly. The country calls its sons for action and sacrifice in these hard times."⁴⁸

The meeting was held on 26 March 1933 and attended by some five or six hundred Arabs of all classes, townsmen and villagers, and of all parties, by the members of the Arab Executive, including the Mufti of Jerusalem, and by the mayors of most of the Arab towns. Resolutions were passed adopting 'the principle of non-cooperation,' and ordering 'the immediate execution of its first steps forthwith, such as boycotting receptions and exchange of courtesies with Government, Government Boards, British goods and Zionist goods, products and commercial premises,' and the formation of a committee to study ways and means for a wider application of the 'non-cooperation principle.'⁴⁹ A similar campaign of non-violent non-cooperation was being practised at the time in India by the followers of Mahatma Gandhi.

From that time onwards, the Arab press, already virulent enough, became steadily more inflammatory. A new press ordinance was enacted under which newspapers publishing matter 'likely to endanger the public peace' could be suspended with or without warning; but a number of warnings addressed to certain newspapers had little effect and none was actually suspended in 1933. By the early autumn charges against the Palestine Government were being printed that it was deliberately 'flooding the country with Jews with the object of displacing Arabs from the land and depriving them of their employment' or that 'a mass immigration of Jews was being allowed and encouraged by Government so that when the legislative council was introduced the Jews would be in a majority.'⁵⁰ In August the flames were fanned by the proceedings of the Zionist Congress in Prague, which demanded, with special reference to events in Germany, that the Jewish national home should be 'built as speedily as possible and on the largest scale,' and by reports that as many as 10,000 'illegal immigrants' had recently entered the

country.⁵¹

At a Moslem festival early in September, the President of the Arab Executive, Musa Kazem el-Husseini, made a violent speech against Jewish immigration and telegraphed to the High Commissioner demanding its immediate cessation. Further serious agitation followed, and public meetings were organized by the *Istiqlal* Party, the Moslem Young Men's Association, and the Moslem-Christian Association—all in the common cause.

Finally, early in October 1933, the Arab Executive, whose members had been bitterly criticized in the Arab newspapers for their apathy and inertia, announced that a 'general strike' would be declared on 13 October and a demonstration made in front of the Government Offices in Jerusalem. Despite the Government's prohibition, the demonstration was attempted on the appointed date, and the angry mob was only dispersed after repeated baton charges by the police. In the course of the next few weeks the trouble spread to other parts of Palestine. On 27 October there was a serious outbreak in Jaffa. So dangerous was the temper of the Arab rioters that the police were forced to use firearms to maintain control. News of these events quickly reached Nablus where public buildings were attacked and the police stoned in retaliation. In Haifa that evening and next day there were similar disturbances. On 28 and 29 October rioting broke out again in Jerusalem. At each of these towns the attacks on the police, though nowhere so grave as in Jaffa, were formidable enough to compel them to fire on the crowds. The total casualties were 24 civilians killed and 204 wounded.⁵² There were also riots in Syria, Trans-Jordan, and Baghdad,⁵³ demonstrating Arab solidarity in spite of the artificial frontiers erected by the colonial Powers. The situation was further aggravated by an announcement by the Jewish Federation of Labour, officially barring Arabs from available jobs.⁵⁴

There was one feature of this last outbreak of Arab violence which was as unprecedented as it was significant. In 1920, 1921 and 1929 the Arabs had attacked the Jews. In 1933, they attacked the Government. The idea that the British authorities in London or Jerusalem were trying to hold the balance evenly between Arab and Jew was now openly ridiculed. They were considered the allies of the Jews, and the enemies of the Arabs. The Mandate was merely a cynical device for promoting British 'imperialism under a mask of humane considerations for the Jews.'⁵⁵ One other point could not be missed—the rapidity with which the trouble had spread. Palestine is a small country, and the Arab leaders, it was clear, already possessed a great measure of control over public opinion. It has been asserted, in justification of their action, that if the police had abstained from firing, a situation as serious as that of 1936 might quickly have developed.⁵⁶ As it was, the prompt repression of the disorders may have tempted the authorities to go on hoping that somehow or other the Mandate might still be made to work without further

bloodshed, that somehow or other the quarrel between Arab and Jewish nationalism could be composed, provided that sufficiently powerful forces were always available.

The Arabs, in this period of tension, were not the only disturbers of the peace. From the beginning of the mandatory regime there had always been a minority-group among the Jews almost as bitterly opposed to the Mandate as the Arab nationalists. They were called 'Zionist-Revisionists,' because they desired the Mandate to be revised so as to include Trans-Jordan within its scope. They repudiated the idea of a Jewish national home only possessing the area between the Jordan and the sea. They claimed, as had Ben Gurion at the 1931 Zionist Congress, that all Palestine and Trans-Jordan should be the national home. If the British Government was not prepared to people the entire area as soon as possible with several millions of Jews, then they demanded the transfer of the Mandate to some other Power that would be so prepared. Party feeling among the Jews had always been vigorous and, despite the progress of the national home and the great increase in immigration, it was running high in 1933. It was widely believed by Jews that the assassination of Dr. Chaim Arlosoroff, a leading member of the Jewish Agency, in June, was an act of Zionist-Revisionist political terrorism,⁵⁷ although Arabs were at first suspected.

In the Arab outbreaks in the autumn, which were directed, as has been seen, against the Government, the Jews were not involved. But on 11 December 1933, soon after their repression, there was a clash in Tel Aviv between a Revisionist gathering and the police who were compelled to charge the mob with batons through a shower of stones. Nobody was killed, but 11 police and 8 civilians were injured.⁵⁸ Unlike previous riots involving Arabs, the police were forbidden to fire on Jewish demonstrators, even if fired on by them. This the Jewish demonstrators knew and therefore they could afford to be more aggressive.

This 'disturbance' was a direct result of an address by Jabotinsky to the second national Revisionist Convention in France, when he declared that "England's presence in Palestine is now a hindrance to our (Zionist) cause; her tactics are a menace to the *Yishuv's* very existence."⁵⁹ He organized, in accordance with his fundamental concept, a world-wide Jewish political offensive of which England would simultaneously be the object and the addressee. Among the addressees were the British Parliament and King George V.⁶⁰

In January 1934 the Municipal Corporations Ordinance was enacted, and in the following months municipal elections were held. In December 1934 a National Defence Party was formed as the political organ of the Nashashibi faction; followed by the creation of three more Arab political

parties, the Palestine Arab Party (Husseinis), the Arab Reform Party and the National Bloc Party.

Also in December 1934, the Jewish Agency for Palestine floated a loan for \$2,500,000 in London,⁶¹ to add to the huge sums being raised in the United States, France, South Africa, Belgium and other countries where the Zionist Organization had consolidated its strength.* This spurred yet another delegation from the Arab Executive to protest to the High Commissioner that sales of land to Jews and Jewish immigration had reached such an extent as to be contrary to the safeguards of Arab rights provided in the Mandate. Many Jews were entering the country illegally in excess of the quota (in 1933 these had numbered 10,376)⁶², but the High Commissioner could only reply with a statement that the Government's policy was to increase the productivity of the land, he was doing what he could to protect Arab cultivators, and that Jewish immigration was not in excess of the absorptive capacity.⁶³

In fact, even though the productivity of Palestine was increasing and the number of Jewish immigrants with capital over \$5,000,** particularly those from Germany, was increasing,⁶⁴ there was a remarkable rise in the adverse balance of trade, from a deficit of LP. 4.3 millions in 1931 to LP. 13.7 millions in 1935.⁶⁵ Previously, when smaller, the trade deficit had been covered by 'invisible exports,' including tourist receipts and British Government expenditure, or more plainly, by the British taxpayer. But despite these economic conditions, American Revisionist leader William B. Ziff was bitterly critical of the Jewish Agency politicians who, 'with their hands out, had set the example in August 1933, by an arrangement for the transfer of German-Jewish capital in the form of German merchandise, thus flooding the whole Near East with German goods. This scheme, which seemingly had the full blessing of the Palestine authorities, resulted in a tremendous fillup to German trade.'⁶⁶

The year 1935 was notable for the growth of the Arab nationalist movement, the emergence of an Arab youth movement, the hardening of Arab opposition to Government and the cooperation of five of the Arab political parties which hitherto had acted independently and often in opposition to each other. The sixth party, the *Istiglal*, remained aloof for the time being.⁶⁷

Minor Government moves conciliatory to the Arabs were useless. An announcement that a Zionist group which had been granted a privileged concession the previous year for the drainage of the Huleh basin had agreed

* The number of registered adherents (*Shekel-payers*) represented at the Zionist Congress at Lucerne in 1935, was 1,216,030; the secessionist Revisionist Organization had an estimated membership of 150,000.⁶⁸

** Jews with capital of over \$5,000 were allowed to enter the country outside the 'immigration quota.' It was overlooked by Government that many were not legitimate cases.

to increase by about one-half the part of the drained area reserved for Arab resettlement, was, to the High Commissioner's mild surprise, greeted with as little gratitude as his announcement in June 1936 of a signal act of clemency. On the occasion of the King's birthday he announced that 14 Arab prisoners, who had been convicted for participation in the disorder of 1929, would be released, and that 22 whose death-sentences had been previously commuted to imprisonment for life would be released in 1936.

In the autumn the situation rapidly deteriorated. In October a large quantity of arms and ammunition, smuggled by Zionists in a consignment of cement from Belgium was discovered at Jaffa port.⁶⁹ This strengthened the Arab belief that the Jews were extensively arming and training to take possession of Palestine by force as soon as they felt strong enough. The Arab press denounced the Government and the Jews. By way of protest a 'strike' was declared for 26 October and widely observed. In Jaffa it excited strong feeling, and a clash with Tel Aviv was narrowly averted.

Early in November 1935 it became known that a 'rebel' band had established itself in the hills of Galilee, pledging to fight for Syria-Palestine liberation. It was under the leadership of Sheikh Izz-ed-Din el-Qassam, a political refugee from Syria with a widespread reputation as a religious leader. The band was cornered by the police near Jenin, and four of its members killed, including Sheikh Izz-ed-Din. A great crowd of Arabs attended his funeral at Haifa, and there was some demonstration and stone-throwing. The Arab newspapers hailed him as a martyr to his nation and his faith. "Dear friend and martyr," said one of them, "I have heard you preach from a platform resting on a sword. To-day... you are, by God, a greater preacher than alive you ever were."⁷⁰

It was exactly twenty years since an Englishman had pledged Great Britain 'to recognize and uphold the independence of all the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca' who was then the spokesman for the Arab nationalist independence movement.

CHAPTER XIV

The Arab Rebellion of 1936-1939 (First Phase) and the Royal Peel Commission

IN 1932 a professional biographer who had been retained by Henry Melchett to write the life of his father, the first Lord Melchett who, like his son, ardently embraced Zionism in later life, visited Palestine. He found the attitude of the Arabs, rich and poor, to whom he spoke optimistic and fatalistic. Of Tel Aviv their view was generally, 'It is built upon sand. Romans and Greeks and others have crossed the Mediterranean and they have come to the edge of our desert, to try and make their civilization here. But always, after bearing patiently with them for a little while, the desert has arisen in protest and it has pressed them back into the sea again. The desert is vast, and if it chooses to breathe, and to move, western civilization falls off its edge, into the water.' Or, 'No immigrant civilization has ever survived on the edge of the desert. The sand will rebel and cast the city of the Jews back into the sea and we shall have peace again.'¹

But by the end of 1935 more and more Arabs were joining those nationalists who were convinced that this fatalistic attitude was a lazy dream, a luxury which no Palestinian could afford, for in 1935 legal Jewish immigration reached the staggering figure of 61,854.² The individualism of the Arabs was transformed by this hard fact into one of unity, and on 25 November 1935 the leaders of the five Arab parties as one body presented a memorandum to the High Commissioner calling for:

(1) The establishment of democratic government.

(2) Prohibition of the transfer of Arab lands to Jews, and the enactment of a law similar to the *Five Feddan Law* of Egypt, also known as *Lord Kitchener's Homestead Exemption Law of 1912*, which gave small cultivators protection against expropriation of their land and livelihood for debt.

(3) (a) The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration until a competent committee were formed to determine the absorptive capacity of the country and to lay down a principle for immigration.

(b) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry

identity cards.

(c) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.³

The first demand was unassailable on grounds of equity. But it was obvious, to neutral British observers, that the remote possibility of conceding the second and third demands would be dependent upon incontrovertible proof that Jewish immigration and land-purchase were definitely injuring the rights and position of the Arabs. An attempted proof would always be met with an avalanche of argument, prepared by Zionist lawyers and economists, alleging that the swelling outlines of the national home movement had not injured the Arabs but benefitted them.⁴ The memorandum was, however, forwarded to the Colonial Office.

The Arabs were waiting for their answer when, on 21 and 22 December 1935, the High Commissioner communicated to Arab and Jewish leaders proposals for the establishment of a legislative council with a non-official majority. For the British this was a development according to precedents established elsewhere in colonies and dominions. The lines had been drawn and specified in 1933 by the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, who had succeeded Sir John Chancellor in 1931: the introduction of self-government by stages, 'first the introduction of non-official members to administrative committees, next the holding of elections for municipal councils under the Municipal Councils Ordinance, and then the establishment of a legislative council.'⁵

The municipal councils were now working with reasonable harmony and efficiency. In Haifa, for example, a mixed Arab-Jewish municipality worked under a Jewish mayor, and in Jerusalem a mixed municipal council worked under an Arab mayor, so the steps of self-government to the national level could not be longer delayed unless Arab-Jewish relations were to change for the worse.

The proposed legislative council would have 28 members: 5 government officials, 2 nominated representatives of commerce, 8 elected and 3 nominated Moslems, 3 elected and 4 nominated Jews and 1 elected and 2 nominated Christians; the President would be an impartial person unconnected with Palestine, and he would neither debate nor vote. There was to be no official majority, and the whole scheme was dependent on the acceptance of three absolute conditions:

- (1) the validity of the Mandate was not to be questioned;
- (2) the High Commissioner would be empowered to legislate in certain circumstances;
- (3) the High Commissioner would continue to determine the labour schedule of the immigration quota.

These proposals were on the same lines as those rejected by the Arabs

and accepted tentatively by the Jews in 1922. Now the balance of power was changed. The Political Commission of the Zionist Congress, meeting at Lucerne the previous autumn, had made its uncompromising attitude quite clear in advance: 'Expressing its grave concern at the intention of the mandatory government to establish a legislative council, a step which it regarded as contrary to the spirit of the Mandate, the Congress reaffirmed its opposition to the establishment of a legislative council in the present stage of the development of Palestine, and reluctantly expressed its categorical rejection of the scheme.' The Zionists also 'appealed to the Government to fulfil its obligations by an active and systematic policy of furthering the Jewish national home on a scale and at a pace demanded by the position of Jews in the world and possibly with active government assistance.'⁶ That is, aiding increased immigration.

Although the proposals were criticized in the Arab press, they were not rejected by the leaders of the Arab parties, and there were indications that Arab public opinion was generally in favour of them. The Arabs were really faced with the dilemma of accepting constitutional proposals whose basis (the Balfour Declaration) they considered to be unconstitutional in the wider sense, and whose acceptance would break their consistency of opposition to a Declaration and policy which they believed to be contrary to promises made to them by the British, or to continue to resist the Mandate policy by protests and non-violence, which had so far won them little or no advantage. The Arabs temporized and said they would 'deliberate on the proposals and present their observations in due course.'⁷ Zionist leaders refused them uncompromisingly and, 'just as happened in 1929, the outbreak of serious trouble was once again to cause the postponement of further progress towards self-government.'⁸

On 29 January 1936, the Colonial Office replied, through the High Commissioner, to the Arab demands of 25 November 1935 that:

- (1) the offer of a legislative council made in December 1935 represented a practical step towards democratic government;
- (2) the Administration intended to enact legislation prohibiting sales of land by Arab owners unless a 'viable minimum' was retained for the indigenous cultivators;
- (3) the rate of Jewish immigration was carefully gauged according to the country's absorptive capacity, and that a new statistical bureau was being established to make the assessment more accurate.⁹

On 26 February 1936 the proposals were debated in the House of Lords, when Lord Snell (who alone had dissented to the findings of the Commission on the Palestine disturbances of August 1929), and Lords Lytton, Lothian,*

* Philip Kerr, a friend of Felix Frankfurter's, and frequent visitor to Weizmann's house

Jessel, Elibank, Mansfield, Melchett, Marley and Cecil, from all parties, were agreed in urging that the scheme should either be 'abandoned for the present or suspended while a Royal Commission inquired into the question on the spot. The Government spokesman, Lord Plymouth, was its only supporter.'¹⁰ At that period, royal commissions sometimes sat on assignments for many years, and their appointment was frequently a parliamentary device for prolonged postponement of meeting a problem and virtually forgetting it. In the House of Commons the result was much the same as in the Lords, in spite of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. J.H. Thomas, who made a chief point in his reply that the Palestine legislative council would have very limited powers, and would not be permitted to discuss the Mandate, the Jewish Agency, or to interfere with immigration. He contended that the representation proposed on the council was fair in proportion to the population of 825,000 Moslems, 100,000 Christians and 320,000 Jews; but his speech was constantly interrupted from all sides of the House, and he had only two supporters.¹¹

The British Government, by making parliamentary acceptance of the proposals a matter of confidence, could have secured their approval in spite of the criticism to which they were subjected,¹² but the setting up of a legislative council in Palestine was rejected in London. 'The debate, indeed, was a striking illustration of the disadvantage which the Arabs suffer whenever the field of controversy shifts from Palestine to the United Kingdom. The Jews are perfectly entitled to make use of all the opportunities at their command for ensuring that their claims are fully understood; but we believe that their own ultimate interests would have been better served if British public opinion could have been confronted from the outset with no less clear and cogent statement of the Arab cause.'

'The Jewish press was jubilant. It went so far as to hail the result as "a great Jewish victory." And that, of course, was how the Arabs looked at it. They were bound to think it an even more conclusive demonstration of Jewish power in London than the MacDonald "Black Letter." The scheme, which in their eyes went only a little way to concede the rights they claimed, had been adopted by the High Commissioner and endorsed by the British Government, only to be rejected by Jewish influence in Parliament. That there might have been some other reason for the rejection seems never to have entered their minds. Inevitably their old hostility to the Mandate and all it stood for was reinforced. More than that, their old fear that the Mandate might ultimately lead to their subjection to the Jews became more concrete

in Addison Crescent, London, as was Lord Cecil. Harry (Lord) Snell, former Labour M.P., was vouched for as a pro-Zionist member of the Shaw Commission by Vladimir Jabotinsky.¹³

and more urgent. They were really to be "swamped", it seemed, and in no long time.¹⁴

At the twenty-ninth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission the British representative was joined by M. Rappard* in giving another reason for the rejection of this measure toward democracy in Palestine. Lord Lugard said: "there was fairly unanimous opinion that the system of secret ballot with restricted franchise and government by debate and majority vote, which had not proved too successful even in some parts of Europe, were quite unsuited to oriental people. If, however, the decision to create a legislative council should be irrevocable, he would like to put a further question in reference to the proposed constitution. It was intended that there should be a large unofficial majority over the Government vote, but experience had shown that a majority which was unable to force a majority decision and did not control the executive staff was a fertile source of friction."¹⁵

Lugard's reference to the lack of success of democracy in Europe seems to be a reference to the growing success of the totalitarian regimes of Germany and Italy. On 10 March 1935 Reichsfuehrer Adolf Hitler had rejected the hated Versailles Treaty and a year later ordered his troops into the demilitarized Rhineland zone. Italy had invaded Ethiopia in October 1935 and on 5 May 1936 Mussolini proclaimed its annexation with King Victor Emmanuel as Emperor. The British representative seems to have been impressed by the success of dictatorships; it may be that the Arabs noted the waverings of Britain, France and the League of Nations when confronted with determined policies backed by force, military or economic, whether from Nazism, Fascism or Zionism.

The abandonment of the legislative council proposals, combined with various other factors, hastened the breakdown of confidence among Palestinians, and the development of an atmosphere in which violence could spread like an epidemic. Soon after J.H. (Jimmy) Thomas, the ex-engine-driver who had been re-elected as a National Labour candidate at the general election of 14 November 1935, had put forward the Palestine legislative council proposals in the House of Commons, heavy insurance was taken out at Lloyds against certain items which appeared subsequently in the budget. The 'leak' was traced to an innocent disclosure which Thomas had made privately, which certain people in 'the city' had exploited. Branded with dishonour, he was forced to resign from the Government, and his son resig-

* William Rappard, a man with deep sympathy for Zionist hopes and endeavours, wrote Weizmann; he 'was a helpful guide to us, and to me in particular, in the inner workings of the League, an intricate labyrinth leading to many dark domains in European and world politics.' Weizmann used to visit M. Orts, another member of the Commission, once or twice a year in Brussels, spending long evenings with him, as he did with Lord Lugard in London or at his home in Surrey.¹⁶

ned from the brokerage firm of Belisha & Co. To replace J.H. Thomas at the Colonial Office, W.G. Ormsby-Gore was once more re-appointed, so that a declared Zionist supporter was again in this key position. But if the pressure of European Zionism was now high in London and Palestine, so also was the strength of nationalism in the other subject territories in the Middle East.

The winter of 1935-36 witnessed a new tide of nationalist agitation in Egypt and in Syria. It was so vigorous and effective at a time when Italian propaganda was conducting a campaign to promote the image of Mussolini as defender of the Arab-Moslem world, that within a few months each country had been conceded a measure of self-government and independence; but not without a struggle. Before negotiations leading to an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance commenced on 2 March 1936, there was a period of constant unrest and rioting, mainly by students in Cairo. In Syria, the growing power of the 'Nationalist bloc' culminated in an outbreak of serious disorder in January 1936, and a strike was declared which lasted for fifty days. On 1 March 1936 the French Government announced its decision to negotiate a treaty.

'These developments in Egypt and Syria were bound to stimulate nationalist-independence agitation in Palestine. The Arab newspapers made the most of such material. At the time of the riots in Cairo, one newspaper called upon its readers to follow the Egyptian example: "Rise to rid yourselves from Jewish and British slavery. . . The leaders in Egypt have awakened. Where are our leaders hiding?" Again, a little later, the students of Palestine were urged: "The time is near and the situation grave. Unify yourselves. Demand your violated rights and stolen freedom. Advance. God is with you." The opening of the Franco-Syrian negotiations, similarly, evoked the strongest expression of sympathy with "our heroic brothers in the northern part of this oppressed Arab country. Syria is to be congratulated. Palestine wishes it success in its national aspirations and in its challenge to the colonizers." It was only to be expected that Palestinian Arabs should thus envy and seek to emulate their successful fellow-nationalists in those countries just across their northern and southern borders.'¹⁷

Of all the Arab peoples in the Middle East, the Palestinians were now the only people who had not attained or were not soon to attain even a limited national freedom. But the memory of the dead freedom-fighter Izz-ed-Din el-Qassam was now the obsession of all native Palestinians, lowering the flash-point when men will rebel against tyranny, however hopelessly, still further. It is generally agreed that the new Palestinian Arab revolt was an unmistakable, mysterious mass-movement among the peasantry.¹⁸ Increasing Jewish immigration, the collapse of the short Palestine boom, and consequent economic distress and unemployment, the feeling that their

common survival was threatened, all contributed to the Arabs' revolt.

'Thus the history of the fifteen years which had passed since the execution of the Mandate was first entrusted to a civil administration had led up to a situation in which almost every factor, both internal and external, prejudicial to a peaceful outcome was stronger than it had been at the outset. It is not surprising in the circumstances that in April 1936 the "disturbances" broke out which occasioned the appointment of the Royal Commission.'¹⁹

There was no Arab military campaign, organized plan of battle, or co-ordinated attack on the occupying Power, but a series of sporadic, spontaneous actions where arms were available, against a background of non-cooperation by nearly the whole non-Jewish population. The British did conduct a military campaign to crush resistance, employing four outstanding commanders, among others, who were each to become Field Marshals and Vicounts in World War II: John Dill, Archibald Wavell, Bernard Montgomery and 'Tubby' Gort, though the last two did not play an important part in the British Palestine campaign.

On 15 April 1936, a number of cars were held up between Nablus and Tulkarm by what was generally believed to be Arab highwaymen, as a result of which three Jewish passengers were shot. The following night two Arabs were murdered near Petah Tiqva as a reprisal.²⁰ The funeral of one of the Jews on 17 April in Tel Aviv led to a series of mob demonstrations and attacks on the Arabs in nearby Jaffa. Rumours spread that a Jewish bid to exterminate Arabs was commencing, and this in turn led to attacks by Arab mobs on Jews. Police and troops dispersed the rioters, curfews were imposed and emergency regulations were brought into force for all Palestine by proclamation.

On 20 April 1936 an Arab national committee was formed at Nablus, apparently unconnected with the previous Arab leadership, and before the end of the month subsidiary national committees had been formed in all Arab towns and large villages.

The Nablus group, joined by the leaders of the five Arab parties in a united front, on 21 April 1936 called for a general strike in which labourers, transport workers, shopkeepers and others were asked to join until the Government accepted the Arab demands of the previous November. On 25 April 1936 a Supreme Arab Committee, subsequently known as the Arab Higher Committee, was established with the Mufti of Jerusalem as President. For the first time perhaps, there was unity between the entire non-Jewish population of Palestine, as Moslems and Christians, moderates and extremists, united in a resolve 'to continue the general strike until the British Government changes its present policy in a fundamental manner, the beginning of which is the stoppage of Jewish immigration.' They also pressed explicitly for the establishment of a national government responsible to a representative

council.²¹ This was a clearer definition of 'the establishment of democratic government' demanded in the previous November.

An appeal made on 5 May by the High Commissioner to the Arab Higher Committee 'to assist the Government in maintaining law and order,' was unsuccessful, and three days later, a conference of the national committees resolved not only that the strike should be continued but that Arabs should refuse to pay taxes. A manifesto issued by the Arab Car-owners and Drivers Committee further called on the Arab Higher Committee to enforce a strike of all Government officials. For this, its president and vice-president were convicted for inciting to disorder and each fined 25 Palestine pounds.²²

The strike proved far more effective than any observers had thought possible, and although the committees declared in favour only of 'civil disobedience' which took the form of passive resistance, nevertheless, as in India, acts of spontaneous violence occurred, such as, the mining and barricading of roads, cutting telegraph wires, derailing trains, and the cutting of the oil pipeline running across northern Palestine to Haifa. Armed bands began to form in the hills recruited from unemployed local youths, as well as from Arab nationalists from the surrounding countries who were prepared to fight anywhere for Arab freedom against foreign domination.

The Arab Higher Committee intimated that 'civil disobedience' must be regarded as an expression of national feeling, and that they could not use their influence to check illegal action or to call off the strike unless Jewish immigration were suspended. The answer to this from the Colonial Office's Ormsby-Gore was the issue on 18 May of an immigration schedule for the next six months of 4,500 immigrants, and on the same day Ormsby-Gore informed the House of Commons that it had been decided 'after order is restored, to advise His Majesty to appoint a Royal Commission which, without bringing into question the terms of the Mandate, will investigate causes of unrest and alleged grievances whether of Arabs or of Jews.'²³ But if the House of Commons and the British people were appeased with the appointment of a Royal Commission, the Arabs were not.

The strike developed into a siege. Jaffa port was put out of action. There were intermittent local demonstrations and assaults on Jews, but the main attacks were against British military personnel. The forces of guerrilla fighters in the hills were swelled by volunteers from Syria and Iraq. Military reinforcements were brought in from Egypt and Malta; but until August, no direct operations were undertaken against them, the troops being used for the defense of key points and the patrolling of roads and railways.

Confident in his belief that force was the way to secure Arab acceptance of British policies, Ormsby-Gore ordered mass arrests of Arab leaders on 23 May, and when this produced no changes, some of the members of the Arab Higher Committee were interned in a concentration camp early in June.

According to the theory that it was a tiny minority of thwarted Arab leaders who opposed British-Zionist policy and promoted unrest, the rebellion should then have collapsed. It did not.

Other measures taken under specially enacted emergency regulations were: The imposition of a collective fine on any village in the vicinity of which an attack had taken place even though there was no evidence that the village in question was actually guilty; the demolition of the best houses in any village suspected of having taken part in an attack; the demolition of any house from the vicinity of which a firearm had been fired;* the forced residence in a specified place of any person suspected of assisting or harbouring rebels.

Among other counter-measures taken by the British Administration was the destruction of a substantial part of the old city of Jaffa. On 16 June 1936, a British plane flew over the old city dropping leaflets notifying the Arab inhabitants that the Government had decided to take advantage of the presence of the Royal Engineers Corps in the country to carry out certain improvements which it described as 'beautifying' measures. These measures called for the demolition of certain parts of the old city and the opening of two main roads to the sea. The leaflets promised the payment of adequate compensation to the owners of the buildings destroyed, and called upon the inhabitants to comply with the law or face the force of Government authority.

The method and urgency with which this 'beautifying' measure was carried out indicated other motives, for only two days later, on the morning of 18 June, the military appeared with machine-guns and boxes of dynamite and began hastily to evacuate the inhabitants and to blow up their homes. Many did not have enough time to remove their belongings, and few knew where they would go after their homes had been demolished.

On 19 June Ormsby-Gore blandly stated in the House of Commons that the situation in Jaffa since the beginning of the disturbances was very serious. He said that the Palestine Government decided to take advantage of the presence of the Royal Engineers Corps in the country to open two main thoroughfares through the filthy parts of the old city to the port area. The Arab inhabitants were notified of the Government's intentions and those whose homes were demolished were given temporary assistance. The area evacuated and demolished had been a nest for lawlessness which the police could not enter. In London, there was no mention of the measures being for 'beautifying' the city of Jaffa.

Government action resulted in the demolition of 220 homes thus rendering about 6,000 persons homeless. At the same time 825 wooden barracks, the

* In one case, the property of a woman Government teacher living alone was destroyed because the Police maintained that the shot had come from the direction of the woman's house. Efforts to save the life-savings of a lonely woman were unsuccessful.

homes of another 4,000 persons, were demolished in other parts of the town.*

On 30 June 1936, a unique incident in the history of British Administration occurred when civil servants protested against the political actions of their Government. A memorandum was submitted to the High Commissioner by senior Arab government officials and judges, condemning the Government's policy and asserting that Arab distrust of its good faith was justified. 'The underlying cause of the present discontent is that the Arab population of all classes, creeds and occupations is animated by a profound sense of injustice done to them. They feel that insufficient regard has been paid in the past to their legitimate grievances, even though those grievances have been inquired into by qualified and impartial official investigators, and to a large extent vindicated by those inquiries. As a result, the Arabs have been driven into a state verging on despair; and the present unrest is no more than an expression of that despair.'²⁴ A similar memorandum was submitted later by 1,200 Arab officials in the Second Division of the public service; and the *Qadis* (Religious Judges) of the Moslem Shari'a courts also

* Under an Order-in-Council of 1931, the High Commissioner could empower the military authorities to destroy any buildings for the purpose of the country's defence. But in the case of the destruction of the old city of Jaffa, no such powers were obtained beforehand.

An Arab inhabitant of the old city applied to the High Court for a rule *nisi* against the order of destruction.

The High Court discharged the rule *nisi*; but it did so on a point of law, namely, that the acts of the Civil Administration, which had employed the military forces, and consequently had been cited by petitioner, were not subject to the 1931 Order-in-Council. In his judgement on the case, Chief Justice Sir Michael McDonnell pointed out: "The Petitioner has done a public service in exposing what I am bound to call the singularly disingenuous lack of moral courage displayed by the Administration in the whole matter. I am not surprised in the circumstances to find that no responsible officer of the Government would affix his signature to the notices" of eviction. The Chief Justice added: "As to their origin, the Junior Government Advocate claims to have been kept in a state of ignorance which is as remarkable as it is profound; and as to their distribution, he declines to say with certainty who is responsible therefor."

Sir Michael continued: "It would have been more creditable if the Government, instead of endeavouring to throw dust in people's eyes by professing to be inspired with aesthetic or other quasi-philanthropic motives, such as town-planning or public health, in the demolition which was contemplated, had said frankly and truthfully that it was primarily for defensive purposes, which one may assume means enabling the forces of the military or the police an easier means of access in the congested quarters of the town in question."

The judgement concluded by stating: "It would be a negation of justice if, in a glaring case of evasiveness such as that before us, this High Court did not speak its mind freely."²⁵ 'Within a few months of delivering the judgment, Sir Michael McDonnell resigned. It was widely asserted, not only in Palestine, that he had been forced to resign because of the action of the Bench in the Jaffa case.'²⁶

presented a memorandum in which the Government's policy was described as 'detestable' and the British authorities warned 'of the revenge of God the Almighty.' It demanded, in conclusion, 'the grant of all the demands of the Arabs and the fulfilment of the pledges given to them.'²⁷

Coming as they did from the most moderate and responsible members of the Christian and Moslem Arab communities, the memoranda from the Administration officials made a considerable impression on local British officials and on the subsequent Royal Commission.²⁸

Into the torrid Palestinian summer the active war between police and troops and the Arab guerrilla bands, and the passive war of nerves between the Administration and the Arab Higher and National Committees, continued. The Administration still hoped resistance would collapse under self-interest and disunity without extra coercion or concessions. The Arab Higher Committee, realizing that this was a climactic moment, was yet divided between the Husseini faction, which looked to the growth of the guerrilla movement to liberate their country, and the rest who feared the prospect of large-scale guerrilla warfare and the death and devastation it was bound to bring: for Britain was still the foremost military Power in the world, consistently spending more on armaments than any other country.

However, with the rising power in Europe of a Germany able to challenge the hegemony of Britain and France, and increasing Italian propaganda in the Levant, the setting up of committees for the defense of Palestine in Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut and Amman could not be ignored by military advisers to the British Government. The personnel* of a Royal Commission was therefore announced on 29 July 1936, without waiting for 'order to be restored' in Palestine.

The Commission was formally appointed by Warrant on 7 August 1936, 'To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to enquire into the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to our obligations as Mandatory towards the Arabs and Jews respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances on account of the way in which the Mandate has been, or is being implemented; and if the Commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence.'²⁹

The prospect of the Royal Commission 'had no effect on Arab opinion.

* Lord Peel (Chairman), Sir Horace George Montagu Rumbold, Sir Egbert Laurie Lucas Hammond, Sir William Morris Carter, Sir Harold Morris and Professor Reginald Coupland, C.I.E.

It was argued, first, that the result of previous enquiries had shown that no recommendations favourable to the Arab cause would be implemented and, secondly, that the terms of reference precluded the Arabs from attacking the Mandate itself on the grounds that it had broken an antecedent pledge.

'Throughout August and September, therefore, the "disturbances" continued. There were two short periods of relative calm while attempts were made to settle the dispute. His Highness the Emir of Trans-Jordan had invited the Arab Higher Committee to Amman on 6 June 1936, and had been informed by them that they were powerless to stop the strike unless Jewish immigration were suspended. Now, on 7 August the Emir repeated his invitation, but the result was no more satisfactory. The next move came from Iraq, Nuri Pasha es-Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, arrived in Palestine on 20 August, having offered his services as an unofficial mediator between the Government and the Arab leaders. The latter welcomed his intervention, and on 30 August the Arab Higher Committee published a manifesto, declaring their willingness to trust to "the mediation of the Government of Iraq and of Their Majesties and Highnesses the Arab Kings and Princes," but that in the meantime "the Nation will continue its general strike with the same steadfastness and conviction which it has shown."

'Throughout these months the Arab forces became more powerful and active. The strength of those in the hills was increased both in numbers and in arms and ammunition; and towards the end of August they were joined by trained leaders from outside Palestine.*

'The activities of individual Arabs or groups became more violent and frequent. Several Jews were murdered. Sabotage of every kind increased. The oil pipe-line running through the Plain of Esdraelon was repeatedly punctured. Roads were systematically mined. Railways were frequently damaged and there was one serious derailment involving loss of life.'³⁰

Towards the middle of August 1936 came reports of certain acts of reprisal by Jews, but these were by comparison few and quickly checked; indeed the Mandatory quickly acknowledged the apparent agreement of the Jews to act in concert with its armed forces against the Arab rebels: 2,800 Jews were enrolled as supernumerary constables, and a number of licences for

* One of these, Fawzi El-Kawukji, a Syrian, had served with distinction in the Turkish army in the war, and after the French occupation of Syria had obtained the *Légion d'Honneur* for his work as an intelligence officer.

On the outbreak of the Druse revolt in 1925 he had joined the rebels and had been sentenced to death; but he escaped to the Hejaz, where he became military adviser to King Ibn Saud. Finally he had obtained a commission in the Iraqi army, which he resigned in 1936. Arriving in Palestine, he appointed himself 'generalissimo' of the rebel forces and issued 'communiqués and proclamations.' Under his leadership the rebels were drilled and instructed in trench-warfare, and they had several sharp encounters with British troops.

rifles were issued to Jews in addition to supplies in sealed armouries which had been permitted for some years in Jewish settlements.³¹

These 'supernumeraries' became quite openly the legal centre of the large illegal military organization, *Hagana*, to which a majority of the male Jewish population belonged. They, in turn, were now allowed to train men within the settlements for the purpose of defense.³²

However, Arab hope at the trend of events was generally bright and was reflected in a corresponding depression among Zionists, who feared that Nuri es-Said had British approval for the proposals he was making. But Dr. Weizmann was in no doubt as to where his support lay, and, on 1 September 1936, addressed a letter to Mr. Ormsby-Gore enclosing a report from the English language daily, the *Palestine Post*, containing terms alleged to have been accepted by the High Commissioner.³³

For their part, the Arab Higher Committee met on 2 September to discuss whether to call a congress of National Committees to consider Nuri Pasha's proposals, but decided to postpone such a meeting until it had received confirmation of his authority to mediate. Shattering blows to the Arabs were soon to follow. On 3 September 1936 one of the most serious encounters of the whole campaign took place between Arab and British troops near Tulkarm, and Arab casualties were very heavy. Next came the publication of Ormsby-Gore's reply to Weizmann stating that the alleged terms had never been accepted by the High Commissioner or by the Government, nor had Nuri Pasha been authorized to give any assurances regarding Arab demands. More troops were also to be sent to Palestine.³⁴ Nuri es-Said, once Emir Feisal's militant supporter in the fight for Arab freedom, returned sadly to Baghdad.

'On 7 September 1936 the Colonial Office issued a 'Statement of Policy.' It outlined the course of the disturbances and described "the situation which had been created" as a "direct challenge to the authority of the British Government in Palestine." It referred to the appointment of the Royal Commission and to the attempts at conciliation from outside, and pointed out that, owing to the Arab leaders determination not to end the strike until "fundamental changes" had been made in British policy, "all efforts to introduce a reasonable spirit of accommodation have hitherto failed." Finally it declared that the state of disorder must be brought to an end without delay, and announced that an additional division of troops was being sent to Palestine with Lt.-Gen. J.G. Dill assuming the supreme military command.³⁵

Reinforcements began to arrive on 22 September 1936, and by the end of the month the number of British troops in the country had risen to about 20,000. These were augmented by the armed police and by units of the Royal Air Force; and an Order-in-Council was issued authorizing the application of martial law, according to which any unauthorized person found possessing

firearms was made liable to summary execution.

'On the one hand, it was evident that the bands could not long resist so large a military force; on the other hand, many of the less politically-minded Arabs were wearying of the long conflict and the personal insecurity and pecuniary sacrifice it entailed. The prospect of not participating in the orange-season, which opens in November, was particularly unpleasant. In this situation, the Arab Higher Committee, which had kept in touch with the Arab kings and princes throughout the disorders, welcomed the arrival of appeals of peace, couched in identical terms, from King Ibn Saud, King Ghazi of Iraq, and the Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. The text read: "Through the President of the Arab Higher Committee to our sons the Arabs of Palestine: We have been deeply pained by the present state of affairs in Palestine. For this reason we have agreed with our brothers the Kings and the Emir to call upon you to resolve for peace in order to save further shedding of blood. In doing this, we rely on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain, who has declared that she will do justice. You must be confident that we will continue our efforts to assist you."

'On 11 October the Arab Higher Committee published this document and announced that with the unanimous agreement of the National Committees they had decided "to respond to the appeal of Their Majesties and Highnesses, and to call upon the noble Arab Nation in Palestine to resort to quietness and to put an end to the strife and disorders."

'These words were obeyed. Work was generally resumed on 12 October. The bands, on which the British troops were now beginning to close in, were permitted to disperse. Cases of sniping and law-breaking still occurred, but the "disturbances" as an organized national movement had ceased. They had lasted six months.³⁶

As in 1933, a feature of the rebellion of 1936, not in common with the disorders of 1920, 1921 and 1929, was the direction of its aim mainly at the Palestine Government rather than at the Jews. The rebellion differed from all previous disorders not only in intensity and duration but in the emergence of two new factors: (a) the support given to it by the Arab officials, and (b) the participation of neighbouring Arab countries both in the provision of arms and volunteers and by the intervention of their governments. The events of 1936 aroused for the first time in the Arab world not merely sympathy with the Palestinian Arabs but strong feelings of antipathy towards Zionism and its defenders.³⁷

However, in the United States, the disorders in Palestine were used to the fullest extent to extract sympathy, support and money for the Zionist Organization. From 1 January to 15 October 1936, \$1,779,454 was raised by the United Jewish Appeal towards a target of \$5,000,000.³⁸

The Royal (Peel) Commission left for Palestine on 5 November 1936. That

day Ormsby-Gore announced in the House of Commons that a suspension of immigration during the course of the Commission's inquiry "would not be justifiable on economic or other grounds." Accordingly, the Arab Higher Committee resolved to boycott the Commission.³⁹ Not until the Commission had heard most of the Jewish and British evidence were letters received by the Arab Higher Committee from King Ghazi and King Ibn Saud, urging it to confront the Commission on behalf of the Arabs. This was accepted.

In March 1937, while the Arabs were awaiting the Royal Commission Report, it was possible to reduce British forces in Palestine to two infantry brigades, and one squadron and one flight of the R.A.F. in Palestine and Trans-Jordan together. The suspension of Arab resistance made this possible, so that British forces could be moved closer to other globally strategic areas where war was imminent, or fighting actually taking place, as in Spain and the Far East. The warships of Britain, France, Italy and Germany were policing the coast of Spain under a flimsy 27-nation neutrality agreement; and on 9 August the Japanese claimed a major victory with the capture of Peking. In all European countries preparations for war were being accelerated including, in Britain, extensive and detailed plans for civil defense, for the evacuation of principal cities, the setting up of emergency hospitals, and so on.

The British, at this period, unlike the Germans or the Russians, did not think of the use of armed force as an extension of means for achieving political ambitions. Instead they found themselves compelled to use force to maintain some policies which had long ceased to be or had never been of advantage to the interests of the British people. This 'muddling through', obvious to the British themselves, was exalted by those responsible, politicians and press, into a virtue. They never acted, only reacted.*

The Royal (Peel) Commission Report (Document 35) surveyed the history of the Palestine situation from early times, as well as that of Zionism. The 1936 rebellion they estimated, had cost the Palestinian taxpayers approximately £P. 3½ million directly, but the country much more indirectly. Casualties had been relatively light among the British forces and Jewish population, but over 1,000 Arabs had been killed by combined forces, and

* This view is confirmed by the statement of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in 1937, his second year of office, when asked by people who were trying to find some bridge of understanding with the Third Reich, to formulate the causes for which Britain would go to war. Eden did so: To defend the integrity of the British Empire, wherever it might be; to protect France and Belgium against attack; the third cause he listed was Egypt and the Suez Canal; and the fourth was Iraq, which supplied much of Britain's oil as well as making a large contribution to world supplies.

the number of wounded was not even guessed at.

The underlying causes of the 'disturbances' were found to be 'the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish national home. Subsidiary factors were as follows:

(1) The effect on Arab opinion in Palestine of the attainment of national independence in other Arab countries;

(2) The pressure on Palestine exerted by Jews throughout the world on account of the sufferings and anxieties of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe since 1933;*

(3) The inequality of opportunity enjoyed by Arabs and Jews respectively in putting their case before His Majesty's Government and public opinion in Great Britain; and the Arab belief that the Jews can always get their way by means denied to the Arabs;

(4) The growth of Arab distrust in His Majesty's Government's ability and will to carry out promises;

(5) Arab alarm at the continued purchase of Arab land by Jews;

(6) The intensive character of Jewish nationalism in Palestine; the "modernism" of many of the younger immigrants; the provocative language used by irresponsible Jews; and the intemperate tone of much of the Jewish as well as the Arab press;

(7) The general uncertainty, accentuated by the ambiguity of certain phrases in the Mandate, as to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Power.⁴⁰

The Arabs 'frankly stated' that they did not rest their case on grievances, but 'that their quarrel is with the Mandate itself. They deny the validity of the Balfour Declaration. They have never admitted the right of the Powers to entrust a Mandate to Great Britain. They hold that the authority exercised by the Mandatory is inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations and with the principle of self-determination embodied in that Covenant. . . It was not to escape oppression but to secure independence that they assisted the British forces and threw in their lot with the Allies. . . The Arabs of Palestine put their trust in the Proclamation which Lord Allenby issued in 1917 in the name of the Governments of Great Britain and France that it was the solemn purpose of the Allies to further the cause of Arab self-determination and to establish Arab national governments.'⁴¹

In view of, on the one hand, 'the Jewish desire to expand and consolidate their position in Palestine as quickly as might be,'⁴² in a Jewish national

* "Economic unrest in Poland," reported Alexander Kahn of the Joint Distribution Committee, "coupled with the persecution of the three million Jews still living there, may soon set off a civil war that will involve all Europe."

There is no record of persecution of Jews in Poland in 1933.

home which had long passed the tentative stage, and on the other hand, an Arab community which, though it had prospered and increased since 1920, was showing a nationalistic and anti-Zionist mood from which it could not be deflected by considerations of material gain, the Commissioners described the Mandatory as being forced to 'govern by arithmetic' in order to attempt a balance of forces.

The Report also contained a summary of the grievances of the Palestine Christians. Monsignor Hajjar, Melkite Archbishop of Galilee, and other Christian leaders, gave evidence before the Commission on their behalf. 'In a written statement supplementing his evidence, Mgr. Hajjar asserted that "the Christians enjoyed privileges during the Ottoman regime which are now abolished." The courts, as also the administrative and municipal councils, had been half Christian and half Moslem. Christian representatives had decreased and were about to disappear owing to Jewish immigration. In former times the vice-president of the municipal council of Haifa was a Christian. He had recently been replaced by a Jew.

'He asserted that the ultimate aim of the Jews was to take possession of the Temple area. He complained that the privileges which the religious heads had inherited from the Ottoman Government had been reduced by the British Administration and quoted as an instance the fact that on one occasion that Administration had forbidden a religious procession from proceeding from one of the Greek Catholic churches to another for fear of trouble from the Jews.

'Yaqub Eff. Farraj, in his capacity as one of the representatives of the Christian Arabs on the Arab Higher Committee, stated that all communities of the Christian Arab population of Palestine were in full agreement with their brethren, the Moslem Arabs, with whom they form a united national entity, as to all their claims and aspirations, whether political, civil or economic. He added that they supported all the statements and complaints which had been made by the members of the Arab Higher Committee to the Royal Commission in connection with the establishment of the Jewish national home and the development of self-governing institutions in Palestine. The Christian Arabs have, in fact, thrown in their lot with their Moslem brethren.'⁴³

The second part of the Report was a survey of the different fields—administration, public security, finance, the land, immigration, education, and other subjects—in which the Administration had tried to carry out its mandate. On each subject they made detailed recommendations, but stressed that these were palliatives. Of Jewish immigration the Commissioners believed that numbers should be regulated not only by 'economic absorptive capacity' but also in accordance with political considerations.

In the third and last section, the Report offered 'drastic treatment' for the problem of Palestine—'An irrepressible conflict between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country.' 'Partition seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace. We can see none in any other plan.'⁴⁴ This recommendation broke with the past assurances of the British to the Arabs that it would not support designs on the integrity of Palestine. Zionists claim that it was thanks to the friendship of Lewis Namier (Bernstein-Namierski) with Professor Coupland, 'the author of the famous 1937 Report of the Peel Commission (the first official British document to bring up the idea of a Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine),' that 'Namier was able to exercise a direct impact on matters of high importance.'⁴⁵

The 'Recommendation for Termination of the Mandate on a Basis of Partition' provided in the main for division of the country between Arabs and Jews, save only for enclaves under a new Mandate covering Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, and ensuring access to these holy places for all the world, and the setting up of two independent states in treaty relations with Great Britain. Under their tentative plan of partition the Jewish state was to comprise the whole of the districts of Haifa and Galilee, and the whole of the maritime plain from Isdud (19 miles south of Jaffa) northwards, with the exception of a corridor of approach to Jerusalem, which would include the Arab towns of Jaffa, Lydda, and Ramle, to remain under Mandate. (See map 6 on page 271).


Simultaneously, a 'Statement of Policy' (Document 36) was issued by the British Government expressing general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Commission. It stated that the Government proposed to take steps, having regard to their treaty obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international instruments, to obtain freedom to give effect to a scheme of partition. As an interim measure, land transactions which might prejudice the scheme would be prohibited, and a total Jewish immigration of 8,000 would be permitted for the eight months August 1937 to March 1938, provided the economic absorptive capacity was not exceeded.⁴⁶

The House of Commons debated the 'Statement of Policy' on 20 July 1937, and resolved that the proposals contained therein 'should be brought before the League with a view to enabling the British Government, after adequate enquiry, to present Parliament with a definite scheme taking full account of all the recommendations' in the 'Statement.'⁴⁷

The Palestine National Defence Party, which had withdrawn from the Arab Higher Committee three weeks previously, published their views on the Peel Report and the 'Statement of Policy' on 21 July 1937, as did the Arab Higher Committee two days later. Both of these documents rejected the

Map 6

PALESTINE – Partition proposed by Royal (Peel) Commission (Map 8 in Cmd. 5479)



proposals for partition and demanded recognition of the Arab right to complete independence in Palestine, the termination of the Mandate, and a Palestinian sovereign state. They also demanded the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land purchases, but declared Arab readiness to furnish guarantees covering the holy places, the protection of all legitimate Jewish and other minority rights, and the safeguarding of reasonable British interests. The memorandum of the National Defence Party further stipulated that the ratio existing between the Arab and Jewish populations should not be altered, and that this principle should be admitted in the Anglo-Palestine treaty which they proposed.⁴⁸

The partition proposals gave rise to a sharp cleavage of opinion among the Jewish parties. At the Zionist Congress in Zurich in the summer of 1937 the Zionist Executive was empowered to enter into negotiations to ascertain the Government's precise terms for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State. A similar resolution was adopted by the Council of the Jewish Agency, but the Agency Executive was directed to request the convening of a conference of Arabs and Jews to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in an undivided Palestine. There is some evidence that before the conference met, these tactics were agreed upon as being the most politic.⁴⁹

In the United States, the Zionists were immeasurably active in bringing pressure to bear on the British Government through both the State Department and non-governmental agencies. Support was given to their position by three American Senators—Warren R. Austin, Royal S. Copeland and Daniel O. Hastings, who had been conducted on a flying visit to Palestine in 1936.* Just before the publication of the Royal Commission Report the United States requested 'an elucidation of the official position' with respect to any change in Palestine which might be proposed in that report.⁵⁰ An exchange of correspondence followed in which the Roosevelt Administration made it plain that any such proposal was a matter which directly concerned them, and a study of the Royal Institute of International Affairs states that

* Austin was to become U.N. ambassador during the partition debates ten years later. 'Copeland, product of the unbending morality of an up-state New York village, bluntly wrote that "there are really two strikes going on in Palestine. One is conducted by Arab terrorists, who throw bombs and snipe at passersby in the streets and highways. The other is conducted silently by the Mandatory Government of Palestine against the proper administration of justice. The prolongation of the terror in the Holy Land is due... to a manifest sympathy for the vandals and assassins displayed by many officers who are sworn to uphold the law... creating a condition which could not but shock any American observer".'

The Zionist line was summed up by Ziff: "Unless the British are the victims of the worst accumulation of circumstantial evidence that ever made white paper appear to be black, the current disturbances, as well as the preceding situations they have been required so busily to police, were created with adroit cunning by themselves."⁵¹

strong pressure was being exerted on the British Government to consider Zionist interests.⁵²

Partition had been denounced by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and by U.S. Senator R.F. Wagner before the Royal Commission's Report was published.⁵³ Dr. C. Weizmann and David Ben Gurion made appeals to S.S. Wise and other leading American Zionists to visit England 'to prevent decisions which might jeopardize Jewish development' in Palestine; while Wise, Louis Lipsky and Rabbi A.H. Silver criticized British rule there.⁵⁴

The objections were based on the conviction that the area put forward for a Jewish state was too small and that 'The whole area of the Dead Sea minerals concession,* operated by the Palestine Potash Company, is to be included within the Arab state. The expropriation of alien-owned oil properties in Mexico gives ample warning of what is likely to happen to this enterprise after the proposed Arab state has been organized. Jewish participation would then depend entirely on the sufferance of the British and their Arab puppet state. Since it would be by far the most valuable asset contained within the boundaries of that state (which will be presumably *Judenrein*), its fate would not be difficult to see.'⁵⁵

In 1929 the French scientist George Claude had asserted that 'a fabulous amount of gold' lay in the Dead Sea, 'the concentration being forty times that of sea water, making its extraction highly profitable. He estimates the actual gold content at ten milliard Pounds.'⁵⁶ That this is not altogether crazy is shown by 'the estimates of British chemists who compute the gold at half this figure or £5,000,000,000.' The Zionists also believed that the Dead Sea made Palestine, 'if it possessed nothing else, wealthy beyond the dreams of avarice through a natural phenomenon which makes it the greatest chemical crucible on earth. From the waters of the Dead Sea alone, the amount

* Zionists charged that Herbert Samuel's interference almost lost the important Dead Sea concession for the Jews. He had deliberately held it up, not considering it seemly that Jews should get such a valuable concession.'⁵⁷

'The Dead Sea concession was obtained originally by a Jewish company through the far-sighted vision of the Zionist engineer Novomeysky... Final approval was only obtained after much wrangling. When it appeared that Novomeysky's faith would ultimately be justified, the French claimed prior title under the old Ottoman Act. To forestall this claim, London backed the Zionist company solidly. (As it was, the French vigorously protested, threatening to take the matter before the International Tribunal at the Hague).'⁵⁸

The concession did not extend to 'gold, silver, precious stones, mineral oils or antiquities;' The Palestine Government was to receive 5 per cent of the bulk value and up to 40 per cent of the net profits. The concession was to run for 75 years. On the board of the Palestine Potash Company were Lords Lytton and Glenconner who leased their names for the sinecure. Incidentally, the concessionaires paid no dividends to the shareholders during the whole period of the Mandate.

of potash, so essential to agriculture and to war, would supply the world with one million tons a year for two thousand years. The Dead Sea holds 2,000 million tons of potassium chloride; 11,900 million tons of sodium chloride; 22,000 million tons of magnesium chloride; 6,000 million tons of calcium chloride; and 980 million tons of magnesium bromide.⁵⁹

Secretary of State Cordell Hull had listened to the plea of a delegation of the Arab National League in February 1937, that the United States should not discriminate against Arabs in favour of Jews in its foreign policy,⁶⁰ but President Franklin D. Roosevelt made no attempt to hide his partiality. On 30 June 1937 he issued a laudatory message on the work of Zionists,⁶¹ and a week later, in a message to the Zionist Organization of America, he denounced the scheme of partition suggested by the Royal Commission as being inadequate.⁶² But not all Jews in the United States favoured extreme Zionist demands. In a leading article in the *New York Times*, Rabbi S. Schulman denied that the British were guilty of failure in controlling the operation of the Mandate and held that Zionism itself was at fault.⁶³

The unpopularity of partition among the Arabs, now faced with the permanent alienation of a part of a land that they considered to be Arab sovereign territory, was signalized by an almost immediate renewal of violence. "The Palestine Arabs," a writer in the Palestine newspaper *Al-Difa'* had said in October 1936, "are recognized as part of the Arab federation and therefore are no longer alone."⁶⁴ An Arab conference at Bludan in Syria, presided over by the Prime Minister of Iraq, Tawfiq as-Suwaidi, expressed its support for the Arab Higher Committee in its rejection of partition and resolved that "we must make Great Britain understand that it must choose between our friendship and the Jews. Britain must change her policy in Palestine or we shall be at liberty to side with other European Powers whose policies are inimical to Great Britain."⁶⁵

In September 1937, General Archibald Wavell succeeded General Dill as General Officer Commanding, Palestine, and the war against the guerrilla fighters was renewed. Among the British troops was a man of thirty-three who had come out as an Intelligence Officer in the autumn of 1936: Orde Wingate. At the Royal Military Academy he had been morose, melancholic, and 'didn't appear to have a friend in the place.'⁶⁶ Within three months of arrival in Palestine he became a Zionist, and by the end of 1937 had persuaded General Wavell to allow him to organize 'special night squads', ostensibly for counter-guerrilla operations against the Arabs. But 'the S.N.S. gradually became what Wingate secretly intended, the beginnings of a Jewish army.'⁶⁷

CHAPTER XV

The Arab Rebellion of 1936-1939 (Second Phase) and the Technical (Woodhaed) Commission of Partition

IN GENERAL, British, Arabs and Zionist Jews viewed the prospect of partition in entirely different ways. The British considered it a good compromise which would enable them to conclude a policy which was proving more and more costly to sustain in military man-power and taxpayers' money and which was turning the sympathy of the Arab peoples away from Britain at a time when Italian and German propaganda were seeking to draw the Arab countries to their side. It was increasing criticism of British imperialism and colonialism in countries of the British Empire, particularly in India. It was a comforting solution which, without a knowledge of the origins of the situation, appeared fair, giving Jews a national home and Palestine Arabs a national independence. This view had been set out in the Government's 'Statement' on the issue as follows:

"In supporting a solution of the Palestine problem by means of partition, H.M.G. are much impressed by the advantages which it offers both to the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs would obtain their national independence, and thus be enabled to cooperate on an equal footing with the Arabs of neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress. They would be finally delivered from all fear of Jewish domination, and from the anxiety which they have expressed lest their holy places should ever come under Jewish control... On the other hand, partition would secure the establishment of the Jewish national home and relieve it from any possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule. It would convert the Jewish national home into a Jewish state with full control over immigration. Its nationals would acquire a status similar to that enjoyed by the nationals of other countries... above all, fear or suspicion would be replaced by a sense of confidence and security, and both peoples would obtain, in the words of

the Commission, 'the inestimable boon of peace'.¹

To the Arabs, partition meant a permanent loss of part of their territory and the forcible transfer of their people from that part, 'For the Royal Commission assumed that provision would be made for the transfer of the greater part of the Arab population in the Jewish state, if necessary by compulsion under a scheme to be agreed upon between both states.'²

To Zionist Jews, partition of Palestine along the lines so far suggested meant a restriction of their ambition to possess the entire area. "Much propaganda work had been accomplished during the preceding six months by (Dr. B.) Akzin here (in London), by (Dr. Wolfgang von) Weisl in Rumania, by (Dr. J.B.) Schechtman in Poland. I actually saw traces of our memoranda being circulated from embassy to embassy, ministry to ministry... Our men have seen *all* the members (of the Mandates Commission)," wrote Jabotinsky. King Carol of Rumania was counted among those 'ready to right any scheme which threatens to curtail the area of the possibilities of Jewish expansion in Palestine,' a result of Zionist 'educational' efforts in a country with the second largest Jewish community in Europe (750,000).³

Though it was obvious that the League of Nations was a hollow body, there was yet hope despite previous experience that its Mandates Commission would produce or suggest an equitable solution. It was from an amendment by Winston Churchill, accepted by the Government during a debate in the House of Commons on 21 July 1937 on the Peel Report and 'Statement of Policy', that the partition proposals were brought before the League.⁴ Churchill's powerful intervention in the policy of his Party was 'indubitably based on the arguments and political material' in an anti-partition memorandum prepared by Vladimir Jabotinsky, and an hour-long conversation before the debate, when he prepared a delaying action on the British Government's scheme.⁵ Mr. Ormsby-Gore, who had formerly been a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, was one of the accredited representatives for Great Britain before the Commission. At the first meeting he said, "An endeavour must be made to consider how best to formulate some scheme for the better government of Palestine in accordance with the spirit of the League and the Balfour Declaration."⁶

The members of the Commission were asked to express an opinion on whether they considered the mandate unworkable.⁷ Two members, Lord Hailey and M. Palacios,* believed it was, and said so. Lord Hailey had had an outstanding experience in imperial administration as a senior member

* Palacios had made himself conspicuous in 1919 by taking part in protest meetings against Jewish pogroms in Argentina.⁸ These followed suppression of a communist revolution led by Pedro Wald, alias Naleskovskij and Macaro Ziazin, both Eastern Jews. In Buenos Aires alone, during the revolution, 800 Argentinians were killed and 4,000 injured.

of the Indian Civil Service, a service which drew many of their most brilliant graduates from British universities by competitive examination. Hailey regarded the Mandate as unworkable, not merely because of the recent passive and armed revolts by the Arabs against it, but because the future political development of Palestine was essentially impossible on the lines which appeared to be implicit in the Mandate.⁹

The seven other members contented themselves with the formula: 'The present Mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with the twofold authority conferred on it by its impartiality and its unanimity, and by the Government of the Mandatory Power itself.'¹⁰

The Chairman, M. Ort, suggested that instead of scrapping the Mandate for independence, there should be substituted two mandates over a territory divided into Arab and Jewish areas to be continued in the hope that, 'as time passed and memories faded into oblivion, a rapprochement might be brought about by the growth of a conviction, which was at present lacking, of the community of material and moral interests of both sections of the population, which undoubtedly existed.'¹¹ But even his knowledge of the persistence of European ethnic and border-territory and border-population disputes should have made him wary at undervaluing the polarity: European Zionism—Arab nationalism, which increased with every Zionist immigrant.

A resolution was passed by the Mandates Commission which agreed in principle to partition, but opposed the immediate creation of two independent states in Palestine or an independent Palestine, favouring instead a prolongation of 'the period of political apprenticeship constituted by the mandate', either in the form of 'cantonisation or of two independent states.'¹²

Before leaving Geneva, Ormsby-Gore sent greetings to the World Zionist Congress, meeting in Zurich,¹³ and the *New York Times* reported indications that he promised changes in the plan for the division of Palestine in exchange for Weizmann's support.¹⁴

On 16 September 1937, the Council of the League of Nations considered the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission and resolved to request the Mandatory Power to carry out 'the study of the problem of the status of Palestine, while concentrating on the solution involving partition of the territory.'¹⁵

The British Parliament had denied Palestine a legislature; now the League of Nations was denying Palestine its integrity. This seemed monstrous to both the Zionist-Revisionists who had come so recently from Russia, Poland, Germany, Rumania and other European countries, and to the Palestinians whose ancestors as far back as the Crusades and before, had lived, loved and died there. From a meeting between Jabotinsky and the *Irgun*

High Command* in Alexandria, Egypt, in July 1937, there had already emerged a decision 'to start preparations for retaliation (against the Arabs), but large scale action was to await a coded message from Jabotinsky.'¹⁶ In contrast, an Arab congress in Bludan, Syria, in mid-September seemed to be content with vociferous support for a speech by Naji es-Suwaïdi, who stressed the solidarity of the Arab peoples against the partition of Palestine and warned the British against supporting it.¹⁷

When, according to Zionist accounts, Arabs murdered three Jews in early September 1937, '*Irgun's* counter-attack cost the lives of thirteen Arabs.'¹⁸ On 26 September 1937, the British Acting District Commissioner, L. Andrews, and his British police escort were ambushed and killed in Nazareth by persons unknown; the Assistant District Commissioner, Christopher Perie-Gordon, who was with Andrews at the time, miraculously escaped unhurt. *The Times* held that the murders indicated the failure of the mandate. Whether or not the assassins were Arabs, 106 prominent Arabs were immediately arrested.¹⁹ The second phase of the Palestine Arab rebellion had begun.

The Officer Administering the Government declared the Arab Higher Committee and all the National Committees to be unlawful associations, five of the principal Arab leaders were arrested and deported to the Seychelle Islands while others fled the country. Haj Amin El-Husseini was deprived of his office of President of the Moslem Supreme Council and of membership of the General *Waqf* (religious foundations with funds amounting to LP. 60,000 annually) Committee, of which he was chairman. Haj Amin avoided arrest by moving to the *mosque of Omar* area, the sanctity of which could not be violated by British troops without causing extreme Moslem resentment. Due notice of impending trouble was given to the Mufti by a Swedish member of the American Colony in Jerusalem, who had received from a British source a warning which he was apparently expected to pass on to enable Haj Amin to leave his home outside the city walls for the safety of the *Haram Esh-Shareef* area in the Old City.** Although virtually a prisoner, he was able to continue his political activities† without interference from the British Government.

* Headed by Robert Bitker, former head of the Jewish self-defense force in Shanghai and Jabotinsky appointee, and his lieutenants, Moshe Rosenberg and Abraham Stern. Delegations of the Palestine New Zionist Organization and illegal immigration groups were also present. Late in October 1937, Bitker was replaced by Rosenberg. Although Jabotinsky expressed in private grave doubts as to the moral aspect of indiscriminate killing of Arab men, women and children, he said to Rosenberg: "I can't see much heroism and public good in shooting from the rear an Arab peasant on a donkey, carrying vegetables for sale in Tel Aviv." He favoured multiple reprisal over self-restraint (*havlaga*).²⁰

** This statement was divulged to the authors by the Swedish gentleman himself in 1960.

† It is difficult for those brought up in a tradition of separation of Church and State to

A few weeks later, Haj Amin left Jerusalem in disguise and reached Lebanon by fishing boat.

In accordance with Turkish precedent, accepted by the Mandatory Power as the *status quo*, the office of Grand Mufti is for life, and the British were therefore unable to deprive Haj Amin of it. The Palestine Government appointed a commission with a British judge as chairman to administer the *Awqaf* in place of the Moslem Supreme Council and the General Waqf Committee.²¹

Ironically, military courts were established on 11 November 1937, nineteen years after the armistice, for the trial of offences connected with the discharge of firearms at any person, the carrying of arms, both punishable by death, and causing sabotage and intimidation.*²² Prominent Arab residents

accept the Mufti's involvement in politics. But separation is something of an historical novelty. In the 1950's an analogous position taken in political questions by Archbishop, and later President, Makarios of Cyprus, in the Greek Orthodox Church the *Ethnarch* (leader of the people) was a focus of hostility for some of those who did not appreciate this fact. In the current 'social doctrine' of church and synagogue, there is a turning back to a commitment to political and state affairs.

- * On 22 November 1937 Sheikh Farhan es-Sa'di was the first man to be executed by order of these military courts. A man of about eighty years, he was found hiding in a barn following a local skirmish between British troops and Arab insurgents. When questioned as to whether he possessed any firearms, he replied that he did have an old rifle which was hanging on the wall of his home. He was arrested and, following a trial which lasted about three hours, was summarily sentenced to death by hanging. Throughout the trial, Sheikh es-Sa'di remained calm and refused to answer any questions, while several self-appointed Arab defence lawyers tried to save his life on the grounds that he was not caught in the act of firing the rifle and had willingly indicated where it was to be found; furthermore, the accused was too old to take part in military action. But possibly, because he was a sheikh, the military decided to make his case an example to others fighting British authority.

Sheikh Farhan's summary trial and execution had the opposite effect on the Arab population, especially because, under Moslem custom and tradition, no man over seventy years of age was ever sentenced to death and no execution of a condemned man had ever been carried out during *Ramadan*, the month of Fasting. That Sheikh Farhan was sentenced and executed without regard to his age and the holiness of *Ramadan*, inflamed Arab feeling against the British still further and sent many a young man into the hills to fight British 'oppression'.

The law was soon also to be used to avenge feuds between certain Arab families: a fire-arm or some ammunition would be 'planted' in the yard or home of the other family and then word sent to the military authorities that that man possessed a gun, with the result that many innocent people were hanged because they could not prove that it had been placed on their property without their knowledge.

According to official sources, 54 death sentences were confirmed by the General Officer Commanding during 1938; and in 1939, a further 55 death sentences were confirmed, making a total of 109 persons (all Arabs) executed under the Emergency Regulations.²³

suspected of complicity in the disorders were without redress when 'their homes and goods were blown to smithereens' by charges of dynamite set by British troops.²⁴ When the airport at Lydda was damaged, a row of Moslem houses in the vicinity were officially dynamited in reprisal. 'Collective fines running into huge amounts were levied on entire villages without the slightest inquiry or proof of guilt.'²⁵

Establishment of the courts, however, did not prevent, 'after much heated debate and soul-searching,' a 'spectacular' attack on Arabs in Jerusalem by *Irgun* on 14 November. The Jewish Agency denounced 'these reprisals', but when twenty Revisionists implicated in the action, including Jabotinsky's son Eri, were arrested and interned in Acre prison, Jabotinsky's reaction was: "The tendency of the Jews to hit back cannot be stopped by arrests and imprisonments; I personally feel very proud that my son is among the arrested." (But as 'a typical nineteenth century liberal, he considered human life as sacrosanct' and for some time remained upset by the deaths of innocent Arabs. Following 'a series of bloody reprisals by *Irgun*,' he asked one of their *officiers de liaison* in Europe: "How can your *Irgun* people throw bombs in Arab quarters at random, indiscriminately killing women and children? You must at least warn the Arabs in time to evacuate the sections where you are going to retaliate.")²⁶

Sir Charles Teggart, who had a reputation for effective police measures in India, was brought in to assist the Government in taking steps to combat 'terrorism'. He devised a system of about 65 military-police forts strategically situated across the country, and the 'Teggart Line', a barbed-wire entanglement six feet high and six feet deep, strung on stakes set in concrete, along the borders with Lebanon and Syria from the Mediterranean as far as Lake Tiberias. The 'Line' was however, ineffective, and many kilometers of its wire were soon offered for sale in the markets of Lebanon and Syria.

At the League of Nations Assembly toward the end of 1937, the 'Peel partition plan' was bitterly criticized. Dr. C. Lange of Norway demanded the inclusion in the Jewish state of the strategic areas over which Britain proposed to retain control. Poland's delegate, M. Komarnicki, made it plain that his Government would agree only if the proposed Jewish state were to get an area large enough to make it economically sound, and capable of absorbing a compact Jewish immigration. On this position he was backed by the representatives of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania). Uruguay, Lithuania, Latvia and Haiti joined in demanding that if the Jews were to be given a state, it should be a state in fact, and not the makeshift proposed by Great Britain.*

* By early 1937, a pressure of world public opinion on behalf of the refugees from Germany had been built up to such a degree that an international conference was called and resul-

In the newspapers of the participating countries, however, news of their delegates' speeches on Palestine was given little if any space. It was needed to report the horrors of Spaniard killing Spaniard while the warships of Britain, France, Germany and Italy patrolled the coasts of Spain under a 27-nation neutrality agreement; on 9 August the Japanese had strengthened their position in the Far East with the capture of Peking; and on 6 November 1937, Italy joined in the anti-comintern pact which Germany and Japan had signed the year before. Most industrialized countries were preparing for war.

On 4 January 1938, a dispatch was published from the Colonial Secretary announcing a Government decision to send a technical commission to Palestine whose functions would be 'confined to ascertaining facts and to considering in detail the practical possibilities of a scheme of partition.' Detailed terms of reference were given, but the Colonial Secretary stated that he wished to make clear that the Government was not committed to approval of the particular plan of partition tentatively proposed by the Royal Commission and 'in particular that they have not accepted the Commission's proposals for the compulsory transfer in the last resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area.' He added that if, as a result of the investigation of the technical commission, a scheme of partition was regarded as equitable and practicable by the Government, it would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations for consideration.²⁷

The Partition Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead, arrived in Palestine on 27 April 1938 and stayed until 3 August. No Arab witnesses came forward.

Meanwhile the Arab rebellion gained strength. More young men joined the small armies in the hills, and their warfare gradually developed in organization and effectiveness; the roads became unsafe for use by their enemies and the economic and social life of the country was seriously disrupted. According to the British account, the campaign received its momentum from the political leaders who had found refuge in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, and from their supporters in those countries; arms and money were smuggled

ted in the appointment of an office of high commissioner of the League of Nations with the specific charge: "to solve the problem of transporting and resettling refugees." This organization, under George Rublee, undertook a series of negotiations with the German authorities to this end.

An inter-government committee composed of representatives of ambassadorial rank from 32 countries under the chairmanship of Lord Winterton was established and another body in the United States known as the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, the first chairman being James G. McDonald, later first ambassador to Israel. Acting in an advisory capacity to all these bodies and coordinating them was Myron C. Taylor, Roosevelt's personal representative at the Vatican.²⁸

across the frontier into Palestine. 'The great majority of Arabs who had hitherto been prominent in the life of the country and who had not either been deported, excluded from Palestine or detained under emergency regulations, found it prudent to leave; any who remained and attempted loyalty to Government or refused assistance to the rebels were subjected to intimidation, abduction and assassination; pressure was brought to bear in particular on village *mukhtars* (headmen) and police personnel, some of whom paid with their lives for their connections with Government.'²⁹ Those suspected of collaboration with the enemy, however honourable their intentions, were always subject to reprisals.

During the first half of 1938 the Jews, of whom about 5,000³⁰ were enrolled in the police force, were in general cooperative with the British. But from the end of June the Jewish attitude in all sections of the community underwent a change following the conviction by a military court of a Revisionist youth, Shlomo Ben Yoseph (his name in Poland was Shlomo Tabacznik), who had fired on an Arab bus and was caught with two other members of the colony of Rosh Pinah in possession of bombs and revolvers; the sentence of death was carried out on 29 June and was the cause of angry Jewish demonstrations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, where the Union Jack on the Government offices was pulled down.* These demonstrations were followed by further acts of violence by Zionists and Arabs. On 6 and 25 July bomb explosions in the Arab fruit market at Haifa caused the death of 74 Arabs and injury to 129 others; there were bomb outrages in Jerusalem and Jaffa.³¹ The Samaritan Jews of Nablus denounced Zionist Jewish attacks on innocent Arabs.³²

During this period, the new Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, the son of J.M. Ramsay MacDonald, went incognito to Palestine to see the situation for himself. His appointment on 17 May 1938, following Ormsby-Gore's elevation to the peerage, had given the Arabs no new hopes, for during his first speech in the House of Commons in 1930, he is reported to have said that if the Balfour Declaration had not been given in 1917 it would be given 'now.' As a declared Zionist sympathizer, therefore, it seemed that British Palestine policy had been entrusted to hands which would not seek to unravel it. He refused to answer letters requesting an interview from Dr. Izzat Tannous, the secretary of the Arab Palestine Office, (later called

* At the urging of Jabotinsky, the influential Conservative M.P.s, Vivian Adams and Sir John Haslam, unsuccessfully intervened with M. MacDonald on 28 June. Following the execution, a monster protest and memorial meeting in London was addressed by J. Wedgwood, Prof. A.S. Yehuda, Horace Samuel, and the Revisionist Mordecai Katz. In a confidential talk with Eliahu Colomb on 10 July, Jabotinsky told him: "If I were a terrorist in Eretz Israel, I would have felt the urge, after Ben Yosef's trial, to do something against England. In this case the Arabs have not given any reason for action against them."³³

the Arab Centre,) which had originally been set up in London in 1936 by Miss Frances Emily Newton and a group of British friends of the Arabs. When, however, Tannous took the advice of Col. Clifton-Brown, M.P., by writing from his London hotel and not from his office, he obtained an interview with MacDonald. When Tannous told him frankly how sorry the Arabs were at his appointment, MacDonald warmed a little to this candour, and told Tannous that he favoured existing pro-Zionist British policy, "But if you can convince me that it has been wrong, I am willing to change my views." His visit to Palestine, like that of Northcliffe in 1921, may have helped the change which followed.

'On 24 August 1938 the British Assistant District Commissioner in Jenin (S. Moffatt) was assassinated in his office, and in September the power of the rebels reached its climax; there was a large increase in abductions and a studied concentration on the destruction of Government buildings and property and on the seizure of armouries in outlying police posts. On 9 September Beersheba was raided by a large Arab force which broke into the prison, released the prisoners and raided the police station; later in the month all police and Government buildings in Beersheba were set on fire and destroyed.'³⁴

The continuing effect of events in Palestine on Arab and Moslem opinion in general was underlined by a 'World Inter-Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Moslem countries for the Defence of Palestine' held in Cairo in 1938. Cairo was at that time not the centre of Arab nationalism, but conveniently situated geographically for such a meeting; the Egyptians at one time did not consider themselves as Arabs; in May 1933 Egypt had admitted 200 exiled Jewish doctors and lawyers from Germany³⁵ who had been followed by other Jewish refugees; and in November of that year the Palestine Arab Youth Organization had complained to the Egyptian Prime Minister of the lack of cooperation by Egypt with the Palestine freedom movement.³⁶ This Congress was not convened quite so precipitously as was the Bludan conference held the previous year, and was more representative of Arab and Moslem opinion. It repeated that Britain should choose its friends carefully in view of the imminence of war. It also served notice on the governments of the Arab states that the cause of the Palestinian Arabs was their own and should be so regarded.

The Zionists too, felt that they must fight harder. But not in the hills and valleys of Palestine—they were not ready for that—but in the homes of the influential in Britain and America, and in the foreign offices of the world. A 'World Conference for Palestine' was organized in New York to rally sympathizers, Jewish and non-Jewish, and to provide a platform with an impres-

sive title from which Dr. Weizmann could declare his opposition to British partition schemes, and any curbs on Jewish immigration to Palestine.³⁷ It is likely that this was part of a campaign to discount the imminent report of the Woodhead Commission, of which Weizmann was doubtless fully informed. Public interest in America was stimulated by this and other devices, such as the planning of a Palestine pavilion for the New York World's Fair by the Zionist Organization of America, which Lloyd George was invited to open.³⁸ Even discarded, discredited J. Ramsay MacDonald reached a press headline by recalling pledges to support a Jewish State in Palestine.³⁹

In October 1938, Roosevelt and Cordell Hull were 'deluged with pleas' by individual Zionists and Jewish organizations to support Zionist aims, and Justice Louis Brandeis had a special conference with Roosevelt on the subject,⁴⁰ made more urgent by a rumour that Hitler was preparing to demand abandonment of the whole mandate system.⁴¹ While the Polish Government, which had opposed reduction of Palestine immigration schedules in 1936,⁴² announced that it would use its influence to aid Jews in this and other ways.⁴³

In October also, Major Orde Wingate went to London, at Dr. Weizmann's cabled request telling the authorities he had to attend to urgent personal affairs.⁴⁴ He had established the headquarters of his British-officered Jewish Special Night Squads (S.N.S.) at Ein Harod. General Haining, however, who had succeeded Wavell as General Officer Commanding in May 1938, not only had reservations about the wisdom of the S.N.S. policy, opposed as it was to the general British policy of avoiding any line of action which could bring Jews and Arabs into armed conflict, but had his doubts about allowing a junior officer such independence of the general command.⁴⁵ Wingate showed that independence by leaving Palestine without waiting for official leave, 'but Dr. Weizmann's message left him no alternative. In a fateful hour for the future of Zion and Jewry he wanted to do what he could to influence the men in power.'⁴⁶

Immediately following his arrival in London and conversations with Weizmann, he set about meeting key men like Malcolm MacDonald, Professor Harold Laski, Sir Lewis Namier (Bronstein-Namierski), Lord Beaverbrook and Winston Churchill, with the object of bringing other 'persons of political consequence to the belief that only through a Zionist policy could the British Government find a road to permanent tranquility in Palestine.'⁴⁷ The Churchill meeting took place on Churchill's birthday, 30 November, at the celebration given for him every year by Venetia Montagu, the widow of the Jewish anti-Zionist Cabinet Minister Edwin Montagu, and was arranged by Lord Rothschild, a close friend of the widow. It was apparently a great success.⁴⁸

The Secretary of State for War was now Mr. L. Hore-Belisha, a Jew who aspired to be another Disraeli. He was an extremely active man and

must have been concerned in the decision, when the Munich crisis was over, to send massive reinforcements to Palestine. Not only was this a way of crushing the rebellion by sheer weight, but a means of giving as many troops as possible combat experience. The Arabs always faced a mixture of fresh and experienced troops, and there was now no longer an excuse for Wingate's units. On being transferred, he addressed the assembled British and Jewish squads in English urging their continued cooperation, but added in Hebrew "I am sent away from you and the country I love. I suppose you know why, I am transferred because we are too great friends. They want to hurt me and you. I promise you that I will come back, and if I cannot do it the regular way, I shall return as a refugee."⁴⁹

There is no evidence that the Palestinians received any kind of material assistance from Italy or Germany. The Arabs had for many years been antipathetic to the Italians because of their imperialism and colonialism in Libya, Somaliland and Ethiopia. The Italian radio station in Bari had broadcast programmes calculated to encourage hostility to Britain, but following an Anglo-Italian agreement on 16 April 1938, Germany predominated in this field, broadcasting accounts of British 'atrocities'.^{*}

The report of the Partition (Woodhead) Commission was presented to Parliament and published on 9 November 1938 (Document 37). Three alternative plans—that of the Royal Commission Report, Plan A and two others dubbed B and C—were examined. The majority of the Commission put forward Plan C as the best they were able to devise. (See map 7 on page 287)

* Shortly after the First World War, Weizmann had visited Mussolini to whom he told something of the Zionists' plans and intentions. Mussolini was interested to hear that much of their Palestine immigration went through Italian ports and that they 'had extremely friendly relations with the Lloyd Triestino.' Mussolini then spoke of England and insinuated that Zionists were merely a pawn in Great Britain's power game. Weizmann replied that there would certainly be a chair of Italian language and literature at the Hebrew University and that they greatly admired the Italian civilization.

Before the Rome-Berlin Axis had been formed, Weizmann paid a second visit to Mussolini and toured the Italian-Jewish communities. Mussolini said "he had been delighted to learn that the Zionists in Jerusalem were on excellent terms with the local Italians: also, that our colonies were making good progress." Weizmann believed that his visit was followed by a more pro-Zionist tone in the Italian press. His third interview, arranged by Count Theodoli, whom the Zionists, because of his relationship with the Sursocks, had called pro-Arab, also took place before close relations had been established with Germany. Mussolini 'was extremely affable, and talked freely of a Rome-Paris-London combination' and of the Italian need for pharmaceuticals which the Jews could produce in Palestine. In this case he seems to have been using Weizmann and Zionist influence as an intermediary with the British Government.⁵⁰ A Jewish naval school established by the illegal immigration organizations in Civitavecchia, Italy,⁵¹ was obviously supported by the Fascist state in which, until 1938, 'anti-Semitism was practically unknown.' Several Jews were prominent in the Fascist inner circle.⁵²


This suggested division of Palestine into three parts:

- (1) a northern part to be retained under the Mandate,
- (2) the Negeb to be retained under the Mandate, and
- (3) a central part to be divided into an Arab State, a Jewish State, and an enclave around Jerusalem.

However, the commissioners concluded that, 'apart from the question whether Plan C, which is the best plan that the majority of us have been able to devise, will be accepted by those concerned, the financial and economic objections to that plan, without a customs union between the three areas, are so serious that we could not recommend it. If, therefore, we were to confine ourselves strictly to our terms of reference, we should have no choice but to report that we have been unable to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States.

'Rather than end our report with this merely negative conclusion, however, we have ventured to go further and put forward a suggestion for a modified form of partition, which we shall call economic federalism, which, while it withholds fiscal autonomy from the Arab and Jewish States, seems to us, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis of settlement, if His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the very considerable financial liability involved.'⁵³ This would amount to more than '£P.1,000,000 to begin with. The best we can hope for is to find an arrangement which will enable these deficiency grants to be provided in the manner least open to constitutional objections.'⁵⁴ This projected burden on the British taxpayer must be seen beside the British grants-in-aid which were always, under the Mandate, a feature of Transjordan's public finance.⁵⁵

On the probability of a forcible transfer of Arabs resulting from partition, the Woodhead Report stated: "The Royal Commission assumed that provision would be made for the transfer of the greater part of the Arab population in the Jewish state, if necessary, by compulsion under a scheme to be agreed upon by both states. But in his (W.G. Ormsby-Gore's) dispatch of the 23rd December, 1937, your (Malcolm MacDonald) predecessor made it clear that H.M.G. have not accepted the proposal for compulsory transfer; and we have found it impossible to assume that the minority problem will be solved by a voluntary transfer of population. It is largely because of the gravity of the situation that would thus be created that we have felt obliged to reject the Royal Commission's plan, under which at the outset the number of Arabs in the Jewish state would be almost equal to the number of Jews. But, it may be said, if it is wrong in principle to put nearly 300,000 Arabs against their will under the political domination of the Jews under the Royal Commission's plan, how can it be right to do the same with 50,000 Arabs under Plan C? The ethics of this question are certainly very difficult to determine."⁵⁶



The Report of the Royal Commission and the 'Statement of Policy' issued with it agreed 'that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution to the deadlock.'⁵⁷ Now Woodhead's Technical Commission reported on their inability to devise a scheme of partition which would produce viable parts.

There was one loose-leaf left in the British book of precedent as to what to do when you have no policy—talk. A 'White Paper'—*Palestine: Statement by His Majesty's Government* (Document 38), issued simultaneously with the Partition Commission's report, announced the conclusion of the Government that the examination by the Commission had shown that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable.⁵⁸ The British Government would therefore continue their responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine, and were prepared to make a determined effort to promote an understanding between the Arabs and the Jews. They proposed immediately to invite representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of neighbouring Arab States, on the one hand, and the Jewish Agency on the other, to confer with them in London regarding future policy, including the question of immigration into Palestine. The admission of other Arab states as parties to the conference was, however, a departure from British precedent, previous policy having denied any community of Arab interests. This inclusion was no doubt due to the conciliatory role and peace appeals made to the Arab Higher Committee by King Ibn Saud, King Ghazi of Iraq and Emir Abdullah in October 1936.

However, the right to refuse to receive those Palestinian leaders whom the British Government had been led to believe were responsible for the campaign of so-called assassinations and violence, was reserved. Subsequently, for example, the Secretary of State announced in the House of Commons that the Mufti of Jerusalem would not be accepted as a delegate. It was stated further in the 'White Paper' that, if the London discussions did not produce agreement within a reasonable period of time, the Government would take their own decision in the light of their examination of the problem and of the discussions in London, and announce the policy which they proposed to pursue. In considering and settling their policy, H.M.G. would keep constantly in mind the international character of the Mandate and their obligations in that respect.

Arab and Jewish critics were united only in complaining that the Woodhead Commission and the 'Statement of Policy' thereon had no policy to state.

The Arabs were gratified that partition had been abandoned and the neighbouring Arab countries had been invited to participate in discussions, but they were displeased that immigration and land sales were not to be stopped during the discussions, and that the Mufti was to be excluded from the proposed conference. The abandonment of partition meant that the Zionists could concentrate on more immigration and land acquisition, but in case it should come up again, the Jewish Agency declared for the record that the Commission's proposals excluded some Jewish settlements from the 'Jewish State', and the most important area of colonization.⁵⁹ The Zionist General Council deplored the lack of understanding of 'Jewish homelessness and the deep Jewish tragedy' shown by the Woodhead Commission.⁶⁰

From America, Zionist pressure on British policy was kept up through solicited statements from political leaders eager to retain Zionist goodwill. President Roosevelt and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, a friend of Felix Frankfurter, expressed 'their deep and continuing concern for Jewish efforts to build a national home.' "With cruel pressure against Jews in Europe unrelaxed and access to Palestine no easier," Secretary Ickes told a Zionist gathering in January 1938, "the need for a viable Jewish homeland in Palestine is greater than ever... The enemies against whom you are forced to contend are not so much your enemies as the enemies of all human progress... As the darkening shadows lift from a troubled world, the sun will also rise over Palestine, and law shall again go forth from Zion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem."⁶¹ In the American Congress, Representative Hamilton Fish introduced a concurrent resolution on 12 May 1938 demanding that Great Britain lift its 'unjust and inhumane' restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine.

International Zionism had now secured such recognition that its convention in Prague, which commenced on 31 January 1938, was attended by many foreign diplomats; and on 3 February, accompanied by Dr. Oscar K. Rabinowicz, Vladimir Jabotinsky was received at the Hradcin Castle by the President of Czechoslovakia Eduard Benes and was promised support for an international conference on Jewish emigration.⁶² On 22 March the World Jewish Congress asked the League of Nations to maintain the minority treaties which they had worked so hard for at Versailles in 1919,⁶³ but the European structure erected at the Peace Conference was fast disintegrating with the rising strength of German nationalism.

In Germany, 'acts of violence by the uniformed Nazi Storm Troopers (Brown Shirts) against Marxists and Jews which were reported abroad with world-wide repercussions' in 1933,⁶⁴ had given rise to less evident forms of pressure on Jews to leave Germany, although on 24 February 1938 Hitler

warned Jews agitating against Germany.*⁶⁵ Renewed emigration after the German *anschluss* with Austria on 11 March was, however, preponderantly to the Americas and to Britain, where they were warmly welcomed, although Lord Beaverbrook warned against the impact of their influx on the character and economy of the country.⁶⁶

The Jewish situation in Germany became more critical, when on 7 November 1938, a Polish Jew, Herschel F. Grynszpan (Greenspan), shot and killed a German diplomat, Ernst vom Rath, in the German Embassy in Paris.⁶⁷ Although the Reich Jewry executive deplored the shooting, outbreaks of popular violence against Jewish property in Germany resulted; shops were demolished and synagogues burned. Feelings ran so high that on 10 November Reichsminister Dr. Joseph Goebbels publicly called for an end to the demonstrations, and warned the crowds against looting.**⁶⁸

The explosion of violence in Germany set off new anti-German detonations of indignation in the world's press. On 17 November Roosevelt conferred with Secretary Frances Perkins and agreed that U.S. aid to the Jews was to be fiscal because immigration quotas were filled.⁶⁹ For the first time the Italian press attacked Roosevelt, saying that he was of Jewish stock.⁷⁰ Weizmann visited Anthony Eden and said: "The Powers which stand looking on without taking any measures to prevent the crime will one day be visited by severe punishment."⁷¹ War preparations throughout the world were intensified.†

* National Socialist actions inimical to Jewish objects were not unrelieved. On 19 January Julius Streicher's anti-Jewish newspaper *Der Stürmer* was seized for attacking the Exchange Control Administration for granting exchange to Jews to attend educational institutions in Switzerland; and a special issue on 21 January urging death for racial crimes, resulted in a week's ban on publication.⁷²

** On 8 November, Hitler had specifically blamed the Jews for Germany's post-war economic collapse,⁷³ adding to popular anti-Jewish feeling. Reporting on damage to Jewish property and a fine imposed on the Jews of one billion Reichsmarks, it was estimated that Jews owned 60 per cent of Berlin real estate.⁷⁴

† Hitler, seemingly ill at ease in the face of world-wide repercussions to the events of 9 November, declared he had no objection to the scheme suggested by Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, whereby all Jewish property in Germany should be brought into a trust company. The Jews would be represented on the international governing committee. With the property as security, the committee would issue an international loan of one to one and a half billion Reichsmarks, carrying interest of five per cent, and repayable in dollars by annual instalments over a period of twenty to twenty-five years. Interest and repayment would be guaranteed by the German government. From the loan, 'every Jew wishing to emigrate will receive a certain sum which will facilitate his reception in another country and serve as a foundation on which to build a new life.' Hitler authorized a political discussion in London which took place from 14 to 17 December 1938 with Lord Bearsted, of Samuel and Samuel, bankers, Mr. Rublee, American chairman of the so-called Evian Committee, and Lord Winterton, British Minister.⁷⁵ Commenting on the scheme, Montague Norman, then governor of the Bank of England,

Debates in the House of Commons on 24 November and 8 December, 1938 once more revealed 'the various forces influencing the British Government in regard to Palestine.'⁷⁶ Perhaps it was for this reason that Weizmann called Orde Wingate to London. There was criticism of the Government for its inability to produce an effective policy, but for obvious reasons no effective policy could be generally acceptable. The Secretary of State for the Colonies recognized that a 'strong' policy (the massive intervention of British troops) could 'restore order', but not peace, and the British must at last realize that the argument that Jewish immigration brought material gains to the Arabs was of no avail against Arab nationalism, which genuinely feared Jewish domination. Compromise from both sides was essential for any settlement, and the British Government could not give up its efforts to reach a settlement for the alternative would mean the locking up of a great part of the British army in Palestine indefinitely.⁷⁷ In the House of Lords, Herbert Samuel's speech suggested that he was now awakened to these realities, stressing, "The Arab movement exists; it is a reality and not an artificial creation fostered by British timidity and foreign intervention."⁷⁸ To the consternation of the more extreme Zionists, he praised the Mufti's attempts to bring about a settlement. This conflicted with the views expressed by Felix Frankfurter, soon to be appointed by Roosevelt to the United States Supreme Court, 'that the Mufti should be held responsible for much of the violence,'⁷⁹ and the general Zionist 'line', which was to discredit Arab leaders. To this end, the influential American news commentator, H.R. Knickerbocker, who made

sent a message through Max Warburg to Lewis L. Strauss, a partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., who had represented the American Jewish Committee at an international meeting of Jewish organizations on refugees in 1933: "Tell Mr. Strauss," he said, "that in my opinion seized Jewish property in Germany as security for forcing investment is not worth a penny." However, 'by the end of 1938, some four hundred thousand persons had managed to escape over the frontiers of Germany and Poland and rather more than half of these, largely on their own initiative or aided by individuals, had found homes for themselves in various parts of the world.' Those assets in Germany which they had not been able to repatriate were certainly worth an attempt to realize, and an Anglo-American corporation was formed, the presidency being offered to Dr. Paul van Zeeland, who later served as Prime Minister of Belgium.

Concurrently, there was another project, whereby Lewis Strauss had received 'assurances from Bernard Baruch, Albert Lasker, Mr. Rosenwald and others, that if the British Government could be persuaded to devote a sufficiently large area in Kenya, Tanganyika or Northern Rhodesia for settlement by refugees,' these men were willing to tithe their capital to assist it. 'They had in mind the subscription of a number of millions of dollars to the capital of a central bank to be located in the new country.' The British Government was unfavourable to the creation of such a state within a state in Africa and, at a meeting with Secretary of State for the Colonies Malcolm MacDonald and Anthony de Rothschild, Guinea was put forward as an alternative, but the Jews did not find the country offered sufficient promise.

The two schemes were abandoned in 1939.⁸⁰

fame from unauthenticated rumours, let loose the *canard* that the Grand Mufti received £.10,000 a year from Berlin.*⁸¹ For his defense of the Mufti, Samuel was almost immediately assailed by the National Jewish Council, which declared itself 'aggrieved'. It also objected to the British proposal to invite Arabs to the London conference⁸² the holding of which was then under consideration.

If the British Government was anxious to come to some understanding with the Palestine Arabs, enabling Britain to transfer the large tactical forces being deployed from Palestine to areas directly menaced by Germany, Italy and Japan, and eager to mollify Moslem opinion along its great pipeline for oil, men and supplies which ran from Suez to the Far East, the British people were largely indifferent to the Palestine rebellion. Wars in far-off corners of the Empire naturally meant little except to the comparatively few whose sons and lovers would never return. The British people would generously subscribe to alleviate the sufferings of the victims of floods, earthquakes, famine, persecution and pestilence anywhere across the world, they gave generously to help the Jewish refugees from Nazi policies, and untold thousands of them were freely admitted to Britain, its business, homes and universities, but they knew next to nothing of this history of the Palestine issue, and to the majority of the British the suffering of the people of Palestine was thought of as somehow 'their own fault.' But this was the beginning of 1939, and soon the results of British politicians' ineptitude from before World War I would be felt in every home in England.

During 1939 the Arab rebellion continued, but with gradually diminishing vigour. 'It slowly lost the characteristics of a national movement and degenerated into a series of crimes of reprisal.'⁸³ The intensive operations against the larger of the organized rebel groups which had begun at the end of 1938, proceeded with increased and continuous British military pressure, aiding the growth of dissension among the Arab military leaders. When in March 1939, Abdul Rahim el Haj Mohammed, their outstanding general who carried the greatest reputation and commanded the respect of Palestinians, was killed in action, most of the other principal leaders left the country. There were left smaller groups without controlled leadership, inspired often by personal gain, family blood-feuds and individual jealousies. It was Abdul Rahim who had tried hardest to concert direct action on the principles of

* An attempt to discredit simultaneously the Mufti (among the Arabs) and the Administration had been tried with the following formula: 'By presenting those first outbreaks' (in 1929) 'of terrorism and hooliganism, inspired by the Jerusalem Mufti, who was the Administration's paid servant, as manifestations of awakening Arab national consciousness, the British authorities sought to impress world opinion with the immense difficulties confronting Britain in the discharge of her task of transforming Palestine into a national home for the Jewish people.'⁸⁴

Arab opposition to Zionist colonialism and British imperialist rule, against those whose policies involved intimidating and assassinating other Arabs, in particular the so-called moderates, and supporters of the Nashashibis,⁸⁵ who were known to be close to Emir Abdullah of Transjordan.

By July 1939 the state of Arab disorders had sufficiently improved to warrant the release of a large number of detainees, the resumption of Arab bus services, and the removal of restrictions on out-of-town telephone calls. Arabs began to pay their taxes to the Administration, and even to carry the identity cards, as required of them by the British authorities, which had previously been banned and boycotted by the leaders of the rebellion.

The majority of the Arab population lost their sense of engagement with the rebellion, but as the rebels scattered among the civilian population, they were usually given a hiding place. 'It was, therefore, necessary for the authorities to check and search every district or village suspected of being a centre of rebel activity; this in itself was no easy task on a countryside where olive groves provided admirable cover and a rifle could be exchanged for a hoe, and hidden before a British patrol could approach. Moreover, all males had often to be rounded up in order to identify a wanted man; sometimes innocent persons were marched away, to the distress of their womenfolk. Punishment for harbouring rebels or for attacks on the military from a given village were usually collective, in the form of fines, or demolition of houses, and inevitably inflicted suffering on innocent as well as guilty.'⁸⁶

These incidents were widely publicised by the German press and radio up to the middle of 1939, dwelling persistently on heartrending accounts of maltreatment of an innocent civilian population by a brutal British soldiery, and characterizing an official statement by the War Office refuting the charges⁸⁷ as an open admission of terrorism by the military in Palestine.⁸⁸ Regular broadcasts in Arabic against British imperialism were given from Berlin.

The number of 'incidents' of violence during 1939 was 3,315, compared with 5,708 in 1938. The military courts tried 526 persons during the year: 454 Arabs and 73 Jews; 55 death sentences (all Arabs) were confirmed by the General Officer Commanding. The number of persons kept in detention was 5,933, of whom 254 were Jews, the remainder being Arabs.⁸⁹

Though the gradual cessation of the rebellion may be ascribed in part to powerful military measures combined with detention of known leaders and suspects, there were other factors. For one, political investigation was being undertaken in London during 1939 in which, for the first time, Arab

* Similar methods were employed by German forces in occupied countries during World War II, and in Cyprus and Algeria by British and French forces twenty years after these events in Palestine.

grievances and their historical background were publicly considered and Britain's undertakings to the Arabs more than twenty years before given complete official British publication. Once the British people had the opportunity to hear the truth, the Arabs believed, they need fear no longer for their cause. For another, on the outbreak of the Second World War, the Arab States, at the request of the British Government, intervened with the Palestine Arabs, and the three-and-a-half year old rebellion against British authority was called off unconditionally.

'It was with considerable relief that, on the actual outbreak of war, the British learnt from Arab leaders in several countries, including certain Palestinians, that no attempt would be made to embarrass them while they were at war with Germany. They were therefore able to build up the comprehensive military organization based on Cairo which was to serve them so well.'⁹⁰

CHAPTER XVI

The London Conferences and The New British Policy (1939)

BY 1939 IT WAS more than clear that the sore which had developed under the heel of British power in Palestine was more than a local irritation to the British Colonial Office, with its global responsibilities.

After 'Munich', President Roosevelt had written privately to Chamberlain telling him that the 'appeasement policy' towards Germany had created a bad impression in the United States, and hoping that Britain would use Palestine as a means of solving the Jewish problem.¹ The increasing use of power and influence by Zionists in the United States to sustain and improve their position in Palestine was officially recognized by a letter to F.D. Roosevelt from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. In this, he set before the President the sense and grievance which the Arabs of Palestine felt as a result of British colonialist policy; he denied that Jews had any historic claim to occupy Palestine, and attacked the Balfour Declaration. Roosevelt assured Ibn Saud 'that the Government has never taken any position different from that which it has maintained from the beginning towards this question,'² leaving King Ibn Saud to interpret what American policy had been.

The Czechoslovak Government announced that official funds would be made available for the 5,000 Jewish refugees which the British Government had agreed to admit to Palestine, and the Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk* suggested that Palestine should become a refugee haven.³ Czechoslovakia had recently lost its Sudetenland areas to Germany, for which the Czechs were to avenge themselves on the Sudeten Germans after World War II, yet their leaders seem to have been unaware that the Palestine Arabs felt, if anything, more strongly about their territorial losses, actual and projected.

Mussolini wooed Moslem interests by opposing further Jewish settle-

* There had 'always been a great affinity between the Masaryks and Zionism. Jan's father, the founder and first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, had been a strong supporter of the Balfour Declaration.'⁴

ment in Palestine,⁵ a position somewhat vindicated two weeks later when the All-India Moslem League asked for representation at the London Conference, and urged that the demands of the Arab nationalists be granted.⁶

While the delegates to the conferences were preparing for the talks, a United Palestine Appeal was opened in New York. The Attorney General of the United States was on the platform, together with guests Jan Masaryk and D. Ben Gurion, and the occasion was used to demand that Britain admit 100,000 German Jews to Palestine during 1939.⁷ This was nearly half of the number of Jews remaining in Germany, who had totalled 540,000 out of a population of 70,000,000 in 1933.

Invitations to attend the Round Table Conference had been sent out at the end of 1938 to the Palestinian Arabs; the neighbouring states of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen, and to the Jewish Agency. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was described by the British Government as an 'unacceptable' delegate but the members of the Arab Higher Committee who had been detained in the Seychelles were set at liberty and, though barred from returning to Palestine, were able to consult with the Mufti and act as delegates.

The exiles travelled through Cairo to Jounieh, near Beirut, where the Mufti was living. Six delegates were nominated there on 11 January 1939 by an assembly which, in effect, represented the old Arab Higher Committee but excluded the National Defence Party. Meanwhile the Arab States had accepted their invitations to send representatives to the London Conference and these representatives had assembled in Cairo. Beginning on 17 January, the six Palestinian Arab delegates held discussions in Cairo with the representatives of the Arab States, who indicated clearly their opinion that the Defence Party should be represented on the Palestine Arab delegation.

'There followed considerable political activity as to the composition of the delegation and, eventually, two separate parties left for London, one consisting of the representatives nominated at the Jounieh meeting and the other of representatives of the National Defence Party. On 9 February, agreement was reached in London between these two parties, and one Palestine Arab delegation, including two Defence Party members, was formed under the leadership of Jamal Eff. El-Husseini.'⁸

On 7 February 1939 the London Conferences between the British Government and the Arab and Jewish delegations were opened at St. James's Palace. On the British side, it is important to know that the Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, who had succeeded Stanley Baldwin on 28 May 1937, did not appear partial either to the Arab or Zionist sides, while his predecessor had been definitely associated with Zionism through his attacks on the Hope-Simpson Report of 1930 and the Passfield White Paper, which had led to Ramsay MacDonald's 'Black Letter'.

The Arab Delegation consisted of representatives of the Palestine Arab parties, and included four leaders who had been exiled to the Seychelles in the autumn of 1937. Egypt was represented by Prince Mohammed Abdul Moneim, the Egyptian ambassador to London, the Chief of the Royal Cabinet and the Egyptian Minister to the Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Governments. Iraq's representative was General Nuri es-Said, military commander under Prince Feisal of the Hejaz (later King Feisal I of Iraq), who had accompanied Feisal to London after World War I when Feisal claimed fulfilment of British pledges of Arab independence. Es-Said was now Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Saudi Arabia was represented by Emir Feisal, son of King Ibn Saud.

The Jewish delegation consisted of Dr. C. Weizmann and four others chosen by the Jewish Agency from its Executive to be a working group of negotiators throughout the conference, while the remainder were drawn from a wider conference committee of leading Jewish personalities, Zionist and non-Zionist, chosen so as to appear representative of Jews in the British Empire and countries where Jewish influence was strongest. In this way it was hoped to capture the interest and support of as many Jews as possible: 'Non-Zionist leaders who have hitherto shown no practical interest in Palestine affairs (will) cooperate with life-long Zionists. Great industrialists and labour leaders, spokesmen of extreme Orthodox and Reform Rabbis, representatives of the great Jewries of the West and the leaders of the Jews in Germany, a Sephardi leader of Oriental Jewry, and spokesmen of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe...'⁹

The conference committee consisted of Dr. Weizmann, the four members of the Jewish Agency Executive just referred to, three other members of the Executive, eleven representatives of Palestine Jewish organizations, thirteen representatives of Zionist and non-Zionist bodies in Great Britain, two from the United States, and one each from France, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Eastern Europe and South Africa.

The first two weeks after the opening of the conferences were occupied by statements of the Arab and Zionist cases, and discussions between the British Government and each of the parties on points arising out of the claims made by them. The Palestine Arabs refused to sit at the same conference table as the Zionists, lest this be construed as a *de jure* recognition of Zionist claims to a favoured status for Jews in Palestine in accordance with the Balfour Declaration. The spokesman of the Arab Delegation, Jamal Eff. El-Husseini, made demands which were nearly identical with those consistently put forward by the Arabs since the end of World War I, and especially in 1930 and 1935. His statement 'revealed the enduring Arab fear of domination by the Jews, and a determination to secure recognition of their right, supported by British wartime promises, to complete independence in their own

country.¹⁰ Dr. Weizmann made no specific proposals, basing his appeal for support on the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate as recognizing the right of Jews to a national home in Palestine in 'this blackest hour of Jewish history', and described Jewish homelessness as the root of the 'Jewish problem'.¹¹

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald then conferred with the Jewish Delegation alone on 10 February 1939. He surprised them by asking if they expected a Jewish national home to be maintained by guns, presently those of the British army, and listed the Arab arguments against further immigration and settlement in Palestine.¹² The next day, he met the Arab Delegation and stressed that Britain was tied to guarantees of a national home for Jews.¹³ The Arabs replied that the guarantees given to them were more explicit, and both antedated and succeeded the Balfour Declaration. It was agreed that these be published. Meanwhile the British Government appealed to Jews to assist in reaching an accord in the dissension over Palestine, citing the world strategical problems which Britain was facing. But the same day, Lady Reading, speaking for the Zionists, challenged the analysis that the Arab peoples as a whole backed the claims of the Arab Delegation, and declared the Arab nationalist leaders' demands for independence did not represent the views of the Arab peoples.¹⁴

On 23 February the first meeting between the Jews and representatives of the Arab States took place, in a friendly atmosphere, but failed to produce positive results in narrowing the gulf between the two standpoints. The next day, the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, and the American Ambassador in London, Joseph P. Kennedy, were visited by Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Louis Lipsky. Lipsky was general secretary of the Zionist Organization of America, and Wise had become 'a political force in American life. He associated with political movements. He assiduously cultivated American political leaders. He had a deep interest in winning non-Jewish support for Zionism.'¹⁵ J.P. Kennedy was a lavish financial supporter of President F.D. Roosevelt. The reason for the visit appears to have been that the Zionists were seeking American Government support in their rejection of tentative proposals for a settlement which the British put forward during the week. It is, therefore, understandable that Ambassador Kennedy had an interview with Lord Halifax on the Palestine issue on 27 February 1939, and on the same day U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis urged Jews to reject the British proposals.¹⁶ At the centre of the London arena was Weizmann. "I exerted myself," he wrote, "as indeed I have always done, to maintain contacts with the most influential figures in and about the conference, and with leading personalities generally, among them Lord Halifax, Prime Minister Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald and Winston Churchill."¹⁷

The Zionist moves in London and New York were simultaneous with the circulation in Palestine of a report that the British Government had decided that Palestine should be given independent status in five years; a limited Jewish immigration during these five years, none thereafter without Arab consent; and an Anglo-Palestine treaty concluded on the lines of that with Iraq.¹⁸ This gave rise to intense but temporary exhilaration and demonstration of joy on the part of the Arabs. The Zionist militants at once responded, and on 27 February 1939 there were bomb attacks on Arabs throughout the country in which 38 Arabs were killed and 44 wounded.¹⁹ However, with over 1,000 Arab rebels killed in action in 1938,²⁰ and stringent British military control preventing Arabs from retaining or securing weapons, this did little to stir up disorders again on a large scale. Abroad, Polish Zionist revisionists demonstrated in Warsaw against Britain and the lack of militancy associated with Dr. Weizmann;²¹ a group of United States senators signed a statement demanding that Britain adhere to the Balfour Declaration;²² and 'leading U.S. clergymen' asked Britain to uphold the Balfour Declaration.²³ On the other side, more Jewish attacks on Arabs were reported, the bodies of 12 more murdered Arabs were found near Turlkarm,²⁴ and a British group started a collection of funds for the orphans of these and other murdered Arabs.²⁵

During the conference, the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca (July 1915-March 1916,) was officially published by the British Government in Cmd 5957 (See Chapter VI pp. 35-52). The Arab delegations criticised the translation of certain passages in the English text from the Arabic originals, and maintained their contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, undertook to recognize and support Arab independence. The Arabs asked that an English judge might try the issue, but this was refused; and it was finally agreed on 15 February 1939, that a committee should be set up of representatives of the Arab delegations and the British Government to consider the correspondence. Chief representative for the British Government was the Lord Chancellor, Lord Maugham, who explained at the outset of the proceedings that he was not present in any judicial capacity, but as a representative only of the Government, 'with the sole function of expounding and advocating their views upon these questions.'²⁶ Sir Michael McDonnell, formerly Chief Justice of the Palestine Supreme Court, was appointed adviser to the Arab representatives.

The committee first considered a number of corrections to the English text of translations of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, which had been agreed between an Oxford-educated Palestinian, Mr. George Antonius and Mr. J. Heyworth-Dume, senior lecturer in Arabic at the London Univer-

sity School of Oriental Studies, representing the British Government. 'Although the Arab members of the committee were of the opinion that even with these corrections the English text still failed to represent the best possible rendering of the Arabic text, they agreed that if these corrections were made the English text would be free from actual error...'²⁷ and the new version was presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary on 3 March 1939. But not only was the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence considered by the Maugham Committee: its members considered 'the surrounding circumstances in which the Correspondence took place.'²⁸ Evidence relating to these was published as annexes to the report, and consisted of statements and documents referred to elsewhere, as well as certain others. One showed that in March 1915, 'largely at Lord Kitchener's instigation, a committee was set up by the Prime Minister to inquire into the whole subject of British interests in the Ottoman Empire...the committee is known to have reported in June, 1915, in favour of detaching southern Syria from the area of French influence.'

The arguments of the Arab representatives, and the contentions of the British, are officially summarized in the report, known as *Report of the Commission on the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence*—Cmd. 5974 (Document 39). Of major importance is the 'statement by Sir Michael McDonnell on certain legal points arising out of the Lord Chancellor's statement at the second meeting of the committee on 24 February 1939.' As McDonnell was not in a relationship to the Arab states as an advocate to a client, there was no question of any pecuniary or personal advantage; he was doing what the Lord Chancellor as British Government representative could not do: giving a judicial opinion on the material evidence. Sir Michael said:

"I have been invited, with the assent of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, by the Arab delegations, to be present at these meetings and to address Your Lordship to-day. My position differs from that of these gentlemen in that the text of the Correspondence, long known to them in Arab publications, came first to my knowledge, as to Sir H. McMahon's letter of 24th October, 1915,²⁹ only when published on page 18 of the Report of the Royal Commission in 1937, and as to the whole Correspondence only upon the publication of Mr. Antonius' book ³⁰ three months ago. There can be no doubt that the Sherif's first letter of the 14th July, 1915, included a demand for the whole of what are now Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Transjordan and Palestine with the express exclusion of the enclave of Aden.

"As to the contention of the British Government that there was no intention on its part of including Palestine in the area of independence, it seems to me incredible that a similar reservation of that enclave was not made in the first of Sir Henry's letters to the Sherif or, if not there, in the second, in reply to the Sherif's letter of the 9th September in which, according to Mr.

Antonius' text, he said 'Our people believe that these frontiers form the *minimum* necessary to the establishment of the new order for which they are striving.'

"Much stress has been laid upon that which Sir H. McMahon in his letter to *The Times* of the 23rd July, 1937, and that which Sir Gilbert Clayton in his letter of the 12th April, 1923, to Sir Herbert Samuel, declared was intended.

"That which Sir Henry or Sir Gilbert say they intended to mean seems to me to be a matter of no consequence whatever. It was not they who were making an offer to the Sherif; it was, as Sir Henry himself states in his letter of the 24th October, the British Government. The High Commissioner in Egypt was merely the conduit pipe through which the proposals of his Majesty's Government were conveyed to the other party. Sir Gilbert merely made preliminary drafts of the letters. There is a dictum of Lord Halsbury as Lord Chancellor, in the case of *Hilder v. Dexter* (1902) A.C. at p. 477, on the construction of statutes, which might equally well be applied to any written instrument, including the letter under consideration. Lord Halsbury said: 'I have more than once had occasion to say that in construing a statute I believe the worst person to construe it is the person who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed. At the time he drafted the statute, at all events, he may have been under the impression that he had given full effect to what was intended, but he may be mistaken in construing it afterwards just because what was in his mind was what was intended, though, perhaps, it was not done.'

"The case was concerned with the interpretation of a subsection of the Companies Act of 1900, and after the observation which I have cited, Lord Halsbury proceeded: 'For that reason I abstain from giving any judgment in the case myself, but at the same time I desire to say, having read the judgments proposed to be delivered by my noble and learned friends, that I entirely concur with every word of them. I believe that the construction at which they have arrived was the intention of the statute, I do not say my intention, but the intention of the Legislature. I was largely responsible for the language in which the enactment is conveyed and for that reason alone I have not written a judgment myself, but I heartily concur in the judgment which my noble and learned friends have arrived at.'

"That with which a Court of Law alone would be governed in interpreting Sir Henry's letter of the 24th October would be that which was called by a very distinguished Judge, Lord Wensleydale, the golden rule of legal interpretation, to the effect that in construing all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the

rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words might be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency but no further. The problem, therefore, before one is to ascertain what, giving words their ordinary meaning, is the area referred to in Sir Henry's letter as 'the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo which cannot be stated to be purely Arab.'


"I suggest that a reference to Map No. I in the Report of the Royal Commission, which is a War Office map, showing the pre-war Turkish Administrative Districts comprised in Syria and Palestine, [See Map 8 on page 303] or to the Map opposite page 248 in Mr. Antonius' book, makes it perfectly easy to give a grammatical and ordinary sense to the words of the British Government to which the High Commissioner of Egypt put his signature.

"Having studied the administrative divisions on the map, can it be said that they bear out Mr. Churchill's interpretation, when Colonial Secretary in 1922, that the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cover the southern part of the *Vilayet* of Beirut and the independent *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem? It was clearly necessary to say so if Palestine, which comprises the *Sanjaqs* of Acre and Balqa in the *Vilayet* of Beirut and the independent *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem, was to be held to be excluded from the area promised to the Arabs.

"So far from it being clear that Palestine was included in the reservation defined in the letter of the 24th October, one can, on the contrary, only say that everything possible was done in order to indicate that it was intended to include Palestine in the area promised to the Sherif. Why, for example, speak of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, not one of which is east of Palestine, and all of which go northward in that order away from Palestine? Why say nothing of the *Sanjaqs* of Hauran and Maan to the west of which the whole of Palestine lies? Why not, if Palestine was to be described, speak of Lake Huleh, the River Jordan, the Lake of Tiberias and the Dead Sea as the eastern boundaries?

"So far from the words in their grammatical and ordinary sense excluding Palestine, they do the exact opposite, and leave Palestine clearly within the area to which Arab independence was to be granted. To hold otherwise is exactly as though anyone who in a description of the South of England wished to exclude the area south of the River Thames, that is to say, the Counties of Berkshire, Surrey and Kent, in purporting to do so were to speak of the districts of Gloucester and Monmouth which are miles away from the line which it is intended to demarcate, a line moreover which is clearly defined by a natural geographical feature in the shape of a river. As Mr. Antonius states, Mr. Churchill in 1922 tried to argue that the word *districts* in the phrase, in Sir H. McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915, 'the

Map 8



Based on map in *The Arab Awakening*, by George Antonius

portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Homs, Hama and Aleppo' was to be read as equivalent to '*vilayet*'; and that since the '*Vilayet of Damascus*' included that part of Syria, now known as Transjordan, which lay to the east of the River Jordan, it followed that that part of Syria, now known as Palestine, which lay to the west of the Jordan was one of the portions of territory reserved in Sir Henry McMahon's phrase. As Mr. Antoniut points out, on pages 177 and 178 of his book, this argument is untenable inasmuch as there was no '*Vilayet of Damascus*,' '*Vilayet of Homs*' or '*Vilayet of Hama*.'

"The Arabic word *wilayat* may have been employed in the translation of Sir Henry's letter to the Sherif, but the meaning of this is nothing more than 'district' in general, and it does not necessarily import an Ottoman *vilayet*, which was a determined administrative unit, controlled by a *Vali* (hence its name), as definite as is an English county.

"To say that when Sir Henry wrote of the 'district of Damascus' he meant the Ottoman *Vilayet* of Syria is exactly as though one should be asked to believe that a reference to the district of Maidstone meant the County of Kent.

"Lord Lindley, when Master of the Rolls, in the case of *In re Birks, Kenyon v. Birks* (1900) 1 Ch. p. 418 said: 'I do not know whether it is law or a canon of construction, but it is good sense to say whenever in a deed, or will, or other document, you find that a word in one part has some clear and definite meaning, then the presumption is that it is intended to mean the same thing where, when used in another part of the document, its meaning is not clear.'

"The fourth paragraph of Sir Henry McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915,* speaks of no less than six 'districts' in connection with six towns, namely Mersin, Alexandretta, Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

"Of these, there was only one, namely, Aleppo, from which an Ottoman *vilayet* took its name, and since to the west of the *Vilayet* of Aleppo was the sea, that *vilayet* cannot have been meant. It is surely contrary to good sense, in view of these facts to pick out a second of the five remaining towns, namely, Damascus, and allege that a reference to its 'district' indicates the Ottoman *vilayet* in which it lay, a *vilayet* which bore the name not of Damascus, but of Syria, and which contained in it, moreover, two of the other towns, namely, Homs and Hama, whose 'districts' were named in Sir Henry's letter immediately after the 'district' of Damascus. Does not common sense indicate that in every case the term 'district' implies the neighbourhood of the town which is named? By this interpretation alone do we arrive at a consistent explanation of the use of the words which have been employed and thus alone are we enabled to give a meaning to every word including the 'districts of

* It was this letter which the British representatives at the 1919 Peace Conference had secretly recognized as committing to an inclusion of Palestine 'in the boundaries of Arab independence.' ³¹

Homs and Hama'.

"It is to be observed, further, that the Sherif, in his letter in reply, of the 15th November, 1915, (Antonius page 421, Note I) uses the Arabic word *wilayat*, in speaking of Mersin and Adana, clearly in the general sense of 'district' inasmuch as there was not, as he must have known, an Ottoman *Vilayet* of Mersin, but only a *Vilayet* of Adana in which the port and district of Mersin were situated.

"In speaking of Mersin and Adana the Sherif, one may believe, was harking back to the mode of definition employed in his first letter of the 14th July, 1915, in which he had laid down the northern boundaries for which he asked, limited, not by administrative districts, whether *vilayets* or *sanjaqs*, but by a line of towns situated approximately on a particular parallel of latitude.

"I therefore believe that the Sherif was using the Arab term *wilayat* in this letter in the sense of the environs of the towns named, not only in reference to Mersin and Adana, but also when speaking later of the two '*Wilayats* of Aleppo and Beirut'. I base this contention on the fact, moreover, that in insisting on their inclusion in the independent Arab area he says that the two '*vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut and their western maritime coasts... are purely Arab provinces'; while in his next letter, of 1st January, 1916 the Sherif refers to 'the northern parts and their coastal regions,' and later to 'Beirut and its coastal regions.'

"Now, why did the Sherif explicitly refer to the 'maritime coasts' and the 'coastal regions'? If one is speaking, for example, of Durham, one does not speak of 'the County of Durham and its maritime coasts' or of 'the County of Durham and its coastal regions.' The mention of the coasts, if one is speaking of the county, is mere redundancy; but if one's intention is to cover in one's description only a part of that county, including some of the environs of the chief town of the same name and the adjoining sea coast, what is more natural than that one should speak of the 'district of Durham and its maritime coasts' or the 'district of Durham and its coastal regions?'

"A further point of great importance is this, that the only reason set out in Sir Henry McMahon's letter for the exclusion of the portions of Syria to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo as well as of the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, was that 'they cannot be said to be purely Arab.' Now, Mersin contained a large Turkish population, as did the contiguous territories of the coast-line of the *Vilayet* of Aleppo, in which is situated Alexandretta. The districts of Latakia, Tripoli and the Lebanon comprised large numbers of Alawis, of Druzes and of Maronites who differed in some cases in race, and in all in religion, from the majority of the Moslem Arabs of Syria, and it is of the highest significance that the portions of Syria which may be accurately described as lying to the west of the districts

of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo comprised exactly these areas of Latakia and of the Lebanon and Tripoli where the minorities in question are to be found.* Further, an area of which it emphatically could not be said that the population was not purely Arab was Palestine, where notwithstanding the presence of a number of Christian European institutions, at that time at least 95 per cent of the population was Arab.

"Not one single word of the world-wide importance of the Holy Land appears in the McMahon Correspondence. Freedom to act without detriment to the interests of France was the only condition precedent to recognition and support of Arab independence in any portion of the territory involved. The greater part of the small *Sanjaq* of Beirut is not west of the *Sanjaq* of Damascus and this area, containing the towns of Tyre and Sidon, was included in the area allotted to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and is to this day part of the French mandated territory. To suggest that an area of the size of Palestine and of the importance of the Holy Land, if not excluded by the fact that it did not lie west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, was intended to be excluded by a side wind by the reference to the interests of France which, at the very time, the British Government was refusing to admit, is an argument that will not hold water.


"Sir Henry McMahon in the last paragraph of his letter to *The Times* of the 23rd July, 1937, which has been already quoted, concluded as follows: 'I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein.'

"Sir Henry does not state upon what grounds he bases that belief, but here again, a court of justice, if it were concerned to interpret the meaning of the written instrument containing the offer to King Hussein would not attend for one minute to what impression the person making the offer stated 22 years after that he had reason to believe the words conveyed to the person accepting the offer; it would arrive at the intention by the meaning of the words which had been made use of in the offer in the light of the words made use of in the acceptance.

"The second paragraph of the Sherif Hussein's third note to Sir Henry McMahon, dated the 5th November, 1915 (Antoniou, p. 421), in reply to the latter's letter of the 24th October, is of great importance in this connection. It runs as follows:

'First, in order to facilitate and serve the cause of Islam by the removal of possible sources of hardship and tribulation, and in earnest of the great esteem in which we hold Great Britain, we no longer insist on the

* See sketch Map 9 on page 307 which shows the area lying 'west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, shaded. This is the area in which the French Government was interested and which later was assigned by the League of Nations to France under mandate.



SYRIA 1916

Shaded area excluded from Arab independence as defined by Sir Henry McMahon in his letter to Sherif Hussein No. 4 dated 24 October 1915 and explained further by letter No. 6 dated 14 December 1915 as being the area falling west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo; Palestine being to the south-west of Damascus.

inclusion of the districts of Mersin and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. As for the *Vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut and their western maritime coasts, these are purely Arab provinces in which the Moslem is indistinguishable from the Christian, for they are both the descendants of one forefather. And we Moslems intend in those provinces to follow the precepts laid down by the Commander of the Faithful, Umar ibn al-Khattab (God have mercy upon him!) and the Caliphs who came after him, when he enjoined upon the Moslems to treat Christians on a footing with themselves, saying: "they are to enjoy the same rights and bear the same obligations as ourselves." They will, moreover, have their denominational privileges as far as the public interest allows.'

"It will be observed that once more there is no mention of the *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem; that the Sherif in speaking of the *Vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut is clearly referring to the part of the latter *vilayet* west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, referred to in the letter under reply, inasmuch as he protests that they are by *heredity* purely Arab provinces, whether the inhabitants be Christian or Moslem, and he is not contemplating the area west of the Hauran or still less that which is west of Maan which would include the *Sanjaqs* of Acre, Balqa and Jerusalem or, in other words, Palestine.

"The fact that he explicitly undertakes to safeguard the rights of Christian Arabs is a confirmation of this, as it is natural to suppose that he has in mind the large Christian Maronite community in the Lebanon which had for years looked upon France as its protector and which was the only Christian community living in a compactly defined sphere in the whole area in question.

"In reply to this, in his letter of the 14th December, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon wrote to the Sherif as follows (Antoniou, p. 423):

'I was glad to find that you consent to the exclusion of the *Vilayets* of Mersin and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab countries...As for the two *Vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have fully understood your statements in that respect, and noted it with the greatest care but as the interest of their ally, France, are involved in these two provinces, the question calls for careful consideration. We shall communicate again with you on this subject at the appropriate time.'

"It will be observed that here, too, although there is an express reference to the *Vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut not one word is said by Sir Henry McMahon about the *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem; and that the interests of France in the two provinces in question, not as hitherto the fact that they are not purely Arab, are the only reason given for the exclusion of the two *vilayets*. No mention is made of Palestine and no reference whatever is made to the world-wide interest in its holy places.

'Next comes, in the Sherif Hussein's fourth letter of the 1st January, 1916 (Antonius, p. 425), the following passage:

'With regard to the northern parts and their coastal regions, we have already stated, in our previous note the utmost that it was possible for us to modify. We made these modifications solely in order to achieve the ends which, Almighty God willing, we desire to attain... On the other hand—and this Your Excellency must clearly understand—we shall deem it our duty at the earliest opportunity after the conclusion of the War to claim from you Beirut and its coastal regions, which we shall overlook for the moment on account of France... The proximity of the French to us would be a source of difficulties and disputes such as would render the establishment of peaceful conditions impossible, to say nothing of the fact that the people of Beirut are resolutely opposed to such dismemberment...

'Thus any concession designed to give France or any other Power possession of a single square foot of territory in these parts is quite out of the question.'

'Here again, there is not one word about the Holy Land, the *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem or any reference with geographical intent, save to the 'northern parts and their coastal regions' and to 'Beirut and its coastal regions,' both of which come clearly within the area to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

'It is very significant, also, that the last paragraph which I have quoted is concerned to name France alone as a Power concession to which of any of the territory is out of the question. Precisely the same may be said of the only relevant remark in the final letter in the Correspondence. Sir Henry McMahon's note of the 30th January, 1916 (Antonius, p. 426), runs as follows:

'As for the northern regions we note with great satisfaction you desire... to avoid anything that might impair the alliance between Great Britain and France.'

'It seems to me that the Sherif must have been endowed with a remarkable gift of clairvoyance if he understood, from the letters in question, that the Government intended to exclude Palestine from the area whose independence it guaranteed, for every one of the four communications to the Sherif forwarded by the British Government over Sir Henry McMahon's signature so far from indicating that Palestine was to be excluded from the sphere of Arab independence, served to evade all suggestion that any question of Palestine was in issue, by using geographical descriptions which exactly fitted the adjoining territories, but were not apt to describe Palestine itself, and by giving as reasons for the exclusion of the territory in question none

of the religious and historic grounds which were applicable to the Holy Land, but only political grounds which were applicable to the northern parts of Syria and in no case political grounds which would have been germane to the case of Palestine.

"I have confined myself to the intention which, as I contend, may without great difficulty and without stretching the meaning of words be gathered from the expressions used in the Correspondence as a whole.

"The only interpretation by the Government other than that which we have heard from Your Lordship was that embodied in the White Paper of 1922 in which Mr. Churchill as Colonial Secretary stated that 'the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus', for thus he partially quoted the definition, was regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the *Vilayet* of Beirut and the independent *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem, in other words all Palestine west of the Jordan.

"At that time the whole Correspondence had never been published in English. Successive Governments declared that it would be contrary to the public interest so to do.

"Now that it has been published by Mr. Antonius it appears to me that the Government has been compelled to shift its ground and to say that it was 'inconceivable' that it was intended to include Palestine and that it must have been 'regarded as automatically and obviously excluded.'

"To support this contention surrounding circumstances, namely, religious, historical and political considerations, are called in aid by His Majesty's Government.

"I do not propose to deal with these, as members of the delegation itself are more competent to do so; but I would point out that it is only when, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible to know what the intention is without enquiring further, that then it is legitimate to see what the circumstances were with reference to which the words were used and what was the object appearing from those circumstances which the person using them had in view (per Lord Blackburn. *River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson* (1877) 2 A.C. at page 763).

"In my contention the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used in the Correspondence lead to no absurdity and no inconsistency, and for that reason it is not necessary, indeed it is not legitimate, to consider any surrounding circumstances in order to modify their meaning. I submit that it is only when the language is ambiguous that it may be controlled by surrounding circumstances or explained by other documents, and that in the absence of such ambiguity no subsequent statement, written or verbal, can have any effect on the construction of the Correspondence. (Per Wightman J. in *Lewis v. Nicholson* (1852) 18 Q.B. at page 512).

"I would point out also that there is always some presumption in favour

of the more simple and literal interpretation of the words of a written instrument. (Caledonian Railway and North British Railway (1881) 6 A.C. at page 212 per Selborne L.C.)

"Finally, may I say that His Majesty's Government has changed its ground of defence more than once in the history of this controversy. In 1922 it relied solely on the allegation that the whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge by the reservation of the portions of Syria lying west of the district of Damascus. Judging from pages 19 and 20 of the Report of the Royal Commission it appears in giving evidence before that body to have relied on the claims of France in respect of her alleged interests in the area in question. The present line of defence of His Majesty's Government, that Palestine must have been regarded as automatically and obviously excluded *sub silentio* from the area involved, which is incompatible with the other two arguments, has never been brought forward publicly before and if it was put before the Royal Commission when sitting *in camera* it was deemed of so little value that they omitted all reference to it in their Report."³³

Perhaps only in pre-World War II England could such a critical opinion have been given without the honour of McDonnell being at any time questioned. However, the British expectation that eminent figures are free from prejudice in great matters pertaining to national policy sometimes led them to place faith in the judgment of those who were definitely biased.* McDonnell's opinion was virtually supported by the whole Committee, for it ended its report by referring to the various statements made to the Arabs during and after the war. 'In the opinion of the Committee it is, however, evident from these statements that His Majesty's Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine, and that these statements must all be taken into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilities which, upon any interpretation of the Correspondence, His Majesty's Government have incurred towards those inhabitants as a result of the Correspondence.'³³

Thus the Committee confirmed that a promise of an independent Arab Palestine was clearly made in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. This was already known to the small group around Lloyd George, and others, who had read the secret *Memorandum on British Commitments to King Hussein* prepared for the 1919 Peace Conference; among the commitments recognized was 'its [Palestine's] inclusion in the boundaries of Arab indepen-

* For example: the pro-Zionism of Sir Winston Churchill is not generally known in Britain; and when *Middle East Diary 1917-56*, by Col. R. Meinertzhagen (Cresset Press, London, 1960), was published, a British reviewer wrote "It reads strangely to one brought up in the tradition that the British officer does not take sides."³⁴

dence.’*

If the Arabs thought that these revelations would have a great effect on British public opinion, they were over-optimistic, for the British press was much more occupied with the mounting crisis in Europe arising out of the German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March, and later, by the Italian invasion of Albania on Good Friday, 7 April 1939. More discussions followed, including another meeting between the Arab States, the British and Zionist leaders, also without definite results. Finally, proposals were formulated by the British Government and laid before the two delegations as the basis for an agreement or settlement. These were substantially the same as the proposals subsequently issued in a ‘White Paper’. Neither the Arab nor Jewish delegation accepted them and the Conference failed to reach any agreement. The London Conferences closed on 27 March 1939, and on 30 March M.J.A.C. Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, told representatives of the All-India Moslem League that the international body could do nothing to promote independence for Palestine.³⁵

Weizmann immediately threw himself into more vigorous campaigning to muster opposition to British plans for Palestine, and in a message to a Zionist conference in Chicago, urged American Jews to more efforts in acquiring Palestine Arab land and supporting immigration.³⁶ In fact, the problem of organized illegal immigration, financed and operated by an extensive Zionist network, especially in eastern Europe, was becoming more serious. On 5 February 1939 the ‘*Artemisia*’ crowded with immigrants had arrived, and during the five weeks following 25 March over 1,700 more illegal immigrants were known to have been beached on the shores of Palestine.³⁷

Polish Government officials were active in assisting this movement, which was dominated there by the Revisionist faction. On a visit to Poland from

* The contents of this secret document and others, including an *Appendix on Previous Commitments by His Majesty's Government in the Middle East*, came to light in 1964, and provided more explicit evidence that Palestine was indeed included in the proposed area of Arab independence.

These documents belonged to the late Professor William Linn Westermann, one-time adviser on Turkish Affairs to the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. They were deposited at an American University, and on his instructions, were not to be opened until after his death.

In these papers there are several references to Palestine as being included in the proposed area of Arab independence; and the most clear is a passage in section (iv) of the *Memorandum*. This reads:

“With regard to Palestine, His Majesty's Government are committed by Sir Henry McMahon's letter to the Sherif on October 24, 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence.”³⁸

Palestine, Abraham Stern, commander of the *Irgun*, a clandestine and outlawed military organization, was introduced to several leading officials in the Foreign, War, and Internal Affairs Ministries. From them he secured a promise to put at *Irgun's* disposal 'a sizable amount of arms and ammunition,' part gift and part to be paid for in cash on easy instalments. The first instalment was delivered as promised in the spring of 1939, after confirmation of the deal by Jabotinsky. On 12 May 1939, on a visit to Poland, Jabotinsky wrote to the head of the Emigration Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry thanking him for his cooperation in 'realizing an important transaction, which represents the (monetary) value of 200,000 Zlotyz (approximately \$42,000, at that time a very considerable amount).' Further, with the active cooperation of the Polish Government and the most powerful man in Poland, Marshall Rydz-Smigly, courses for *Irgun* instructors were established at Andzichow, Warsaw, Zoflow, Poddebie, etc., and Count Lubiensky, Cabinet Chief of the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, congratulated Jabotinsky on their fine record.³⁹ The main officers' training school for the *Irgun* was in a huge, three-storey converted farmhouse in the mountains of Zakofna in south-west Poland. Here Polish army officers lectured young *Irgun* instructors, many of whom had come from Palestine with forged passports, on military tactics and strategy, trained them in partisan fighting, in sabotage, in all the arts of guerrilla warfare, as well as in regular army skills. Stern, who spoke at the first graduation exercises in May 1939, had told Polish leaders that the *Irgun* would train 40,000 Jewish youths, gathered from throughout Europe, for a one-day invasion of Palestine, to be launched from Italian ports in October 1939. Seizing the Government from the British, they would raise the Zionist flag over Jerusalem and proclaim an independent Jewish state headed by Jabotinsky. If the British eventually seized him, his colleagues in Europe and the United States would constitute themselves a Jewish government-in-exile. "We will decide the fate of Palestine in one action," he promised. The Italians were ready to assist; and the Poles took the Revisionist plan seriously enough to make military services and supplies available.⁴⁰

This support for action contrary to British policy appears bizarre alongside Britain's guarantee of Poland's integrity in March 1939, which was to be the *causus belli* for a declaration of war against Germany. Jewish sources state that Polish aid for evacuation of Jews from Poland was denounced by world Jewish leaders as a 'shameless collaboration with anti-semitism and one that could set a dangerous precedent.'⁴¹ But no word of the denunciation reached the gentiles.

Behind a movement in the summer of 1939 to unify Revisionist and official fund-raising and support for illegal immigration was Baron Robert de Rothschild, assisted by Israel Sieff, S. Jacobi and Geremia Halperin.⁴² (On 4 October, Malcolm MacDonald reported in the House of Commons

that between 1 August and 30 September alone, 4,892 Jews had entered Palestine without certificates.)

For their part, the former Arab Higher Committee issued from Beirut a manifesto restating their demands for complete Palestine independence. They then endeavoured to give new impetus to the waning revolt. But by now there were many more armed Jews, who were also organized, than there were armed Arabs, quite apart from the British forces which were available to counter Arab attacks. The Arab demonstrations were loud, Jewish arming and organizing was underground, quiet and effective.

A proportion of the Palestine delegates, however, and the delegates from the Arab States congregated in Cairo after the end of the London Conferences. Through the mediation of the Egyptian Prime Minister, contact with the British Government was re-established with the declared object of reaching an Anglo-Arab accord. The British Government hoped that by further negotiation the express agreement of the Arab States to a new policy for Palestine, and their intervention with the Palestinians, might be obtained by offering certain concessions to the Arab view. The main points Britain put forward were:

(a) The acceleration of the constitutional programme. Instead of deferring the appointment of Palestinians as heads of government departments to a second stage in constitutional development, as provided by the proposals laid before the London Conference, this was to be effective as soon as peace had been restored. This proposal was well received by the Arab States' delegates.

(b) Britain offered to consult, in any question relating to deferment of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state after ten years, with the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States. It was on this point that these negotiations failed owing to the insistence of the Arab States on a counter-proposal that any such deferment should depend on the *consent* of the Arab States.⁴³

On 17 April 1939 the *Histadruth* also issued a manifesto. This condemned the trend of British policy in seeking reconciliation with the Arabs, and called upon Jews all over the world to aid in a campaign of resistance to any limitation of the national home. This open adoption by responsible Zionist leaders in Palestine of an attitude contrary to the officially-declared Jewish policy of cooperation with the Government in Britain and in Palestine served to increase Jewish tension.⁴⁴ In New York, a visit to the Palestine exhibit at the World's Fair was used by Mayor LaGuardia and the politically and financially powerful Governor of New York State, Herbert H. Lehman, to support publicly the Zionist leaders and the idea of further immigration to Palestine by Jewish refugees.⁴⁵

In spite of a direct attempt by Chaim Weizmann to urge Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain not to publish it,⁴⁶ the 'Statement of Policy' on Palestine, known as *The MacDonald White Paper* (Document 40), was issued on 17 May 1939. After referring to the abortive London Conferences and to the terms of the Mandate, the Statement pointed out that 'the Royal Commission and previous commissions of enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people," and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews.' The Government was convinced that, in the interests of peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine, a clear definition of policy and objectives was essential.

The proposal of partition of Palestine, as 'recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable;' for the Woodhead Commission had reported upon the economic difficulties of a divided Palestine, and the political difficulties of getting Arab acquiescence in the partition of the country. The Government had therefore devised an alternative policy to meet the needs of the situation. This policy was classified under three headings, (I) Constitution, (II) Immigration and (III) Land.

(I) **Constitution**

Under (I), was stated "It has been urged that the expression 'a national home for the Jewish people' offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish state or commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish state was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But", the Statement continued, "with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country." An excerpt from the Churchill White Paper of 1922 was then quoted:

'Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that "Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contem-

plated . . . the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of The (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded *in Palestine*.'

'But this Statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish state against their will.' The nature of the Jewish national home envisaged by the British Government was described in terms of the 1922 White Paper, which had stated that the development of such a 'home in Palestine . . . is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride.'

The Statement adhered to this interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. Evidence that Britain had been carrying out this policy was that, 'since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the national home has risen to some 450,000 or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish national home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.' In this way the British Government showed that it had in fact carried out the obligation to Jews which had been proclaimed in 1917 and accepted in the Mandate.

Regarding statements made to the Arabs, including the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the British Government regretted 'the misunderstandings which may have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the (Maugham) Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon Correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.'

Since the British Government was charged in the Mandate 'to secure the development of self-governing institutions' in Palestine, and since 'they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that

the population of Palestine should remain for ever under Mandatory tutelage, it is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine state. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.'

The establishment of such a State within ten years was a British objective. During the transitional period the people of Palestine would be given an increasing part in the government of their country. As a first step it was proposed that, 'As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored' Palestinians would be placed in charge of departments of Government with British advisors to assist them. These Palestinian heads of Departments would be members of the executive council, which might at a later stage be converted into a council of ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of heads of departments. It was further proposed that at the end of five years a body representative of the people of Palestine and of the British Government should be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements in the transitional period, and to make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine state. If, at the end of ten years, it appeared that independence should be postponed, the British Government would consult with the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations, and the neighbouring Arab States, and invite their co-operation in framing plans for the future.'

(II) **Immigration**

'Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "While ensuring that the rights and position of the other sections of the population are not prejudiced," is required "to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions." Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate.'

In practice, from 1922 'until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr. Weizmann in February 1931, 'it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolution of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and

in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent statements of policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position of the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored. Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread among the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish population which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.'

'In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish national home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish national home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish national home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former

policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish national home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish national home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.'

'It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of the Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish national home. But, above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:'

These provided that Jewish immigration, during the five years beginning 1 April 1939, would be at a rate which, if economic capacity allowed, would bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the population of the country. On such a basis it was calculated that 75,000 immigrants could be admitted. For each of the five years a quota of 10,000 would be allowed, the shortage in any one year to be added to the quotas of subsequent years within the five year period, if economic absorptive capacity permitted. As a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees would be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner was satisfied that adequate provision for maintenance was assured.

'After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.' The number of illegal immigrants would be deducted from the annual quotas.

(III) **Land**

'The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the man-

date, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfer of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this Statement of Policy and the High Commissioner will retain them through the transitional period.'

'The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.'⁴⁷

The Zionists unanimously condemned the proposals of the 'MacDonald White Paper.' Their reaction was immediate. In Palestine, 'Dr. Herzog, the Chief Rabbi, stood in the pulpit of the great Yeshurim Synagogue of Jerusalem and before the weeping congregation tore up a copy of the White Paper to pieces. The illegal armed left-wing organization *Hagana* ('Defence'), which Orde Wingate had fostered, commenced a planned attack even as Wingate and his wife were preparing to leave Jerusalem for the last time. On 17 May 1939, the Palestine Broadcasting Service transmission lines were cut and the Palestine broadcasting studios bombed, so that the official announcement of the British Government's new policy could not be immediately broadcast to the country. The next day the headquarters offices of the Administration's Department of Migration were set on fire, and the Government offices at Haifa and Tel Aviv were sacked by crowds bent on destroying every document of illegal immigration. A Jewish general strike was called for the following day, when violent and inflammatory speeches were made by Zionist leaders. In Jerusalem, Arab shops were looted, the police were stoned in trying to maintain order, and a British constable was shot.⁴⁸ The British police had orders not to fire on Jews, even when threatened with the loss of their own lives, and this order was no secret to the *Hagana*. But in a matter of hours, they had rounded up most of the terrorist leaders save two: 'Commander' David Raziell and Abraham Stern. Raziell was seized by the British on 22 May, but Stern was in Poland on a mission for Jabotinsky. Stern

and three colleagues were arrested in Tel Aviv in August.

This was the beginning of the Jewish rebellion in Palestine which was to partition Palestine and drive the British out of the country. It was synchronized with Zionist political action in many countries. Even in Rumania, where a pro-Nazi government was said to be in power, the protests of the Rumanian Zionist Organization against Britain and its proposed Palestine policy made headlines.⁴⁹

'The Irgun launched full-scale warfare, now attacking Arabs, now the British. On May 28, a week after Razieli's arrest, Irgunists mined the Rex Cinema in Jerusalem. Five Arabs were killed and eighteen wounded. Forty-eight hours later, they attacked the village of Bir Adas, from where many raiders were alleged to have come. Five more Arabs were killed. Four days later, in a concerted attack on British installations, they destroyed mail and telephone boxes, slashed telephone wires between Jerusalem and Jaffa, destroyed railway tracks and blew up part of the main post office in Jerusalem.'⁵⁰

The Arab Higher Committee, led by the Mufti from Beirut, rejected the terms of the White Paper but, on 29 May 1939 the National Defence Party announced its readiness to cooperate with Britain in giving effect to them.

The House of Commons debated the White Paper on 22 May 1939, and by 268 votes against 179 approved its policy. A motion, supported by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, that 'as the proposals of His Majesty's Government relating to Palestine, as set out in Command Paper No. 6019, are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Mandate and not calculated to secure the peaceful and prosperous development of Palestine, this House is of the opinion that Parliament should not be committed pending the examination of these proposals by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations,' was defeated.⁵¹ On 23 May the House of Lords, after debate, approved the policy without a division.⁵²

What had happened between 1930, when the Passfield White Paper policy had been rejected in the House of Commons, and 1939, to bring about acceptance of a policy to which Zionists were violently opposed? Weizmann, in spite of his knowledge of England, poses the revealing innuendo in his autobiography: "I tried to find an answer to a question which was to occupy me for the remainder of my life... Why was it... a completely invariable rule that politicians who were enthusiastically for the Jewish homeland during elections forgot it completely if they were returned to power."⁵³ This might be disputed with the records of Ormsby-Gore and others, but it could be said of Malcolm MacDonald. What counted was the information available to the men in office, compared with the propaganda which they relied on when out of office. This was not only true of Palestine.⁵⁴ Many Jews were

led to believe that the British were influenced by anti-semitism, but in fact the British were occupied in preparing for war with their greatest antagonist, influenced to a high degree by reports of inhumane treatment of Jews in Germany* and by the many Jewish refugees crowding into Britain from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. The facts seem to be that there was now a greater knowledge in England of the Near and Middle East among those influential in making policy or supporting it. Diplomatic representation of the nominally independent Arab States in London had changed the common misconception of Arab leaders as romantic, semi-barbarous sheikhs who looked like film actors. More people had visited or read about the area and realised that all Arabs were not living in the age of Biblical history. About sixty members of Parliament, under the chairmanship of Lord Winterton, who had been on Allenby's staff in 1918, and Colonel Clifton-Brown, later Speaker of the House, had formed an informal group who believed in the merits of the Arab case. All were Conservatives save one. The first book in England to carry the Arab point of view, together with accounts of British wartime promises to the Arabs, had been published in 1938, and this, *The Arab Awakening* by George Antonius, 'had probably done much to influence British opinion toward sympathy with Arab nationalism.'⁵⁵

Furthermore, Arab solidarity on independence for Palestine against Jewish objections, made Zionism a strategic liability instead of a potential strategic asset. The idealism of those who had seen Zionism as part of a new

* The Zionist-Revisionists themselves were impressed by some positive aspects of the policies of the Third Reich. Jabotinsky was strongly moved by an Italo-German agreement signed on 23 June 1939, providing for the voluntary transfer of the Germans from the South Tyrol, for which more than half opted. He recalled a talk with Israel Zangwill in 1916 who 'saw in the evacuation of Arabs from Palestine the basic prerequisite for the implementation of Zionism.' In an article '*A Talk with Zangwill*', published in July 1939, he noted that 'a precedent has been created here which the world will note and forget, and this precedent may perhaps be fated to play an important role in our Jewish history as well.'

(In fact the five years of World War II saw the forcible transfer of 900,000 persons belonging to 55 ethnic minority groups. From 1944-51 nearly 20 million persons were 'transferred'.)

However, Jabotinsky's basic attitude included no admiration for the Orient and no regard for the Arabs. "We Jews are Europeans," he wrote in 1925 to Senator O.O. Gruenberg. Population transfer might be a useful expedient, but basically the establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine would 'have to be achieved *against the wish* of the country's present Arab majority; an 'iron wall' of a Jewish armed force would have to protect the process of achieving a majority...'⁵⁶

Such views were not confined to Revisionists. Chaim Arlosoroff, in 1931 Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, had believed that 'under the British there was no possibility of achieving a Jewish majority in Palestine,' and that 'he had in mind a real *putsch* against the British.'⁵⁷ *Putsch* had taken on a universal usage from the national socialist struggle for power in Germany.

phase of European expansion 'was so much outmoded as to seem, not merely ridiculous, but perverse. Gone were the days of intimate confabulation between Dr. Weizmann and high officials of the Foreign Office... Visits to Weizmann's house in Addison Road were no longer regarded as being particularly helpful to official careers in the making. And American support had not yet developed to redress the balance.'⁵⁸

That development was, however, being urgently pressed. More Jews and Jewish organizations and others were being recruited with the argument that if they did not support Zionist aims in Palestine they were failing in their humanitarian duty to assist refugees from oppression. Thus the *New York Times* reported: "Thousands of telegrams and letters have been received by the State Department asking this government to take a strong position of opposition to the British programme for Palestine, and delegations of prominent Jewish leaders have visited Secretary Hull and insisted that its execution would jeopardize American interests there. Senators and Representatives also have been recipients of such missions, and have addressed themselves to Secretary Hull on the matter."⁵⁹

Mr. Hull referred to his statement of 14 October 1938 which stressed that, while the United States treaty with Great Britain on Palestine did not empower the United States to prevent modification of the terms of the Mandate, 'this government can decline to recognize the validity of the application to American interests of any modification.' 'Some said,' according to the *New York Times*, 'that this statement did not make clear whether the State Department regarded American interests of more than \$100,000,000* in Palestine, and the position of American citizens there, as jeopardized as a result of the plan outlined in the White Paper.'⁶⁰

There was no other official American reaction to the plans of the 1939 White Paper, but Roosevelt privately expressed the belief that 'the British are not wholly correct in saying that the framers of the Palestine Mandate could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country,' and while 'the Palestine Mandate undoubtedly did not intend to take away the right of citizenship and of taking part in the government on the part of the Arab

* In 1926 Jabotinsky published in the *Rasswyet*, Paris, a discussion under the heading *Utilization of Niagara* in which he observed that of the four main components of the 'Niagara' of Jewish money—personal budget, business investments, savings and philanthropic contributions—only the last one, which was the least, was being utilized, though inadequately, for Palestine. Palestinian enterprises must make investment attractive and their marketed products were to make inroads into the 'living expenses' of the Diaspora Jew, to make him include Palestine manufactures in his purchases of food, clothing, furniture, book or luxury items. This financial relationship was summed up: 'the Diaspora keeps its savings in Palestine; the second—Palestine produces, the Diaspora buys.'⁶¹ This policy was gaining acceptance and producing results.

population, it...did intend to convert Palestine into a Jewish home which might very possibly become predominantly Jewish within a comparatively short time.' For these reasons, the President felt that the White Paper could not be approved by the United States even though 'there are some good ideas in regard to actual administration of government.' Roosevelt advocated that the administration of Palestine should continue on a temporary basis for another five years, with continued Jewish immigration. But Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy was simply instructed to inform the British Government informally, that there was much disappointment in America over the White Paper, 'especially in Zionist circles.'⁶²

In news from Palestine, terrorist attacks on Arabs were prominent, presumably calculated to provoke Arab reaction, disorder, and British counter-action in which the Arabs always seemed to fare worse than the Jews. An issue of the *New York Times* for 30 May 1939 gave an account of four women and one man found killed, and four men and one child wounded by Zionists early that morning in a small Arab village in the Sharon valley. On the same day, a bomb had been exploded in an Arab cinema in Jerusalem, killing and wounding its patrons.⁶³

Malcolm MacDonald made a statement before the Permanent Mandates Commission on 15 June 1939 regarding 'the policy which His Majesty's Government, with the approval of Parliament, have decided to pursue' as laid down in the White Paper of 17 May 1939.⁶⁴ There were divergent views among the members of the Commission. Four of its members—Orts, Rappard, Dannevig and Van Asbeck—'did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate.' In this decision, M. Rappard, who had been one of Woodrow Wilson's favourite secretaries and had a deep sympathy with Zionist hopes and endeavours,⁶⁵ seems to have played a major role. A minority of three, Lord Hankey, M. Giraud and Count De Penha Garcia, considered 'that existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the Council did not oppose it.' They concluded their observations with the following words: "All the members agree in thinking that the considerations put forward in the report of the Royal Commission of 1937 and in the preliminary opinion presented by the Mandates Commission in August of the same year have not lost their relevance: the solutions envisaged in these two documents (excluding the setting-up of two independent States withdrawn at the outset from mandatory control) should be borne in mind at the appropriate moment."⁶⁶

The position of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council in relation to the White Paper and the Mandate was remarked upon

by Mr. MacDonald during a debate in the House of Commons on 20 July 1939. The fact that time and energy of the Government was being spent on Palestine at this vital period of British and world history emphasizes again the futile drain of the 'Palestine problem' upon Britain's resources in spirit and ingenuity, men and money. He said, "We recognise fully that the Permanent Mandates Commission have a certain function to perform in this matter. It is purely an advisory function. They present their report not to His Majesty's Government, not to Parliament, but to the Council of the League of Nations, and their function towards the Council is purely an advisory one. The authority in this matter is the Council of the League itself; and when Council receives the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, we shall, of course, be present at the Council. We shall present to the Council then our arguments for believing that this policy is entirely within the terms of the Mandate..." He added, "I give the House the assurance straight away that if the Council of the League were to reach a decision which would, in our view, involve the necessity of altering the Mandate, then we shall not take steps to bring about that alteration until this House has had another opportunity of considering the situation."⁶⁷

Mr. Winston Churchill delivered one of the great speeches of his career against the White Paper denouncing it as a 'second Munich'. At a luncheon with Weizmann, Randolph Churchill and Professor Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell) before the debate, Churchill had gone over his speech and Weizmann had made suggestions for minor alternations. Mr. Herbert Morrison for the Labour Opposition, declared that if a socialist government should come into power, it would not consider itself bound by the terms of the White Paper. He was loudly applauded by the Labour benches.⁶⁸

The Mandates Commission's report on the White Paper was an attempt to encourage the British Government to continue its policy as before. It was issued in Geneva on 17 August 1939 while a World Zionist Congress was in progress there. It questioned the consistency of the White Paper with the terms of the Mandate, but published also a memorandum by the British Government in reply to this charge. The Zionist Congress denounced the policy of the British Government but generally maintained a tone of friendship towards Great Britain.

In Palestine, in fact, there was unmitigated Zionist hostility. On 13 July 1939 MacDonald had announced that as a result of the increase in Jewish illegal immigration, the immigration quota for October 1939 to March 1940 would be suspended. "This caused widespread expressions of anger in the Jewish community and a Jewish general strike of 24 hours was held in protest. Jewish acts of terrorism increased thereafter."⁶⁹

David Ben-Gurion, as Chairman of the Jewish Agency, wrote at the

time: "The Jewish demonstrations of yesterday marked the beginning of Jewish resistance to the disastrous policy now proposed by His Majesty's Government. The Jews will not be intimidated into surrender even if their blood is shed. In our submission, the responsibility for what may occur in this country in the course of enforcing the new policy will rest entirely on the Government."⁷⁰

In August 1939 the reservists of Britain's territorial army were called to the colours and the country prepared for the war against Nazi Germany. 'On 26 August two British police inspectors, engaged on the investigation of Zionist-Revisionist terrorism, were murdered in Jerusalem by a bomb.'⁷¹

The Council of the League was to have considered the policy of the White Paper in September 1939. Owing to the outbreak of World War II at the beginning of the month, the appraisal was never made.

* One was Police Inspector Ralph Cairns, head of the Jewish section of the C.I.D. Fluent in Hebrew, he was accused by the Revisionists of brutality towards prisoners, and sentenced to death by them. This was their execution.⁷²

CHAPTER XVII

World War II: From 1939-1942

THE INTER-WAR years had been great years of growth and achievement for the Zionist movement. Even the persecution of Jews by the Nazis had lent strength to the movement by making the appeals for funds more urgent, increasing the numbers of potential immigrants from Europe, and making these immigrants more ready to become colonists in an unwilling land with an alien cultural stratum. The First World War had enabled them to extract the pledge of the *Promised Land* and the key to enter it as a privileged people. Now a Second World War would bring the opportunity for the exclusive State which was the Zionist dream.* History shows that the Zionists meant to be ready to grasp the opportunity.

The ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate had served their purpose. Now that the White Paper of 1939 had stressed their proviso 'that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not to be prejudiced,' the Mandate had not only ceased to be of service to Zionism, but threatened to thwart one of Zionism's primary aims, the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine through immigration.¹ The problem was: In what circumstances could British rule be ended and Zionist power turned to territorial advantage?

Britain, unlike its opponents, did not see the war as an opportunity. In spite of having spent comparatively large sums on its forces, they were poorly armed and supplied. While the British people thought that Hitler would be 'straighened out' and the war over by Christmas 1939, Lord Woolton was angrily telling the Secretary of State for War, L. Hore-Belisha, that if the Minister knew the state of unpreparedness of the Army, the Secretary of State's reputation would be ruined for ever. 'If the country knew, the Go-

* On 28 April 1944 Weizmann, in dining with Meinertzhagen, disclosed his desire for the whole of Palestine as a Jewish state. When asked why he had favoured partition under the Peel plan of 1937, he said that he had done so because 'he knew that war was inevitable and he thought that if there was only a small Jewish Palestine, the Jews might have gained by conquest what they wanted in a general world war.'²

vernment would fall, and quite rightly.⁷³

Thus, when German troops crossed the Polish frontier on 1 September 1939, the British could not, and the French would not, take advantage even of the opportunity offered by German preoccupation in the East. Britain's generals had seen the war coming, but its expeditionary force was small and ill-equipped in tanks, guns and other essentials. France, although possessing the strongest land army in western Europe, lacked the group will which is an essence of aggressive defense or attack.

In the first two months of the war, Adolf Hitler made two references to Palestine: On 4 September 1939 he replied to the British ultimatum of the day before that German troops should withdraw from Polish territory, or a state of war would exist between Britain and Germany. He declared that Germany was not willing to tolerate a continuation of the conditions existing in the border areas "in order to make it possible for Great Britain to execute her obligations to Poland. The German Government is not willing to tolerate conditions similar to those now existing in Palestine, which is a British protectorate."⁷⁴ And on 7 October 1939, after the successful conclusion of the Polish campaign in which Russia had occupied eastern Poland, he appealed to Britain and France for a peaceful agreement rather than continuation of the war, and he again used the Palestine situation to propaganda advantage. He said that he had never made any demands inimical to British or French interests. Germany's interests were continental. Speaking of the British desire to restore the Polish frontiers of the Versailles Treaty, he said, "The example of Palestine shows it would be better to concentrate on the tasks at hand and solve these in a reasonable manner instead of meddling in problems which lie in the vital spheres of interest of other nations and could certainly be solved by them."⁷⁵ An apparent reference to the commitment shown toward Palestine by the neighbouring Arab States in the London Conferences earlier in the year.

Another significant reference to Palestine made by a German leader during the war was in a speech by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop at Danzig on 25 October 1939. Among five examples to prove "that no British statesman has the right ever to utter the words 'breach of faith'," he listed, "Example Two : In 1915 the British Government, speaking through the medium of the High Commissioner in Egypt, promised the Arabs to create an Arab State that was to include Arab territory and also Palestine. What did the British do? "An independent Arab State was not formed and the famous British colonel who had won over the Arabs for the British and had pledged his word to them on behalf of the British, resigned his commission on account of the breach of good faith on the part of his country's government. "In this case, Britain's treachery was twofold, for despite the pledge given the Arabs, Arabian Palestine was promised to the Jews on the basis

of the Balfour Declaration while the war was in progress. By this promise to the Jews, the British intended to win over influential Jews to persuade the United States of America to come into the war against Germany.”⁶

Whatever the demerits of these references, they indicate how the Palestine issue, which British policy had created, was used to attack the United Kingdom by the Germans, as well as by the Arabs and the Zionist Jews.

It is generally held that with the outbreak of war, the Zionists unanimously agreed to set aside their differences with British policy and to co-operate again with British forces. ‘Jewish terrorist acts ceased completely, and the illegal broadcasting station which had previously been operating for some months closed down.’⁷ Mr. Pinhas Rutenberg was elected President of the Executive of the *Vaad Leumi* (General Council of the Jewish Community) on 17 September 1939, and charged with the task of unification of Jewish factions, but this unity lasted only until August 1940. A Jewish national register of volunteers was opened and over 134,000 between the ages of 18 and 40 enrolled for national service (63 per cent men, 37 per cent women). The services of these volunteers were offered by the Jewish Agency to the Crown, with the qualification that they be recruited as Jews in recognised Jewish units for service in Palestine. The offer, with its qualification, was not accepted.

However, the record also points to a chess-player strategy in Zionist tactics. Calls for cooperation in one place turned to denunciations in another, offers to help the British war effort were made at the same time a force was being concentrated to checkmate British power in Palestine. In October 1939, David Ben Gurion announced that Zionism’s new policy must be based on an insistence that Jewish immigration be increased and Jewish land holdings extended.⁸

In mid-December 1939 Chaim Weizmann called on Winston Churchill at the Admiralty and claimed that after the war the Zionists would want to build up a state of three to four million Jews in Palestine; Churchill replied that such a plan met with his entire approval.⁹ With this preliminary agreement with the future Prime Minister, Zionism as a whole, rather than just the statist revisionists, began to depart from the phase of advantageous co-operation. It moved actively toward preparation for the fulfilment of the basic aim of Zionism—the creation of a Jewish State.¹⁰

Palestine Arab reactions to the war were unorganized and less marked, but there were spontaneous appeals in the Arab press to Arabs to rally to the side of Great Britain and set aside local issues; acts of terrorism were roundly condemned;¹¹ and Arab notables called on High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael, who had replaced Sir Arthur Wachope in Feb-

ruary 1938, to assure him of their loyalty.¹² The Arabs hopefully expected a declaration by the Mufti in favour of the democracies, but he did not go beyond a vague assurance to the French in gratitude for allowing him asylum in Lebanon,¹³ and soon after he left for Baghdad.

There was a marked decrease in illegal acts from political motivation, and by November the state of public security had so improved that road and rail restrictions were removed, curfews raised and a large number of detainees released. By the end of the year a tendency on the part of the bulk of the population to abandon Palestine politics and to concentrate more and more on their normal avocations was apparent; this led to encouraging signs of renewal of social and economic contacts between Arab and Jew.

Zionist revisionists and other extremists, however, did not disengage from preparations and activities opposed to the pleas of 'practical' Zionist leaders like Weizmann for non-violent protest against the White Paper policies. They still believed 'that the only method that Britain recognises is force.'¹⁴ At a meeting on 14 September, Jabotinsky told Colonel Meinertzhagen, that eighty-five per cent of the *Irgun* would obey instructions from him to cease fighting, but not if illegal immigration were obstructed. The War Office could not agree to this, and Meinertzhagen told the Revisionist leader 'that his action would prevent us (the British) from moving military units from Palestine at a moment we badly needed them elsewhere. To this he turned a deaf ear.'¹⁵

On 5 October 1939, Jews wearing uniforms were arrested while engaged in military manœuvres and carrying rifles and bombs. They were subsequently tried by a military court and sentenced to long periods of imprisonment. There followed Jewish demonstrations of protest and a two-hour general strike on 28 November, but no disorder.¹⁶

On 18 November 1939, Revisionist Jews engaged in manœuvres and carrying arms, gelignite and other war material, were arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.¹⁷ Jabotinsky wrote to Malcolm MacDonald protesting against the arrests, and then on 27 December, to Meinertzhagen. He concluded: "It has unfortunately become a rule that no complaint in this climate is considered valid unless accompanied by some veiled threat establishing the claimant's nuisance value, e.g., something about American public opinion and such like."

Meinertzhagen replied sternly two days later that, "you know as well as I do that all this illicit drilling is not a genuine desire to help the Allies in the war but has other motives... I fear your claim to nuisance value is too well known to be denied; but I can assure you that so long as this country is fighting for its life in Europe, such a thing as nuisance value becomes a criminal offence."¹⁸

Meanwhile, a committee of the American Federation of Labour, which was very influential with the Roosevelt administration, asked Britain categorically to uphold the Balfour Declaration,¹⁹ and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise used his pulpit to liken Zionism to Americanism.²⁰

During the first two months of 1940, although Arab opinion was perturbed at a renewed influx of illegal immigrants and was increasingly critical of the delay in implementing the land sales policy of the White Paper, and though on 22 January 1940, a search of the Jewish settlement of Ben Shemen revealed a hoard of arms and ammunition, Arab-Jewish relations continued to improve, especially in the economic field where the plight of the citrus industry, caused by war conditions, called for cooperation. The Arabs showed great cordiality to a Jewish pilgrimage to traditional sites of the tombs of Rachel and Abraham.²¹ Many of the Arab feuds which were the legacy of four years of rebellion and disorder were liquidated at peace meetings and large numbers of the self-imposed Arab exiles, together with three members of the Arab Higher Committee, returned to the country.²²

Illegal immigration, in excess of the quota, continued as a major Zionist activity and the Nazis shrewdly exploited this for their own purposes. Prior to the 1939 White Paper, it should be noted, immigration of Jews with capital and of dependants had been unrestricted; only the 'labour schedule' had been subject to the quota negotiated with the Jewish Agency. Rumania, although long a communications centre for the organization in Europe, banned Zionist action at the beginning of February 1940 because it was sponsoring illegal emigration,²³ but, as reported by the *New York Times*, "The Germans systematically encourage the emigration of the Jews from Germany and the Bohemia-Moravia Protectorate.

"In the Prince Eugen Palace in Vienna, Karl Eizhmann [Adolf Eichmann], the Palestine-born German chief to the whole movement, directs the organizations. He is believed to be the son of an 'Aryan' engineer who settled in the German colony of Sarona in Palestine when the Baghdad Railway was being built. More than 300 persons are on his staff." This central organization helped Jewish organizations with the aid of emigration bureaus directed by Jews. Bureaus in Vienna and Prague "work in cooperation with the Gestapo (German police) and with the central organization. The latter also gives the emigration bureaus the funds in foreign currency necessary for the refugees' transport. Of course, the money comes from the property belonging to the refugees.

"The bureaus receive so much a person, amounting to £6 to £7. These bureaus are private undertakings which make a business of the service.

"As soon as the Danube becomes navigable again, that is, towards the end of February, at least 4,000 to 6,000 Austrian and Czech Jews will, with the 'help' of the Gestapo, try to immigrate illegally to Palestine." The paper

also reported that 'high Nazi authorities' were considering blocking further Jewish emigration till the end of the war lest 'they enter the services of the enemy or leave with information vital to Germany'.²⁴


The Nazi policy of making central Europe *Judenrein* coincided with the desirability of shaking the British position in the Near and Middle East, thus accounting for the strange collusion of Gestapo and Zionist organizations. The Wilhelmstrasse documents of the Hitler period show that neither he nor the German Foreign Office ever calculated that to push German Jews towards Palestine was to embarrass and weaken Britain.²⁵ The encouragement and protection of illegal immigration was one of the non-violent ways in which the Jewish Agency opposed British policy. When illegal immigrants, often in badly overcrowded ships, were on their way, or had arrived in Haifa, for example, tremendous pressure was organized by the Jewish Agency and other Jewish bodies in Palestine, in London, in Washington²⁶ and in unoccupied allied and neutral countries to induce Britain to break its undertaking and admit them to Palestine. It was pressure on top of dilemma since the British people believed that they were fighting for humanitarian principles and this was an appeal to their humanitarianism; refusal to admit non-quota Jews to Palestine was bound to appear callous but acceptance would have destroyed the White Paper policy and provoked Arab resentment. From the British military and political points of view, the White Paper policy was necessary to secure enough Arab compliance to tide Great Britain over the early war years. But its eventual non-fulfilment 'had long-term repercussions that reduced both British repute and British power'.²⁷

Another method of Zionist resistance to British policy was an accelerated and selective purchase of land in mainly Arab areas. They were chosen with a view to staking a claim to the most favourable possible boundaries in the event of a future scheme of partition which might be forced upon Britain as a result of Jewish resistance to the White Paper.²⁸ In April 1939, Weizmann had appealed to American Jewry for more aid for this purpose,²⁹ and presumably received it. An attempt to stop these transactions, in accordance with paragraphs 16 and 17 of the White Paper proposals, dealing with the protection of Arab cultivators, was made through Land Transfer Regulations published on 28 February 1940.³⁰

The Regulations designated certain areas in which the transfer of land save to a Palestinian Arab was prohibited except in certain circumstances. In other areas the transfer of land by a Palestinian Arab save to a Palestinian Arab was subject to the discretion of the High Commissioner, while in others there were no restrictions on transfer. The first category included about 63.4 percent of the land of Palestine, the second 31.6 percent, leaving only about 5 per cent in which Jewish purchases were unrestricted. (See Map 10 on page 333)

PALESTINE LAND SALES RESTRICTED ZONES


Shaded areas indicate Jewish-owned lands as on 14 May 1948, date state of Israel came into existence. Total area in Jewish ownership — 372,925 acres (or 5.67%) of total land area of Palestine: 6,580,755 acres



Zone A — Transfer of land save to a Palestinian Arab prohibited, except in special circumstances.

Zone B — Transfer of land by a Palestinian Arab save to a Palestinian Arab prohibited, except in special circumstances.

Free Zone — No restriction on transfer.



Publication of the Regulations was followed next day by a Jewish general strike, followed by a week of processions and demonstrations in the Jewish urban areas. These were organized by the *Histadruth* and received the support of all Jewish parties, except the Revisionists, who stood aside. On 6 March Mr. Ben-Gurion, representing the Jewish Agency, informed the General Officer Commanding Palestine, General Giffard, that he was not prepared to put an end to the disturbances. This gave official Zionist endorsement to force and activism against the Mandatory.³¹ Although they were subjected to considerable provocation, on no occasion did the police and military forces open fire on the Jewish mobs, but the illicit Hebrew broadcasts, which had been silent since the outbreak of war, opened a new attack on Government policy in general and on the police in particular.³²

On 6 March 1940 the Land Transfers Regulations were debated in the House of Commons. With the country in the most imminent danger, Zionists and pro-Zionists put forward the motion: "That this House regrets that, disregarding the expressed opinion of the Permanent Mandates Commission that the policy contained in the White Paper on Palestine was inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate, and without authority of the Council of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government have authorised the issue of regulations controlling the transfer of land which discriminate unjustly against one section of the inhabitants of Palestine."

In the course of the debate, Mr. MacDonald explained the reasons for enactment of the Regulations before the opinion of the Council of the League had been obtained, and the motion was defeated by 292 votes to 129.³³

Although few exemptions from the Regulations were approved, the Jewish National Fund (*Keren Kayemeth*) which was the authority engaged in the purchase of land was apparently able to circumvent the regulations to the extent of acquiring some 275,000 dunams (68,750 acres) of land in the prohibited and restricted areas, mostly from Arab owners, during the seven years following promulgation of the Regulations.*³⁴ With the purchase of 50,000 dunams (12,500 acres) in the free area, this had the effect of nearly doubling *Keren Kayemeth* holdings during those seven years.

On 10 May 1940 the German 1st Panzer Division crossed the Luxem-

* These were purchased by Arabs acting as agents for the Jewish National Fund in return for a specified fee. To circumvent the law, the land was registered in the official Land Registers in the name of the Arab agent who in turn gave the Jewish National Fund an 'irrevocable power of attorney'. This prevented the new Arab 'owner' from disposing of the property and enabled the Jewish National Fund to take immediate physical possession. Although this practice was known to government, nothing was done to suppress it.

bourg frontier lancing towards the Channel, spreading confusion among France's hundred divisions and panic among her civilian population. A small Palestinian pioneer unit of Arabs and Jews retreated with the British Expeditionary Force which it had joined at the end of February.³⁵ On 11 May 1940 the Chamberlain government was replaced by that of Winston Churchill, and after a few months at the Ministry of Health, Malcolm MacDonald, by reason of a series of overseas appointments, was virtually banished from England for many years. He had proved to be an outstanding Minister but his political life in England was finished.

The Zionists must now have felt much as they did when the Asquith administration of World War I was replaced by that of their exponent Lloyd George, for on 17 December 1939, before Weizmann left for the United States (from Lisbon on the Italian liner *Rex*), Churchill had agreed with Weizmann that after the war a state of three or four million Jews should be built up in Palestine.³⁶

An immediate objective was a Jewish army, which Weizmann had discussed with Sir Edmund Ironside, C.I.G.S., and others. Captain Orde C. Wingate's biographer records that from November 1939, Wingate, Mrs. Dugdale (Arthur Balfour's niece) and another prominent Zionist, Victor Cazalet, M.P., met frequently at Cazalet's country house near Tonbridge. Cazalet had introduced Wingate to Leopold S. Amery, now Secretary of State for India, a pro-Zionist whose friendship with Churchill made him more important than his office.* In July 1940 at a meeting of the Middle East Committee of the Cabinet, Amery suggested to General Haining, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that Wingate be used in the Middle East. On 15 July Weizmann had an interview with Haining as a result of which the General promised to telegraph to General Wavell urging him 'to get on with the training of cadres of Jewish officers and N.C.Os.' Haining had second thoughts or reservations about Wingate's role, but with the Prime Minister's support it seemed the project could not fail. Mrs. Dugdale's diary recorded an elated but solemn Weizmann returning from a similarly successful meeting with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and parlour meetings with the backstairs politician Lewis Namier and Wingate. However, the new C.I.G.S., Sir John Dill, thought he would be of greater service to his country in operations against Italian East Africa, and to his instructions was added the condition, 'which caused him grief to the end of his life: he was prohibited from going to Palestine for any reason whatever, either on duty or on leave.' Wingate believed that the prohibition was an act of revenge

* Amery had acquired celebrity by calling out to Chamberlain in the House of Commons, 'For God's sake go!' and leading the force for his resignation.

His son John Amery, revolted by his father's Zionist partiality and for other reasons, broadcast for Germany during the war, for which he was afterwards executed.

by people in the War Office. In fact it came from the Middle East Commander, Sir Archibald Wavell. An enraged Wingate asked Weizmann to demand a Jewish army from Churchill, but Weizmann replied that this was impossible. He could only make one absolute demand to Churchill, but he went to see Churchill many times. They parted in anger and the Jewish army remained to be formed,³⁷ although Churchill's consent to recruitment was given in September 1940.* Instead, the British armed and trained a force of Jewish 'special constables' which numbered nearly 16,000 by 1941.³⁸

Palestine politics became temporarily obscured by world events. With a declaration of war by Italy against Britain and France on 10 June 1940, the illegal Jewish broadcasts ceased, and the defeat of France caused depression in Jewish circles as it did elsewhere. Arab antipathy towards Italy hardened following the Italian bombings of Haifa in July, August and September, and the bombing of Tel Aviv on 9 September 1940 was condemned by the Arab press as a barbarous act. Arab envoys who had been sent to Palestine in May and June by the Mufti returned to Baghdad with unfavourable reports as to the possible revival of the Arab revolt. This period of calm resulted in an announcement on 17 June 1940 that the military courts would no longer hear cases connected with old offences, and that the authority to impose the death penalty had been withdrawn from them. But it seems that the Revisionists were not satisfied with the *status quo*: Mr. Rutenberg resigned from the Vaad Leumi and the Revisionists withdrew their representatives.

According to the Revisionist position, the British Mandatory made a truce impossible by barring immigration above the quota, and Jabotinsky refused 'to play the silly game of *noblesse oblige* where there is obviously no truce.' War or no war action would continue. Within *Irgun*, a division developed over command, with Stern opposing Jabotinsky's control from outside Palestine. In September 1940, a month after Jabotinsky's death, Stern left the *Irgun* with a group of his followers and founded an independent body under the name of 'Fighters for Freedom of Israel.'³⁹ For them, there was a war only between Jews and *goyim* (non-Jews).^{**40}

* As a result of a discussion between Weizmann and Churchill at which Brendan Bracken, Bob Boothby and others were present, Weizmann presented a memorandum for Lieutenant General Sir John Dill, C.I.G.S., which included: (a) recruitment of the greatest possible number of Jews in Palestine for the fighting services, to be formed into Jewish battalions or larger formations; (b) officer cadres, sufficient for a Jewish division in the first instance, to be picked immediately from Jews in Palestine, and trained in Egypt; (c) the formation of a Jewish 'desert unit'; (d) the recruitment of Jewish refugees in England. Churchill agreed to these, but the Colonial Office insisted that there should be approximate parity in the number of Jews and Arabs recruited for units in Palestine.⁴¹

** In January 1940, David Raziel, the head of *Irgun*, was unexpectedly released from internment, but his followers only five months later. Stern charged that Raziel, his rival for leader-

During the autumn of 1940, reports had been received from the Balkans of intensification of the illegal immigration traffic facilitated by the organization headed by Karl Adolf Eichmann, 'For security reasons, both in the broader and narrower aspects, it was decided that any Jewish illegal immigrants arriving in Palestine in consequence of this revival should not be permitted to remain in the country but should be provided with an alternative place of refuge in the Colonial Empire.'⁴²

On 1 and 3 November 1940, respectively, the steamships *Pacific* and *Milos* were intercepted off the Palestine coast with 1771 illegal immigrants on board, and on 20 November the decision to deport them, together with others who might arrive in the future, was announced officially. The announcement stated that deportation was necessary partly on account of existing unemployment in Palestine, and partly as a war security measure to guard against the possible infiltration of persons who might impede Allied military activities in the Near East. Arrangements were accordingly made to transfer the *Pacific* and *Milos* passengers to Mauritius on the s.s. *Patria*, then in Haifa harbour. In the meantime, a third ship the *Atlantic*, was approaching Palestine with a further complement of 1,783 Jews. It arrived on 24 November and arrangements were made for transfer to the *Patria* of as many of its passengers as could be accommodated. With almost the entire Jewish population of Haifa watching the preparations for its departure, however, the *Patria* was blown up by an explosion in the morning of 25 November and she sank in a quarter of an hour. 252 Jewish refugees and some British police lost their lives.

The commission of inquiry appointed found that the damage to the *Patria* had been committed by Jewish sympathizers ashore, probably by the Revisionist organization *Irgun Zvei Leumi* (National Military Organization), with the cooperation of at least one person on board the ship. The Zionist explanation, which received much more publicity, was that the sinking was a mass-suicide protest against the British refusal to permit the immigration.

ship, had made a secret deal with the British but, in fact, he was killed in Iraq in May 1941, while on a secret British mission. With several of his close supporters, he was flown into Iraq by the British military authorities. Disguised as Arabs, they were detailed to blow up oil installations; but Raziel secretly intended to use this opportunity to kidnap the Mufti of Jerusalem, who was a refugee in Baghdad. Before he could succeed in either plan, he was killed in a German air raid.

To Stern, cooperation with the British was absurd. He served notice that he would fight not only the British in Palestine but British imperialism everywhere. He was impassioned: "Yes, we shall pray for freedom—we shall pray with the revolver, the machine-gun and the mine!" His group obtained its funds by robberies of various branches of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, from which Stern received an allowance equivalent to ten dollars a month. Working closely with him at this time was Nathan Friedman-Yellin who had come to Palestine a few months earlier from Warsaw. Late in 1941, Stern sent Friedman-Yellin to the Balkans to persuade Axis authorities there to facilitate the passage of fleeing Jews to Palestine.⁴³

In later years it was admitted that the Hagana general staff had the ship blown up in order to lay this charge at the door of the mandatory authority.* It was known that the British Government was very sensitive to publicity given to charges of inhumanity, and their effect on public opinion in the United States. Britain was becoming increasingly dependent on the western hemisphere for food and military supplies; American 'observers' were present in all the British fleets and, in the month of October 1940 alone, U-boats had sunk 63 British ships totalling 352,407 tons, making imminent United States intervention almost an imperative for British survival. In fact, Britain had a far better pre-war record than the United States in the relief of Jewish refugees, but the Zionists saw opportunity in the British predicament.⁴⁴

Weizmann had called on the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Lloyd, 'to try and persuade him to give permission for the passengers to be landed...' Lloyd refused and warned that he had told Churchill that he would not consent to being overruled. But Weizmann then went to see Lord Halifax⁴⁵ who was more sympathetic. On 4 December 1940 the Palestine Government announced that it did not propose to deport the survivors of the *Patria* disaster, but other newly arrived illegal immigrants were transferred to Mauritius on 9 December. There followed a campaign of agitation by the Jewish Agency directed particularly against the Palestine Government and especially the High Commissioner, and on 19 December the government immigration offices at Haifa were sabotaged by bombs in protest against the deportations.⁴⁶ In March 1941 a further 793 illegal immigrants, arriving on the *s.s. Darien*, were detained in Palestine.

In early 1941 German gains in the Balkans and in Cyrenaica had an unsettling effect on both Jews and Arabs. Local politics became secondary to interest in world events and the potential threat to Palestine. Both Arab and Jewish recruiting, which had been steady since September 1940, dwindled in February and did not revive appreciably before the end of the year. In the case of Jewish recruits only, was there a temporary spurt following an intensive recruiting campaign by the Jewish Agency. The falling off was attributed in part to a revival in propaganda by the official Jewish organizations in favour of a Jewish national army.⁴⁷ In the United States they maintained or increased their pressure. Lord Halifax, now British Ambas-

* In the *New York Morning Freiheit* of 27 November 1950, David Flinker, the Israeli correspondent, wrote of the Hagana decision: 'The English must be given to understand that Jews would not be driven away from their own country. The *Patria* must be blown up. The decision was conveyed to Hagana members on the *Patria*, and in the hush of night preparations had begun for the execution of the tragic act.'

The *s.s. Patria*, a Messageries Maritimes liner, was commissioned and paid for by Britain. At a time when every ton of shipping was of vital importance to the war effort, this wanton act of destruction was a considerable loss to the Allied cause.

sador, manfully insisted that Britain had carried out the pledge of the Balfour Declaration.⁴⁸ Cordell Hull, however, found it necessary to counter with a denial that Roosevelt was or would attempt to placate Arabs by promising to cancel support for the Balfour Declaration.⁴⁹

Britain's need to maintain secure access to the oilfields of Iraq was the essential consideration for encouragement of Arab national aspirations and countering Axis propaganda which, as has been stated, stressed the gap between British promise and performance to the Arabs during the previous World War. This was particularly so in Iraq, where, despite virtual British control, the presence and influence of Haj Amin, had resulted in pro-Axis sympathies among a small group of revolutionaries who had set up a new regime under Rashid Ali el-Gailani in May 1941. The dilemma of the Arabs was that they had been unable, alone, to oppose British imperialism and Zionist colonialism: should they seek Axis help to do so? Adolf Hitler was aware of the Arab dilemma and issued the following directive No. 30 on the Middle East: "Victory by the Axis Powers will liberate the lands of the Middle East from the British yoke and give them the right of self-determination..."⁵⁰

It was under these circumstances that Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, was inspired to make the following pledge: "This country has a long tradition of friendship with the Arabs, a friendship that has been proved by deeds, not words alone... The Arab world at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval."⁵¹

In fact, pro-Mufti elements in Palestine received no support from the Arab population as a whole for such an alliance,⁵² and this was true of other Arab countries. In the Arab world Zionism had sunk from first place as a national preoccupation, and they, in general, welcomed the collapse in June of the Rashid Ali rebellion in the face of British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, under the command of Glubb Pasha. The subsequent entry into Syria of British and Free French troops was also popular among Arabs on account of the prospects of Syrian independence for, before the invasion, French General Catroux and the British Ambassador in Egypt had announced on behalf of their governments, for the second time in little more than twenty years, that that was their intention. The comparative ease with which these missions were accomplished was due to a large extent to the presence of friends to the Allied cause within Arab countries. King Ibn Saud, gave

the Allies the support of his moral prestige in the worst days of defeat and Egypt proved a secure base for their Middle East forces.⁵³

Of considerable importance in gaining a cooperative attitude towards the Allies in the foreign-dominated Arab countries was a document prepared by Churchill and Roosevelt, known as the *Atlantic Charter* (Document 41). It was hailed by a British chronicler present at the meeting off the coast of Newfoundland as a 'new Charter for Humanity,' and on this theme the immense world-wide propaganda was disseminated.

The eight points of the document, officially known as the *Joint Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister of 12 August 1941*, were in many ways a modernized write-up of the first six and fourteenth of President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' and were equally successful in mobilizing support, or at least acquiescence, from those who were cynical of the Allies' purposes in prosecuting the war. While the Axis Powers offered nothing and were as associated with imperialism-colonialism as Britain and France, Churchill and Roosevelt now deemed 'it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world. These were:

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them..."

These were the rights for which the Arab peoples had joined Britain against the Turks and Germans in the previous war. These were the principles for which the people of Palestine had asked, agitated, and fought Britain since it had ended. Was not this Charter, underwritten by the United States, a promise that they would be allowed to choose their own government and that their country would not be fragmented against the common will?

Many Arabs believed this, and those who were cynical at least thought it prudent to wait and see that this time their faith would be respected.

In July 1941 the Jewish National Fund audaciously launched a campaign in London for funds to buy more land in Palestine.⁵⁴ It not only raised money but kept the Zionist view before the British public. Weizmann left the United States for London to continue this 'political work.'⁵⁵ Simultaneously, a terrorist campaign to extort funds from Jews, directed by *Irgun Zvei Leumi* mainly in Tel Aviv, became so serious that a special warning was given by the Government of Palestine to responsible revisionist leaders.⁵⁶ In July also, the

Histadruth and Jewish Agency showed hostility towards proposed war legislation for the settlement of labour disputes and threatened a general strike.⁵⁷ This violence by Zionist activists and intransigence by their official organs may have been associated with a great increase in the smuggling into Palestine of arms abandoned by the Vichy French forces after the Syrian campaign. The operation was facilitated by the presence in Syria of a small Zionist group which was under British command but was, at the same time, attached to the *Palmach*.*

In the autumn of 1941, the prestige of the Mufti's supporters in Palestine, which had waned following the collapse of the Rashid Ali revolt and Haj Amin's flight from Baghdad to Iran on 30 May 1941, suffered a further setback when, in cooperation with Soviet forces British troops with American support invaded Iran, he was forced to take refuge with the Axis Powers.** No neutral territory was accessible. He arrived in Rome on 28 October and in Berlin a few days later. Jamal Eff. El-Husseini, Amin Eff. El-Tamimi—both members of the former Arab Higher Committee—and others of the Mufti's entourage were captured by British forces while trying to escape from Iran in October. Five, including the two mentioned, were sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment under defence regulations. Amin El-Tamimi died there in 1944; the others were released on 29 November 1945.

As the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration approached, the American Federation of Labour was again constrained to endorse the Declaration, and proposed to implement aid to immigration and the 'large-scale settlement of Jewish labouring masses' in Palestine.⁵⁸ On that day, the keynote address was made by Field Marshall Smuts, Winston Churchill's close friend and a pro-Zionist from the days of World War I. In a broadcast he stated that "the case for the Balfour Declaration has become overwhelmingly stronger. Instead of the horror of new ghettos in the twentieth century let us carry out the promise and open up the national home."⁵⁹

On the morning of 7 December 1941, Japanese midget submarines and planes attacked the United States Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, and bombed surrounding strategic areas. Japan had been under economic blockade by the United States (see Vice President Henry Wallace's statements on trade pressure on Japan through the Economic Defense Board),⁶⁰

* Abbreviation for *Plugot Machatz*: mobile detachments of the *Hagana*. One of this unit's members was Moshe Dayan, later chief-of-staff of the Israeli army, then Minister of Defence.

** Reza Pahlevi, Shah of Iran, fearing the Russian troops that were within a few hours' march of Teheran, abdicated and went into exile on Mauritius.

and Japan was also 'alarmed by British-U.S. full aid to the U.S.S.R.'⁶¹ Following a message to Congress by President Roosevelt, the United States declared war on Japan; and, in accordance with their treaties with Japan, Italy and Germany declared war on the United States. This brought the United States directly into Britain's overseas affairs, an influence which was eventually to decide Palestine's fate. Days later, Roosevelt announced that 26 nations, many represented by governments in exile, had signed a declaration in Washington agreeing not to make separate peace. This was in a way, the beginning of 'United Nations' involvement in the affairs of Palestine.

In the United States, as we look back in the foreshortened perspective of history, the year 1942 seems a close succession of Zionist successes in public relations. Numerous Jewish and Zionist groups held meetings and organized protests and demonstrations against British Palestine policy under different auspices. These were reinforced by public charges by spokesmen like Rabbis Abba H. Silver, of Cleveland, and Stephen Wise and Governor Lehman in New York. Extraordinary bodies like the 'Committee of Christian Leaders, Clergymen and Laymen on Behalf of Jewish Immigration into Palestine' held 'conferences' to urge against 'appeasing the Arabs' at the Peace Conference.⁶²

In May a conference of American, European and Palestinian Zionists was held at the Biltmore Hotel, New York, under the sponsorship of an Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs. What was sought was the convention of a significant body of the Zionist *Diaspora* at a suitable place to proclaim unanimously the decision of world Zionism to bid for the establishment of an Israel State after the war.⁶³ The conference was addressed by the three top leaders of Zionism: Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Nahum Goldman, chairman of the administrative committee of the World Jewish Congress. The participants expressed their desire to insist on 'a full implementation of the Basle program.'⁶⁴ This referred to the Zionist Congress of 1897, under Herzl's presidency, when the first official statement of Zionist aims was formulated. The text of that statement read: "The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

(1) The promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by agricultural and industrial workers.

(2) The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

(3) The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

(4) Preparatory steps towards obtaining government, where necessary, to the attainment of the aims of Zionism.'⁶⁵

Thus the underlying clarity of purpose of political Zionism now came to the surface and there remained the task of formulating proposals for the already planned new policy of activism.⁶⁶ On 11 May 1942, the Conference adopted a set of resolutions known collectively as the *Biltmore Program* (Document 42). They called for: the immediate establishment in Palestine of a Jewish commonwealth as an integral part of the new democratic world; the rejection of the White Paper of 1939; unrestricted Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine; Jewish Agency control of immigration and settlement in Palestine; and the formation and recognition of a Jewish military force under its own flag.

In October 1942, the Zionist Organization of America and Hadassah adopted the 'Biltmore Program' as did subsequently the Mizrahi and Labour groups, though the Labour organization did not rule out the possibility of binationalism.⁶⁷ Then on 6 November, the General Council of the World Zionist Organization endorsed the 'Program', stamping it as the official policy of Zionism at large, and adding to the building up of a climate in which Zionist statism would be acceptable to Gentile and Jew.⁶⁸

Roosevelt gave the Zionists the support of the office of President,⁶⁹ and the Republican presidential hope, Wendell Wilkie, supported the special prominence given to the Balfour Day celebrations by a majority of the Jewish community. But State Department officials were more cautious, and in response to a presidential request that a message of greeting be prepared for a dinner honouring Weizmann, Secretary Hull commented, in sending along the proposed draft that '... if anything at all is to be sent, this is as about a colourless as can be devised.'⁷⁰ The whole campaign for the year, based on the theme of the persecution of Jews in Nazi Europe for whom Palestine was claimed to be the only possible place of refuge,⁷¹ reached a climax in December 1942, when a memorandum was submitted by New York Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr. to the President on behalf of 13 Senators and 181 Representatives favouring restoration of 'the Jewish national homeland.'⁷² This was followed two days later by a submission of proposals by a 'National Council for Palestine' to the infant United Nations aimed at 'the liberation of Jews and the establishment of a national homeland.'⁷³ Although the German threat to the Middle East had somewhat diminished, Hull advised the President on 29 December 1942 not to send a message to the Jewish National Fund in view of the situation in the Near East and North Africa 'where there is a strong feeling against Zionism among the Arab peoples.'⁷⁴

Maurice Wertheim, president of the immensely prestigious and hitherto non-Zionist American Jewish Committee, had reservations about supporting the *Biltmore Program*. After ambiguous assurances from David Ben Gurion that there would no longer be any talk of Jewish nationalism in America and that Zionist intentions were the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth

—rather than an exclusive state—he advised the membership to support the Program.⁷⁵ A comparatively few Jews, mainly led by Dr. Judah L. Magnes, demurred. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem from 1925, was elected leader of a small fundless Union Association which advocated a bi-national state, only to be violently assailed by the powerful new Zionist Organization.⁷⁶ Outside the Arab world, only the Indian Moslem League vigorously opposed these Zionist efforts to consolidate their physical position in Palestine and their political position in the rest of the world.⁷⁷

In Palestine, a group of terrorists under the leadership of Abraham Stern came into prominence in January 1942 with a series of robberies and murders in the Tel Aviv area, culminating in the murder of senior police officers in charge of counter-measures. The group had broken away from *Irgun Zvei Leumi* in October 1939, and had been active since Stern's release from detention in June 1940. Jewish public opinion openly supported the drastic police measures taken against the gang. In February Stern was killed, the activities of the gang disrupted and public confidence restored. Attempts to assassinate the inspector-general of police and one of his assistants on 22 April 1942, were presumed to be acts of reprisal by the remnants of the gang.⁷⁸

The Palestine Government had been notified by the British authorities in Turkey on 20 December 1941 that a motor vessel, the *Struma*, had arrived at Istanbul with 769 Jewish refugees from Rumania on board. The Turkish Government inquired whether they would be admitted into Palestine. For security reasons (Rommel had launched a counter-attack in Libya and was steadily advancing towards Egypt) there was at that time a ban on the admission of persons from Axis or Axis-controlled territory to Palestine, and the Turks were informed that they would not be admitted. Pending clarification of the intentions of the Turkish Government, the Palestine Administration ascertained that, given reasonable weather, the vessel would be fit to undertake a Mediterranean voyage to other British-controlled territories. On 19 January 1942 the Jewish Agency asked the Palestine Administration to raise the ban on admissions from Axis territory generally, and in respect of the *Struma* passengers in particular. On 15 February the Agency was notified that the ban could not be generally removed, but children between 11 and 16 years on the *Struma* would be admitted. It was later learned that, before the relevant arrangements had been completed, the Turkish authorities had returned the vessel to the Black Sea.⁷⁹ Within a mile of the Turkish coast, in view of correspondents of the worlds' news agencies and papers as well as sightseers, the tragedy of the *Patria* was repeated. But this time there was only one survivor from the explosion. As soon as the news reached Palestine, a violent campaign was launched by the Jews against the Palestine and British

governments; abusive pamphlets and manifestos condemned the 'murder' of the refugees* by the Palestine Government and demanded removal of the restrictions on immigration.

This anti-Government propaganda continued throughout March. Though Germany had already suffered a million casualties in the East, their drive was continuing, and on 7 March Dr. Joseph Goebbels had time to read a detailed report on the 'Jewish question.' "To begin with," he wrote in his diary, "they will have to be concentrated in the East; possibly an island, such as Madagascar, can be assigned to them after the war."⁸⁰ And globally, British-American fortunes were at a low ebb in North Africa. Singapore was lost, India menaced, and General Douglas MacArthur had withdrawn from the Japanese-occupied Philippines, but the British House of Lords still found time to debate the problem of immigration into Palestine, with special reference to the *Patria* and *Struma* disasters. Lord Davies, among others, attacked the British policy and this series of 'stupid, callous and inhuman acts,'⁸¹ and Goebbels wrote of the debate: "The House of Lords has once again taken a stand against the Arabs and for the Jews."⁸²

However, continuing German advances toward the Caucasus, and the success of Rommel's Africa Korps offensive which was across the Egyptian frontier in June 1942, threatened the whole Near and Middle East with Nazi control and quieted Zionist agitation. If Egypt went, Palestine could not be held. 'Rumours which had previously been put about that the Palestine Arabs were planning serious trouble proved totally unfounded, and local security conditions remained good. The economic condition of the Arab population generally, and of the peasantry in particular, was now better than it had ever been, and the near approach of the enemy brought full realization of what Axis domination would mean to them.'⁸³

The British prepared for the worst. A special branch of Middle East Headquarters commanded by Major-General B.T. Wilson, known as G.S.I. (J.), reached an agreement providing for the arming and training of Hagana guerilla troops which were to operate as a maquis in the case of Rommel's entry into Palestine. These groups would harry German communications, and set up a secret radio network to keep contact with the Allies during German occupation. At the same time, the Jewish Agency's intelligence service in the other Arab countries was to be placed at the disposal of the British army.⁸⁴

From April to July 1942, the Jewish official organizations made great efforts to revive recruiting, especially for the supply and other ancillary services

* A few days after the sinking of the *Struma* posters in Hebrew and English appeared all over Palestine showing a photograph of the High Commissioner and bearing the caption: MURDER! SIR HAROLD MACMICHAEL, known as High Commissioner for Palestine, wanted for the murder by drowning of 800 refugees on board the *Struma*.⁸⁵

of the British army, and for local defense organizations. These were accompanied by a renewal of the campaign in Palestine, the United States and Great Britain demanding the formation of a Jewish army. Pro-Zionist members of both Houses of Parliament supported the creation of such an army, to include Jewish refugees from Europe, and though these proposals did not then materialize, they probably helped create the climate for the establishment of a Jewish army in 1944. But in August 1942, the announcement of the formation of a Palestine regiment consisting of Arab and Jewish battalions was coolly received by the Jews, and was criticized by the Arabs as a first step in the direction of a Jewish army.⁸⁶ The Balfour Declaration celebrations in the United States and the pro-Zionist memorandum submitted by Senator Wagner also began to resurrect Arab fears for their future. In Gaza there was a one-day strike of protest.

It was on the recommendation of the Palestine Administration that the British Government, in Britain's darkest hour since 1917, refused to raise Jewish military support if that meant exclusively Jewish units. For these units the officials knew would only decrease the likelihood of Arab and Jew living at peace in Palestine. The Palestine Administration was eventually overruled, mainly by Winston Churchill's personal intervention,⁸⁷ and as the Administration had foreseen, the men of the Jewish brigades formed the nucleus of the army which was to be a decisive factor in dividing Palestine, which amounted to a defeat of British policy.⁸⁸

CHAPTER XVIII

A War Within the War - 1943-1945

BY THE BEGINNING of 1943, as a result of the British victory at Alamein, the Russian victory at Stalingrad (now Volgograd), and Anglo-American landings in North Africa, the threat of an invasion of Palestine had been removed.

Renewed demands began to be made for the return to Palestine of Jamal Eff. El-Husseini and Amin Eff. Et-Tamimi, the leaders who were being held in detention in Southern Rhodesia. At the same time, attempts led by Rashid Eff. El-Haj Ibrahim, were made to coordinate the various local political organizations to work in the interest of all Palestinian Arabs; but owing to individual jealousies and disagreements, these attempts, which continued during the first four months of 1943, came to nothing. The Husseini faction was compromised by the Mufti's absence in Berlin, the Nashashibis in alliance with King Abdullah of Transjordan had only a limited following, and the Istiqlal Party was unable to form with them a representative working committee to work out a programme of common action.

During the latter part of the year, the tendency for local politicians to rely more and more on the neighbouring Arab rulers and States to champion the Palestine Arab cause grew stronger. This accentuated Palestine Arab factionalism, but was concomitant with an increased inclination to view the Palestine problem as an integral part of the Middle East context, with emphasis on the discussions of Arab federation which were revived at this time.¹

British support for Arab unity had been voiced by Anthony Eden in May 1941 when he said that it was "both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the (Arab) countries, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. H.M.G. will, for their part, give their full support to any scheme which commands general approval."² This was now reaffirmed by Eden in February 1943 when he assured the House of Commons of British sympathy with "any movement among the Arabs to promote their economic, cultural or political unity," but stressed that "the initiative would have to come from the Arabs themselves."³

For their part, however, the Arabs were still disunited in spite of themselves. *The Palestine Arab Party*, founded in May 1935 under the presidency

of Jamal Eff. El-Husseini, campaigned for the independence of Palestine, the termination of the Mandate, the preservation of the Arab character of the country in opposition to the Zionists and the establishment of closer relations between Palestine and other Arab countries. *The National Defence Party*, formed in 1934 and headed by Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, aimed at the independence of Palestine, scorning any international interference which might prejudice Arab independence or permit the introduction of foreign influence, whether in political or administrative matters. *The Arab Reform Party*, from its formation in 1935, stood for the attainment of freedom for Palestine, opposing the concept of a Jewish national home and emphasizing the welfare of farmers and workers and the encouragement of education. *The National Bloc Party*, also formed in 1935 under the presidency of a former official of the Ottoman Senate at Istanbul, had the declared objects of working for the independence and preservation of the Arab character of Palestine, political unification of the Palestinian Arabs and the dissemination of propaganda for this purpose. The *Istiqlal* or Independence Party was the Palestine branch of the Pan-Arab Independence Party founded by the followers of the Emir Feisal in Damascus in 1920. Its declared aim was the independence of Arab countries based on the principle that they are an indivisible entity, and that Palestine is an Arab country, historically and geographically a part of Syria.⁴

The divergencies were really between personalities and personal loyalties. Nearly all believed in some form of union of the Arab world which the British and French had partitioned at the 1919 Peace Conference, but how far should integration go? Would the Hashemite family and their Palestinian supporters seek dominion for Abdullah over Palestine? Would Palestine suffer economically if a union with Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon could be accomplished? Discussion was endless and ineffectual.

Though most of the leaders of the original Arab independence movement of World War I were scattered among the different territories, holding prominent political posts in Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Egypt, they retained the comradeship and habit of consultation of Ottoman days,⁵ but had little influence on Palestine Arab unity. Even in Iraq and Transjordan, under the rule of the Hashemite family, there was more rivalry than unity. Two projects, known as the 'Fertile Crescent' and 'Greater Syria' schemes, were predominant. Both envisaged no more than a loose association with other Arab countries; both laid primary emphasis on the union of geographical Syria, comprising what was known as the Republics of Syria and Lebanon, as well as Palestine and Transjordan; both allowed some measure of autonomy for the area of Lebanon; both left the final decision as to the form of unification, federal or unitary, and the form of government, monarchic or republican, to the choice of the people.⁶ But there is little doubt that when Abdullah spoke of a 'Fertile Crescent Federation', he saw a bigger role for himself than

did Nuri Es-Sa'id when the latter proposed a 'Greater Syria', consisting of united Syria and Iraq, which other Arab States might join to form an Arab league.

Dynastic rivalries hindered the formation of such a league. There was latent enmity between the families of Es-Saud and Hashem because of Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz and its unification with Najd, 'Asir and Shammar. Moreover, the relatively greater dependence of the Hashemite family on Great Britain meant that the nationalists of Egypt and Syria usually supported Saudi Arabia. There were other considerations hindering Arab cooperation, but the continued resistance of the Palestine Arabs to Zionist pressure served to awaken sympathy and solidarity among the masses of Arabic-speaking peoples.⁷

On 30 March 1943, the Egyptian Premier informed his Parliament that the Egyptian Government would take steps to examine the points of view of the other Arab governments concerning unity and try to harmonize them. In the course of the ensuing two years, Arab officials of then independent States were active in building a new pan-Arab organization, eventually founded with the Pact of the League of Arab States on 22 March 1945. It is noteworthy that in August 1943 the reported statements of Nuri Es-Sa'id of Iraq that Palestine might possibly be excluded from projected Arab federation talks in Cairo evoked strong opposition in the local Arab press. Subsequently, he was induced by the Palestine Arab leaders to issue a public disavowal of his statements.⁸

On the Jewish side, the year was one of increased estrangement in relations with the Palestine Government and of ascendancy of uncompromising political elements over the more moderate in Zionist councils. In the United States as in Palestine, there was dissension between moderate and extremist, the former losing ground. Rabbi Samuel H. Goldenson was one of the few who outspokenly opposed the doctrine of a Jewish State with sovereign status,⁹ but the Rabbinical Assembly of America loudly reaffirmed its loyalty to the Zionist cause.¹⁰ A great pageant, produced and organized by influential masters of American 'show business', Billy Rose, Ben Hecht, Moss Hart and others, was held in New York, Washington and other major cities to commemorate 'the two million Jews who have already died under Nazism.' It was a great financial and political success.¹¹ The first day of the pageant in New York was declared by Governor Thomas E. Dewey as a day of mourning, and on the same day, 9 March, a resolution was passed by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring on 18 March 1943) viewing 'with indignation the atrocities inflicted upon the civilian population in the Nazi occupied countries, and especially the mass murder of Jewish men, women and children...'¹² And with the deep human sympathy this support represented,

'An Emergency Conference To Save The Jews of Europe' was launched.

The Conference received messages from the President, Mrs. F.D. Roosevelt, the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and from American political leaders of both parties. Among these, Wendell L. Wilkie, referred to 'The increasing military advances of the United States armies, the repeated bombing attacks upon Axis strongholds, the turning of the tide,' which might produce more outbursts against European Jews. 'Truly the last hope of the enslaved Jews of Europe rests with the people of the United Nations... The creation of a United Nations agency, the aim of your Emergency Conference, is one with which I am in complete agreement.'¹³ One of the propaganda officers known as *shlichim*, sent by the Palestine Zionist Executive to the United States,¹⁴ exposed further the aim of the Conference to secure more international approval for the Zionist concept of Jews as a nation rather than members of communal, ethnic or religious groups. Great publicity was given to the village of Lidice in Poland, where 156 of its inhabitants were executed after the murder of Gauleiter Heydrich. He considered that this announcement would put the Germans on the defensive in the propaganda battle, and 'since then there was scarcely any news about atrocities in Czechoslovakia. The massacre of the whole Jewish people will be made impossible the moment when the United Nations will demonstrate that they consider the Jew an EQUAL MEMBER of the family of nations...'¹⁵

Attempts of organizations to bring Jews from Europe to the United States were not publicized, although many were entering the country through the efforts of the War Refugee Board and by other means. Instead, the pressure was put on Britain to offer to admit more Jews to Palestine, and thereby, among other things, end the policy of the White Paper. Britain's record of admitting and aiding Jewish refugees was unparalleled—between 1933 and 1943, 67,000 Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria alone had been welcomed to Britain as had many Hungarian and Polish Jews.¹⁶ Britain was an island fortress under constant attack and was mustering her resources to play a major role in winning the war. With the U-boat campaign at its worst, rations for the entire population just above subsistence level, and the food necessary to maintain this level having to be brought in precious ships across the Atlantic, what resources could the British divert for Jews still in Europe?

On 27 March 1943, Anthony Eden is said to have told Cordell Hull that the British were ready to take about 60,000 more Jews to Palestine but there was the problem of transport. Hull raised the question of the 60,000 to 70,000 Jews in Bulgaria, threatened with extermination* unless we could

* After the war, the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry of 1946 reported that there was no anti-semitism in Bulgaria, and that the Jewish population was 'some 45,000' compared

get them out and, very urgently, pressed Eden for an answer to the problem. Eden replied that the whole problem of Jews in Europe was very difficult, and we should be very cautious about offering to take all the Jews out of a country like Bulgaria. If we do that, he said, then the Jews of the world will be wanting us to make similar offers in Poland and Germany. Hitler might well take us up on such an offer and there are simply not enough ships and means of transport in the world to handle them.¹⁷ American ships which had taken war supplies and troops to Europe were returning to the United States in ballast, but it was not a haven for Jews in the United States which was sought. It was the weakening of Britain's policy on Palestine immigration which appears to have been the primary target of the whole operation. Further, support of this argument is given by the official rejection by the Swedish Government of a United States plea to evacuate Jewish refugees from Rumania through Sweden, not to the United States but to Palestine.¹⁸

In Palestine, 'There was evidence of some apprehension among certain sections of the Jewish community at the reported development in the Hagana of special detachments trained on commando lines, and also at the methods of violence and intimidation which were being employed in the Jewish recruiting campaign; Government action to stop these recruiting tactics by the issue on 23 January of a defence regulation directed against the intimidation and diversion of individuals by coercion from their rightful occupations, met with a measure of approval among the Jewish public.'¹⁹ However, the arrival in Palestine of a young Revisionist lawyer and editor, Menachem Beigin, with General Anders' Polish army, helped weigh the balance against Jews who wished for peace and understanding with the Arabs. An exceptionally gifted organizer and fanatical propagandist, he succeeded within a few months in resurrecting the terrorist organization, *Irgun*.²⁰ He declared war on the British Administration 'which hands our brothers over to Hitler. Our people are at war with the regime, war to the end.' Power should immediately be transferred to a provisional Hebrew Government, *Irgun* demanded, and concluded with a passionate, 'Enough! The hand that touches our sister, our father, our child, that hand shall be cut off!'²¹ At the same time, the Stern Gang, now led by David Friedman-Yellin, managed a series of escapes for their members from a detention camp at Latrun and from the Central Prison in Jerusalem.

The Leaders of the Jewish Agency accused the Mandatory Administration of having deliberately let the Stern leaders escape in order to renew their terrorism against the Jewish community, and to intensify internal strife among the Jews. The British accused the Jewish Agency of impeding their

with '50,000 in 1939'²² a difference which could be accounted for by emigration, change of religion, armed service, etc.

war effort.²³ During March 1943, there was a notable increase in the number and magnitude of thefts of arms and explosives from military establishments. In a speech at Tel Hai on 20 March, Mr. David Ben Gurion stated that the end of the war would not necessarily mean the end of fighting for the Jews but might on the contrary be only the beginning of their own fight.²⁴ Shortly afterwards, in a speech to the Jewish Elected Assembly, he made a bitter attack on proposals which had been announced by the Government on 22 March 1945 in appointing Sir Douglas Harris as Reconstruction Commissioner to prepare a coordinated scheme for the post-war development of the agricultural and industrial potentials of Palestine and the introduction of social security in the interests of the well-being of all communities. His speech contained the statement: "We wish to be frank and tell the Government that there will be no cooperation between us and the White Paper authorities neither at present nor after the war. We shall not give a hand in carrying out the plans revealed to us last night, for all those plans are based on the stoppage of Jewish immigration, on the seclusion of Jews in a special Jewish living space, on the realization of the White Paper policy, on the deprivation of the Jewish people of its homeland."²⁵

No special declaration on Jewish problems was issued after the Bermuda Conference on European refugees held 19-20 April 1943.* This evoked keen Zionist disappointment, and on 15 June a strike of the whole Palestine Jewish community was staged by the *Vaad Leumi* ('General Council') in protest against Allied failure to make special provisions for Jews to leave enemy-occupied territory. In Tel Aviv, police and military vehicles and Government offices were stoned.²⁶ Chagrin centered on a statement which appears to have been agreed upon between British representatives and U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who said that "The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi measures against minorities have caused the flight of persons of various races and faiths as well as of other persons because of their political beliefs."²⁷

Soon afterwards, British police and Criminal Investigation Department detectives uncovered the existence of a large-scale organization connected with the *Hagana*, which was directing the theft and storage of British arms and equipment. This organization was found to have ramifications at least throughout the Near and Middle East. The trial of two British military deserters, Privates Harris and Stoner, who were sentenced to fifteen years' im-

* The minutes were not published until the following November. They voted decisions to enlarge the inter-governmental committee for refugees and to guarantee its finances; to maintain refugees reaching neutral territory; to approach the French National Committee in Algeria with a request for refugee settlement in Madagascar. It gave rise to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, known as UNRRA, and indirectly to the American War Refugee Board.

prisonment for complicity in the thefts, was succeeded by the trial by military court of two Jews who had taken part in the traffic. 'The arms trial,' as it came to be known, roused Jewish feeling against the Government and military authorities in Palestine, and for the Zionist cause in the United States. The arms trial revealed the possible involvement of Ben Gurion, the *Histadrut* and the *Ha-Poel* Workers' Sports Organization; the defence counsel pleaded that the soldiers had been ensnared "in an organization so powerful and so ruthless that once its tentacles had enclosed on them, there was virtually no escape."²⁸

The Axis propaganda machine warned the Arabs that the United States would attempt to spread Zionist influence and domination throughout the Middle East after the war,²⁹ a fear which many of them have not forgotten.³⁰ The Indian Moslem League remained firm in its long support for Palestinian Arab independence, and protested against United States' Zionist pressure to remove curbs on Jewish immigration as an attempt to perpetuate the injustice to the Arab and Islamic world.³¹

In July 1943, there was some Jewish public agitation over the transfer outside Palestine of a Jewish battalion of the Palestine regiment. Even though there was an opportunity for them to take a more active part in the war against the Nazis, the transfer was represented in the Jewish press as a deliberate attempt to weaken the Jewish armed forces in the country.³² During the same month, there was a minor but portentous incident which led to a fracas between Jewish and Arab soldiers in a military camp; this arose through the exclusion of an Arab soldier from the Jewish canteen, and culminated in the killing of one Arab and the wounding of four others by the Jewish guard.³³

The trial of Jews concerned in the thefts of arms was conducted from 11 August to 27 September 1943. Jewish anti-Government feeling was aggravated by the stress which was laid by the Jewish press and in pronouncements of Jewish leaders on the motives of the accused in acquiring arms 'for the defence of the national home against aggression.' One of the accused hinted that the whole operation and trial were anti-semitic and said that the trial had become a second Dreyfus case.³⁴ The defendants were convicted at the end of September and sentenced to ten and seven years' imprisonment respectively. In passing sentence, the president of the court stated that the trial had shown "that there is in existence in Palestine a dangerous and widespread conspiracy for obtaining arms and ammunition from His Majesty's Forces," and that the organization behind the activities of the two accused "seems to have had considerable funds at its disposal and to possess wide knowledge of military matters, including military organization."³⁵

Breaking into the arms stealing and smuggling operations of Hagana was something of an achievement for the British police and Army Intelli-

gence services, for we now know from many publications something of the ramifications of the Zionist spy and information network. The commander of the Hagana Intelligence Service (*Shzi* or security section of Hagana) from 1929 to 1946, came to Palestine from the Ukraine in 1921. He wrote of its beginning in Czarist Russia and of the 'comrades and successors in the *Hashomer* (Watchmen's) movement' in Palestine. This had preceded the establishment of Hagana before and during the First World War, 'and who later also helped to supply arms for the Hagana.'³⁶ From as early as 1921, agents in the police force had passed on useful information to Hagana,³⁷ and most of the achievements of the security-intelligence section were made possible by Jews in the employ of the Palestine Government who 'also fulfilled their duty to the Hagana.'³⁸ When arms were found by the authorities, *Shai* immediately made plans to confound them, if possible by spiriting away the evidence and men involved in the preliminary stages of the investigation. The evidence to be given was coordinated with the men in detention through lawyers and others who had permission to visit them, and alibis were prepared for presentation in court. When weapons were shown in court as evidence, they were often by then found to be in a damaged condition and experts were put up to testify that in that state they could not be termed dangerous weapons capable of being used.³⁹ Sometimes the organization threw suspicion on Arabs near the places from which arms were being stolen.⁴⁰

A fire at a secret Hagana arms factory on 3 June 1943 had called for coordination directed by the Tel Aviv intelligence chief so that the firemen did not report the incident, the officer in charge of the local police station was told not to enter it in his record, and though hospitals were required to report every case admitted as a result of an accident, it was 'arranged' that the hospital report that the injuries to the factory workers had resulted from the explosion of a kitchen stove.⁴¹ Thus, these Hagana arms factories, known as *Ta'as* (from *Ta'asiya Tsva'ith*-military industry) were kept a complete secret throughout the war and after. Only those Hagana members directly concerned knew the location of the workshops and the types of arms made. Through the *Histadruth* organization, which was engaged on big contracting jobs for the Government and which, in 1943, was still negotiating with the British authorities for contracts throughout the Middle East worth millions of pounds, necessary but scarce materials, such as copper, were stolen from army stores.⁴²

But though only a small part of the Zionist military network had been uncovered, its exposure, virtually in the middle of the war, deserved some credit. However, Jewish feeling was aggravated by the fact that the trial was held in public and that Jewish official bodies had been mentioned in the course of the proceedings.⁴³

During August, circulars and posters appeared in Tel Aviv denouncing

by name girls alleged to be consorting with non-Jews, and threatening punishment by hair-cutting and other means. Incidents of girls being abused in public for being in the company of Allied soldiers, led to an affray on 4 September between United States soldiers and Jewish civilians in which 28 civilians were injured.⁴⁴

In the same month, Orde Wingate was summoned to England by Winston Churchill, who knew how the Zionists had sought Wingate as the future commander-in-chief of an Israeli army that might be formed.⁴⁵ On his way back from Burma, he stopped in Cairo, where he was able to get in touch with his Zionist friends.⁴⁶ In England, he dined with Churchill on 4 August, and then went with the Prime Minister and the chiefs of staff to meet President Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff at the Quebec Conference (17-24 August 1943).⁴⁷ Congressman Emanuel Celler of New York had previously asked Roosevelt to urge Churchill to declare Palestine an unrestricted homeland for the Jews. Instead, the two leaders resolved to review the Palestine situation from month to month, and to withhold the issue of a statement which embodied promises made to King Ibn Saud in May 1943 at the request of the War Department. These consisted of assurances that Arabs and Jews would be given full opportunity to express their views before any long-term decisions were taken.⁴⁸

In the United States as in Britain, the Zionists, in addition to cultivating the support of clergymen and church groups, were successfully obtaining the cooperation of journalists and persons in public services,⁴⁹ and realizing their programme '...to inject Zionism's political-nationalism into every crevice of the American scene.'⁵⁰ Protests focussed on restriction of immigration by Great Britain and the plight of Jewish refugees were used to gain popular support for a Jewish state.⁵¹ In this way, the combination of Zionist ingenuity and the general ignorance of Zionism's implications on the part of well-meaning Christians resulted in significant gentile support for Zionism,⁵² although in 1943 the total number of American Jews affiliated with Zionism amounted to less than five per cent of the country's Jewish population.⁵³ At its conference in September 1943, the Zionist Organization of America demanded the creation of a 'Jewish commonwealth' and unlimited immigration under the control of the Jewish Agency, but pledged full regard for the rights of the Arab population and cooperation with them.⁵⁴

With the escape of twenty members of the Stern gang from the Latrun detention camp on 1 November, and the recommencement of anti-British broadcasts from a station styling itself *The Fighting Peoples' Station*, conditions in Palestine headed towards chaos. Whether the British would have dealt more effectively with the Zionist terrorists had they not been fighting the hardest war in Britain's history, with her cities under constant air attack and her men deployed against the Axis Powers across the world, no one can tell.

On 16 November 1943, a search for Polish army deserters carried out by military and police forces at Ramat Hakovesh set off more acts of violence. Four divisions remaining from the defeated Polish army taken prisoner by the Russians had come to Palestine via Iran, Kazakhstan and Iraq, some with their families, as well as other Polish civilian refugees—in all about twenty-five thousand persons, of whom eight to ten per cent were Jews. Representatives of the Jewish Agency had met these Jews while they were still in Teheran and Baghdad, obtaining information on developments and conditions in the Jewish centres of Poland and other areas and organizing contacts with Zionist groups when they reached Palestine. There, their desertion was organized through the immigration centre of the *Histadruth*.⁵⁶ Thus the forces of the Hagana were strengthened with European-trained forces, and at the same time the Jewish population of Palestine was increased. Some six thousand Jews were settled in Palestine in this way.⁵⁶

The men and women of the Ramat Hakovesh settlement, supported by Jewish settlers from the surrounding area, were eager to resist the search for deserters, and the police were compelled to fire one round from a revolver: one Jew was fatally wounded. The incident was misrepresented in the Jewish press, and the action of the police and military forces vilified in a campaign of incitement against their alleged 'brutality' which provoked serious incidents in Tel Aviv. Ten Jewish newspapers were suspended for their inaccurate accounts of the search,⁵⁷ but their effect had been successful: incensed crowds rushed to the government district office and set it on fire, causing many to be hurt.⁵⁸

The vehemence of the outbreak seems out of proportion to the stimulus of the search of a small settlement for deserters. It is not beyond possibility that the disturbances were provoked to coincide with the visit of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt to Cairo for the conference which was held 22-26 November 1943, in order to keep the Zionist cause before them. The two statesmen and their staffs went on to the Teheran Conference held from 28 November to 1 December, where decisions were made which were to have an indirect effect on the post-war Middle East.⁵⁹

British forces were, however, not intimidated by mob violence and propaganda charges of anti-semitism in their search for arms and deserters from the Allied armies. In this, they were helped by the Polish military intelligence service, though the Zionists had agents in their offices and everything was done to help deserters to avoid detection and arrest.⁶⁰ On 10 December 1943, the Allied forces had a small success when the *mukhtar* (headman) and six members of the Jewish settlement of Hulda were convicted by a military court for the concealment of arms, and sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from two to six years. They were considered in the Jewish press as martyrs in the cause of Jewish defence organization.⁶¹

In January 1944, resolutions endorsing the Zionists' *Biltmore Program* were introduced in both Houses of Congress. The way for this had been paved in 1942 when 67 Senators and 143 Representatives were enrolled in the American Palestine Committee, followed in December 1942 by one-third of the Senate joining 1,500 other public figures in signing a Revisionist proclamation demanding the creation of a Jewish army.⁶² Other major propaganda foundations had been the passing of resolutions favouring Zionism by 33 state legislatures, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the American Federation of Labour;⁶³ in the autumn of 1943 the Zionists succeeded in committing the American Jewish Conference—a gathering of all factions of American Jewry—to an endorsement of the *Biltmore Program*;⁶⁴ while non-Zionist Jewish organizations were accused by Rabbi Wise and Mr. Henry Monsky, President of B'nai Brith, of dividing American Jewry, supported by other propagandists who insisted that non-Zionists were acting against the interests of American Jews.⁶⁵ On 6 October 1943, a group of 500 rabbis arrived at the Capitol and presented Zionist demands to Vice-President Wallace,⁶⁶ dramatically supplementing Zionist lobbying.

In Britain, tactics were similar. By 1943 the Board of Deputies of British Jews, supported by the most influential Jews in commerce and public affairs, created a Zionist majority, and in the autumn of 1944 endorsed the *Biltmore Program*.⁶⁷ Though the non-Zionists withdrew and formed an organization of their own, Jewish opposition to Zionism in Britain had been broken.⁶⁸

The main Zionist appeal was based on humanitarian themes and abolition of the restrictions of the 1939 White Paper on immigration and land purchases in Palestine. The restrictions were criticised by the American Council for Judaism,⁶⁹ the American Palestine Committee publicly announced its aim to get United States Christian backing against the restrictions,⁷⁰ and even the United Pacifist Conference meeting in New York denounced them.⁷¹ It had been calculated by the British in September 1943 that, of the provision for 75,000 immigrants made in the White Paper, some 44,000 had entered Palestine. The assumption that the balance of 31,000 would have reached Palestine before the expiry of the period of five years fixed by the White Paper, but for the exigencies of the war, was considered justified. The British Government had therefore announced on 10 November 1943 that they had reached the conclusion that it would be inequitable to close the doors of Palestine to 31,000 Jews on account of the time factor, and that they would do their utmost to facilitate their arrival, subject still to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity.⁷² This fresh intimation that the British Government, though now controlled by Churchill, still intended, nominally, to adhere to what amounted to a pledge of protection of the Palestine Arabs against further Zionist incursions on a great scale, perhaps hastened the bid for official American Government opposition to a British Government policy.

In the United States Senate, a resolution endorsing the *Biltmore Program* was proposed under the names of Wagner and Taft,⁷³ and was vociferously backed, among others, by the A.F.L. (American Federation of Labour) and Rabbi Israel Goldstein, the President of the American Zionist Organization.⁷⁴ In the House of Representatives, it was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, under the chairmanship of Sol (omon) Bloom,* representative from New York and a Zionist,⁷⁵ who hoped at first that the resolution would be approved without the usual hearing. This, however, was pressed by the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism,⁷⁶ and subsequently held, when Bloom circulated to committee members a pamphlet summarizing the Zionist position on Palestine and ending with a memorandum of the Jewish Agency vilifying the 1939 White Paper.⁷⁷ It contained no report from the State Department, though the resolution involved American foreign policy to a major degree, and the evidence appears conclusive that Bloom used his position as chairman to guide the committee in such a way as to avoid embarrassment to Zionism.⁷⁸

General George C. Marshall opposed passage of the resolution on the grounds that the whole great military supply, training and strategic complex which had been built up in the Arab states as part of the war plan, would be threatened by American governmental endorsement of Zionist aims. He was backed by Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. On the same day it was reported that the Iraqi Parliament had sent a strong protest to Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn and Vice-President Henry A. Wallace; King Abdullah of Transjordan had cabled a protest to President Roosevelt; and Jerusalem Arab newspapers assailed the Wagner position as undermining the faith of small nations in the *Atlantic Charter*;⁷⁹ while Cairo 'observers' reported that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon had signed a joint protest.⁸⁰

Nothing came of the resolution at that moment, but the aims of the *Biltmore Program* had been widely promulgated and more sympathy had been engendered. One such setback meant that two steps forward could be taken quickly when the right time came, when the friendship of the Arab States no longer seemed paramount to the war effort in the Mediterranean area.

The stand of Marshall, Hull and Stimson, based on the sound geopolitical appraisal of their departmental advisers, was awkward for President Roosevelt who relied heavily on labour union and financial support which was committed to the Zionist course. But he was a master of obliquity. Within a week, therefore, when he was visited by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and Abba H. Silver, co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council, and asked to clarify the position, he authorized them to say that the United States never approved the 1939 White Paper, and that he could be quoted as supporting the plan

* Bloom was a Congressman from New York where he had been a burlesque show operator.

for a refugee homeland.⁸¹ Though this did not announce any active opposition to the White Paper, the Zionists could use it in such a manner as to give the American public the impression that their Chief Executive was fully behind the principles of the *Biltmore Program*⁸²—an important 'declaration' in an election year when it was supposed that the 'Jewish vote' needed courting by supporting Zionism.

In April 1944, a notable international Zionist success was scored when the *Histadruth* succeeded in securing, by majority vote, a resolution by the International Trades Union Congress in support of the *Biltmore Program*.⁸³ In May 1944, a resolution of the British Labour Party, like the American political parties, warming up for an election, went further than the *Biltmore Program*, clearly supporting the immediate promotion of a Jewish majority in Palestine, and practically suggesting that the Arabs should be induced to move out of Palestine.⁸⁴ This provoked a particularly strong outburst of indignant press comment and public protest from Arabs, who regarded it as a new manifestation of the effectiveness of Zionist propaganda abroad in distorting the local picture. It was also deprecated by the Hebrew press and official Zionist circles, who contended that Zionist aims could be achieved without displacing or harming the Arab population.⁸⁵

It has been alleged that at this time, the Swiss Government obtained Hitler's agreement to the emigration of the 7,000 Jewish inhabitants of Budapest, capital of Hungary, to Palestine. The documentary evidence of this is said to be a telegram sent to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 25 July, by Hitler's envoy in Hungary Edmund Veessenmayer. However, in spite of his previous cooperation with the Zionist movement in assisting Jewish emigration from German-occupied Europe to Palestine, Karl Adolf Eichmann is said to have prevented 'any further efforts to evacuate Jews from Budapest by clearing them out himself so quickly that their papers could never be got ready in time for them to be sent to safety.' The telegram is said to have been obtained by Israel from files Britain captured during the war.⁸⁶

In 1944 Zionist activities in Palestine were mainly directed against the British not the Arabs. Thus, militant action in Palestine was harmonized with political and diplomatic action in the United States. The attitude of the bulk of the Jewish public was of strong disapproval of the methods employed by the terrorists, accompanied by determined refusal, inspired partly by fear but mainly by a feeling of communal solidarity and of sympathy with

* The annual Labour Party conference resolved, *inter alia*: "There is surely neither hope nor meaning in a Jewish national home unless we are prepared to let the Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the war. There is an irresistible case now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated German Nazi plan to kill all Jews in Europe."⁸⁷

ultimate objective, to cooperate in Government counter-measures or give information which might lead to the arrest and conviction of the culprits.⁸⁸ Jewish policemen who carried out their orders to arrest persons illegally carrying weapons were treated as traitors by the Hagana, who held courts-martial at which the choice was often execution or suicide.⁸⁹

The Arabs took every opportunity to condemn the Jewish acts of violence against orderly government, and offered their active assistance, though knowing well that this would not be accepted. They were critical that Government action was not sufficiently drastic and compared it with the extreme measures taken at the time of the Arab rebellion; they argued that the Zionist leaders, having incited these acts by public speeches, should be treated with no greater leniency than were the members of the Arab Higher Committee in 1937. But they held aloof from any direct action, basing their attitude apparently on the principle that, so long as the aggression was not directed at them but at weakening British control, the greater the violence of the Jews the better for the Arab cause.⁹⁰

A brief mention of some of the incidents in the year's campaign of terror can give only an indication of the growing challenge to British authority and power during a year when British forces, with their Allies, were doggedly pushing back the Nazis in southern Europe and fighting hard to establish a second front in Normandy, as well as experiencing at home the most devastating attack from flying missiles and V2 rockets.

At the end of January 1944, bombs exploded in the Government Transport Agency's car park in Jaffa. On 3 February, two Jews were surprised while tampering with the wall of St. George's Cathedral; from material left behind, it appeared that they had been engaged in the installation of a bomb at the gate of the Cathedral through which the High Commissioner usually passed on his way to Sunday service. On 12 February, there was an explosion in the offices of the Department of Migration in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa, destroying important records or perhaps covering the theft of others, and heavily damaging the buildings. On 14 February, a British police officer and a British constable were shot dead in the streets of Haifa. On 24 February explosions occurred in police headquarters in Haifa causing police casualties, and on 26 February, the income tax offices in Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel Aviv were severely damaged by bombs.

During March, there were isolated murders of policemen, and on the 23rd, eight British policemen were murdered and serious damage was done to police buildings in the four major towns. Following these last attacks, curfews were imposed and the death penalty reintroduced for the carrying of arms, etc. On 17 May, the Ramallah broadcasting station was attacked. On 14 July, the district police headquarters and district land registry offices in Jerusalem were attacked and severely damaged by explosives and fire; the

police suffered casualties and the land registry records, so important to the Arabs, were destroyed. On 8 August, an attempt was made by Zionists to assassinate the High Commissioner while he and Lady MacMichael were proceeding to a municipal farewell function in Jaffa; his aide and the British police driver were seriously wounded. A fine of LP. 500 was subsequently imposed on the Jewish settlement of Givat Shaul for refusing to assist the police who investigated the crime. On 22 August, three police buildings in Jaffa and Tel Aviv were attacked with loss of police lives. On 27 September, four police stations were attacked with some casualties to Palestinian police personnel, and on 29 September, a senior police officer was assassinated on his way to office. On 5 October, the Tel Aviv offices and stores of the Department of Light Industries were raided by some fifty Zionists and textiles valued at LP. 100,000 were stolen.⁹¹

Thus, on 10 October 1944, the Officer Administering the Government and the Commander-in-Chief Middle East issued a joint official communique in which it was clearly stated that the terrorists and 'their active and passive sympathizers are directly impeding the war effort of Great Britain' and 'assisting the enemy.' The communique called upon 'the Jewish community as a whole to do their utmost to assist the forces of law and order in eradicating this evil thing within our midst' and added that 'verbal condemnation of outrages on the platform and in the press may have its effect but it is not enough; what is required is actual collaboration with the forces of law and order, especially the giving of information leading to the apprehension of the assassins and their accomplices.' The communique then demanded 'of the Jewish community in Palestine, their leaders and representative bodies to recognize and discharge their responsibilities and not to allow the good name of the *Yishuv** to be prejudiced by acts which can only bring shame and dishonour on the Jewish people as a whole.'⁹²

During October 1944, 251 Jews who had been detained on strong suspicion of terrorist activities, were deported to Eritrea as a security measure,⁹³ and at the end of the month, Field Marshall Lord Gort, V.C., arrived in Palestine to succeed Sir Harold MacMichael.

But the most dramatic act of the Zionist gangs was yet to take place. On 6 November 1944, two of their gunmen murdered Lord Moyne, the British Minister of State in Cairo. This office, carrying British Cabinet rank, had been set up earlier in the war to coordinate the political problems of the Middle East. The Minister was resident in Cairo, which was also the Headquarters of a Middle East Supply Centre for coordinating training, provisioning and procurement for the Middle East and in some respects to the whole Mediterranean theatre of war.

* The whole Jewish population in Palestine, literally, 'people who have come and settled down.'

He had been sentenced to death by Zionist terrorist leaders 'for three reasons. One: He pays with his own life for his stand. He carries out policy but that policy flows in part from the guidance he gives London. He is responsible as a symbol but also as a personality. Two: The man who succeeds him will think twice before doing the same thing. Three: We have a stage to explain our motives to the world.'⁹⁴ A Zionist writer has listed the charges: he had been 'busy rigging up' the Arab League as a counter-force to Zionism; as Colonial Secretary in 1941 and 1942, he 'vehemently' opposed Jewish immigration; his declaration in the House of Lords on 9 June 1942 that the Jews were not the descendants of the ancient Hebrews with no 'legitimate claim' to the Holy Land; and as being 'an implacable enemy of Hebrew independence.'⁹⁵ Moyne was also condemned for refusing to cooperate with Adolf Eichmann in a trade of Jews for Allied goods.

As far as Britain was concerned, Moyne, who had taken office at the end of January 1944, was a valued patriotic servant and Cabinet representative. He had distinguished himself at the Allied-Bulgarian peace negotiations in Cairo at the beginning of September. Now he, and his chauffeur, corporal A. Fuller, were dead. The murder was committed in Egypt and not in Palestine by two 'proud Hebrew' youths,⁹⁶ members of the Stern Gang, which had split from *Irgun Zvei Leumi* at the beginning of the war and rejoined it in 1943.

On 17 November, Prime Minister Winston Churchill made a statement in the House of Commons regarding the assassination: "If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins' pistols and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past. If there is to be any hope of a peaceful and successful future for Zionism, these wicked activities must cease and those responsible for them must be destroyed, root and branch." He stated that His Majesty's Government was "entitled to demand and to receive" the "wholehearted cooperation of the entire Jewish community." He quoted the appeal of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to the Jewish community "to cast out the members of this destructive band, to deprive them of all refuge and shelter, to resist their threats and to render all necessary assistance to the authorities in the prevention of terrorist acts and in the eradication of the terrorist organization." He added: "These are strong words but we must wait for these words to be translated into deeds. We must wait to see that not only the leaders but every man, woman and child of the Jewish community does his or her best to bring this terrorism to a speedy end."⁹⁷

Accordingly, the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, headed by Mr. Moshe Shertock, declared their readiness to cooperate with the Government in the campaign against Jewish terrorism. The Zionists complained that no credit was given to the Jewish Agency for such cooperation

and that arms searches, and arrests of Hagana members did not cease.⁹⁸

In general, all Jews deprecated the assassination of Lord Moyne, if for no other reason than that such acts, if repeated, would alienate the gentile support which was essential to the founding of their State. However, the chairman of the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation in the United States expressed his indignation at Churchill's attitude, his condemnation of *Irgun Zvei Leumi*, and wrote, "... I consider the life of every Hebrew mother or infant, tortured to death, to have been as holy as the life of a dead Tommy or of Lord Moyne. They are all casualties of the present world cataclysm."⁹⁹

Prominent Egyptian lawyers defended the assassins of Moyne and his chauffeur, but they were condemned and hanged.

The hatred of Lord Moyne, based on his alleged 'rigging-up' of the Arab League, was associated with the meeting of representatives from all the Arab countries in Alexandria in October 1944, under the chairmanship of Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister. The meeting had taken place when British future intentions towards Palestine were again appearing suspicious to the Arabs. In September 1944, the incessant Zionist agitation in Britain and America for the establishment of a Jewish brigade had at last been successful. This 'army' was sent to Italy in the last days of the campaign, allowed to parade its own flag* in equality with flags of the Allies, thereby affirming Jewish nationality.¹⁰⁰ For their part, the Hagana command now made a new effort to come to terms with *Irgun*. The Hagana Chief, Eliahu Golomb, had just returned from London where the influence of Dr. Weizmann in British Government circles made a deep impression on him, and in a press conference he alleged that many doors in London that were shut even to the governments-in-exile were wide open to the President of the Zionist Organization, but terrorism jeopardized his influence. A meeting was held by Golomb with the leaders of *Irgun*, Eliahu Lankin and Menachem Beigin, but he did not secure their cooperation.¹⁰¹ The Stern group did, however, agree for a time to suspend operations against the British.¹⁰²

Unknown to the Arabs, the Colonial Office had, some time in 1943, prepared new plans providing for the partition and cantonment of Palestine for possible post-war use,¹⁰³ and on that basis, a Cabinet committee had recommended the establishment of a Jewish State in a partitioned Palestine after the war.¹⁰⁴ But all that the Palestinians knew was that the British Government has sponsored, and would arm and train a Jewish brigade group. This was regarded by both Jews and Arabs as a further step towards the attainment of Jewish national status, and hailed in the Jewish press as a belated recognition of this right.¹⁰⁵

* The flag of the brigade is the flag of Israel today.

Signs of more cohesion in Palestine Arab political activity had begun to emerge during 1944, though personal jealousies and loyalties still predominated. The continued refusal of the British authorities to allow the exiled Arab leaders to return certainly stultified democratic growth, since their supporters felt it disloyal to make important decisions without them and potential new leaders could not formulate new policies nor exert leadership by democratic means.* The Palestine Jews, on the other hand, had no political leaders in exile; in fact, they were given the money and authority to visit Britain and the United States, for example, to improve their political and financial contacts. In August 1944, after a brisk electoral campaign, the *Mapai* Party** secured a victory in the elections for the Elected Assembly of the Jewish community, thereby emphasizing the support of the *Yishuv* for the *Biltmore Program* and strengthening the Jewish public in their opposition to the White Paper.¹⁰⁶

In June and July 1944 some Arab political activity was able to coalesce around the Arab National Fund, which increased its strength by means of an energetic campaign throughout Palestine to advertise the dangers arising from the Zionist purchases of Arab lands, and to collect funds for their pre-emption. However, when it came to agreeing upon representation for Palestine at the Arab conference in Alexandria, discussions in September aimed at the selection of an all-party delegation broke down, and a neutral representative, Musa El-Alami, was chosen by Jamil Mardam, the Syrian Prime Minister, who had gone to Palestine to resolve the dissensions.¹⁰⁷

A statement, known as the *Alexandria Protocol* (Document 43), contained a resolution dealing with Palestine: "That Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab world and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab world... that the pledges binding the British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security...there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations."¹⁰⁸

This resolution stated in effect that the Arab Governments were prepared to accept the 1939 White Paper as the basis for the future of Palestine, and

* The imprisonment of Congress Party and Moslem League leaders in India during World War II, also stultified the possible evolution of a government of cooperation. Instead, differences were sharpened and partition became inevitable.

** *Miflet Po'alei Eretz Israel* or Worker's Party of Palestine, the political counterpart of *Histadruth*.

may be regarded as a compromise on their part from the attitude they had adopted in 1939. It has been suggested that the resolution was almost certainly the result of negotiations between the Arab leaders and the British Middle East Office, controlled by the Minister of State resident in the Middle East, Lord Moyne, who was in touch with Arab leaders through Brigadier Iltud Clayton, brother of General Sir Gilbert Clayton of the Arab Bureau in World War I.¹⁰⁹

One of the decisions reached at the conference, where the general purposes and principles of inter-governmental Arab cooperation within the proposed League of Arab States were defined, was to create Arab information bureaux. The success of Zionist propaganda was working up a tidal-wave of world support, and though the whole system of mass communication and consumer psychology were alien to the Arab mind, a start had to be made in putting the facts of the Arab case before a wider public than that of the Middle East where the facts were generally known. On 15 November 1944, a committee of the conference appointed to consider the matter decided to set up information bureaux in Washington, London and Jerusalem under the title of the Arab Office. These bureaux were established during the following months under the direction of Musa Eff. El-Alami.¹¹⁰

The U.S. presidential elections in the autumn of 1944 were bedevilled by the Palestine issue, although Hull had advised the President on 26 July 1944 that the leaders of both parties should refrain from campaign statements which might 'tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the precarious balance of forces in Palestine.'¹¹¹ American Jewry, harrowed by accounts of German treatment of Jews and displaced persons, was, by now, largely won over to the concept that the best way to save those they termed the remnant, was to support Zionism financially and politically. Since in New York State alone there were over 2,000,000 Jews with synagogue affiliations at the time, and the State was marginal in its party loyalties, it was thought the 'Jewish vote' could influence the outcome of the election. Thus, statements in support of Zionism were made by both Democrats and Republicans, but Roosevelt bid highest with a letter to Senator Wagner, released on 15 October, in which the President said, "I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim, and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization." The wording had been requested by Senator Wagner in a letter to Roosevelt two days before.¹¹²

His Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles asserted that Roosevelt believed that once a 'Palestine commonwealth had been successfully established, the neighbouring states of Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan would

be persuaded of the advantages they would secure by a federal union with Palestine... The President firmly believed that reason and self-interest would prevail. He under-estimated in this case the strength of Arab nationalism.¹¹³ "Except for Woodrow Wilson," wrote Summer Welles, "no President has shown greater sympathy for Zionism than Franklin D. Roosevelt."¹¹⁴

Now, like certain of Wilson's Fourteen Points, the clauses of the 'Atlantic Charter' which had promised that any territorial changes made after the war and any form of government should rest on the consent of the people concerned, were clearly not going to be applied to the people of Palestine.*

However, few people realized it, but the most fateful result of the presidential election in the autumn of 1944 was not the re-election of Roosevelt. It was the choice of the Vice-President. In June 1944, it was suggested by Roosevelt to James F. Byrnes, later Secretary of State, that he be permanent chairman of the coming Democratic Convention and that he was the preferred candidate for Vice-President. But in July there were indications of opposition from Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, a member of the War Mobilization Advisory Board, who worked closely with the leaders of organized labour.¹¹⁵ Whereupon Byrnes phoned Roosevelt to ask if he had changed his opinion on the vice-presidential nomination. Roosevelt replied, "You are the best qualified man in the whole outfit and you must not get out of the race. If you stay in, you are sure to win."¹¹⁶ On 13 July, as he left the President's office, Byrnes met the Labour Union leader, Sidney Hillman (alias Schmoul Gilsman), and a stranger going to the President's office by the colonnade used by occupants of the White House residence.¹¹⁷ Later he was told that Roosevelt still wanted him as Vice-President but that the nomination should be 'cleared with Sidney' (Hillman).¹¹⁸ Hillman seemed determined to have the C.I.O. name the Vice-President,¹¹⁹ and he with Philip Murray of the C.I.O. eventually got the President to agree to Harry S. Truman.¹²⁰ Thus Hillman, born in Lithuania, educated as a rabbi, who had participated in the Russian revolution of 1905, an ardent Zionist and head of a very influential union in the textile industry, chairman of the Political Action Committee of the C.I.O., who 'was influential in the re-election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt for a fourth term,'¹²¹ was a deciding factor in the nomination of the Vice-President who was to play a figurative role in the fate of the people of Palestine. On Inauguration Day in January 1945, Harry Truman at the White House quipped gaily to financier Bernard Baruch: "So I'm on the payroll once more."¹²²

* Neither were they to be applied to the peoples of eastern Europe. At the Teheran Conference at the end of 1943, for example, the post-war dismemberment of Poland had been agreed upon. Churchill has described how he and Anthony Eden showed Stalin, with the help of three matches, how Russia's frontiers could be moved westward at the expense of Poland and Germany.¹²³

One of the first resolutions introduced into the new Congress (Senate 27 January and House of Representatives 2 February 1945) called for the United States to 'take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for the free entry of Jews into the country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth' (Document 44). Though it was not passed, with the similar resolutions which followed it during the year, a climate of United States' commitment was created in Congress and in the public mind.

On their way from the Yalta conference, held from 4 to 11 February 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt met with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia in Egyptian waters. A concession was granted in 1943 to the Standard Oil Company of California by which American interests had acquired control of the development of Arabian oil resources. Throughout the war which was coming to an end, Ibn Saud's attitude to the Allies had been friendly and helpful,¹²⁴ but though it was alleged by Zionists that the meeting and the subsequent exchange of letters between King and President were influenced by American oil interests,¹²⁵ it has also been stated that Ibn Saud's intervention on behalf of the Palestine Arabs was limited by 'The complete dependence of the state finances on the royalties received from Aramco...'¹²⁶

In January 1939, the Arab leader had written to Roosevelt an appeal to the United States on behalf of the Palestine Arabs, denying the Zionists' 'historic claim' and attacking the Balfour Declaration,¹²⁷ and as early as May 1943, Roosevelt had assured Ibn Saud that no long-range decisions would be taken about the future of Palestine without consultation with the Arabs.¹²⁸ Now the President, motivated by a wish to bring about peace between Arabs and Jews,¹²⁹ at his meeting with the King gave him the double assurance that:

(1) He personally, as President, would never do anything which might prove hostile to the Arabs; and

(2) the United States Government would make no change in its basic policy in Palestine without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs.

To the King these oral assurances were equal to an alliance.¹³⁰ There were also conversations between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and King Farouk.

Harry Hopkins noticed the effect that the meeting with the Arab leaders had on the views of Franklin Roosevelt regarding the Palestine issue, and this is not surprising since it was probably the first time that the Arab point of view had been expressed directly. 'There is no doubt that Ibn Saud made a great impression on the President that the Arabs meant business,'¹³¹ but

he said nothing on the subject to Hopkins or to his close adviser, Judge Samuel Irving Rosenman, on the way back to America. Rosenman and the Zionists were therefore dismayed when, in his report to Congress on 1 March 1945, Roosevelt looked up from his prepared text and stated: "For instance, on the problem of Arabia, I learned more about the whole problem, the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I would have learnt in the exchange of two or three dozen letters."¹³²

Zionist suspicions deepened when Franklin Roosevelt, on 16 March 1945, said that he supported a free and democratic Palestine;¹³³ and five days later, the speakers at a Zionist meeting in New York criticized him for the holding of the conference with Ibn Saud.¹³⁴

The Zionists also disapproved of Roosevelt's interest in developing a scheme whereby the European Jewish refugees could be settled in welcoming nations throughout the world. The preliminary planning of this humanitarian programme was assigned to Morris L. Ernst, who soon discovered that the work he regarded as a project for the salvation and development of uprooted European Jewry was regarded by Zionists as an insidious scheme which threatened the fulfilment of their aims. "I was amazed," wrote Ernst, "and even felt insulted when active Jewish leaders decried, sneered and then attacked me as if I were a traitor. . . I could see why. . . the leaders of these [Zionist] movements should feel that their pet thesis was endangered by the generosity and humanity of the F.D.R. programme."¹³⁵

The meeting was followed up by King Ibn Saud declaring war on Germany and Japan 1 March 1945, and then sending a letter to the President on 10 March 1945 to which Roosevelt replied 5 April. The letters (Document 45) were not made public until 18 October 1945. The King's letter repeated a charge which had been made in an editorial in the moderate Jewish paper *Ha Mishmar* of 24 August 1944 against the authoritarian Zionist extremists associated with the *Irgun* and Stern groups which had stated: "We have powerful allies in the struggle against world fascism; but who will be concerned if our own fascism devours us entirely?"¹³⁶ By the use of lying propaganda, invented, concealed and employed by Zionism throughout the world, wrote Ibn Saud, Zionists were covering up their hostile preparations against the Arabs, and 'preparing to create a form of Nazi-Fascism within sight and hearing of the democracies and in the midst of the Arab countries. . . ' contrary to the Arabs' right to live in their homeland, 'a right guaranteed to them by natural law established by the principles of humanity which the Allies have proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter and on numerous other occasions. . . '

'We state frankly and plainly that to help Zionism in Palestine not only means to endanger Palestine but all neighbouring countries.

'The Zionists have given clear evidence of their intentions in Palestine and in all neighbouring countries. They have organized dangerous secret

military formations. It would thus be a mistake to say that this was the action of a group of their extremists and that it had met with the disapproval of their assemblies and committees.' If the Allied Governments wished to see 'the fires of war break out and bloodshed between Arabs and Jews, their support of the Zionists will surely lead to this result. What we and the Arab countries fear from the Zionists are:

(1) That they will carry out a series of massacres as between themselves and the Arabs;

(2) That the Zionists will be one of the main causes of dissension between the Arabs and the Allies. The latest proof of this is the case of the two Jews who killed Lord Moyne in Egypt. Had the Jews been able to hide the criminals, a dispute would have occurred between the British Government and Egypt;*

(3) That the ambitions of the Jews are not confined to Palestine alone. The preparations they have made show that they intend to take hostile action against neighbouring Arab countries;

(4) Supposing that the Jews obtain their independence somewhere in Palestine, what is to prevent them from coming to an agreement with any Power that may be hostile to the Allies and to the Arabs? As it is, they have begun taking hostile action against Britain while under her protection and mercy.¹³⁷

Zionists were also alarmed by the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League in Cairo on 22 March 1945, for it contained a special annex on Palestine (Document 46). This set out the basis in international law for an independent Palestine and stated that 'Although the external aspects of that independence are not apparent owing to force of circumstances, this should not stand in the way of her participation in the work of the Council of the League.' And the Council was asked to 'undertake the selection of an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work.' The optimism which the signing of this document caused in Palestine Arab circles was soon dissipated by the failure of the League to agree on any practical measures to assist their cause.¹³⁸

Zionists always feared that true Arab unity, and particularly the friendship of the United States, Britain and France for the Arab people, would hinder their aims. Every meeting or diplomatic exchange of President or Premier with the leader of an Arab State caused them discomfort or irritation. Many firmly believed that Britain had planned to create a Pan-Arab move-

* In 1954, Israeli organized through its Embassy in Paris, a team of saboteurs with orders to bomb United States Information Agency libraries in Egypt in an attempt to damage Arab-American relations. In this case, which became known as the 'Lavon Affair', the culprits were also caught; the leader upon arrest committed suicide, two received the death sentence, and others were given prison terms.¹³⁹

ment against Zionism to secure their influence in the Middle East, to oust France from the Levant States, and to secure Libya. 'Under the skilful hands of the Colonial Office, the Arab States were fashioned into a powerful weapon against the Hebrew aspirations.'¹⁴⁰

One week after Roosevelt had written to Ibn Saud that "It gives me pleasure to renew to Your Majesty the assurances which you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own, as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and to inform you that the policy of this Government in this respect is unchanged,"¹⁴¹ he was dead.

It is generally held that the Zionists were largely unsuccessful in getting full Roosevelt backing for their policies,¹⁴² but they strengthened during his administration a tradition of seeking to influence American policy on the Middle East through the White House.¹⁴³ As the Second World War ended, the Zionists were quietly confident: a man whom one of their leaders had nominated, was President of the United States, and Britain had ceased to be a major power in the world.

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